Letter Sequence RAI |
---|
|
|
MONTHYEARIR 05000346/19870321987-12-0101 December 1987 Partially Withheld Enforcement Conference Rept 50-346/87-32 on 871119 (Ref 10CFR73.21(c)(2)).Major Areas Discussed: Circumstances Resulting in Potential Violation of Licensee Security Plan Re Barrier Inadequate Penetration Resistance Project stage: Request IR 05000346/19880221988-08-10010 August 1988 Partially Withheld Insp Rept 50-346/88-22 on 880111-15 (Ref 10CFR73.21).Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Assessment Aids,Audits,Detection Aids - Vital Areas, Communications,Records & Repts Project stage: Request ML20151S6601988-08-10010 August 1988 Forwards Evaluation for B&W Owners Group Generic Rept, Design Requirements for Diverse Scram Sys & AMSAC (ATWS Mitigation Sys Actuation Circuitry). Most of Rept Sections Acceptable.Several Design Requirements Encl Project stage: Other ML20195E5931988-10-31031 October 1988 Discusses Util ATWS Design Requirements & Implementation Schedule.Util Plans to Design & Install ATWS Sys by End of Sixth Refueling Outage Project stage: Other ML20235W5371989-02-28028 February 1989 Forwards Design Summary Re plant-specific Info for ATWS Implemetation (10CFR50.62).Encl Provides Evaluation That Demonstrates That for All Loss of Offsite Power Scenarios, Control Rods Will Be Released Due to Loss of Voltage Project stage: Other ML20246E3091989-05-0303 May 1989 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re ATWS Rule (10CFR50.62). Subjs Include Diversity from Existing Reactor Protection Sys & Electrical Independence from Existing Reactor Protection Sys Project stage: RAI ML20246D2231989-06-30030 June 1989 Submits Rev to plant-specific Submittal for ATWS Implementation (10CFR50.62).Util Plans to Design & Install ATWS Sys by End of Sixth Refueling Outage,Scheduled to Begin in Feb 1990 Project stage: Other ML20248D8211989-09-29029 September 1989 Forwards Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 890228 & 0630 Proposed plant-specific Designs to Comply w/10CFR50.62 ATWS Rule Requirements.Proposed Date of May 1990 for Implementing ATWS Mods Also Acceptable Project stage: Approval 1989-02-28
[Table View] |
|
---|
Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217P2061999-10-26026 October 1999 Forwards for First Energy Nuclear Operating Co Insp Rept 50-346/99-17 on 990928-1001.Insp Was Exam of Activities Conducted Under License Re Implementation of Physical Security Program.No Violations Identified ML20217N3851999-10-20020 October 1999 Forwards RAI Re Licensee 990521 Request for License Amend to Allow Irradiated Fuel to Be Stored in Cask Pit at Davis-Besse,Unit 1.Response Requested within 60 Days from Receipt of Ltr ML20217N2321999-10-15015 October 1999 Requests NRC Approval to Use Alternative to Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(f)(4)(ii).Licensee Requests Extension to Specified Schedule for Implementing Updates to IST Program ML20217G9201999-10-14014 October 1999 Discusses Utils Request for Approval of Quality Assurance Program Changes PY-CEI-NRR-2438, Informs That DBNPS & Pnpp Staffs Have Modified or Withdrawn Several of Positions Proposed within Re Request for Approval of Qap.Revised Positions Encl1999-10-14014 October 1999 Informs That DBNPS & Pnpp Staffs Have Modified or Withdrawn Several of Positions Proposed within Re Request for Approval of Qap.Revised Positions Encl ML20217F8371999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-10 on 990802-0913.One Violation Occurred Being Treated as NCV ML20217A5641999-09-30030 September 1999 Informs of Completion of mid-cycle PPR of Davis-Besse on 990901.Informs That NRC Plans to Conduct Addl Insps to Address Questions Raised by Issues Re Operator Errors & Failure to Commit to JOG Topical Rept on MOV Verification ML20212L0691999-09-30030 September 1999 Forwards,For Review & Comment,Copy of Preliminary ASP Analysis of Operational Condition Discovered at Unit 1 on 981014,as Reported in LER 346/98-011 ML20216J6701999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards Post Examination Documentation for Written Operator Initial License Examination Administered at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station on 990920.Without Encls ML20212D3501999-09-21021 September 1999 Forward Copy of Final Accident Sequence Precursor Analysis of Operational Event at Plant,Unit 1 on 980624,reported in LER 346/98-006 05000346/LER-1998-001, Forwards Rev 1 for LER 1998-001,which Updates Corrective Actions & Revises Completion Date Re Implementation of Changes to Plant Emergency Operating Procedure.List of Commitments Attached1999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards Rev 1 for LER 1998-001,which Updates Corrective Actions & Revises Completion Date Re Implementation of Changes to Plant Emergency Operating Procedure.List of Commitments Attached ML20216E5961999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,revising Tech Specs 3/4.3.2.1,safety Features Actuation Sys Instrumentation & Associated Bases 3/4.3.1 & 3/4.3.2,reactor Protection Sys & Safety Sys Instrumentation ML20211P3001999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards FEMA Transmitting FEMA Evaluation Rept for 990504 Emergency Preparedness Exercise at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant.No Deficiencies Identified.One Area Requiring C/A & Two Planning Issues Identified ML20211K6681999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Copies of Certified Personal Qualification Statement - Licensee (NRC Form 398) for Operator Candidates Listed Below.Without Encls ML20211K6611999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Copies of Operator License Renewal Applications for Individuals Listed.Operators Have Successfully Completed Appropriate Operator Requalification Training Program at Dbnps.Without Encls ML20211K0951999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Fire & Seismic Analyses of IPEEE for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1. Response Requested within 60 Days ML20211H0201999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards semi-annual FFD Rept for 990101-0630 for DBNPS, Unit 1,IAW 10CFR26.71(d) ML20211D1171999-08-20020 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-09 on 990623-0802.Violations Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violations ML20211G3911999-08-20020 August 1999 Forwards Update to Estimated Info for Licensing Action Requests Through 010930,re Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Reactor Licensing Action Estimates PY-CEI-NRR-2411, Informs That Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Co Has Developed Corporate QA Program Manual for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station & Perry Nuclear Power Plant,As Discussed on 990318 Between Util & Nrc.Revised USAR Pages,Encl1999-08-19019 August 1999 Informs That Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Co Has Developed Corporate QA Program Manual for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station & Perry Nuclear Power Plant,As Discussed on 990318 Between Util & Nrc.Revised USAR Pages,Encl ML20211J9201999-08-13013 August 1999 Urges NRC to Find Funds for Stockpiling Radiation Pills for Residents Living Near Plant ML20211B0161999-08-13013 August 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Evaluation of Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Request for Relief Numbers RR-A16, RR-A17 & RR-B9 for Plant,Unit 1 ML20210T1061999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Preliminary NRC Forms 398 & 396 for Listed Candidates,Per Operator License Exam Scheduled for Week of 990913.Encl Withheld ML20210S6071999-08-11011 August 1999 Provides Final Response to NRC RAI Re GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Systems at Npps ML20210P8051999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-15 on 990712-16.No Violations Noted.However,Several Deficiencies Were Identified with Implementation of Remp,Which Collectively Indicated Need for Improved Oversight of Program IR 05000346/19980211999-08-0606 August 1999 Refers to NRC Insp Rept 50-346/98-21 Conducted on 980901- 990513 & Forwards Nov.Two Violations Identified Involving Failure to Maintain Design of Valve & Inadequate C/A for Degraded Condition Cited in Encl NOV 05000346/LER-1998-009, Forwards LER 98-009-01,IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). Commitments Made by Util Are Encl1999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards LER 98-009-01,IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). Commitments Made by Util Are Encl ML20210H6101999-07-30030 July 1999 Informs That Region III Received Rev 21 to Various Portions of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Emergency Plan.Revision Was Submitted Under Provisions of 10CFR50.54(q) in Apr 1999 ML20210H0491999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,revising TS 3/4.7.5.1, Ultimate Heat Sink, to Allow Plant Operation in Modes 1-4 with Water Temp Less than or Equal to 90 F ML20210G5521999-07-28028 July 1999 Provides Addl Response to 980923 OL Licensing Exam Rept 50-346/98-301 Re OL Exam Administered in Aug 1998.Results of Root Cause Investigation & Corrective Actions,Discussed ML20210G3831999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to NPF-3,changing TSs 6.4, Training, 6.5.2.8, Audits, 6.10, Record Retention, 6.14, Process Control Program & 6.15, Odcm ML20211P3071999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Final Rept for 990504 Biennial Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise for David-Besse Power Station.No Deficiencies Identified for Any Jurisdiction During Exercise ML20210G4391999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,revising Tech Specs 3/4.3.2.1, Safety Features Actuation Sys Instrumentation, & Associated Bases 3/4.3.1 & 3/4.3.2, Reactor Protection Sys & Safety Sys Instrumentation ML20210G7151999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,revising TSs 3/4.3.3.1, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation, 3/4.3.3.2, Instrument - Incore Detectors & 3/4.3.3.9, Instrumentation - Waste Gas Sys Oxygen Monitor ML20210G5151999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,revising Tech Specs for Implementation of 10CFR50,App J,Option B for Type B & C Containment Leakage Rate Testing ML20210G3211999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Written OL Exam & Supporting Matl for Exam to Be Administered at DBNPS During Week of 990913.Listed Encls Withheld from Public Disclosure Until After Exam Complete ML20210C4381999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-08 on 990513-0622.Unidentified RCS Leak Approached TS Limit of 1 Gallon Per Minute Prior to Recently Completed Maint Outage.Three Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as NCVs ML20209G3681999-07-15015 July 1999 Advises That Info Submitted in & 990519 Affidavit Re Design & Licensing Rept,Davis-Besse,Unit 1 Cask Pit Rack Installation Project,Holtec Intl, HI-981933,marked Proprietary,Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure ML20207H6401999-07-0909 July 1999 Discusses Closure of TAC MA0540 Re Util Responses to RAI on GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1, Rv Structural Integrity. Staff Has Revised Info in Rvid & Releasing It as Rvid Version 2 ML20209D1341999-07-0808 July 1999 Forwards Notice of Withdrawal of Application for Amend to Operating License.Proposed Change Would Have Modified Facility TSs Pertaining to Allowable as-found Pressure Lift Setting Tolerance of Two Pressurizer Code Safety Valves 05000346/LER-1998-012, Forwards LER 98-012-01,which Is Being Submitted to Provide Addl Info Re 981018 Occurrence.Commitment List Attached1999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards LER 98-012-01,which Is Being Submitted to Provide Addl Info Re 981018 Occurrence.Commitment List Attached ML20209C3981999-07-0101 July 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-346/98-21.Corrective Actions:Developed Rev to Boric Acid Control Program & Work Process Guideline on Plant Leakage ML20209B5821999-06-24024 June 1999 Provides Justification for Rev to Completion Date for One of Insp follow-up Items Cited in Insp Rept 50-346/98-03, Designated as Inspector follow-up Item 50-346/97-201-10 ML20196G1251999-06-23023 June 1999 Responds to NRC RAI Re GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants ML20196E5321999-06-17017 June 1999 Forwards Addl Info Re Relief Request RR-A16 to Support NRC Approval of Relief Request ML20195K2751999-06-16016 June 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20196A6601999-06-16016 June 1999 Forwards Master Decommissioning Trust Agreements Revised After 1990 for Ohio Edison Co,Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co,Toledo Edison Co & Pennsylvania Power Co Re Bvnps,Units 1 & 2,DBNPS,Unit 1 & Perry Unit 1 ML20195F9071999-06-10010 June 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to NPF-3,changing Tech Specs 3/4.6.4.4, Hydrogen Purge Sys, TS 3/4.6.5.1, Shield Bldg Emergency Ventilation Sys & TS 3/4.7.6.1, Crevs ML20195F8851999-06-0707 June 1999 Withdraws 950929 License Amend Application,Proposing Mod to Allowable as-found Pressure Lift Setting Tolerance of Two Pressurizer Code Safety Valves ML20207G0751999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-04 on 990323-0513.Violations Occurred & Being Treated as non-cited Violations,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:NRC TO UTILITY
