ML20205G568

Advises of Completion of Plant Performance Review on 990202 to Develop Integrated Understanding of Safety Performance. Overall Performance of Plant Acceptable.Plant Issues Matrix & Insp Plan Encl

ML20205G568
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	03/26/1999
From:	Grant G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Campbell G SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.
References
AL-98-07, AL-98-7, NUDOCS 9904070291
Download: ML20205G568 (37)

Text

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UNITED STATES

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801 WARRENVILLE ROAD U

f lisle, ILLINOIS 60532-4351 ks

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March 26, 1999 t

l Mr. Guy G. Campbell Vice President - Nuclear FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760

SUBJECT:

PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW - DAVIS-BESSE

Dear Mr. Campbell:

On February 2,1999, the NRC staff completed a Plant Performance Review (PPR) of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety performece. The results are used by NRC management to facilitate planning and allocation of inspection resources. PPRs provide NRC management with a current summary of licensee performance and serve as inputs to the NRC's senior management meeting (SMM) reviews. PPRs examine information since the last assessment of licensee performance to evaluate long term trends, but emphasize the last 6 months to ensure that the assessments reflect current performance. The PPR for Davis-Besse involved the participation of all technical divisions in evaluating inspection results and safety performance information for the period January 19,1997 to January 31,1999. The NRC's most recent summary of licensee performance was provided in a letter of February 28,1997, and was discussed in a public meeting with ycu on March 21,1997.

As discussed in the NRC's Administrative Letter 98-07 of October 2,1998, the PPR provides an assessment of licensee performance during an interim period that the NRC has suspended its Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program. The NRC suspended its SALP program to complete a review of its processes for assessing performance at nuclear power plants. At the end of the review period, the NRC will decide whether to resume the SALP program or terminate it in favor of an improved process.

The plant entered the period and was operated at or near 100 percent power until the reactor tripped on May 4,1997, due to a deluge on the main transformer. The reactor was made critical on May 26 and was connected to the grid shortly thereafter. The unit remained at 100 percent power until it was manually tripped due to a letdown system resin retention element failure while the plant was being shut down for refueling outage 11 on April 10,1998. The plant was made critical and was subsequently connected to the grid on May 23. The unit operated at or near 100 percent power until the reactor tripped on June 24, due to a loss of offsite power which was caused by a tornado. The reactor was connected to the grid on July 6 and was at or near 100 percent power until July 22, when the unit was shut down to fill, soak, and drain the steam generators. The plant was operated at or near 100 percent power until September 24 when the unit was manually tripped due to the closure of a feedwater regulating valve. The plant was returned to service on September 26 and was operated at or near 100 percent power 9904070291 990326 PDR ADOCK 05000346 G

PDR

G. Campbell until October 14 when it was manually tripped due to decr% sing levels in the component cooling water system surge tank following the rupture 4 a letdown system cooler rupture disc.

j While increasing power on October 18, the plant tripped from 4 percent power on a signal from the anticipatory reactor trip system. The plant was returned to 100 percent power on October 21 and, later that day, a runback to 60 percent power occmed during maintenance work. Later that day, power was increased to 100 percent power nd remained at or near that level for the remainder of the period.

i Overall, performance at Davis-Besse was acceptable. However, the operational performance of the unit changed from a condition where operators were rarely challenged during the several previous assessment periods to one in which operators were challenged by a number of events during this assessment period. The organization was well-equipped to handle minor emerging problems during routine plant operations. Notwithstanding, the licensee did not effectively prioritize normally scheduled work with the emergent items that were encountered during the tornado and subsequent events. This stressed the work management process and contributed to the poor pedormance in evaluating a leaking pressurizer spray valve and the avoidable plant transients that occurred. After the series of two plant trips and a turbine runback occurred in October, immediate actions were taken to augment the work control process, review the collective significance of the events, and develop a long range plan to impsove performance.

Since the runback, the plant has been operated very conservatively and a methodical approach to scheduling, preparing, and executing work has been implemented. These actions have been initially effective as the plant has been operated event-free since mid-October.

Performance in plant operations was consistent. Plant operators were effective in responding to the many challenges they encountered and promptly ensured the plant was in a safe condition in all cases. However, some cases where operators exhibited inattention-to-detail and made non-conservative decisions detracted from the otherwise good performance during routine operations. In addition to normal core inspections, the resident inspectors will perform initiative inspections to observe operators perform equipment manipulations and testing activities.

Overall, maintenance performance declined somewhat. The maintenance department performed well while identifying and repairing the numerous equipment problems encountered during the various events that occurred at the station. However, the evaluation of a leaking pressurizer spray valve was not well done and maintenance work activities contributed to some of the avoidable plant transients that occurred. For example, although surveillance testing was normally effectively conducted, a non-conservative decision during a surveillance associated with a feedwater regulating valve led directly to a plant trip and inadequate work controls led to the runback. The effectiveness of the work control process was improved after the series of events in October 1998, and a plan for long term improvement was initiated. In addition to normal core inspections, an initiative inspection is planned in April 1999, to review the work control process including the assessment of risk while performing online maintenance activities.

Performance in the engineering area was consistent. Engineering department personnel provided good oversight of activities associated with their systems and performed well while

G. Campbell assessing most issues associated with the various plant transients that occurred. In most cases, a systematic, comprehensive approach to the issues was employed and the issues were effectively resolved. However, the failure to identify the correct root cause for a circuit breaker failure assedated with the tornado event and some other instances of inadequate support detracted from the otherwise good performance in this area. The performance during this period does not warrant any additional inspection effort above the normal NRC core inspection program.

Program implementation in the plant support area, including ALARA planning, radiological controls, emergency preparedness, and security remained effective. In particular, the emergency plan was well-implemented in response to the tornado event. Self-assessment efforts remained effective in identifying and promptly correcting issues. Material condition in the plant support area was good. The performance during this period does not warrant any additional inspection effort above the normal NRC core inspection program. contains a historicallisting of plant issues, referred to as the Plant issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this PPR process to arrive at an integrated view of licensee performance trends. The PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and FirstEnergy. The NRC does not attempt to accument all aspects of licensee programs and performance that may be functioning appropriately. Rather, the NRC only documents issues that the NRC believes warrant management attention or represent noteworthy aspects of performance. In addition, the PPR may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspect!ons that had occurred since the last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and censideration.

This material will be placed in the PDR as part of the normalissuance of NRC inspection reports and other correspondence.

This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the Davis-Besse PPR review. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. details our inspection plan for the next 6 months. The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program is provided so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas. Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.

i

- G. Campbell 4

p We willinform you of any changes to the inspection plan. If you have any questions, please contact me at 630-829-9866.

Sincerely,-

4 Original signed by Geoffrey E. Grant, Director Division of Reactor Projects i

Docket No. 50-346 i

License No. NPF-3 l

Enclosures:

1. Plant issues Matrix J

2. Inspection Plan See Attached Distribution i

l 1

l w

a 1

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\DAVl\\lNSPPLA8.DAV To receive a co sy of this document indicate in the box *C" = Copy w/o attach /enci"E" = Copy w/att.ch/enci *N" = No copy OFFICE Rlli i Rll!

l Rlli l

l NAME DuPont/ml d Kozak W L Grant %

DATE 03h4J99 h

03/J4/99 ' ~

03fA0/99" U OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

4 G. Campbell cc w/encis:

J. Stetz, Senior Vice President - Nuclear J. Lash, Plant Manager J. Freets, Manager, Regulatory Affairs M. O'Reilly, FirstEnergy State Liaison Officer, State of Ohio R. Owen, Ohio Department of Health C. Glazer, Chairman, Ohio Public Utilities Commission C. Emahiser, Ottawa County Sheriff J. P. Greer, Director, Emergency Management Agency S. Isenberg, President, Lucas County Board of Commissioners t

J. Telb, Lucas County Sheriff B. Halsey, Director, Emergency Management Agency G. Adams, Village Administrator, Genoa The Honorable Robert Purney The Honorable Lowell C. Krumnow The Honorable Robert Skilliter, Jr.

t The Honerable Peter Macko The Honorable Carleton Finkbeiner The Honorable Thomas Brown C. Koebel, President, Ottawa County Board of Commissioners The Honorable Kathleen K. Dziak INPO Distribution:

RPC (E-Mail)

G. Tracy, OEDO wiencls Chief, NRR/ DISP /PIPB w/encis T. Boyce, NRR w/encls

//

Project Director, NRR w/encls

//

Project Mgr., NRR w/encls J. Caldwell, Rlli w/encls B. Clayton, Rill w/encis R. Lickus, Rill w/enets SRI Davis-Besse w/encls DRP w/encls DRS (2) w/encls Rill PRR yv/encls PUBLIC IE-01 w/encls Docket Filh'w/encls GREENS g100&<J

Pogo: 1 of 9 Dolo:03/26/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission -

Tim e: is: m e nooion a PLANT ISSUE MATRIX DAVIS-BESSE By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Dale Source Area ID Type Codes item Description 02/12/1999 1999001 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt1B Conservative actions were taken to isolate letdown cooler 1-1 when it was identified that one of its rupture discs had partially folled g

Tec 02/12/1999 1999001 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt SB The inspectors concluded that the results of the employee ottitude and culture su vey that was performed lost year, which had positive findings regarding the nuclear safety culture, personneljob satisfoction, and g.

supervisor credibuity, were gererony consistent with observed behovfors and attitudes of Icensee personnel Tec that the Station Review Board provided offective oversight of important station sk 6 6iiuiive prc^ esses, and

' hot the Monogement Review Committee effecttve!y prioritized and assigned condition reports for action 02/12/1999 1999001-01 Prt OPS NRC NCV Prt 3A Emergency desel generator (EDG) 2 was inadvertentty rendered inoperable for four hours because of incitention-to-detail by operators during the generation and review of a togout and a lock of a questiv, a ig attitude by operators while hanging the togout. One Non-Cited Violation resulted wten the Icensee failed Tec to do o surveillonce within the required time offer the EDG was rendered inoperable 12/22/1998 1998018 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt The initial corrective actions taken to address the events which led to several plant trips and a plant runbock in the latter port of 1998 resulted in event-free performance since mid-October 1993 Tec 12/22/1998 1998018 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt 1B Operations monogement took conservative measures to commence shutting down the plant. due to lowering intoke fore' oy levels, in anticipation of the possibility that the Technical Specification 3.7.5.1 Emit for o

g.

