IR 05000528/1986019
| ML20207C907 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 07/02/1986 |
| From: | Miller L, Sorensen R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207C881 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-1.A.1.3, TASK-TM 50-528-86-19, 50-529-86-19, 50-530-86-13, GL-85-09, GL-85-10, GL-85-9, IEB-85-002, IEB-85-2, NUDOCS 8607210453 | |
| Download: ML20207C907 (5) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.:
50-528/86-19, 50-529/86-19, 50-530/86-13 Docket Nos.:
50-528, 50-529, and 50-530 License Nos.:
NPF-41 and NPF-51 Construction Permit No.:
CPPR-143 Licensee:
Arizona Nuclear Power Project P. O. Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 Facility Name: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1, 2 and 3
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Inspection at: Palo Verde Site, Wintersburg, Arizona Inspection Conducted: May 27-June 13, 1986 Inspector:
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72k R. C7 'o nsen, p.ct r Inspector Dave signed Approved by:
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React 6r Projects section 2 Summary:
Inspection on May 27-June 13, 1986 (Report Nos. 50-528/86-19, 50-529/86-19 and 50-530/86-13)
i Areas Inspected:
Unannounced inspection by a regional based inspector of open items in Units 1 and 2, preoperational test program implementation in Unit 3, Licensee Event Reports (LERs) in Unit 1, IE Bulletins and Generic Letters in all three units.
NRC Inspection Procedures 30703, 92700, 92701, 70302 and 92703 were covered during this inspection.
This inspection involved 61 hours7.060185e-4 days <br />0.0169 hours <br />1.008598e-4 weeks <br />2.32105e-5 months <br /> onsite and in-office by two NRC inspectors.
Results: Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
8607210453 860702 PDR ADOCK 05000528 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Arizona Nuclear Power Project
- T. Shriver, Compliance Manager
- L. Souza,.',cting Manager, Quality Systems and Engineering D. Sanchez, Manager, Maintenance Control Center
- J. Quan, Licensing Engineer B. Gratja, Quality Monitoring The inspector also talked with numerous other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection.
- Denotes individuals attending exit meeting of June 6, 1986.
2.
Licensee Action on Inspector Identified Items (Closed) Followup Item 50-528/85-26-03 a.
Previous Inspection Licensee management had agreed to revise as appropriate, procedure 10AC-0ZZ07, Overtime Limitations. This revision would allow only the PVNGS Plant Manager, and the first-line managers who report directly to him, to authorize exceeding the overtime guidelines established in 10AC-0ZZ07 and in the Technical Specifications. These overtime guidelines applied to plant personnel involved in safety-related activities, and were based on TMI Action Plan Item I.A.1.3.1.
This Inspection The inspector verified _that procedure 10 AC-0ZZ07 had been revised to allow deviation from the established overtime limitations to be authorized only by the Plant Manager, or a manager who reported directly to him.
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The inspector was satisfied that the licensee's commitment had been met.
j This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Followup Item 50-528/85-19-01 The licensee had agreed to submit a schedule for revising the Procedure Generation Package and the Emergency Procedures to meet the revised guidelines of CEN-152, Revision 2.
CEN-152 was the Combustion Engineering (CE) Owner's Group guidelines for developing emergency procedures.
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The inspector had previously verified that the emergency procedures for both Units 1 and 2 had been updated to incorporate the revised
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guidance contained in CEN-152, Revision 2 (See Inspection Report 50-529/86-01).
These revisions incorporated the use of the trip two/ leave two reactor coolant pump scheme during certain types of
events. Also included from CEN-152, Revision 2, was verification of adequatu core cooling during emergency conditions.
l This item is therefore closed.
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c.
(Closed) Followup Item 50-529/85-26-01 Previous Inspection
l The inspector had expressed a concern that startup management
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had not attended a post-audit conference after a Quality Assurance audit had identified.three potential Quality I
Assurance Observations and nine potential Corrective Action
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Requests. This appearcJ to indicate a lack of concern on the part of startup management for deficiencies identified in their organization. Licensee management indicated that steps were being taken to ensure greater management presence from the audited organization at post-audit conferences.
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This Inspection i
The inspector reviewed the licensee's quality monitoring report
- SM-85-1014 which followed up on this concern. As stated in the above monitoring report, the site Startup Manager directed the Startup Administration Manager to attend audit exit meetings of all future startup audits.
In addition, monitoring of recent post-audit conferences showed management of audited j
organizations taking active part in the post-audit conferences.
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The inspector concluded that this action was adequate to address this concern.
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This item is closed.
d.
(Closed) Followup Item 50-529/85-26-02 Previous Inspection
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The inspector had noted weaknesses in identifying-post-maintenance retest requirements on work orders. This was specifically identified on a work order on a backup power supply battery for a fire alarm control panel in Unit 2.
In addition, the Determination /Retermination sheet for this particular work order did not'have the required verification initials.