MONTHYEARML20058H6411990-11-0909 November 1990 Forwards Final SALP Rept 50-346/90-01 Covering Mar 1989 to June 1990 ML20058E7141990-10-30030 October 1990 Forwards Exam Forms & Answer Keys,Grading Results & Individual Answer Sheets for Each Applicant ML20058D6771990-10-25025 October 1990 Forwards Exemption Request for Reactor Operators Selected for NRC Requalification Exam ML20058F4811990-10-24024 October 1990 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-346/90-16 on 900814-1009.No Violations Noted ML20062C6811990-10-18018 October 1990 Forwards Safeguards Insp Rept 50-346/90-19 on 900924-28.No Violations Noted ML20059N6661990-10-0909 October 1990 Forwards Correction to SER Re Request for Relief from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI Requirements.W/O Encl IR 05000346/19900091990-09-26026 September 1990 Forwards Insp Repts 50-346/90-09,50-346/90-12 & 50-346/90-13 on 900417-0717 & Notice of Violation ML20059M2101990-09-25025 September 1990 Forwards Info Re Generic Fundamentals Exam Section of Operator Licensing Written Exams to Be Administered on 901010,including Map of Area Where Exams Will Be Taken, Preliminary Instructions for Exam & Equation Sheet ML20059L6041990-09-14014 September 1990 Confirms 901002 Meeting at Plant Site to Present Initial SALP 8 Rept for Facility ML20059J2511990-09-13013 September 1990 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-346/90-17 on 900827-31.No Violations Noted ML20059G1431990-09-0404 September 1990 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-346/90-15 on 900701-0813. Violation Noted But Not Cited.Util Implemented Corrective Actions as Result of Violation & Will Be Examined During Future NRC Insps ML20056B2701990-08-20020 August 1990 Forwards Safety Evaluation Granting 900710 Request for Relief from ASME Code for Class 3 Piping in Svc Water Sys. Request Granted Until Next Scheduled Outage Exceeding 30 Days But No Later than Dec 1991 ML20059A6821990-08-13013 August 1990 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-346/90-09 on 900417-0717. Violations Noted But Not Cited.Util Will Be Notified by Separate Correspondence of NRC Decision Re Enforcement Action Based on Findings of Insp ML20059A6631990-08-10010 August 1990 Forwards Enforcement Conference Rept 50-346/90-14 on 900601 & 900717 Telcon Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-346/90-09 & 50-346/90-12 ML20059A6721990-08-10010 August 1990 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-346/90-13 on 900605-30 & 0709. Violation Noted But Not Cited ML20059A7161990-08-0808 August 1990 Provides Comments on 900105 Response to Generic Ltr 89-10 Re safety-related motor-operated Valve Testing & Surveillance. Util Should Provide Description of Methodology for Periodic Verification of motor-operated Valve Switch Settings ML20058M6141990-08-0707 August 1990 Forwards Sample Registration Ltr for 901010 Generic Fundamentals Section of Written Operator Licensing Exam. Registration Ltr Listing Names of Candidates Taking Exam Should Be Submitted to Region 30 Days Prior to Exam Date ML20055J2761990-07-24024 July 1990 Confirms 900731 Meeting in Region III Ofc to Discuss Util Response to Violation Re Instrumented Insp Techniques ML20055G6621990-07-20020 July 1990 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-346/90-10 on 900430-0518.No Violations Noted ML20055G3051990-07-13013 July 1990 Confirms 900718 Tour of Plant & Mgt Meeting to Discuss Sixth Refueling Outage & Other Items of Mutual Interest ML20055F2231990-07-0606 July 1990 Ack Receipt of Containing Scope & Objectives for 1990 Emergency Plan Exercise Scheduled on 900919 ML20055D3181990-06-29029 June 1990 Advises of Safety & Performance Improvement Program Implementation Audit Scheduled for Wk of 900716-20.Selected Samples of Technical Recommendations Encl ML20055D9781990-06-29029 June 1990 Advises That 900614 Changes to QA Program Meet 10CFR50,App B Requirements & Acceptable.Nrc Should Be Notified of Changes to QA Commitments Existing in Docketed Correspondence Outside QA Program Description ML20059M8631990-06-13013 June 1990 Forwards NRC Performance Indicators for First Quarter 1990. W/O Encl ML20248D8211989-09-29029 September 1989 Forwards Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 890228 & 0630 Proposed plant-specific Designs to Comply w/10CFR50.62 ATWS Rule Requirements.Proposed Date of May 1990 for Implementing ATWS Mods Also Acceptable ML20248C5691989-09-27027 September 1989 Forwards Amend 6 to Indemnity Agreement B-79,reflecting Changes in 10CFR140, Financial Protection Requirements & Indemnity Agreements, Effective 890701 ML20248A4711989-09-25025 September 1989 Requests Submission of Update Rept or Replacement Pages to Updated FSAR Submitted on 890721 to Appropriate Regional Ofc,Per 10CFR50.4(b)(6).Review of Updated QA Program Description,Section 17.2 Will Require More than 60 Days ML20247H9201989-09-0707 September 1989 Responds to Requesting Emergency Notification Sys Phone at Plant.Proposed Method for Recording Would Involve Emergency Notification Sys Phones Located in Control Room, Technical Support Ctr,Emergency Control Ctr & Inspector Ofc ML20247B4361989-09-0505 September 1989 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-346/89-18 on 890807-11.No Violations Noted ML20246L6571989-08-30030 August 1989 Responds to Re Annual Requalification Exam Grading Results.Based on Reviews & Consultations W/Nrc, Remedial Training,Consistent W/Identified Weaknesses, Provided & Intent of Requalification Program Met ML20246C4561989-08-17017 August 1989 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-346/89-16 on 890605-0716 & 24 & Notice of Violation.Violation Noted in Paragraph 7 of Rept Identified by Util Meets Criteria of 10CFR2,App C,Section V.G,Therefore Notice of Violation Will Not Be Issued ML20245J7641989-08-0909 August 1989 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/89-20 on 890724-28.No Violations Noted ML20245F1061989-08-0303 August 1989 Confirms That Written & Oral Exams Scheduled for Wk of 891211.Ref Matl Listed on Encl & Reactor Operator License Applications Should Be Submitted at Least 60 Days Prior to Exam Date ML20247N8521989-07-28028 July 1989 Confirms 890908 Enforcement Conference in Glenn Ellyn,Il to Suppl & Clarify Info Provided by Util in 890228 Response to 880128 Insp Rept 50-346/88-04 & Notice of Violation Re Approval of Procedure AD 1805,Rev 27 ML20247C3271989-07-19019 July 1989 Advises That 890616 Rev 7 to Physical Security Plan Consistent W/Provisions of 10CFR50.54(p) & Acceptable ML20247C2911989-07-19019 July 1989 Forwards Addendum to Insp Rept 50-346/89-08 Transmitted by ,Consisting of Comparisons of Results of Liquid Sample Collected During Insp & Criteria for Comparing Analytical Measurements IR 05000346/19890121989-07-18018 July 1989 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violation Noted in Insp Rept 50-346/89-12 Re Failure to Assemble Fire Brigade Immediately Upon Receipt of Any Unplanned Fire Alarm ML20246E7781989-07-0505 July 1989 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-346/89-17 on 890614-16.No Violations Noted ML20245K9891989-06-23023 June 1989 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-346/89-15 on 890605-09.No Violations Noted.Response to Concerns Re Use of Request for Info Forms & Document Change Requests to Correct Deficiencies Identified in Design Documents Requested ML20245G1371989-06-22022 June 1989 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-346/89-14 on 890424-0604. No Response to Violations Required