Intoke foreboy water level would be exceeded Tec 12/22/1998 1998018 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt1C The operations department action plan to isolate and restore letdown in order to minimize personnel dose was well thought out, executed, and monoged g gp g

Tec 11/20/1998 1998020 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt 1 A Control room operators were knowledgeable of equipment status and effecitvely communicated plant Sec:

Sec:

Tec 11/20/1998 1998020 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt 1C in generd, operators assigned to the simulation control room executed their duties durir7 ubnormd and emergency con &ans in a safe manner, and in accordance with station procedures orn vmogement g.

g, expectations. Mir/ ; deficiencies in indvidud operator performance were prompffy identtts md dscussed Tec with the operating crew members. The operating crew's ability to implement oppropriate safeguards measures was not impeded by individud operator errors.

11/20/1998 1998020 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt 1C The licensed operator continuing training progrorn provided oppropriate instruction en lessons learned from significant industry events.

Tec ttem Type (Compliance.Other) From 08/15/1998 To 03/26/1999

. = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.

Page: 2 of 9 Dole:03/26/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission nme:isme hgion a PLANT ISSUE MATRIX DAVIS-BESSE By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Dole Source Areo ID Type Codes item Description 11/20/1998 1998020 Prl' OPS NRC POS Prt 1C The requolification program examinations, which included on operating test and a written examination, were developed in accordance with progrom guidance and were consistent wtth regulatory requirements.

i k-Sec,*

The requalificotton progrom evoluotions for determining mastery of 5 censed operator ski!!s were conducted Tec in accordance with program guidance and were consistent with regulatory requirements. Experienced evoluotors were utilized to verify individud mostery of required operotor skills.

11/20/1998 1998020 Prh OPS NRC POS Prt 1C An oppropriate feedbock process was in place to provide input for the improvernent of the Heensed operator continuing training program. The various mechonisms for providing operator feedback mode the process very effective.

l Tec l

11/20/1998 1998020 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt IC Individual operotors reouiring accelerated requalification training were appropriately assigned o remedation package requiring completion prior to returning the operator to licensed duties.

Sec:

See:

Tec 11/09/1998 1998017 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt 1B Two manual reactor trips. on outomatic reactor trip and a plant runbock occurred during th!s inspection period. The inspectors concluded that the operators responded conservatively and prompfty to ensure the g.

g, reactor was in a stable condition following each event. Operctors correctfy implemented procedures and Tec property entered and exited Technical Specifications. Communications during the events were effective and senior reactor operators demonstrated very good command and control during each event. However, it was of concern that the licensee's processes were not effecttve in preventing these events from occurring 11/09/1998 1998017 Prt OPS NRC POS PrtIB Station personnel responded to a lockout of Bus K and iso'otion of the Transformer XO2 in occordance w:th plant procedures. Good teamwork between station personnel was noted. Subsequently, Transformer XO2 g.*

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was prompt'y restored to service Tec 11/09/1998 1998017 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt 2A Plant operators were prepared for the possibility that the main feedwater regulating volve could go closed during surveillance testing of the steam / teed regulating control system and, when it did, responded W*

Sec'-

promptly by monuouy tripping the reactor. Operators oiso responded well to the MSSV that lifted and to o t

Tec failed turbine byposs volve subsequent to the trip t

I 10/23/1998 1998019 Prt OPS NRC NEG Prt IB The inspectors concluded inct the operators should have consulted with engineering and maintenance personnel before proceeding with the CCW pump 2 start. Storting the pump resulted in the complete failure g.

g, of the CCW rupture disk which resutted in a manual reactor trip with complications.

Tec I

10/23/1998 1998019 Prt OPS NRC NEG PrtIB Control room operators were slow to re-enter the overcooling section of Procedure DB-OP-02000 when it was recognized that the cooldown rate was excessive which resulted in on outomatic rather than a monud Sec" M.'

steam and feed water rupture controt system isolation of the steam and condensate system.

Tec 10/23/1998 1998019 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt 1B The inspectors concluded that, overoll, control room operators responded we!! to the lockout of electried buses D1 and D2, the component coding water (CCW) system rupture disk failure, and the main steam g.*

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safety vdve thof did not immediately resect. Emergency procedures were effectively implemented and Tec station monogement provided good oversight.

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United States Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission nme:i3xis ResPon e PLANT ISSUE MATRIX DAVIS-BESSE By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Date Source Areo ID Type Codes item Description 02/12/1999 1999001 Pi MAINT NRC NEG Prt 3A The inspectors determined that the dominant root cause of the events of the post year were m

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Sec: 3C avalloble personnel. Consequentty, plant personnel did not dways comply with work process guidelbes, did Ter not always seek additiond assistance when problems were encountered during their octMtles, spent less time reviewing work packaget and dd not always conduct os thorough reviews as necessory before proceeding with tasks 02/12/1999 1999001 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 2B The inspectors concluded that station personnel were odhering to the risk motrix and that efforts to update 3.

the matrix should improve the licensee's risk-Informed decision-making process Tec 02/12/1999 1999001 Prt MAINI NRC POS Prt SC The corrective actions to stop work, reinforce expectofions, and reschedule work have been effective to increase the quo!ity of work in the short term os evidenced by the lock of significant human performance g.

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related maintenance issues and examples of good performance since November. Station monogement Tec efforts to increase emphasis on human performance and to initiate stoffing increases in criticd skill creos should help to bolonce work lood with available resources in the long term 02/12/1999 1999001 Prk MAINT NRC POS Prt SC The inspectors determined that a human performance stand-down was beneficid towards ereuring that maintenance personnelimplemer't lessons-learned from the events of the post year 3g, 3

Tec 12/22/1998 1998018 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 2A Although the initiot oction plan developed to odd ess a pocking leok on letdown cooler 1-1 Isolation volve MU-1 A did not icke into account the additiond stress that would exist on the body-tM)onnet bolts if the g.*

3 volve was shut, the find plan used to oddress the leck, which resutted in stopping the pocking leak and a

Tec slowing the body-to-bonnet leck, was comprehensive and conservative. Good teamwork was exhibited by 6

operations, engineering. maintenance, and radiction protection personne?.

12/22/1998 1998018 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 28 FirstEnergy technicians inodvertently left a test device instolied during restoration of a transmission control circuit, resulting in the Inodvertent opening of switch ABS 34626 and the temporary unavailability of one of g

g, the two qudified offsite circuits. Subsequentty, station management took comprehensive remedal Tec corrective actions by verifying compliance with the technicd specifications, stopping work on high risk octivities, determining the apparent root cause, ossessing the domoge to ABS 34626, requiring continuous l

station personnel oversight for the remainder of the switchyard testing octMties, and restoring the swttchyard i

to o normd lineup 12/22/1998 1998018-01 Prt MAINT NRC NCV Prt 2B inodequate work instructions led to o contractor creating on opening in the control room negative pressure boundary greater than the o!! owed three square Inches wttich rendered both trains of control room Sec'*

W.

emergency ventilation inoperable. This was a Non-Cited Violation of NRC requirements Tec i

l i

i Itern Type (Compliance.Other), From 08/15/1998 To 03/26/1999

Page: 5 of 9 Date: 03/26/1999 United Stat:s Nuclear R:gulatory Commission u m.: n:u:ia stegion in PLANT ISSUE MATRIX DAVIS-BESSE By Primary Functional Area L

L Functional Temploto t

Dale Source Area ID Type Codes item Description t

11/09/1998 1998017 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt SC Licensee management took severd octions in order to prevent recurrence of the recent events and

[

Improve overcil performance, includng: Issuing a stop work order follovdng the October 21 plant runbock to g.

g.*

focus efforts in identifying and correcting the causes of the events: estobushing a work rev!ew team to review i

Tec work packages prior to issuance; and initiating a conective significance review to identify Orguicikmci and i

equipment issues that contr!buted to the events. The inspectors concluded that these oeflons were Initially 4

effective In ensuring work pockoges were adequate to support error free work actMiles for the remainder of 1

the inspection period 10/23/1998 1998019 Pvt MAINI NRC POS Prt 2B Troubleshooting and equipment repoirs associated with the bus lockout and CCW system were performed I

professionally. Personnel did not appear pressured to complete octMties to meet the restart schedule.

g g

Tec 10/21/1998 1998017-02 Prt MA!NT NRC -

VIOIV Prt 2B One violation was identified associated with the performance of an inadequate ridu Jm,cr.ce work order f

which resulted in o plant runbock from 100 percent to 60 percent power. Control room operators were

[

g.

g.*

unoware of the werk octMty which led to the runbock due to the foBure of the shift monoger to inform the Tec operators that he opproved work to deenergize o circuit in panel YAU. The control room operators responded promptly and effective?y to ensure the plant was placed in a stable condtion in o timely manner fonowing the event.

10/02/1998 1998017-03 Prt MAINT NRC NCV Prt 2B One Non-Cited Violation was identified when the inspectors determined that on instrument and controls l

technician specified the wrong overpower trip setpoint during the reactor protection system Channel 2 g.

calibration check. Contributing to this procedurol error was the failure of the l&C technicion to verify the Tec correct overpower trip setpoint with the shift supervisor. The error was corrected and the calibration was completed cocectly.