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Licensee management agreed to:
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(1) Review this work order with applicable personnel emphasizing the importance of Determination /Retermination sheets.
(2) Issue a new work order to functionally retest the battery concerned.
(3) Formalize a method to determine, clearly specify, and document correct retest requirements following maintenance.
This Inspection The inspector confirmed that the above actions had been taken by the licensee. Work Order #101224 was issued, and completed the retest of the battery in question. Objective evidence of training held for applicable personnel was reviewed by the inspector.
This training was conducted on the use of the Dete rmination/Retermination verification sheets. Finally, the inspector verified that the licensee had taken steps to improve the way they determine and specify retests following maintenance. Procedure 30AC-92Z01, Work Control and Maintenance Instruction #10, Retest Instructions were revised to more clearly specify how retests were to be handled.
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T,he inspector was satisfied with the licensee's action concerning this item.
This item is closed.
The inspector also requested to review the licensee's action concerning followup item 50-529/85-20-01, which involved a commitment to reverify a sample of IE Bulletins and Circulars. The licensee agreed over one year ago to reverify the actions taken for a sample of Bulletins and Circulars (see inspection report 50-529/85-20). At the time of this inspection, no action had been taken on this commitment to the NRC. The inspector expressed his concern to licensee representatives at what appeared to be a lack of aggressive action to resolve commitments made to the NRC. The licensee subsequently informed the inspector that action on this open item would be completed by July 25, 1986.
The inspector will address this open item during a subsequent inspection.
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3.
Maintenance During Preoperatio'tal Testing in Unit 3 (Preoperational Test Program Implementation)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for providing preventive and corrective maintenance associated with plant hardware during i
preoperational testing. The preventive maintenance program was defined by procedure 30AC-0ZZ10, Startup Preventive Maintenance. The inspector reviewed this procedure, then interviewed applicable licensee and contractor personnel to assess their knowledgr of it.
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A group of four Bechtel employees was responsible for scheduling and carrying out preventive maintenance for various instruments and components. They appeared knowledgeable of procedural requirements.
However, this group was to be abolished, and their responsibilities transferred to the licensee's maintenance department.
The inspector interviewed the applicable maintenance manager to determine his knowledge of maintenance procedures used during the preoperational test phase. Also, the inspector sought to determine how the transition of preventive maintenance schedules form the original Bechtel maintenance group to ANPP maintenance would be accomplished.
The licensee's maintenance manager, who was in charge of scheduling preventive and corrective maintenance, appeared to be knowledgeable of the procedural requirements for both activities. Also, he in:licated that
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transfer of all applicable documentation from Bechtel to ANPP was ongoing, and that the original preventive maintenance schedule developed by the Bechtel group would be followed.
The inspector concluded that key licensee personnel had adequate knowledge of the preoperational testing maintenance program.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (Unit 1)
Through direct observations, discussion with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following LERs were reviewed to verify that reporting requirements had been met, causes for the events had been identified, appropriate corrective action had been taken or committed to, and any violations of Technical Specifications identified.
The-following LERs were therefore closed:
85-21 - Lack of Proper Fire Protection 85-23 - Inadvertent ESFAS Actuation 85-35 - Failure to Perform ASME Section XI Required Test Review 85-40 - Continuous Fire Watch Not Performed 85-45 - Failure to Perform ASME Section XI Required Test Review 85-47, Supplement 1 - Fire Watch Performed Late 85-53 - Spurious Automatic Actuation of Engineered Safety Features 85-91 - Valve Retest Not Performed Due to Misinterpretation of Retest Requirements No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
IE Bulletins and Generic Letters (GL)
The following items were not applicable to Palo Verde and were, therefore, closed for Units 1, 2, and 3.
a.
(Closed) IEB 85-02: Undervoltage Trip Attachments of Westinghouse DB-50 Type Reactor Trip Breakers.
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(Closed) TI-2515/72:
Inspection of Response to IEB 85-02.
c.
(Closed) GL-85-09: Technical Specifications for GL 83-28, Item 4.3 (Automatic Actuation of Shunt Trip Attachments for Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor Licensees and Applicants).
d.
(Closed) GL-85-10: Technical Specifications for GL 83-28, Items 4.3 and 4.4 (Automatic Actuation of Shunt Trip Attachments and Improvements in Maintenance and Test Procedures for Silicon Controlled Rectifiers for Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) Pressurized Water Reactor Licensees and Applicants).
The licensee ut51ized a CE reactor trip system design that does not include B&W silicon controlled rectifier power relays or Westinghouse
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DB-50 reactor trip breakers. General Electric AKR-30 and Westinghouse DS-206 type breakers were used which include an automatically actuated shunt trip device.
6.
Exit Meeting The inspector met with the license representatives denoted in paragraph 1 on March 21, 1986.'
The scope of the inspection and the inspector's findings as noted in this report were discussed.
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