ML20245H1941989-06-21021 June 1989 Requests That Results of Review of Encl Allegation RIII-89-A-0081 & Disposition of Matter Be Submitted within 30 Days of Ltr Date.Encl Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790) ML20244D7791989-06-12012 June 1989 Comments on Util 890103 Response to Generic Ltr 88-17 Re Expeditious Actions for Loss of Dhr.Expeditious Actions to Achieve Immediate Reduction in Risk Associated W/Reduced Inventory Operation Will Be Replaced by Program Enhancement ML20244B6911989-06-0606 June 1989 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-346/89-13 on 890315-19.No Violations Noted ML20248A0581989-06-0202 June 1989 Informs That Response to NRC Bulletin 88-004, Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss, Acceptable.Response Indicated Rev to CCW Sys Operating & Alarm Procedure Prior to Restart for Cycle 6 to Ensure That 4-hr Limit on Min Flow Not Exceeded ML20247N9471989-05-31031 May 1989 Advises of Conclusion That Allegation RIII-88-A-0057 Re Improper Work Practices for Duct Work Unsubstantiated ML20247J8181989-05-18018 May 1989 Forwards Amend 133 to License NPF-3 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Deletes from License All Remaining Sections of App B ML20247G4041989-05-18018 May 1989 Forwards Safeguards Insp Rept 50-346/89-07 on 890221-0417.No Violations Noted.Requests That Util Retain Supporting Documentation for Investigation of Allegation for Min of 1 Yr from Date of Ltr ML20247D1211989-05-12012 May 1989 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-346/89-11 on 890301-0423.Notice of Violation Will Not Be Issued Since Violations Identified by Licensee ML20246K7541989-05-0505 May 1989 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/89-12 on 890313-17 & 0418 & Notice of Violation ML20246E3091989-05-0303 May 1989 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re ATWS Rule (10CFR50.62). Subjs Include Diversity from Existing Reactor Protection Sys & Electrical Independence from Existing Reactor Protection Sys 1990-09-04
[Table view] Category:OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217P2061999-10-26026 October 1999 Forwards for First Energy Nuclear Operating Co Insp Rept 50-346/99-17 on 990928-1001.Insp Was Exam of Activities Conducted Under License Re Implementation of Physical Security Program.No Violations Identified ML20217N3851999-10-20020 October 1999 Forwards RAI Re Licensee 990521 Request for License Amend to Allow Irradiated Fuel to Be Stored in Cask Pit at Davis-Besse,Unit 1.Response Requested within 60 Days from Receipt of Ltr ML20217G9201999-10-14014 October 1999 Discusses Utils Request for Approval of Quality Assurance Program Changes ML20217F8371999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-10 on 990802-0913.One Violation Occurred Being Treated as NCV ML20217A5641999-09-30030 September 1999 Informs of Completion of mid-cycle PPR of Davis-Besse on 990901.Informs That NRC Plans to Conduct Addl Insps to Address Questions Raised by Issues Re Operator Errors & Failure to Commit to JOG Topical Rept on MOV Verification ML20212L0691999-09-30030 September 1999 Forwards,For Review & Comment,Copy of Preliminary ASP Analysis of Operational Condition Discovered at Unit 1 on 981014,as Reported in LER 346/98-011 ML20212D3501999-09-21021 September 1999 Forward Copy of Final Accident Sequence Precursor Analysis of Operational Event at Plant,Unit 1 on 980624,reported in LER 346/98-006 ML20211P3001999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards FEMA Transmitting FEMA Evaluation Rept for 990504 Emergency Preparedness Exercise at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant.No Deficiencies Identified.One Area Requiring C/A & Two Planning Issues Identified ML20211K0951999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Fire & Seismic Analyses of IPEEE for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1. Response Requested within 60 Days ML20211D1171999-08-20020 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-09 on 990623-0802.Violations Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violations ML20211B0161999-08-13013 August 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Evaluation of Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Request for Relief Numbers RR-A16, RR-A17 & RR-B9 for Plant,Unit 1 ML20210P8051999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-15 on 990712-16.No Violations Noted.However,Several Deficiencies Were Identified with Implementation of Remp,Which Collectively Indicated Need for Improved Oversight of Program IR 05000346/19980211999-08-0606 August 1999 Refers to NRC Insp Rept 50-346/98-21 Conducted on 980901- 990513 & Forwards Nov.Two Violations Identified Involving Failure to Maintain Design of Valve & Inadequate C/A for Degraded Condition Cited in Encl NOV ML20210H6101999-07-30030 July 1999 Informs That Region III Received Rev 21 to Various Portions of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Emergency Plan.Revision Was Submitted Under Provisions of 10CFR50.54(q) in Apr 1999 ML20210C4381999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-08 on 990513-0622.Unidentified RCS Leak Approached TS Limit of 1 Gallon Per Minute Prior to Recently Completed Maint Outage.Three Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as NCVs ML20209G3681999-07-15015 July 1999 Advises That Info Submitted in & 990519 Affidavit Re Design & Licensing Rept,Davis-Besse,Unit 1 Cask Pit Rack Installation Project,Holtec Intl, HI-981933,marked Proprietary,Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure ML20207H6401999-07-0909 July 1999 Discusses Closure of TAC MA0540 Re Util Responses to RAI on GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1, Rv Structural Integrity. Staff Has Revised Info in Rvid & Releasing It as Rvid Version 2 ML20209D1341999-07-0808 July 1999 Forwards Notice of Withdrawal of Application for Amend to Operating License.Proposed Change Would Have Modified Facility TSs Pertaining to Allowable as-found Pressure Lift Setting Tolerance of Two Pressurizer Code Safety Valves ML20195K2751999-06-16016 June 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20207G0751999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-04 on 990323-0513.Violations Occurred & Being Treated as non-cited Violations,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20207G0621999-06-0404 June 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/98-21 on 980901-1201 & 990425-0513.Violations Identified & Licensee Being Provided Opportunity to Either Respond to Violations within 30 Days or Inform NRC That LER Rept Already Contain Info Requested ML20207B8161999-05-25025 May 1999 Confirms Discussion Between Members of Staffs to Have Mgt Meeting on 990608 in Oak Harbor,Oh to Discuss Recent Performance at Davis-Besse as Described in Plant Performance Review ML20207B3141999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That in September 1998,Region III Received Revision 20 to Various Portions