09/18/1998 1998014 Prt MAINT NRC POS Pri: 28 Online safety squipmen+ outages were performed wen and in accordonce with procedures. An increase in l

the CCW system outoge scope was handled wen and sofety-related equipment was returned to service wei g.

g.*

within the o!! owed outage time L

Ter:

i 02/12/1999 1999001 Prt ENG NRC NEG Prt 4C in generd, the conduct of engineering activities was chorocterized by careful planning and good l

corr.munications to the rest of the organization. Detracting from this was a failure of performance g.

g, engineering personnel to communicote to management that a corrective action plan to make volve i

Tec CV5010E operoble, by ensuring that its stroke time was within its acceptance criterio, had been changed to stroke timing the volve with a more occurate timing device rather than odjusting the Hmit switch setting 02/12/1999 1999001 Prt i NRC POS Prk 4A The use of rupture disks in the CCW system has proven to be on unreHobie design. Pending parts availability.

l the licensee intends to replace the rupture disks with a more reliable design during the May mid-cycle j

outage Tec i

02/12/1999 1999001 Prt ENG NRC POS Prt 48 Engineering personnel effectively supported plant operations by using visud and thermd imaging technology to determine that the component cooling water (CCW) system rupture disk downstream of Sec*

k-

• letdown cooler 1-1 was leaking. thereby minimizing dose and avoiding unnecessary thermal cycling of the l

Tec letdown coolers item Type (Compliance.Other), From 08/15/1998 To 03/26/* 999

Page: 6 of 9 Date:03/26/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm..ission Time:ismis itegion m PLANT ISSUE MATRIX DAVIS-BESSE By Pdmory Functional Areo Functional Template Date Source Aroo ID Type Codes item Description 12/22/1998 1998018 Prt ENG NRC NEG PR4C Although station personnelidentified that sitt had built up in the eastern end of the intoke cond and developed o plan to dredge the canol, the hspectors determined that a plan had not been developed to Se' Sec: 5B ensure the sitt level in the intoke canal would be monitored at a frequency sufficient to ensure it remained Tec below 562 feet 12/22/1998 1998018 Pri' ENG NRC POS Prt 4B Engineering personnel anticipated a lowering lake level due to o forecost of high winds, and took pro-octive measures to notify operations and maintenance personnel to monitor canal water level and to be prepared g,'

g,'

to remove some of the sitt buildJp with a boCkhoe Tec I

11/09/1998 1998017 Prl: ENG NRC NEG PrtSB The inspectors concluded that dthough there was some basis for determining that a solenoid volve used for closing the main feedwater regulating volve was operating correctly, the decision to dectore !! functiond g*

g, and continue with testing was non-conservative. Once the testing was resurned, a moh feed regulating Tec volve went closed and operators initiated a monud reactor trip of the plant l

10/23/1998 1998019 Prt ENG NRC POS Prt 4A Although no design basis Information existed for the CCW system, the licensee cdculated that the surge tonk lavel Intertocks provided odequate protection against four rupture disks foiling. Because of the lack of l

g, design basis information, the licensee planned to validate the design for the entire CCW system Tec 10/23/1998 1998019 Prt ENG NRC POS Prt SC The inspectors concluded that the licensee's opprooch to identifying and resolving equipment problems was methodical and comprehensive. All known equipment onomalies were documented and entered into the 3,c, 3

g Ecensee's corrective action program and resolved before plant restort.

i Tec G9/18/1998 1998014 Prt ENG NRC NEG Prt 3A The inspectors concluded that a human error, while colculating thermal performance dato for CCW Heat Exchanger #2 and not actual f.eot exchanger degrodotion, resulted in the opporent failure of the thermal g

performance test Tec 09/18/1998 1998014 Prt ENG NRC POS PrtSA The inspectors observed the monogement rev!ew committee oppropriately categorize and assign Potentid g.

3.

Condition Adverse to Quality Reports (PCAQRs) and the PCAQR review board oppropriately assess proposed corrective actions. The station review board effectively reviewed Priority 1 and Priority 2 PCAQRs Tec and a revision to the Offsite Dose Co!culation Manual. The Ecensee satisfied TS 6.5.1 requirements for the station review boord 02/05/1999 1999002 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt IC The licensee's 1998 non-outoge dose was higher than expected due to emergent actMiles which required severd "at power" containment entries. Although weR planned and controlled, these entries resulted in the g.

g' neutron dose total being the highest recorded in the lost severd years at the site. The Icensee's externoi Tec dosimetry quality control program was effectively implemented and identified o blos in the vendor's processing cigorithm for mixed beto/gomma radiction fields, wtilch was corrected by the vendor 02/05/1999 1999002 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt IC Overall. the licensee had on effective program for monitoring and controlling internd exposure. Specifically, 3,e^,

internal dose ossessments and assigned doses were property performed and recorded, and respiratory protection devices and fit test equipment were well maintained. While the inspectors identified that the Tec licensee did not have o formal maintenance program for the portoble filter units and identified a deficiency with a related procedure these units were maintained in good physicol condition item Type (Compliance.Other), From 08/15/1998 To 03/26/1999

Pose: 7 of 9 Dale:03/26/1999 United States Nuclear Ragulatory Comm. ion iss um.: i3:ma stegion n PLANT ISSUE MATRIX DAVIS-BESSE By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Dole Source Area ID Type Codes llem Descripflon 02/05/1999 1999002 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt IC Primary and secondary water chemistry parameters were well controlled and were consistent with industry guidelines. A potentiot fuel defect was oppropriately identified and was being closely mon!tored by the g.

Sec.

chemistry stoff. Chemistry procedures were of good quality Ter:

02/05/1999 1999002 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS PrtIC The licensee was taking proper actions to minimize steam generator corrosion os stated in their Strategic i

Water Chemistry Plon. A contract study concluded that the June 1998, resin intrusion event did not appear g.

g.*

to have on adverse offect on steam generator integrity. Ucensee planned actions to remove residual resin Tec still entrained in the generator were technicolly sound 02/05/1999 1999002 Prk PLTSUP NRC POS Prt1C The licensee used effective ALARA controls during on "at power

• containment entry to c! eon boric ocid deposited onto the containment fan coolers from o tecking overhead pressurizer isolation volve Tec 02/05/1999 1999002 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prk IC Chemistry sampling and analyses were well conducted and laboratory housekeeping was good. Some problems were identified with the radiooctive labeling of laborotory glosswore and tools which the Ecensee g.

g ',

was oddressing Tec 02/05/1990 1999002 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt1C Chemistry instrumentation was well maintained and the chemistry staff effectively implemented the quoEty control program. Ucensee performance in inter and introlaboratory cross check programs was good.

Soc-MM olthough bloses were noted in the analyses results for Ethium and hydrozine. These bloses remained within Tec the opplicable acceptance band and were being oppropriately addressed by the chemistry staff I

02/05/1999 1999002 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt IC Chemistry self-ossessments were thorough and self-critico!. Severci ossessments identified procedural deficiencies similar to those identified during recent NRC inspections of the radiction protection program.

3,g. SB inese deficiencies were being oddressed by the licensee Tec 12/22/1998 1998018 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt IC The inspectors concluded that station personnel took effective measures to minimize dose and the spread of contomination during volve MU-l A maintenance and containment oir cooler cleaning activities Tec 09/18/1998 1998015 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt1C The inspected emergency response facilities were found in on excellent state of operational reodiness.

Equipment. supplies, and prompt olert and notification system sirens were well-maintained. The weekfy g

g.

pager testing and semi-annual ougmentation testing was effective. Very good procedures provided for Tec semiannual ougmentation drills and included criterio for their evoluction.

t O?/18/1998 1998015 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt IC Overo!L the EP progrom had been maintained in on effective state of operational readiness. Monogement support to the program was apparent and interviewed key emergency response personnel demonstrated a 3,c.

g.

good working knovdedge of responsibilities and emergency procedures.

Tec Item Type (Compliance,Other), From 08/15/1998 To 03/26/1999 i

Pogo: 8 of 9 Date: 03/26/1999 United Stat:s Nuclear R:gulatory Commiss. ion an.:is:ua8 nooion a PLANT ISSUE MATRIX davis-BESSE By Primary Functional Area Functional Temploie Dale Source Aroo ID Type Codes item Description W/18/1998 1998015 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt 1C The EP training program appeared effective. Selected key Emergency Re:ce ise Or u hurwi(ERO) u personnel demonstrated good working knowledge of emergency responsibilities and procedures. The g.

g.

licensee was proactive in identifying and immediately correcting four ERO personnel's training needs.

Ter:

Emergency response organization personnel self-contained breathing opporotus qualifications included sufficient numbers of personnel from each department and were oppropriately trocked.

09/18/1998 1998015 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt IC The EP program reporting structure continued to be effective. Monogement support for the emergency preporedness program was evident, os indicated by the demonstrated copobilities during the recent g.

tomodo event and continued improvement in the program, training, and equipment.

Ter:

I 09/18/1998 1998015 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS PrtIC The emergency pion was effectively implemented during the June 24.1998, tornodo event, which was properly c: ossified as on Alert. Delays in completion of initial offsite notifications and facility staffing were i

g.*

g ottributed to the severe weather conditions. Station personnel responded wet to this event.

f Ter:

09/04/1998 1998016 Prk PLTSUP NRC POS PrtIC ALARA plans and pract:ces were effective in reducing doses during the eleventh refueHng outoge. Outoge dose gools were achieved as a result of more effective work processes, and enhanced use of remote monitoring and communications equipment.