of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Emergency Plan.Rev Submitted Under Provisions of 10CFR50.54(q) ML20206T0881999-05-18018 May 1999 Confirms 990517 Telcon Between Lindsey & M Bielby Re Arrangements Made for Administration of Licensing Exam at Facility for Week of 990913 ML20206N5311999-05-11011 May 1999 Informs That NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Reorganized Effective 990328.As Part of Reorganization,Div of Licensing Project Mgt Created.Aj Mendiola Will Be Section Chief for Davis-Besse Npp.Organization Chart Encl ML20206H2291999-05-0707 May 1999 Forwards Proposed Change to Plant,Unit 1,TS Bases Section 2.2.1, Limiting Safety Sys Settings - Reactor Protection Sys Instrumentation Setpoints - Rc Pressure - Low,High & Pressure Temp ML20206B8171999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-05 on 990405-09.No Violations Noted.Purpose of Insp Was to Examine on-line Maint Risk Assessment Program Recently Implemented in Response to Maint Work Control Weaknesses ML20205G5681999-03-26026 March 1999 Advises of Completion of Plant Performance Review on 990202 to Develop Integrated Understanding of Safety Performance. Overall Performance of Plant Acceptable.Plant Issues Matrix & Insp Plan Encl ML20207G1701999-03-0505 March 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-01 on 990102-0212.No Violations Noted ML20207D4351999-02-25025 February 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-02 on 990202-05.No Violations Noted.Examples of Deficiencies with Station Procedures, Similar to Those Identified Through Staff self-assessments & in Previous NRC Insps,Were Noted IR 05000346/19960141999-02-17017 February 1999 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-346/96-14 on 970225.Ack That Due to Plant Events,There Has Been Delay in Completion of C/As for Violation 50-346/96-14c ML20203F2541999-02-10010 February 1999 Informs That Beginning 990216,DE Hills Will Be Chief of Operations Branch Which Includes Operator Licensing Function ML20206S0811999-01-22022 January 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/98-18 on 981110-990102.No Violations Identified.Conduct of Activities at Davis-Besse Generally Characterized by Conservative Plant Operations, & Effective Engineering Involvement in Plant Issues ML20199H5821999-01-20020 January 1999 Forwards SE Re Ampacity Derating Issues Due to Application of Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Matl at Plant ML20198E6821998-12-17017 December 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/98-20 on 981116-20.No Violations Noted.Implementation of Licensed Operator Requalification Program Was Generally Characterized by Safety Conscious Operations & Sound Evaluation of Operator Performance ML20198C9881998-12-15015 December 1998 Informs That as Part of NRC PRA Implementation Plan, Commission Assigned Two SRAs to Each Regional Ofc.Sras Will Routinely Assess Licensee Event Repts,Plant Event,Insp Findings & EAs from Risk Perspective ML20198B5391998-12-0909 December 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/98-17 on 980918-1109 & NOV Re Inadequate Maint Work Order Used by Electrician During Removal of Primary Water Storage Tank Temp Indicator ML20196G1621998-12-0303 December 1998 Submits Response to Request for TS Interpretation Re Surveillance Interval Extension Allowances ML20196H4411998-12-0303 December 1998 Confirms Plans to Hold Meeting on 981216 in Lisle,Il,To Discuss Recent Performance at Davis-Besse & Actions Being Implemented by Licensee ML20198B1511998-12-0202 December 1998 Forwards Insp Activity Plan for Next 6 Months & Plant Issues Matrix.Infor Provided to Minimize Resource Impact on Staff & to Allow for Scheduling Conflicts & Personnel Availability to Be Resolved in Advance of Inspector Arrival Onsite ML20196J5111998-12-0101 December 1998 Fowards Year 2000 Readiness Audit Rept,Which Documents Results of NRR Audit Conducted at Facility from 981027-29 ML20196D4371998-11-25025 November 1998 Discusses Concerns Re Announced Asset Transfer Between Firstenergy Corp & Duquesne Light Co ML20196C6491998-11-20020 November 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/98-19 on 981014-23.No Violations Noted.Inspectors Reviewed Circumstances Surrounding Events Leading Up to & Following Reactor Trip IR 05000346/19983011998-11-0909 November 1998 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-346/98-301OL Issued on 980923.Effectiveness of C/A Will Be Reviewed Following Submittal of Root Cause Investigation Results ML20155J1471998-11-0303 November 1998 Informs That on 981007,NRC Administered GFE Section of Written Operator Licensing Exam to Employees of Facility. Exam Answer Key for Forms a & B,Grading Results & Individual Answer Sheets Encl.Without Encl ML20155B6641998-10-28028 October 1998 Forwards Safety Evaluation Re Request for Reduction in Commitment Changes in QA Program Matl Receipt Insp Process ML20154Q6711998-10-16016 October 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/98-15 on 980914-18.No Violations Noted.Emergency Preparedness Program Effectively Implemented During 980624 Tornado Event & Station Personnel Responded Well to Event ML20154Q5891998-10-14014 October 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/98-14 on 980808-0918.No Violations Noted.Online Safety Equipment Outages Were Performed Well & IAW Established Procedures ML20154H0241998-10-0606 October 1998 Discusses Arrangements Made During 980924 Telcon for Insp of Licensed Operator Requalification Program at Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station During Wk of 981116 ML20154D1801998-09-30030 September 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/98-16 on 980831-0904.No Violations Noted 1999-09-07
[Table view] |
Text
_. _ - _ . - -- . _ ___ . - _ - . _ - _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _
. p,
'May 3, 1989
. Docket No. 50-346 .,r )1STRIBUTION:,
G.meret F11es O NRC & Local PDRS PDIII-3 r/f GHolahan MVirgilio JHannon TWambach PKreutzer Mr. Donald C. Shelton 0GC EJordan Vice President - Nuclear BGrimes ACRS(10)
Toledo Edison Company PDIII-3 Gray Edison Plaza - Stop 712 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, Ohio 43652
Dear Mr. Shelton:
SUBJECT:
ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM (ATWS 10 CFR 50.62 IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW (TAC N0. 59086)
In the course of our review of the information provided in your submittals dated October 9,1985 and February 28, 1989 regarding the subject issue, we find that we require additional information to complete our review. The enclosure identifies the additional information required. In a telephone discussion with members of your staff regarding this information request, they indicated that a final submittal which includes this information can be made by June 30, 1989. We find this acceptable to allow us time to complete our review with sufficient margin for the scheduled implementation at the next refueling outage for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.
Sincerely,
/s/
Thomas V. Wambach, Sr. Project Manager Project Directorate III-3 Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, Y and Special Projects t
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l
l
Enclosure:
As stated cc: w/ enclosure See next page , - f ;
Office: LA/PDJ11-3 PMhPDIII-3 PD/PDIII-3 i Surname: PKfWtit'zer TWambach/tg JHannon Date: 3 / ,s /89 g / Q /89 f/) /89 l
8905110220 890503 PDR ADOCK 05000346 P PDC L_________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ __
.. . , , j
. Mr. Donald C. Shelton Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Toledo Edison Company Unit No. I cc:
David E. Burke, Esq.
The Cleveland Electric Radiological Health Program Illuminating Company Ohio Department of Health P. O. Box 5000 1224 Kinnear Road Cleveland, Ohio' 44101 Columbus, Ohio 43212 1
Mr. Robert W. Schrauder Attorney General
' Manager, Nuclear Licensing Department of Attorney Toledo Edison Company General Edison Plaza 30 East Broad Street 300 Madison Avenue Columbus, Ohio 43215 Toledo, Ohio '43652 Mr. James W. Harris, Director Gerald Charnoff, Esq. (AddresseeOnly)
Shaw, Pittman, Potts Division of Power Generation ,
and Trowbridge Ohio Department of Industrial Relations 2300 N Street N.W. 2323 West 5th Avenue Washington, D.C. 20037 P. O. Box 825 Columbus, Ohio 43216 Regional Administrator, Region III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ohio Environmental Protection Agency 709 Roosevelt Road 361 East Broad Street Glen Ellyn, Illinois Columbus, Ohio 43266-0558 President, Board of Mr. Robert B. Borsum County Commissioners of Babcock & Wilcox Ottawa County l Nuclear Power Generation Division Port Clinton, Ohio 43452 l
Suite 525, 1700 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 State of Ohio Public Utilities Comission
( Resident Inspector 180 East Broad Street l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Columbus, Ohio 43266-0573 1 5503 N. State Route 2 l Cak Harbor, Ohio 43449 l
1 DAVIS-BESSE-NUCLEAR POWER STATION 10 CFR 50.62 (ATW5 RULE)
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Introduction and Discussion On July 26, 1984, theCodeofFederalRegulations(CFR)wasamendedtoinclude theATWSRule(Section10CFR50.62,"RequirementsforReductionofRiskfrom Anticipated Transients Without Scram [ATWS] Events for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants"). An ATWS is an expected operational transient such as loss of feedwater, loss of condenser vacuum, or loss of offsite power)(, which
-is accompanied by a failure of the reactor trip system to shut down the reactor. The ATWS Rule requires specific improvements in the design and operation of commercial nuclear power facilities to reduce the likelihood of failure to shut down the reactor following anticipated transients and to mitigate the consequences of an ATWS event.
Paragraph (c)(6) of the Rule requires that information sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of the Rule be submitted to the
. Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The ATWS Rule requirements for Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) plants, such as Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (Davis-Besse),aretoprovideadiversescramsystem(DSS)anddiverse(from the existing reactor trip system) ATWS mitigation system actuation circuitry (AMSAC).. !
I Based on review of the information provided with the Toledo Edison letters ;
dated October 9,1985 and February 28, 1989, and on other subsequent !
clarifying discussions, this request for additional information (RAI) is needed to allow the staff to determine fully whether the Davis-Besse design complies with the ATWS Rule requirements of hardware diversity and electrical independence and reliability and testability at power. The response to the RAI should include block diagrams showing DSS and AMSAC circuit components withadescriptionofmanufacturer,model,principleofoperation(e.g.,
electro-mechanical, solid-state,etc.),modeofoperation(e.g.,energizeor de-energize to. trip, etc ), power supplies (e.g., AC or DC, operating voltages,etc.),andidentificationandlocationofallClass1E/non-ClassIE system interfaces.
The principal function of the DSS at Davis-Besse is to prevent an ATWS by tripping the reactor if, for any reason, the rods fail to drop in response to a Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip. The DSS must function to provide a reactor trip, diverse from the existing Reactor Trip System (RTS), for all ATWS transients that require a reactor trip (in addition to AMSAC actions) to prevent the potential for damage to, or over-pressurization of, the Reactor Coolant System (RCS).
8 t
The AMSAC must function to actuate emergency feedwater (EFW) and trip the turbine on ATWS transients, when required, to prevent serious RCS over-pressurization, to maintain fuel integrity, and to meet 10 CFR release requirements. Considerations for avoidance of inadvertent actuation dictate that there be at least two channels, powered from separate sources and coupled with appropriate coincidence capability. The ATWS transients of concern for theB&WOwnersGroup(BWOG)plantshavebeenshowntobealossofmain feedwater (LMFW) and the loss of offsite power (LOOP) leading to a LMFW.
It is the staff's understanding that Toledo Edison intends to detect a loss of 3 feedwater event using low steam generator level. This method of detection is !
not a direct measure of feedwater flow and is inconsistent with the analyses I described in B&W Document 47-1159091-00 for the BWOG generic design.
Therefore, Toledo Edison and B&W performed analyses that support this method of detecting a loss of main feedwater and demonstrated that peak RCS pressures l will remain acceptable for an ATWS event.
The following discussion and associated questions are applicable to the Toledo ~,
Edison " conceptual design" for the DSS and AMSAC at the Davis-Besse Station.
Diversity from the Existing RPS In accordance with B&W Document 47-1159091-00, the generic design requirements for DSS and AMSAC diversity are such that the " primary input signals will be diverse from existing protection systems from the sensor output." Also, the
" logic system shall be diverse from existing protection systems," except that "certain plant-specific configurations may require enabling signals and power supply interconnections with existing protection systems." The output of the DSS "will degate SCRs [ silicon-controlled rectifiers] using relays different from RPS SCR degate relays." The AMSAC " actuation devices U ll be shared with existing systems."
l For the DSS, equipment diversity to the extent reasonable and practicable to
} minimize the potential for comtr.on cause (mode) failures is required from the j sensors to, and including, the components used to interrupt control rod I power. For the AMSAC, equipment diversity to the extent reasonable and practicable to minimize the potential for common cause (mode) failures is required from the sensors to, but not including, the final actuation device.
It is the staff's understanding that Toledo Edison's " conceptual design" for the DSS at Davis-Besse will use Rosemont reactor coolant pressure transmitters, which were designed and installed to be qualified to meet post accident conditions. Rosemont pressure transmitters are also used for the RPS; however, diversity of sensors is not required. Toledo Edison's
" conceptual design" indicates that signal conditioning will not be required, and the DSS bistables, logic channels, logic power supplies, and relays will be from manufacturers different from the RTS equipment manufacturers.