Ter 09/04/1998 1998016 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt IC Radiological controls for o contoinment entry during power operations on September 1,1998 were property established and effectively implemented. The pre-Job briefing was thorougtt worker's roles and g.

g.

f responsibilities were clearly communicated and relevant information was obtained and exchanged in Ter:

occordance with procedure. The rodiction protection (RP) stoff's response to a worker skin contuia e5di that occurred during the entry was prompt and oppropriate 09/04/1998 1998016 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt IC The licensee effectively implemented on externoi dosimetry quality control (OC) prograrTL and continued to maintain good oversight of the dosimetry processor. Periodic QC checks were performed to ensure the l

g.

g' occuracy of processed dosimetry, and onomalous results were evotuoted in accordance with station Ter procedure j

09/04/1998 1998016 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS PrtIC Staff response to the June 24,1998, condensate demineralizer resin intrusion into the steam generators was l

UPP' O'

Sec~

Sec: IB cnd frequent coordination with vendor personnel ensured that the licensee's actions and long term recove'ry Ter plans were technically sound i

10/23/1998 1998019 Prt OTHER NRC MISC Prt 2A The CCW system responded in accordance with its documented design throughout the event. The train 2

[

nonessentici volves that cycled open and close was caused by confBcting inputs to volve logic, due to the g.

g.

train 1 flow sensor being out-of-service and the train 2 pump breaker being open. Fotowing the rupture dsk j

Ter:

failure, the automatic containment isolation volve closure stopped the surge fork level decrease at the opproximate level of the divider plate in the tank.

h

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• PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Davis-Besse Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP' -, sALP Area = ' Operations *, Beginning Date m *10/1/1997*, Ending Date = '8/15/1998*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 1

8/14/1998 Positive IR 98011 NRC Operations SB The operating experience program effectively assessed operating experience, informed the proper personnel of the assessments, generated technically sound corrective actions when appropriate, and correctly implemented the actions.

2 6/23/1998 Positive IR 98009 Self-Operations 1A A power reduction to repair a main feed pump was well planned and Revealed controlled with effective managemert oversight 3

6/23/1998 Positive IR 98009 NRC Operations IA Effective communications and thorough control room briefs during plant restart following the refueling outage were noted. The activities were careful'y controlled 4

6/23/1998 NCV IR 98009 Licensee Operations 3A The inspectors concluded that, on two separate occasions, operators performed actions without management approval when faced with unanticipated c.rcumstances. In the first case, an operator did not follow an emergency diesel generator (EDG) operating procedure when he improperly opened a bus tie breaker. This deenergized a 4160-volt safety-related bus and momentarily overloaded EDG#2. In the second case, after an operator closed the wrong low pressure injection system suction valve, recovery actions were taken without control room supervisor approval. In both instances, operators did not meet management's expectations.

(NCV 50-346/98009-01(DRP))

5 5/12/1998 Positive IR 98005 NRC Operations 1A The licensee appropriately considered shutdown risk before scheduling activities affecting the operation of the decay heat removal system and during reactor vessel draining activities. Generally, the operators used good communication techniques and had appropriate control of the drain down evolution. Procedures regarding reduced inventory and mid-Icop operations met the intent of Generic Letter 88-17, " Loss of Shutdown Cooling" 6

5/12/1998 Negative IR 98005 NRC Operations 1A 3C Poor communication among control room personnel regarding a redundant valve controller failure occurred while lowe'ing reactor vessel water level 7

5/12/1998 Negative IR 98005 NRC Operations 3B During the transfer of radioactive water from the reactor coolant drain tank to the clean waste receiver tank, a degraded filter inlet isolation valve caused the water to be diverted to the miscellaneous waste tank.

Operators did not recognize the water diversion until approximately 8000 gallons had been transferred.

Page 1 of 5

3/26/1999.

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Davis-Besse Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP*, SALP Area =

• Operations", Beginning Date = *10/1/1997*, Ending Date = '8/1s/1998*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 8

5/12/1998 Positive IR 98005 NRC Operations SA The inspectors concluded the licensee effectively prepared for outage activities by scripting risk significant tasks.

9 5/12/1998 Negative IR 98005 Licensee Operations SC A procedural weakness was identified in that a formal reactor coolant system inventory balance was not performed. This weakness could have been identified earlier if two information notices had been dispositioned more aggressively.

10 4/10/1998 Positive IR 98005 Self-Operations 1B 3B Operators reacted very well to an unexpected resin burst in the letdown Revealed system that plugged filters in the system and caused difficulty in controlling pressurizer level. The operators prevented resin from entering '

the reactor coolant system and appropriately tripped the reactor before the increasing water level could cha!!enge the pressurizer code safety valves.

11 3/27/1998 Positive IR 98004 NRC Operations 1A Implementation of the new work support center has significantly reduced distractions in the control room. Further, the administrative workload of the control room senior reactor operator has been reduced, allowing him to devote more of his attention towards supervising control room and shift i

personnel and towards observing the performance of plant equipment.

12 3/27/1998 Positive IR 98004 NRC Operations 1C Overall, observed simulator training was pertinent and effective towards providing assurance that operators were proficient to shut down the plant in an orderly manner.

13 3/27/1998 Positive IR 98004 NRC Operations SA The inspectors reviewed a Qually Assessment Audit Report that evaluated the effectiveness of control room activities. The inspectors concluded that the findings were generally consistent with observations made by the inspectors and that it had good scope and depth.

14 2/18/1998 Positive IR 98002 NRC Operations 1A SA The inspectors observed that the plant was operated in a controlled, conservative manner. Plant issues that were identified were appropriately handled in accordance with the licensee's corrective action program cr material deficiency program. Operators were knowledgeable of Technical '

Specification (TS) operability requirements and tagouts were implemented in accordance with the tagout procedure. Generally, the operators exhibited good knowledge of plant equipment status and properly used plant operating procedures. Control room operators and equipment operators were observed to be adequately fulfilling their duties (Sections 01.1 and 04.1).

Page 2 of 5

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX

/28/m -

Davis-Besse Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Colurnn = *SALP* ; SALP Area = ' Operations *, Beginning Date = *10/1/1997*, Ending Date = '8/1s/1998*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 15 2/18/1998 Misc IR 98002 NRC Operations 3A The operations manager appropriately communicated physical fitness expectations to the operating crews after being notified by the inspectors that a shift supervisor stood watch with the medical condition of laryngitis (Section 06.1).

16 2/18/1998 VlO/SL-IV IR 98002 Self-Operations 3A Plant operations were impacted on two occasions when operators Revealed displayed a lack of attention to detail. The first example involved the inadvertent isolation of seal injection te all four reactor coolant pump seal packages due to an operator error. The second example involved the lifting of a letdown system relief valve due to an operator not performing a procedure in the correct sequence. These events are two examp!es of a violation of TS 6.8.1 (Section O1.2).

17 2/18/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98002 NRC Operations 4C 3B The inspectors identified one violation of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) where the licensee did not report to the NRC, within one hour of the discovery, that speed sensing circuitry for Emergency Diesel Generator #1 was not designed per the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, design criteria for hot short protection, a condition outside the design basis of the plant (Section F8.1).

18 1/28/1998 Positive IR 97015 NRC Operations 2A Valve line-ups and major flow paths for both engineered safety features and important-to-safety systems were verified to be consistent with plant procedures / drawings and the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR).

Other/NA 19 1/28/1998 Positive IR 97015 NRC Operations 2A 1B The inspectors observed that the operators maintained good control of the plant during a failure of the servo control valve for Turbine Control Valve No. 4.

Teamwork / Skill Level 20 1/28/1998 Negative IR 97015 NRC Operations 3A A reactor operator missed noticing that the computer display for Group 38, which indicates reactor core nuclear parameters and calculates secondary heat balance power, did not update for a 50-minute period because he became distracted with a problem on the Nuclear Operations Management System. Personnel Performance Deficiency 21 1/28/1998 Positive IR 97015 NRC Operations 3A 1A Operations activities were conducted in a controlled, conservative manner. Shift briefs were thorough, operators had good knowledge of plant status and activities, and procedures were consistently complied with. Plant management was aware of and responded to operational issues in an appropriate manner. Involved Management Page 3 of 5

3/26/1999 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Davis-Besse Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP' ; SALP Area = " Operations', Beginning Date = *10/1/1997* ; Ending Date = '8/15/1998*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 22 12/17/1997 LER LER 97016 Licensee Operations 2B The refueling canal drain valve to the reactor cavity sump (DH92) was not locked open per the requirements of the procedure, Operation and Control of Locked Valves, to exclude it from the surveillance requirement for Emergency Core Cooling System and Containment Spray System flow path valves. The bypass valves (DH10 and DH26) fo. the reator coolant system to decay heat pump suction isolation valves were not included in the surveillance procedure to verify the ECCS flow path. Personnel Performance Deficiency 23 11/10/1997 Positive IR 97013 NRC Operations 2A Important-to-safety system lineups and major flowpaths were verified to be in conformance with plant procedures / drawings and the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Equipment material condition was excellent in all cases. Teamwork / Skill Level 24 11/10/1997 Positive IR 97013 NRC Operations 2A 3A The excellent material condition of the plant resulted in minimal operator challenges. Operators provided immediate response to plant annunciators and exhibited good adherence to procedures. On-shift communications were good. Tagouts provided adequate protection of equipment and personnel during maintenance activities. Involved Management 25 11/10'1997 Positive IR 97013 NRC Operations 5B Management Review Committee members effectively administered the initial categorization and assignme..t of Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Reports. Involved Management 26 10/1/1997 VIO/SL-IV 1R 97009 NRC Operations 1C The " Conduct of Operations" procedure granted the shift supervisor unilateral authority to allow procedural steps to be performed out-of-order. The NRC identified that this authority did not conform to the requirements of Technical Specification 6.5.3.1.b in that for a procedure change, a second review and approval by another member of plant management staff was not specified in the procedure

,(Section O8.1). Inadequate Procedure / Instruction 27 10/1/1997 Positive IR 97009 NRC Operations 2A Material condition of engineered safety features and important-to-safety plant systems was excellent (Section O2.1).

28 10/1/1997 Negative IR 97009 NRC Operations 3A Communications and documentation associated with a Limiting Conditions for Operation action that was required in response to an inoperable Reactor Protection System channel was inadequate (Section i

O1.2). Personnel Performance Deficiency l

Page 4 of 5

3/26/1999 -

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TAELE LACELS A counter number used for NRC intemal editing.

The date of the event or significant issue. For those items that have a clear date of occurrence use the actual date. If the actual date is not known, use the date DATE the issue was identified. For issues that do not have an actual date or a date of identification, use the LER or inspection report date.

TYPE The categorization of the issue - see the TYPE ITEM CODE table.

SOURCE The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.

ID BY Identification of who discovered the issue - see table.

SALP SALP Functional Area Codes - Engineering, Maintenance, Operations, Plant Support and A!!/ Multiple (i.e., more than one SALP area affected).

SMM CODES Senior Manager Meeting Codes - see table.

DESCRIPTION Details of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summaries.

TYPE ITEM CODE NOTES SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING CODES '

DEV Deviation from NRC Requirements Eels are apparent violations of NRC 1

Operational Performance:

ED Escalated Discretion - No Civil Penalty requirements that are being considered for A - Normal escalated enforcement action in accordance B - During Transients EEI' Escalated Enforcement issue - Waiting Final NRC Action with the " General Statement of Policy and C - Programs and Processes LER License Event Report to the NRC Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action Licensing Licensing Issue from NRR (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600.

2 Materia! Condition:

Misc Miscellaneous (Emergency Preparedness Finding, etc.)

However, the NRC has not reached its final A-Equipment Condition NCV Non-Cited Violation enforcement decision on the issues B - Programs and Processes Negative Individual Poor Licensee Performance identified by the Eels and the PIM entries 3

Human Performance:

Positive Individual Good Licensee Performance may be modified when the final decisions A - Work Performance am made. Before the NRC makes its B - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities Strength Overall Strong Licensee Performance enforcement decision, the licensee will be C - Work Environment URl" Unresolved Inspection item provided with an opportunity to either VIO/SL-l Notice of Violation - Severity Level I (1) respond to the apparent violation or 4

Engineering / Design:

VIO/SL-Il Notice of Violation - Severity Level 11 (2) request a predecisional enforcement A - Design VIO/SL-Ill Notice of Violation - Severity Level 111 conference.

B - Engineering Support

• • UR!s are unresolved items about which C - Programs and Processes VIO/SL-IV Notice of Violation - Severity Level IV Weakness Overall Weak Licensee Performance 5

Problem idenMication and Resolut.on:

i wh e h ue n e s

acceptable item, a deviation, a ID BY nonconformance, or a violation. However, B-Analysis C - Resolution i

the NRC has not reached its final Licensee The licensed ut;lity conclusions on the issues, and the PIM NRC The Nuclear F'egulatory Commission entries may be modified when the final Self-Revealed Identification oy an event (e.g., equipment breakdown) conclusions are made.

Other identification unknown I

Page 5 of 5

-1

3/26/1999 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Davis-Besse Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Colurnn = "SALP" ; SALP Area = " Maintenance *, Beginning Dato = "10/1/1997*. Ending Date = '8/15/1998" DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 1

6/23/1998 Negative IR 98009 NRC Maintenance SA Management's expectation to promptly generate a potential condition adverse to quality report (PCAOR) was not met fo!!owing the inspectors' discovery of an improperly installed wafer check valve, a valve used to ensure effective emergency. ventilation system operation. Although the check valve was promptly re-installed correctly, a PCAQR documenting this condition was not written until the inspectors brought the issue to management's attention a week later 2

5/12/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98005 NRC Maintenance 2B The procedure used to fill the steam generator using a temporary manifold was not adequate to ensure all manifold valves used for this activity were contro!!ed. (Violation 346/98005-02) 3 5/12/1998 Positive IR 98005 NRC Maintenance 3A The inspectors concluded that refueling activities were performed in accordance with administrative procedures that provided multiple barriers to ensure that fuel movements were performed as planned.

4 5/12/1998 Positive IR 98005 NRC Maintenance 3C The establishment of a work support center outside of the control room reduced the distractions and the administrative tasks that operators in the control room had previously been required to perform. The inspectors confirmed that the operators remained aware of plant activities.

5 5/12/1998 Negative IR 98005 Self-Maintenance 3C 58 Several near-misses involving crane and rigging operations occurred in Revealed containment that jeopardized plant equipment and personnel safety. The licensee was addressing the collective significance of this issue. (NCV 346/98005-01.... Closed in report 50-346/98005) 6 5/12/1998 Positive IR 98005 NRC Maintenance SA During main steam safety valve testing, valves found out-of-tolerance were reset. Even though the main steam headers remained operable, the licensee used the guidance of NUREG-1022," Event Reporting Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73," to report an unusual number of valves outside setpoint tolerances. (NCV 346/98005-04... Closed in report ;

346/98005) j i

7 5/12/1998 Negative IR 98005 Self-Maintenance SC Two light fixtures were found broken which resulted in broken glass in the l Revealed refueling canal and the spent fuel pool. This may have been prevented had the actions taken to address a 1996 audit finding been more comprehensive 8

5/7/1998 Positive IR 98006 NRC Maintenance 2B The licensee adequately demonstrated the ability to properfy implement i

ISI and flow assisted corrosion programs, including eddy current examinations of the steam generator tubes.

Page 1 of 5

"S'SSS-PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Davis-Besse Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Coluran = *SALP* ; SALP Nea = " Maintenance *, Beginning Date = *10/1/1997*. Ending Date = '8/15/1998*

Ij#

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY l SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 9

5/7/1998 Positive IR 98006 NRC Maintenance 2B Code repair work perfctmed on the main steam isolation valve was well implemented with active technical vendor oversight.

10 5/7/1998 Positive IR 98006 NRC Maintenance 2B The addition of a ' data patrolman' to the steam generator eddy current examination team, in order to provide an additional quality assurance layer, demonstrated a thorough and rigorous effort to obtain quality data in this area important to safety.

11 G/1998 Positive IR 98006 NRC Maintenance 2B in general, licensee personnel and contracted personnel involved in flow assisted corrosion programs and ISI efforts appeared knowledgeable, well trained, and competent.

12 5/7/1998 Positive IR 98006 NRC Maintenance SA Technically, the most current technology and dispositioning protocols were used to assess and disposition the steam generator tubes.

Although not required until 1999, many of the good practices recommended by Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Pressurized Water Reactor Steam Generator Examination Guidelines, Revision 5, were implemented. The examination data was found to be in accordance with the applicable ISI procedures and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code requirements.

13 5/7/1998 Positive IR 98006 NRC Maintenance 58 2B Consistent with the compcnents importance to safety, the licensee demonstrated an aggressive asse=maa.! d vendor code repair and ISI contractor supplied procedures to assure that applicable ASME and regulatory requirements were met.

14 2/18/1998 Positive IR 98002 NRC Maintenance 2A 3A During surveillance activities, equipment was observed to perform as described by the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Maintenance personnel communicated adequately and adhered to procedure requirements while performing maintenance and surveillance activities.

The inspectors observed that oversight of maintenance activities was effective. Maintenance and surveillance testing activities were professionally conducted (Section M1.1).

15 1/28/1998 Positive IR 97015 NRC Maintenance 2B The licensee removed from service the level controller for both the Train 1 Auxiliary Feed Pump and the Motor Driven Feed Pump for a maintenance outage. The inspectors determined that operations work control personnel were knowledgeable of the maintenance rule requirements associated with this work, and that risk was appropriately considered in the planning stages. Teamwork / Skill Level Page 2 of 5

3/26/1999-PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Davis-Besse Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP*, SALP Area =

• Maintenance", Beginning Date = *10/1/1997* ; Ending Date = '8/15/1998*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 16 1/28/1998 Negative IR 97015 NRC Maintenance SA 2B The inspectors found that surveillance procedures for smoke detectors installed in ventilation ducts were not written in accordance with the vendor's technical manual recommendations. Although the detectors were not required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, the licensee failed to meet management's expectations because a PCAOR was not initially written to document this inconsistency until prompted by the inspectors.

Inadequate Procedure / Instruction 17 11/10/1997 Negative IR 97013 NRC Maintenance 28 The inspector noted that the implementing procedure for a technical specification suiveillance test did not require that test data be recorded.

This lack of documented test data prevented supervisory personnel from having the opportunity to verify that the acceptance criteria had been met. Inadequate Procedure / Instruction 18 11/10/1997 Positive IR 97013 NRC Maintenance 3A 2B Good communications between several departments contributed in minimizing the #2 Emergency Diesel Generator unavailability t:me during a routine maintenance outage. Dieselload swings observed during post maintenance surveillance testing were corrected in a timely manner.

Appropriate housekeeping, foreign material exclusion, and fire protection measures were observed. Surveillance activities were performed in conformance with written instructions, and surveillance results satisfied regulatory requirements. Teamwork / Skill Level 19 10/2/1997 LER LER 97013 Licensee Maintenance 28 The calibration test for the Safety Features Actuation System Channel 2 containment radiation instrument string was partially performed on June i

6,1996. Upon completion of the test, the Test Cover Sheet was erroneously marked and the schedule was updated to indicate the test was performed to meet the surveillance test schedule, even though the test was not performed in its entirety. Personnel Performance Deficiency ;

20 10/1/1997 Positive IR 97009 NRC Maintenance 2B Maintenance and surveillance activities observed or otherwise reviewed during the inspection period were conducted in accordance with plant procedures and applicable regulatory requirements (Section M1.1).

Teamwork / Skill Level Page 3 of 5

/26h999 "

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Davis-Besse Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMr A Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP' ; SALP Arec = " Maintenance *, Beginning Data = *10/1/1997* ; Ending Data = '8/15/1998*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SM.. ODES DESCRIPTION i

21 10/1/1997 Negative IR 97009 NRC Maintenance 2B Leakage integrity of the Component Cooling Water system was not verified nor were applicable acceptance criteria established for leakage between the essential and non-essential portions of the system. At the conclusion of the inspection period, engineering personnel were evaluating the need for additional integrated system leakage rate testing (Section E3.1). Inadequate Oversight b

t Page 4 of 5

3/26/1999 -;

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLE LABELS A counter number used for NRC intemal editing.

The date of the event or significant issue. For those items that have a cicar date of occurrence use the actual date. If the actual date is not known, use the date E

the issue was identified. For issues that do not have an actual date or a date of identification, use the LER or inspection report date.

TYPE The categorization of the issue - see the TYPE ITEM CODE table.

SOURCE The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.

ID %Y Identification of who discovered the issue - see table.

SALP SALP Functional Area Codes - Engineering, Maintenance. Operations, Plant Support and A!!/ Multiple (i.e., more than one SALP area affected).

SMM CODES Senior Manager Meeting Codes - see table.

DESCRIPTION Details of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summaries.

TYPE ITEM CODE NOTES SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING CODES DEV Deviation from NRC Requirements Eels are apparent violations of NRC 1

Operational Performance:

ED Escalated Discretion - No Civil Penalty requirements that are being considered for A - Normal escalated enforcement action in accordance B - During Transients eel' Escalated Enforcement issue - Waiting Final NRC Action with the " General Statement of Policy and C - Programs and Processes LER License Event Report to the NRC Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action Licertsing Licensing issue from NRR (Enforcement Policy). NUREG-1600.

2 Material Condition:

Misc Miscellaneous (Emelency Preparedness Finding, etc.)

However, the NRC has not reached its final A - Equipment Condition NCV Non-Cited Violation enforcement decision on the issues B - Programs and Processes Negative individual Poor Licensee Performance identified by the Eels and the PIM entries 3

Human Performance:

Positive Individual Good Licensee Performance may be modified when the final decisions A - Work Performance are made. Before the NRC makes its Strength Overall Strong Licensee Performance B - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities enforcement decision, the l,censee will be C - Work Environment i

URI'*

Unresolved inspection item provided with an opportunity to either VIO/SL-1 Notice of Violation - Severity Level I (1) respond to the apparent violation or 4

Engineering / Design:

VIO/SL-II Notice of Violation - Severity Level I!

(2) request a predecisional enforcement A - Design VIO/SL-ill Notice of Violation - Severity Level til conference.

B - Engineering Support

• • URis are unresolved items about which C - Programs and Processes VIO/SL-IV Notice of Violation - Seventy Level IV Weakness Overall Weak Licensee Performance 5

P I scation and Resolution:

e ue n ques on s a acceptable item, a deviation, a ID BY nonconformance, or a violaticn. However, B - AnaW.s C - Resolution the NRC has not reached its final Licensee The licensed utility conclusions on the issues, and the PIM NRC The Nuclear Regulatory Commission entries may be modified when the final Self-Revealed identification by an event (e.g., equipment breakdown) conclusions are made.

Other identification unknown

]

Page 5 of 5

3/2B/1999 -

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Davis-Besse Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP' ; SALP Area =

• Engineering

• Beginning Date a *10/1/1997* ; Ending Date = '8/15/1998*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP l SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 1

8/14/1998 Positive IR 98011 NRC Engineering 1C SC The NRC team concluded that management was committed to making the corrective action program effective. Significant management time was expended prior to meetings to ensure the Potential Conditions Adverse to Ouality Reports (PCAORs) addressed the full scope of each issue. Management support for the initiation of PCAORS was also good.

2 8/14/1998 Positive IR 98011 NRC Engineering 4C Based upon review of selected 10 CFR 50.59 screeAng documents and safety evaluations, the NRC team concluded that performance in this area was good. The screenings and evaluations were t;mough and accurately reflected the licensee's methodology for assuring deviations from design, as defined in the Updated Safety Analysis Report did not impact plant safety.

3 8/14/1998 Positive IR 98011 NRC Engineering SA The audit activities by the independent Safety Evaluation Group and I

Quality Assurance were effective, straight forward, and supported by the line organization. The issues identified by the audit group were supported by the line management and appropriate corrective actions were taken.

4 8/14/1998 Positive IR 98011 NRC Engineering SA The NRC team concluded that the licensee effectively captured the scope of the identified problems and resolved issues through the Potential Conditions Adverse to Quality Reports (PCAORs). However, more consideration could be given conceming' Probabilistic Risk Assessment when categorizing PCAORs such as the station blackout breaker failure PCAOR.

5 8/14/1998 Positive IR 98011 NRC Engineering SA SC The NRC team concluded that the corrective action process at Davis-Besse was proactive and effective. Enhancements and improvements continued to be made in identification, resolution, and prevention of problems. The threshold for identifying problems was appropriately low and root cause evaluations were thorough 6

8/14/1998 Positive IR 98011 NRC Engineering 5B The assignment of root cause analysis responsibility to the line organization and having management oversight early in the Potential Conditions Adverse to Quality Reports (PCAORs) process was an improvement in the root cause evaluation process. The team found that recent root cause analysis reports were thorough and effective.

7 8/14/1998 Positive iP 98011 NRC Engineering SC The licensee staff supported the corrective action process and recognized the program as an effective way to resolve issues.

Page 1 of 6

' SSS-PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Davis-Besse Search sorted by Date (Descending) and sMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP*. SALP Area =

• Engineering *, Beginning Date = *10/1/1997* ; Ending Date = '8/15/1998*

r l#

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 8

6/23/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98009 NRC Engineering 4A The inspectors found several unscreened openings around the base of the emergency sump screen enclosure that could permit particles of sufficient size into the sump during recirculation following a loss-of-coat int accident to potentially plug containment spray nozzles. The design basis requirement of protecting the spray nozzles from plugging was not translated into the emergency sump design and is a design control violation (VIO 50-346/98009-03(DRP))

9 6/23/1998 NCV IR 98009 Licensee Engineering 4C The licensee performed a change to the protective relay design of a safety-related 4160-volt breaker without property establishing the suitataty of the change, which is a i.m-cited violation of design control (NCV u0-346/98009-05(DRP)).

10 6/23/1998 Positive IR 98009 Licensee Engineering SC The licensee implemented an effective and methodical approach to identify and comprehensively resolve deficiencies in the actuation logic surveillance test program in response to Generic Letter 96-01, " Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits" 1

11 5/12/1998 Positive IR 98005 NRC Engineering 48 The inspectors concluded that engineering personnel conducted a comprehensive inspection and evaluation of the effects of dust from sandblasting the shield building annulus on equipment in the affected rooms.

12 5/12/1998 Positive IR 98005 NRC Engi.neering SA The inspectors observed the meetings of the Station Review Board and Management Review Committee; and evaluated the activities of Quality Assessment personnel. Overall, these organizations and individuals were effective in their respective roles.

13 3/31/1998 Negative IR 98004 NRC Engineering 4B Weak engineering support to maintenance activities led to the inadvertent breach of the emergency ven;ilation system negative pressure boundary when workers drilled through a drain pipe imbedded in the decay heat removal heat exchanger room. Although no spread of contamination occurred, breaching the boundary exposed the workers to a potentially contaminated system. Clear guidance on the necessary drawings for the engineers to review before approving the drilling location was not readily available to the evaluating engineer due to this being an infrequently performed evolution. The plant response to the event was timely and adequate. The proposed corrective actions were acceptable.

Page 2 of 6

/26/1999' PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Davis-Besse Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP", SALP Area =

• Engineering" : Beginning Date = *10/1/1997*, Ending Data = '8/15/t998*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 14 3/31/1998 Positive IR 98004 NRC Engineering SA The inspectors observed activities of the licensee's offsite review committee. The inspectors concluded that the offsite review committee members effectively communicated concems and suggestions with plant management.

15 3/31/1998 Positive IR 98004 NRC Engineering 5B The inspectors concluded that engineering personnel performed a thorough and detailed review of the concems raised by Information Notice 97-90, "Use of Non-conservative Acceptance Criteria in Safety-Related Pump Surveillance Tests" 16 3/31/1998 Positive IR 98004 Licensee Engineering SC The licensee was adequately addressing NRC and self-identified Updated Safety Analysis Report discrepancies.

17 3/19/1998 Licensing 98NRRPM NRC Engineering 4C Licensing submittals by the licensees continue to be excellent. The licensing bases are thoroughly reviewed, the technical issues are addressed in-depth, and safety issues are appropriately dispositioned.

18 3/19/1998 Licensing 98NRRPM NRC Engineering 4C 3A Communicatior.s between Davis-Besse licensing staff and NRR continue to be very effective. Some schedules slip on non-safety-significant issues due to the licensees' workioad, though all safety issues are handled promptly.

19 2/26/1998 Positive IR 98003 NRC Engineering 4A Engineering was proactive in reviewing inspection findings at other nuclear sites for applicability to Davis-Besse and in reviewing origina:

licensing review questions and answers to verify appropriate incorporation.

in the Updated Safety Analysis Report.

20 2/26/1998 Negative IR 98003 NRC Engineering 5B There was a lack of significant progress on environmental qualification of support equipment in the emergency co:e cooling system rooms 21 2/26/1998 Positive IR 98003 NRC Engineering 5B Timely and appropriate engineering evaluation of the seismic concem, for non-safety pressure gages tied to safety systems, facilitated prompt closure of this item.

22 2/26/1998 Misc IR 98003 NRC Engineering 5B Engineering judgement proved to be correct conceming the structural adequacy of mounting brackets for the borated water storage tank level instrument.

Page 3 of 6

3/26/1999' PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Davis-Besse Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP", SALP Area = " Engineering *, Beginning Date = '10/1/1997*, Ending Date = '8/15/1998*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 23 2/18/1998 Positive IR 98002 Licensee Engineering SA SC The licensee demonstrated an excellent questioning attitude regarding the configuration of a refueling drain canal vah's, a valve whose open position ensured cufficient water supply to e;aergency core cooling system pump suctions during an accident. After determining that the valve was not in its locked valve program, the licensee 8mmediately entered containment, verified the valve was in the ops osition, locked the valve, and plans to enter it in the locked valve propm (Section E8.2).

24 1/28/1998 Positive IR 97015 NRC Engineering 3A 3B Once the turbine control valve servo control valve failure occurred, the plant engineering organization responded well.

25 1/28/1998 Positive IR 97015 NRC Engineering 3B Station Review Board members displayed good technical knowledge of the subject matter presented to them. Members solicited feedback from the sponsors of the documentation that was reviewed. The members requested additional information be provided when clarification or explanation was needed. Teamwork / Skill Level 26 1/28/1998 Negative IR 97015 NRC Engineering 5B Plant engineering personnel missed an opportunity to predict a turbine control valve servo control valve failure. They were not aggressive in responding to a 30 megawatt load swing that had occurred the week before. Further, they did not gather and assess available information regarding the slow response of the turbine control valve found during previous testing. Consequently, the licensee reacted to the issue rather than managed it. Other/NA 27 12/10/1997 LER LER 97015 Licensee Engineering 4A A postulated hot short condition could cause a failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) speed switch before the operator could manually 4 disconnect the EDG tachometer control room circuitry from the EDG speed switch. Engineering / Design Deficiency 28 11/10/1997 Positive IR 97013 NRC Engineering 4B Operability recommendations were technically sound and consistent with i regulatory requirements. Plant engineering personnel pursued corrective :

actions relating to degraded material conditions that affected the operability of plant components in a timely manner. Teamwork / Skill Level Page 4 of 6

3/2' /19F 6

"LANT ISSUES MATRIX Davis-Besse Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Code s (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP* ; SALP Area =

• Engineering * ; Beginning Date = *10/1/1997* ; Ending Date = '8/15/1998*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 29 10/1/1997 VIO/SL-IV IR 97009 NRC Engineering SC Inadequate interim corrective actions were established to address a postulated worst case Circulating Water system linebreak. Although an analysis indicated that operators would have insufficient time to respond to the break and subsequent flooding conditions, no actions were taken to provide additional guidance for operator response or to extend the required operator response time. This situation was determined to be a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI," Corrective Actions *

(Section E8.4), inadequate Oversight i

Page 5 of 6

3/26/1999-GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLE LACELS i

A counter number used for NRC intemal editing.

The date of the event or significant issue. For those items that have a clear date of occurrence use the actual date. If the actual date is not known, use the date DATE the issue was identified. For issues that do not have an actual date or a date of identification, use the LER or inspection report date.

TYPE The categorization of the issue - see the TYPE ITEM CODE tab!e.

SOURCE The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report or LER for Licansee Event Report.

ID CY Identification of who discovered the issue - see table.

SALP SALP Functional Area Codes - Engineering, Maintenance, Operations, Plant Support and All/ Multiple (i.e., more than one SALP area affected).

SMM CODES Senior Manager Meeting Codes - see table.

DESCRIPTION Details of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summaries.

TYPE ITEM CODE NOTES SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING CCDES DEV Deviation from NRC Requirements

• Eels are apparent violations of NRC 1

Operational Performance:

ED Escalated Discretion - No Civil Penalty requirements that are being considered for A - Normal escalated enforcement action in accordance B - During Transients ECI' Escalated Enforcement issue - Waiting Final NRC Action with the " General Statement of Policy and C - Programs and Processes LER License Event Report to the NRC Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action

• Licensing Licensing Issue from NRR (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600.

2 Mate.ial Condition:

Minc Miscellaneous (Emergency Preparedness Finding, etc.)

However, the NRC has not reached its final A - Eeuipment Condition NCV Non-Cited Violation enforcement decision on the issues B - Pragrams and Processes

' Negative Individual Poor Licensee Performance identified by the Eels and the PIM entries 3

Humar. Performance-Positive Individual Good Licensee Performance may be modified when the final decisions A - Wort: Performe are made. Before the NRC makes its B - Knowled' ~ 4:

.nd Abilities Strength Overall Strong Licensee Performance enforcement decision, the licensee will be C - Work Ei URl" Unresolved inspection item provided with an opportunity to either VIO/SL-1 Notice of Violation - Severity Level I (1) respond to the apparent violation or 4

Engineering / Design.

VIO/SL-il Notice of Violation Severity LevelII (2) request a predecisional enforcement A - Design VIO/SL-ill Notice of Violation - Severity Level 111 conference.

B - Engineering Support

• • URis are unresolved items about which C - Programs and Processes VIO/SL-IV Notice of Violation - Severity Level IV Weakness Overall Weak Licensee Performance 5

Problem Identification and Resolution:

e h u

es n a A -Identification acceptable item, a deviation, a ID BY nonconformance, or a violation. However, B - Analysis C - Resolution the NRC has not reached its final Licensee The licensed utility conclusions on the issues, and the PIM j

NRC The Nuclear Regulatory Commission entries may be modified when the final i

Self-Revealed Identification by an event (e.g., equipment breakdown) conclusions are made.

Other Identification unknown Page 6 of 6

/26/1999 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Davis-Besse Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM C,Wes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP", SA1 P Area = " Plant Support', Beginning Date = "10/1/1997* ; Ending Data = '8/15/1998" DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODF.S DESCRIPTION 1

6/17/1998 Negative IR 98008 NRC Plant 1C An inspection followup item was identified in reference to actions required Support to increase the protection for an active barrier within the Vehicle Baider System (VBS). Security equipment observed during the inspection was operable and functioned as designed. (IFl 98008-04) 2 6/17/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98008 NRC Plant 1C A violation was identified for not disclosing specific information required Support for unescorted access authorization background investigations.

Inspection followup items were noted for inaccurate or incomplete information in some background investigation case files, and some materials, not identified in the security plan, being exempt from search prior to entering the protected area. Protected area entry controls for personnel, vehicles, and material were effective. (violation 98008-01) 3 6/17/1998 Positive IR 98008 NRC Plant 1C 3B Security officers and supervisors were very knowledgeable of duty Support responsibilities and no deficiencies were noted during post visits and interviews. Security force performance was very good and consistent 4

6/17/1998 Positive IR 98008 NRC Plant 1C SC The self-assessment efforts were varied and effective in identifying Support problems and performance trends, except for the background investigation related violation and issues addressed in Section S1.

Finding results were effectively monitored, tracked, and resolved 5

6/11/1998 Positive IR 98010 NRC Plant 1C The station and control room emergency ventilation systems were Support maintained in good condition and associated air filtration / adsorption tests and surveillances were performed as required. System engineers maintained good oversight and closely tracked system maintenance activities and performance history.

6 6/11/1998 Positive IR 98010 NRC Plant 1C Radioactive material and radwaste storage containers were maintained in Support good physical condition, were properly labeled, cnd storage areas were posted and controlled in accordance with regulatory requirements. A radioactive materials management inventory system adequately tracked material movement at the site.

7 6/11/1998 VIO/SL-IV 1R 98010 NRC Plant 1C Audit and surveillance activities conducted by the licensee were adequate Support to assass the radiological effluent monitoring and control program, the ODCM and the packaging and transport of radwaste. However, a violation was identified conceming the failure to audit the PCP and the impismentation of procedures for processing radwastes as required by Technical Specification.

(Violation 50-346/98010-01)

Page 1 of 6

3/26/1999 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Davis-Besse Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Colurnn = *SALP* ; SALP Area = " Plant Support', Beginning Date = *10/1/1997* : Ending Data = '8/15/1998*

DATE TYPE' SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 8

6/11/1998 Negative IR 98010 NRC Plant 1C The solid wasta processing systems were as described in the Updated Support Safety Analysis Report (USAR). The Process Control Program (PCP) was consistent with the waste streams described in the USAR and was implemented by knowledgeable staff in accordance with station procedure. However, a weakness was identified with the development of the PCP, conceming the frequency that dewatered wet wastes were sampled and verified to ensure that regu!atory limits for free standing liquid were met, and that all pertinent 10 CFR 61.56 requirements were addressed.

9 6/11/1998 Positive IR 98010 NRC Plant 1C Radiciogical effluent releases were wets. _ rolled and effluent monitoring Support was conducted consistent with the Offsite Duse Calculation Manual (ODCM) and Updated Safety Analysis Report. The total released activity and associated dose remained low and were well below regulatory limits.

One recurrent problem was identified with documentation errors in the ODCM and effluent release reports.

10 6/11/1998 Positive IR 98010 NRC Plant 1C The radioactive waste (radwaste) packaging and transportation program Support was technically sound and program oversight was good. Radwaste shipments were appropriately classified, manifests were completed in accordance with regulatory requirements, and training was provided for personnel involved in packaging and shipping. A scaling factor program for classifying waste streams was applied consistent with regulatory guidance; however, program implementation was not govemed by station procedure to ensure its consistent application.

11 6/11/1998 Positive IR 98010 NRC Plant 2A The effluent process radiation monitors were ope able and well Support maintained. One poor practice was identified conceming a lack of review of Instrument and Control technicians in the performance of monitor calibrations.

12 5/7/1998 Positive IR 98007 NRC Plant 1C The inspectors observed good radiation protection technician work Support coverage, control of high radiation areas (HRAs) and LHRAs, and verified that workers were knowledgeable of RP requirements. However, some problems were identified with the licensee's control of contaminated areas and with the control of hoses used in containment.

t Page 2 of 6

3/2s/i m PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Davis-Besse Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP" ; SALP Area = " Plant Support'. Beginning Data = *10/1/1997*. Ending Date = '8/15/1998*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 13 5/7/1998 NCV IR 98007 Licensee Plant 1C One Non-Cited violation was identified for the failure to provide a Support continuous radiation protection escort prior to allowing an operator to enter an LHRA. The inspectors noted that the corrective actions for this violation were good and designed to prevent recurrence.

14 5/7/1998 Positive IR 98007 NRC Plant 1C Overall the ALARA plarning and controls for the refueling ou' age were Support good, but some examples of inaccurate or incomplete ALARA planning documentation were identified.

15 5/7/1998 Positive IR 98007 NRC Plant 1C The calibration and maintenance program for area radiation monitors was Support well implemented. One weakness was identified in that monitor performance data was not reviewed by the licensee, which may prevent early identification of problems 16 5/7/1998 Positive IR 98007 NRC Plant 1C The radiation protection department response to the breakthrough of Support resin from a purification demineralizer was good. The radiation protection staff effectively evaluated the changed radiological conditions following the resin breakthrough, and controlled access to affected areas without incident.

17 5/7/1998 Positive IR 98007 NRC Plant 1C The licensee's maintenance of records important for the safe Support decommissioning of the facility, as required by 10 CFR 50.75(g), was good.

18 4/23/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98007 NRC Plant 1C Poor documentation of the ALARA planning for the respiratory protection Support controls and the failure to evaluate those ALARA controls implemented during the removal of steam generator mirror insulation, constituted another example of a violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(a)(2).

19 4/21/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98007 NRC Plant 5A The licensee took appropriate actions to control exposure after workers Support encountered unexpected, transient, high dose rates in the annu!us area during incore detector movement. However, the failure to recognize this condition given known industry history and to establish appropriate controls was an example of a violation of 10 CFR 20.1501.

20 3/31/1998 Positive IR 98004 Licensee Plant 1C The licensee continued maintaining proper control of radiological areas Support and proper centrol of personnel entering and exiting these areas.

Page 3 of 6

/26/1997 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Davis-Besse Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP", SALP Area = " Plant Support" ; Beginning Date = *10/1/1997* ; Ending Date = '8/15/1998*

h 4M CODES DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP DESCRIPTION 21 3/31/1998 Positive IR 98004 NRC Plant 1C 5A The central and secondary alarm stations were staffed with attentive and Support knowledgeable personnel. The licensee appropriately identified and replaced degraded equipment with temporary equipment before the end of the inspection period.

i 22 3/31/1998 Positive IR 93004 L!censee Plant 5A SC Security management issued a memorandum to heighten security officer,

Support awareness following recent lapses in security guard attentiveness to their duties. These expectations were discussed during shift security tumovers. Gaurity guard attentiveness improved sub equent to this action 23 2/18/1998 Positive IR 98002 NRC Plant 1C 3A Overall, radiation protection activities relating to a diving activity in the Support spent fuel pool transfer canal and a high integrity container lift were performed in a professional, well planned manner (Section R1.1).

24 2/18/1998 Positive IR 98002 NRC Plant 1C 3B The fire brigade team effectively responded tc a challenging drill scenario Support (Section F4.1).

25 1/28/1998 Positive IR 97015 NRC Plant 3A 1C A thorough ALARA briefing was conducted for a containment entry to Support perform reactor coolant pump upper thrust bearing resistance temperature detector circuit modificaticns. General area radiation dose rate estimates closely matched those actually found in containment Radiation protection personnel provided excellent assistance and support for the entry team. Total dose received for the entry was low at about 10 millirem. TeamwoP/ Skill Level 26 1/28/1998 Positive IR 97015 NRC Plant 3A SA The licensee's response to smoke from a faulted electrical generator for Support the elevator machinery room in the radiological restricted area (RRA) was done in accordance with plant procedures. The operators appropriately staffed the brigade, donned proper fire protection equipment and established good communication with control room personnel. Following the event, the licensee appropriately initiated potential condition adverse to quality reports (PCAORs) to document concems regarding difficulty of personnel exiting the RRA due to smoke. Teamwork / Skill Level 27 11/10/1997 Positive IR 97013 NRC Plant 1C Security personnel were observed to be performing their duties and Support access control equipment was observed to be operating in accordance with regulatory requirements. Teamwork / Skill Level Page 4 of 6

PL. ANT hSSUES MATRIX

' SSSS Davis-Besse Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP*

SALP Area =

• Plant Support' ; Beginning Date = *10/1/1997* ; Ending Date = '8/15/1998*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 28 11/10/1997 Positive IR 97013 N9C Plant 1C Radiological conditions were properly communicated to plant personnel Support through postings, barriers and signs. Actual radiation conditions were verified to be consistent with radiation area postings. Teamwork / Skill Level 29 10/10/1997 Positive IR 97012 NRC Plant 1C The post accident sampling system ', PASS) was effectively maintained as Support required by technical specifications. Material condition and maintenance history was tracked, individuals were trained, and the PASS samples showed good agreement with reactor coolant system samples. One inspection follow-up item was opened to evaluate the long term corrective actions for a PASS configuration which resulted in an alarm of the safety features actuation system radiation monitors. (Section R2.1) 30 10/10/1997 Positive IR 97012 NRC Plant 1C There was no discemable impact on the environment from plant Support operations. Specific aspects of the radiological environmental monitoring program, including material condition of air sampling equipment, and sample collection were appropriately implemented. (Section R1.3) 31 10/10/1997 Positive IR 97012 NRC Plant 1C The chemistry laboratory quality control program was effective, and Support ensured that the licensee could obtain accurate chemical and radiochemical analyses. (Section R7.1) 32 10/10/1997 Positive IR 97012 NRC Plant 1C The water chemistry of primary and secondary systems was well Support maintained and monitored. Levels of corrosive impurities were maintained below industry guidelines. (Section R1.2) 33 10/10/1997 Positive IR 97012 NRC Plant SC The corrective actions implemented to address a violation regarding the

{

Support failure to appropriately post a radiation area were effective in preventing recurrence. (Section R8.3) 34 10/1/1997 Negative IR 97009 NRC Plant 1A The inspectors were concerned that, given the normal duties of the Support assistant shift supervisor, the management decision to designate the control room assistant shift supervisor as the fire watch brigade captain, could result in delays in manning the fire brigade (Section F8.1).

Inadequate Oversight 35 10/1/1997 Positive IR 97009 NRC Plant 1C Plant personnel exhibited satisfactory adherence to radiation protection Support program requirements (Section R1). Teamwork / Skill Level Page 5 of 6

w w

3/$6/1999 GENERAL DESCRIPTION Oi: PIM TACLE LABELS A counter number used for NRC intemal editing.

The date of the event or significant issue. For those items that have a clear date of occurrence use the actual date. If the actual date is not known, use the date DAM the issue was identified. For issues that do not have an actual date or a date of identification, use the LER or inspection report date.

TYPE The categorization of the issue - see the TYPE ITEM CODE table.

SOURCE The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report ID CY Identification of who discovered the issue - see table.

SALP SALP Functional Area Codes - Engineering, Maintenance, Operations, Plant Support and All/ Multiple (i.e., more than one SALD 3rea affected).

SMM CODES Senior Manager Meeting Codes - see table.

DESCRIPTION Details of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summaries.

TYPE ITEM CODE NOTES SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING CODES ;

DEV Deviation from NRC Requirements Eels are apparent violations of NRC 1

Operational Performance:

ED Escalated Discretion - No Civil Penalty requirements that are being considered for A - Normal escalated enforcement action in accordance B - During Transients EEI' Escalated Enforcement issue - Waiting Final NRC Action with the " General Statement of Policy and C - Programs and Processes LER License Event Report to the NRC Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action 2

Material Condition:

Licensing Licensing issue from NRR (Enforcernent Policy). NUREG-1600.

Misc Miscellaneous (Emergency Preparedness Finding, etc.)

Howr.er, the NRC has not reached its final A - Equipment Condition NCV Non-Cited Violation anorcement decision on the issues B - Programs and Processes Negative Individual Poor Licensee Performance identified by the Eels and the PIM entries 3

Human Performance:

Positive Individual Good Licensee Performance may be modified when the final decisions A - Work Performance am made. Befom the NRC makes its B - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities Strength Overall Strong Licensee Performance enforcement decision, the licensee will be C - Work Environment

URI, Unresolved Inspection item provided with an opportunity to either VIO/SL-1 Notice of Violation - Severity Level I (1) respond to the apparent violation or 4

Engineering / Design:

VIO/SL-Il Notice of Violation - Severity Level 11 (2) request a predecisional enforcement A - Design VIO/SL-ill Notice of Violation - Severity Level Ill conference.

B - Engineering Support

• URis are unresolved items about which C - Programs and Processes VIO/SL-IV Notice of Violation - Severity Level IV Weakness Overall Weak Licensee Performance 5

Pr m enWeation and Resolution:

h e sue s

acceptable item, a deviation, a ID BY normformance, or a violation. However, B - Analys.is C - Resolution it a NRC has not reached its final Licensee The licensed utility conclusions on the issues, and the PIM NRC The Nuclear Regulatory Commission entries may be modified v' hen the final Self-Revealed identification by an event (e.g., equipment breakdown) conclusions are made.

Other Identification unknown Page 6 of 6

DAVIS-BESSE INSPECTION / ACTIVITY PLAN IP - Inspection Procedure Tl - Temporary Instruction Core - Minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatory all plants)

Regional Initiative - Discretionary inspections NUMBER OF TYPE OF INSPECTION NRC INSPECTIONI

/

TITLE I PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORSI PLANNED DATES ACTIVITY-ACTIVITY INDIVIDUALS COMMENTS IP62707 Maintenance Risk Inspection 3

April 5 - 9,1999 RegionalInitiative @

IP82301 Emergency Preparedness 4

May 3 - 7,1999 Core IP82302 Exercise Tl 2515/140 Periodic Verification of MOV 2

May 24 - 28,1999 Regional Initiative @

Capability IP83750 Radiation Protection Radwaste 1-2 July 6 - 9,1999 Core

[

IP86750 Licensed Operator Examination 2

September 13 - 17,1999 Notes:

@ Evaluation of risk associated with and control of on-line maintenance activities.

@ Followup inspection of Generic Letter 96-05 for non-JOG plant.

@ TBD - Date to be determined.

1 i

..