Equipment from different manufacturers, alone, does not ensure diversity of the equipment. Therefore, Toledo Edison must further describe how diversity is to be achieved between the DSS and RTS equipment.
i
l l
'It is also the staff's understanding that Toledo Edison's " conceptual design" for the AMSAC at Davis-Besse will use the existing Steam and Feedwater Rupture ControlSystem(SFRCS). Toledo Edison's " conceptual design" indicates that the SFRCS will be initiated on a low steam generator level (an indication of a loss of main feedwater) and will actuate the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system and trip the main turbine. The SFRCS is a Class IE system, which is not part 1 of the RTS. The SFRCS is a digital system, which uses optical isolation 2 technology for its interfaces and is manufactured by Consolidated Controls Corporation. The RTS at Davis-Besse is a Bailey 880 analog system with relays and operational amplifiers. Therefore, the SFRCS appears to be diverse from i' the RTS.
Adequate diversity between the DSS /AMSAC and the RPS is best achieved by the use of components from different manufacturers / manufacturing processes, the
-use of. mechanical versus electronic devices, AC versus DC equipment, or the use of equipment that uses different principles of operation. Therefore,
- Toledo Edison should consider these methods of determining diversity when addressing the DSS bistables, logic, and final actuation devices and the use of SFRCS for the AMSAC design. This information should be included in the Toledo Edison final, plant-specific, Davis-Besse submittal in order for the staff to make a determination of compliance with the ATWS Rule. t Electrical Independence from the Existing RPS In accordance with B&W Document 47-1159091-00, the generic design requirements for DSS and AMSAC electrical independence are such that "the system will be i electrically independent from existing protection systems, except for power supplies and certain enabling signals, which wi?1 be appropriately isolated."
j Electrical independence of the DSS from the existing RTS should be provided r from the sensor output up to, and including, the final actuation device.
I
., Electrical independence of the AMSAC systems from the existing RTS should be provided from the sensor output up to, but not including, the final actuation device.
It is the staff's understanding that Toledo Edison's " conceptual design" for the DSS at Davis-Besse provides for power to be supplied to the DSS circuitry directly from the 480 VAC offsite power sources, with no battery backup capabilities upon loss of offsite power. It is also the staff's understanding that the " conceptual design" for the Davis-Besse AMSAC uses the SFRCS and that both the SFRCS and the RTS share the same vital AC power. As described in the
-September 7,1988,letterfromG.Holahan(NRC)toL.C.Stalter(BWOG),this design falls into Option 2. The Option 2 criteria state that a battery-backed DSS power source is not required and, if the SFRCS is powered from 120 VAC RTS buses, Toledo Edison must identify all DSS and AMSAC system components at Davis-Besse that receive power from the same sources used to provide power to L
the existing RTS.
1 l
l '
Since RTS power supplies will be used, Toledo Edison has provided information to demonstrate that faults within the DSS or AMSAC circuits cannot degrade the reliability / integrity of the existing RTS. This information demonstrates that it is highly unlikely that a common mode failure affecting the RTS power distri-bution system could compromise both the RTS and ATWS prevention / mitigation functions simultaneously.
Even though the Class IE to non-Class IE isolators used in the DSS and AMSAC at Davis-Besse may have been qualified previously, Toledo Edison must ensure that the DSS /AMSAC applications are bounded by the previously-documented testing and so state in the final Davis-Besse plant-specific submittal.
Physical Separation from Existing RPS In accordance with B&W Document 47-1159091-00, the generic design requirements for DSS and AMSAC are such that " channel separation shall be provided in accordance with plant-specific requirements for routing non-safety signals."
To allow the staff to determine if this part of the Davis-Besse design complies with the current approved plant design requirements, specific details on component location and physical separation should be supplied in the plant-specific submittal.
Environmental Qualification (EQ) and Quality Assurance (QA) for Testing, Maintenance, and Surveillance In accordance with B&W Document 47-1159091-00, the generic design requirements for DSS and AMSAC are such that " equipment shall be qualified for a normal environment in accordance with plant-specific EQ program requirements; quality assurance measures are to be provided on a plant-specific basis equal to or better than the requirements promulgated by hRC's Generic QA guidance letter, GL 85-06."
It is the staff's understanding from the Davis-Besse " conceptual design" that all ATWS equipment will be purchased and installed to meet the requirements for the expected environmental conditions and that the equipment will be operational for the anticipated operational occurrences at its location. It is also the staff's understanding that the ATWS equipment at Davis-Besse will be controlled in accordance with the general requirements of the Toledo Edison Quality Assurance Program and will meet or exceed the " Quality Assurance Guidance For ATWS Equipment That Is Not Safety-Related," as set forth in GL 85-06. Maintenance, testing, and determination of operating status will be performed with approved procedures.
l The approach to the EQ and QA requirements identified above appears to be acceptable. It should be noted that the EQ and QA programs will be audited periodically during NRC regional inspections to assure continued compliance.
During the life of commercial light-water-cooled nuclear power plants, many components reach their end of life and must be replaced, including components installed in the RTS, DSS, and AMSAC. In its plant-specific submittal, Toledo Edison should provide a description of the measures / programs implemented for Davis-Besse to assure that the equipment diversity provided in accordance with ,
the ATWS Rule will be maintained during component repair, replacement, and modifications and/or design changes, etc. throughout the life of the plant.
i Safety-Related (IE) Power Supplies In accordance with B&W Document 47-1159091-00, the generic design _ requirements
. for DSS and AMSAC are'such that a " safety-related power supply is not
- required." However, " operability during Loss of Offsite Power is required." i Although the use of safety-related (IE) power supplies is not required for the DSS and AMSAC systems, the logic and actuation device power for the DSS and logic power for the AMSAC designs must be from an instrument power supply independent from the power supplies for the existing RPS. In this regard, it is the staff's understanding that the Davis-Besse " conceptual design" for the DSS provides for power to be supplied directly from offsite power sources, which are not backed up by emergency diesel _ generators. Power for the AMSAC (i.e., SFRCS) is partially provided by the same vital power as the RTS. For the staff to make a final determination of acceptance, the concerns noted in the diversity and independence sections with respect to the use of SFRCS equipment in the ATWS designs should be addressed.
Testability at Power
- In accordance with B&W Document 47-1159091-00, the generic design requirements for DSS and AMSAC testability at power are such that "the system shall be testable at power." At-power tests shall be performed at 6-month intervals with the complete system test being performed every refueling. The following exceptions exist. The DSS input sensors and the AMSAC input sensors and final actuation devices will be tested only at refueling outages.
P To ensure that the DSS and AMSAC circuits perform their safety functions in a reliable manner, the circuits must be maintained and periodically tested at power in accordance with technical specification operability and surveillance requirements or equivalent means.
It is the staff's understanding that the portion of the Davis-Besse
" conceptual design" that will allow testability at power is provided by the design of the DSS and AMSAC systems. The DSS is designed to be a two-out-of-two logic-actuated system, and provisions are incorporated that disable the second channel when a channel is placed in the test bypass condition. The AMSAC is four channel, Class 1E system with testing defined by technical specifications.
This approach appears to be in accordance with the above mentioned design requirements. However, the plant-specific submittal should also address the time limits associated with channel testing, disabling of channels, actions to be taken if one channel fails, etc.
______m._______m___ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . . _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ __ _ _ _ . . _ _ _
l
.)
Inadvertent Actuation In accordance with B&W Document 47-1159091-00, the generic design requirements for DSS and AMSAC to prevent inadvertent actuation are such that "the system ,
shall be designed to minimize challenges to safety systems" by using at least {
two channels with appropriate coincidence logic; the use of two channels j concurrent with the energize-to-trip design should minimize the number of inadvertent actuations. l To avoid the potential for inadvertent actuations of this nonsafety system, 1 the system shall be designed so as not to revert to a one-out-of-one status during channel test. For systems designed using the minimum two-channel logic, this dictates that the system shall become inoperable during channel-test.
It is the staff's understanding,that the Davis-Besse " conceptual design" is in accordance with the above mentioned design requirements.
Maintenance Bypasses. Operating Bypasses, Indication of Bypasses, and Means for Bypassing In accordance with B&W Document 47-1159091-00, the generic design requirements for DSS and AMSAC bypassing are such that "the system shall incorporate a channel test capability; the test function should simultaneously test an input and output channel together from sensor to final actuation device."
System status during testing shall be annunciated in the control room. The system should be designed to provide output to the control-room mounted alarms for input channel trip conditions, output channel trip conditions, system trip, and test status. The system status will also be annunciated when the system is in the Startup Bypass mode / condition and reactor power is less than 25% of rated full power.
It is the staff's understanding that the Davis-Besse " conceptual design" provides for bypassing to allow maintenance, testing, repair, or calibration during. power operation. Testing will be controlled as part of the existing plant administrative controls.
It is also the staff's understanding that the Davis-Besse " conceptual design" for the DSS does not require an operational bypass, and none is provided. The
" conceptual design" does provide for indication of DSS status, including maintenance bypasses in the control room. The " conceptual design"'provides these bypass capabilities for maintenance and test by using test switches under key-lock control.
The Davis-Besse " conceptual design" does not provide information describing the use of operational bypasses, the means of bypassing, or any indications of bypass conditions for the AMSAC. Therefore, Toledo Edison should include this information in the plant-specific ATWS design submittal for Davis-Besse.
Completion of Protective Action In accordance with B&W Document 47-1159091-00, the generic design requirements for DSS (AMSAC is not addressed) to assure completion of the protective action once it has been initiated are such that "the DSS shall incorporate a trip lockup'with manual reset capability in the output channels when activated by a true DSS trip."
It is the staff's understanding that the Toledo Edison " conceptual design" for the DSS at Davis-Besse requires deliberate operator actions to reset the DSS trip function. The " conceptual design" does-not indicate that the AMSAC will complete its protective action nor does the design indicate what action must be taken by the operator once the system is initiated.
Toledo Edison should provide specific information which confirms that both the !
DSS and AMSAC at Davis-Besse are designed such that, upon receipt of a trip 'j signal, the protective action goes'to completion and deliberate operator )
action is required to reset the systems in order to comply with the ATWS. 1 Rule. In addition to the specific information on the system's design, Toledo Edison should include a discussion of any required operator actions.
Information Readout Although this item is not specifically addressed in B&W Document 47-1159091-00, it'is the staff's understanding that Toledo Edison's " conceptual cesign" for Davis-Besse provides for indication of USS system status to the operator via the plant computer and other alarms in the control room. The " conceptual design" does not provide any information describing how the AMSAC status will be displayed or what information is available to the operator.
Therefore, the Toledo Edison plant-specific submittal for Davis-Besse should provide more detailed information relating to how the operator is provided with accurate, complete, and timely information (i.e., what actuates or deactuates alarms, annunciators, lights, and what functions are performed by specific switches, etc.) pertinent to the DSS /AMSAC system status. In
.iddition, Toleco Edison should provide a discussion of how human-factors engineering practices are incorporated into the design of ATWS prevention / mitigation system components located in the control room. The coordination of displays used to provide the status of ATWS systems / equipment to the operator with existing displays should be addressed specifically.
Safety-Related Interfaces In accordance with B&W Document 47-1159091-00, the generic design requirements for safety-related components / interfaces are such that "the DSS and AMSAC are not required to be safety related nor designed to meet IEEE 279, however must be designed and engineered for high reliability to preclude unnecessary challenges to existing safety systems."
i It is the staff's understanding that the Toledo Edison " conceptual design" for the Davis-Besse DSS and AMSAC does include interfaces with the existing reactor protection systems, as noted in the previous discussions of this request for additional information. Theseconcerns(i.e.,thesharin power supplies via SFRCS/AMSAC and the adequacy of isolation devices)g should of I be adequately addressed in_the plant-specific submittal in order for the staff to evaluate the applicability of the devices for use in the DSS /AMSAC systems.
Technical Specifications The staff, in its Technical Specification Improvement Program, is presently ;
evaluating the need for technical specification operability and surveillance requirements. This evaluation includes those actions considered to be appropriate to ensure that equipment. installed per the ATWS Rule will be maintained in an op~erable condition when operability requirements cannot be
. met (i.e., limiting concitions for operation). In its Interim Commission Policy Statement on Technical Specific 6 tion Improvements for Nuclear Power Plants [52 Federal Register 3778, February 6,1987], the Commission >
established a specific set of objective criteria for~ determining which
_ regulatory requirements and operating restrictions should be included in Technical Specifications. The staff will provide guicance regarding the
' Technical Specification requirements for DSS and AMSAC at a later date.
Installation of ATWS prevention / mitigation system equipment should not be delayed pending the development or staff approval of operability and surveillance requirements for ATWS equipment.
Conclusion In order f' or the staff to make a determination on the Davis-Besse compliance with the ATWS Rule and issue a Safety Evaluation report, the additional information requested in the body of this document will be required. This additional information, as well as pertinent information supplied previously, should be submitted to the staff in a single ATWS system final design package. This will assure that only the most complete and up-to-date information is reviewed.
Principal Contributors: V. Thomas B. Collins, EG&G
- _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _