ML20197F621
| ML20197F621 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 05/27/1988 |
| From: | Zech L NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Breaux J SENATE, ENVIRONMENT & PUBLIC WORKS |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8806140285 | |
| Download: ML20197F621 (34) | |
Text
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+ o UNITED STATES g
6 g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[ W ASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 l
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CHAIRMAN May 27, 1988 i l
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The Honorable John B. Breaux, Chairman Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation Committee on Environment and Public Works United States Senate Washington, D. C. 20510 4
Dear Mr. Cha:
" ca.
I am enclosisj :he Commission's responses to the questions posed by Senator Mikulski as forwarded by your letter of April 15, 1988. It is our understanding that the responses to these questions will also be made a part of the recoro' of the Committee's March 2, 1988 hearing on NRC's Fiscal Year 1989 budget request.
Since ,,
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olu W. evL Lando W. Ze , Jr.
Enclosure:
As stated !
cc: Senator Alan Simpson l
1 88061402G5 PDR 080527
, COMMS NRCC
- CORRESPONDENCE PDR i
QUESTION 1A. What criteria will be applied by the NRC for measuring the changes that need to be taken before the Peach Bottom nuclear pisnt can be restarted?
I i ANSWER.
When a facility such as Peach' Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) is shut down for safety reasons, the NRC detennines specific corrective actions that must be satisfactorily implemented before the plant can be permitted to restart. In the case of Peach Bottom, substantial changes are needed ,
- in personnel, organizational interactions, and procedural implementation at all levels of the Philadelphia Electric Company (PECo) organization.
PECo's "Plan for Restart" is the blueprint for the needed changes. Once accepted by the NRC as a satisfactory plan of action to br ig about the needed changes at Pear.h Bottom, fulfillment of the requirements of this plan become th? essential "restart criteria". The NRC uses the utility recovery plan as a basis when evaluating restart readiness. The NRC staff determines the effectiveness of the recovery plan's implementation and whether it is having the desired effect in correcting the problems that have been identified at Peach Bottom.
PECo has submitted its plans to NRC for review. Their recently revised "Plan for Restart of Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station" is currently under review by the sta ". The staff's review, which is based on the NRC's l
rules, regulations, standards, license conditions, and licensee I connitments, will ensure that the PECo plan meets the requirements of the NRC Order that shut down PBAPS. NRC is closely monitoring PECo actions to implement its plan and to prepare PBAPS for return to service.
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l QUESTION 1A. (Continued) I In its review of the PECo plan, the staff is considering NRC concerns which resulted in the Order, concerns subsequently identified by NRC and !
the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations, and other concerns raised by j government officials and membsrs of the public. The staff is giving particular attention to the following aspects:
- 1. Proposec Corrective Actions The root cause of problems and events leading to the shutdown muct be l properly identified and comprehensive corrective actions determined.
The plan must provide for implementation and verification of corrective actions.
- 2. Licensee Management Organization PEco's management organization must provide the necessary resources and an appropriate climate to nurture the safety culture that must exist at an operating nuciear power plant. The station and corporate organizations must demonstrate that they can effectively communicate, coordinate, integrate, and prioritize safety objectives such that I they are achieved in a manner commensurate with that necessary for safe operation:
PEco must further demonstrate that it has an appropriate appreciation of issues of safety significance and a positive attitude toward resolving such' issues. This requires sufficient numbers of qualified and experienced personnel be provided for all key positions, including l management and licensed operators. The organization must demonstrate its ability to work as a team, to provide strong engineering support for plant activities, to identify and correct safety problems and to verify implementation and effectiveness of corrective actions, and must possess an active and effective self-assessment capability.
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l QUESTION 1A. (Continued) 3. Operations Staff l
The individuals licensed by NRC to operate PBAPS must fully recognize and diligently carry out the responsibilities bestowed upon them by this agency in their individual licenses. Each individual must display a positive attitude toward safety in all aspects of plant operations, including attentiveness to duty and fitness for duty.
- 4. Plant Readiness The licensee must demonstrate that all safety equipment meets NRC requirements for operability, including surveillance test require-nents, prior to restart. All outstanding safety-related maintenance work should be complete and the backlog of other maintenance work reduced to a level commensurate with a high state of operation readiness. Consideration will also be given to PEco's ability to maintain their maintenance backlog at a level consistent with sustained safe operation.'
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OVESTION 1B. How will the NRC determine and apply these criteria?
ANSWER.
As discussed in the response to Question 1A, the NRC approved "Plan l for Restart" will form the basis for these criteria. The criteria will be I applied by evaluating the implementation of PECo's "Plan for Restart", when it is ultimately accepted by the NRC. Not only must all elements of the plan be implemented by PEco, but the implementation must be done in an effective manner which 'ives a high degree of assurance that past problems are corrected and that they will not recur. In this regard, the NRC will rely on its extensive past experience in evaluating technical, managerial, and operational programs at nuclear facilities.
For example, since plant management and leadership skills were of concern, the staff will be reviewing the qualifications of and training provided to plant management personnel. The effectiveness of the human relations training provided to operations personnel is being assessed both by reviews of tha program content and by conferences with operations personnel to determine its expected effect 'on future levels of performance. The revised corporate management structure, membership, and self-assessment capabilities are being reviewed to assess the expected ability to recognize and act upon future problems. NRC team inspections will assess the physical readiness of the plant by conducting maintenance program inspcctions and operational readiness inspections.
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l QUESTION IC. What will the involvement of the public 'ev in the restart decision?
ANSWER.
Numerous meetings have been held with the licensee, state and local govern-mental groups, and with the public since the shutdown of the PBAPS. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the State of Maryland have been given an opportunity to comment on the "Restart Plan", which, as discussed in Question IA, defines the restart criteria. Similarly, comments have been solicited at the series of public meetings that have been held in Pennsylvania and Maryland. Thus, by being afforded an opportunity to comment on the restart criteria, the public has been able to participate in the restart evaluation, I
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l In November of last year, PECo submitted their original OUFSTION 2.
plan for the restart of Peach Bottom. On January 11 of this year, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INP0) issued a report that was highly critical of the PECo plan, stating that it was "insufficient to bring about the necessary change." What actions have been taken by PECo since that time and have these actions been deemed adequate to address and correct the problems that have been identified by either tho NRC or INPO?
ANSWER.
It must be recognized that there have been several versions of the PECo "Plan for Restart". None of these has been accepted by the NRC as being wholly satisfactory and responsive to the Order. The INPO report was highly critical of an interim version of the "Plan for Restart" and INP0's conclusions and recommendations were similar to concerns raised by the NRC during its review of the several versions of the "Plan for Restart". As ;
the process has unfolded, both NRC and INP0 have submitted their concerns I to PECo for resolution.
The initial corrective action plan was submitted by the licensee in August 1987 and was followed by a staff position in October 1987 that stated that the Plan failed to address a fundamental staff concern. In November 1987, I the licensee submitted Section I of its revised corrective action "Plan for ]
Restart" in response to the issue raised by the staff. In February 1988, ;
the licensee completed the plan with the submittal of Section II, which addressed actions specific to the onsite organization and the plant, i i
The licensee's actions in response to the INPO report were discussed in their letter of April 8, 1988, which submitted Revision 1 of the "Plan for Restart." The licensee indicated that they had incorporated the second and third recommendations of the INP0 letter into the revised plan. These recommendations dealt with minimizing actions that bypassed or undermined line management and with establishing accountability for the unsatisfactory situation that had developed over a period of years.
QUESTION 2. (Continued) The licensee also stated in the April 8 letter that an independent consultant had been retained to respond to INP0's first recommendation that a detailed analysis of the licensee's interna? investigation material should be developed.
By letter dated March 4,1988, the staff requested that any information PECo provided to INP0 in response to the issues in the INP0 report also be provided to NRC and that the NRC be apprised of the results of INP0 evaluations prior to restart.
The staff is continuing its review of the revised "Plan for Restart" and will review the information requested by its March 4,1988, letter upon receipt from the licensee. The NRC will complete its evaluation when all appropriate information and plan revisions have been received from PECo.
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QUESTION 3A. It is my understanding that there are numerous maintenance items outstanding at Peach Bottom. In fact, it is my understanding that there are over 1,500 items in need of maintenance activities of one sort or another. How many outstanding maintenance items does the NRC believe exist at the plant?
ANSWER.
As of April 21, 1988, the licensee's records indicate that there are approximately 11,200 open maintenance items at the Peach Bottom facility.
These open items include corrective maintenance, preventive traintenance, facility enhancements, arid the routine refurbishment of structures, systems, and components. Of these open items, about 3,200 are for work on safety-related equipment. Someoftheopenitems(2,700ofthe11,200) have been completed except for testing which cannot be accomplished in the present plant condition (e.g., some components must be tested at elevated plant temperatures or in system configurations not permitted in the present shutdowncondition). It should be noted that these numbers are changing daily based on work activities, that are ongoing at the facility.
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e QUESTION 3B. Please explain why there are so many outstanding maintenance items?
ANSWER.
During periods of operation, any plant accumulates a backlog of outstanding maintenance items that can or must be deferred until an outage. When a plant shuts down for a major outage, additional preventive maintenance items that must be completed during the outage are added to the backlog.
Moreover, potential problems identified to the utility by the NRC or the industry that require maintenance actions to investigate and repair as necessary frequently add to the backlog. For example, a generic industry problem with a particular type of valve, of which there may be several hundred in the plant, could lead to several hundred maintenance items to inspect and repair or modify the identified condition. During an outage, maintenance activities would be scheduled to accomplish tasks on safety- I related equipment as a high priority. Accordingly, some open maintenance items on non-safety-related equipment, which have no impact on the safety or reliability of plant operations, have a low priority and may be deferred until a subsequent outage. Th,erefore, these low priority items also contribute to the backlog. As indicated in the response to Question 3A, the maintenance backlog is also influenced by the inability to complete the l testing of some components due to existing plant conditions. Although the numbers of outstanding maintenance items is large, the fact that 10,500 l maintenance activities were completed during the last Peach Bottom sal.P ,
period from February 1986 to May 1987 may help to put the current number of 11,200 into perspective.
QUESTION 3C. Are the number of outstanding maintenance items at the 1 Peach Bottom plant above average, average, or below average for the industry as a whole?
l ANSWER.
There are always a number of outstanding maintenance items at any nuclear power plant, including preventive and corrective maintenance actions, facility enhancements and routine refurbishment of structures, systems, and components.
However, since each utility has a different approach to identifying and tracking maintenance activities, comparing the numbers of outstanding maintenance items between individual plants is not always meaningful. For instance, the administrative controls at one utility may designate a separate open item for each maintenance activity, whila another utility may consolidate several related maintenance activities into a single open item. Thus, the first utility may initiate several maintenance items for a specific activity, (i.e., correction of leaking valves) while the second utility may initiate a single maintenance item for the same activity. For the reasons stated above, it is difficult to compare Peach Bottom with the industry as a whole.
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QUESTION,30. Please provide a list of those ouestanding maintenance items that the NRC believes have a significant safety related implication.
ANSWER.
A complete list of outstanding maintenance items was forwarded earlier at your request. The NRC believes the majority of the 3,200 safety related items identified on that list are significant. The licensee plans to complete all of these items before a request to restart each respective unit is made. As noted in the response to Question 3A, some of these items may continue to be outstanding because testing must be delayed until appropriate plant conditions are achieved.
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OVESTION 3E. What type of improvements in the maintenance program at Peach Bottom will the NRC insist on before it allows the plant to reopen?
ANSWER.
As explained in the answer to Question 1A, the NRC staff's review of the PECo restart plan is giving particular attention to plant readiness, including equipment operability, maintenance backlog, and sufficiency of maintenance resources. The NRC will evaluate PECo's effectiveness in implementing the approved plan prior to any restart decision on Peach Bottom.
In addition, on March 23, 1988 the Comission issued its Policy Statement on Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants. This policy statement identifies the activities that form the basis of an adequate maintenance program and provides guidtnce to the industry on improving maintenance programs. We will also review the Peach Bottom maintenance program in light of this policy statement. A team inspection will complete a programatic review by evaluating maintenan,ce and post-maintenance testing records, l witnessing selected maintenance and post-maintenance testing activities, and inspecting the physical condition of equipment in the plant. A copy of the Coninission Policy Statement on Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants is enclosed for your information. i l
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Enclosure:
As stated ,
QUESTION 4A. Employees at Peach Bottom have been indicted for possession and/or use of illegal substances while on the job. How does the NRC propese to correct the problem of drug abuse at Peach Bottom?
ANSWER.
PECo, not the NRC, must correct the probler af 'rv abuse s at Peach Bottom.
The NRC expects licensee management to esgres".vely address and resolve :
drug abuse problems at all nuclear power "iants. In addition to .
frplementation of industry wf ae prog.-r.is, such as preemployment and 1
for-cause drug testing, PECc has taken additional steps to currect the I problem at Peach Bottom. These extra measures include annual drug testing, undercover investigations, searches of the plant by trained dogs, and a policy which encourages confidential reporting of drug involvement by concerned co-workers. NRC will continue to monitor activities at Peach Bottom to ensure that responsible actions are taken when management becomes aware of any casa of drug involvement. A proposed rul? making being developed by the NRC staff would further strengthen the ability of PECo and other utilities to identify an,d correct drug abuse problems by requiring random testing programs and by prescribing sanctions against those individuals possessing cr using drugs while on the job at nuclear power plants, l
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QUESTION 48. Is PEco's fitness-for-duty program adequate to detect drug abuse at Peach Bottom?
ANSWER.
As described in the answer to Question 4A, the fitness-for-duty program at Peach Bottom includes those basic elements that are expected to be implemented at all operating nuclear power plants, as well as additional i measures which go beyond basic programs. The basic program includes such elements as worker training in drug awareness and company policy, supervisory training in behavioral observation, availability of an employee assistance program, and drug testing on a preemployment and for-cause basis. Based on the results of the program and an NRC inspection of the program, we conclude that Peach Bottom has implemented an adequate program to detect drug abuse. Nevertheless, in order to provide additional assurance that all nuclear power plant operations are free of the effects of drugs, the Commission is initiating rulemaking that would require random, unannounced drug testing as an additional measure to deter and detect abuse.
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QUESTION SA. What is the status of the NRC's current efforts to curtail drug abuse by personnel at nuclear puwer plants?
ANSWER.
In order to provide additional assurance that all nuclear power plant operations are free of the effects of drugs, the Commission is initiating rulemaking that would require random, unannounced drug testing as an additional measure to deter and detect abuse. The regulations will be issued as a proposed rulemaking for public comment within the next several months. Until such time as these new regulations are promulgated in final form, the Commission's 1986 Policy Statement on Fitness for Duty of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel remains in effect. In accordance with this policy, each nuclear utility has implemented a fitness-for-duty program in accordance with guidelines developed by the Edison Electric Institute.
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Does the NRC believe that its current policy is an QUESTION 58.
adequate way to implement fitness-for-duty programs, including drug testing, at nuclear power plants?
ANSWER.
The Commissicn believes that fitness-for-duty programs established by the nuclear industry over the past several years have been successful and responsive to its Policy Statement. Under this policy, significant i progress has been made in establishing an environment in which nuclear power plant operations are free of the adverse effects of drugs. However, the Commission has concluded that federal regulations are needed to ensure uniform standards and practices and to include random drug testing as an I element of fitness-for-duty programs.
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What is the NRC's position on random testing?
QUESTION SC.
ANSWER.
The Commission believes that random drug testing represents an important element of a comprehensive program needed to deter drug use and to detect drug users in the workplace. ' Random testing provides reasonable assurance that workers are not under the influence of drugs and are fit to perform their duties. A program that includes random testing to both deter and detect drug abuse is considered to be especially important at operating nuclear power plants, where the actions of individuals could potentially impact the public health and safety.
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QUESTION 50. How many nuclear power plants have random testing programs in place?
ANSWER.
The Comission understands that 22 of the 54 nuclear utilities utilize rar. dom chemical testing. This inforination is based upon a recent survey of drug testing programs conducted by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INP0). Some utilities have attempted to initiate random testing, but have thus far been unsuccessful because of legal challenges.
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QUESTION SE. How many incidents, nationwide, of drug abuse at nuclear power plants is the NRC aware of? Is the problem getting worse or better over the past five years?
ANSWER.
The following number of drug abuse incidents (occurrirg both ca site and off site) have been reported to NRC since 1984. Some of the reported incidents involved more than one individual:
YEAR NUMBER OF REPORTS 1984 26 1985 30 1986 44 1987 115 1988 31(thoughmid-April)
Formal NRC guidance to licensees on the reporting of drug abuse at operating nuclear power plants was issue,d in mid-1987. Prior to that time, there was no l l
NRC guidance on reporting drug abuse incidents. Therefore, the incidents shown j for the years 1984-1986 resulted fron, the voluntary reporting of some incidents, often informally through NRC resident inspectors.
The Commission does not have sufficient quantitative data to conclusively evaluate the five year trend of drug abuse at nuclear power plants. While the number of incidents (each involving one or more individuals) reported
i QUESTION SE. (Continued) to the NRC over the past five years has clearly increased during 1987 and early 1988, it is the sense of the Commission that this trend in reports is probably attributable to (1) the establishment of formal fitness-for-duty programs, including for-cause testing and some random testing during 1985 I
and 1986, and (2) the promulgation of formal NRC guidance on reporting of drug abuse cases at operating nuclear power plants during 1987.
QUESTION 6A. Over the past few years, Peach Bottom has been issued hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines and has been listed by the NRC as one of the worst run plants in the U.S. Nevertheless, NRC inspectors never detected operators asleep, literally at the switch. It is further my understanding that powei stations that are known as problem plants are assigned additional hours of inspection by the NRC. Is that correct?
ANSWER.
The performance at this plant has been of concern to the NRC for quite some time as evidenced, for example, by the assessment of six civil penalties against the licensee for various violations of NRC regulatory requirements since March 1983. Issues that continued to be of concern vere identified in June 1986 in the staff's Systematic Assessment of Licensee Perfonnance (SALP) report, which concluded that management involvement and effective-ness towards improving activities had not been evident. An NRC inspector did observe one case of a Peach Bottom operator apparently sleeping on watch at about 5 00 a.m. on June 10, 1985. The incident was represented by PEco to the NRC in an enforcentent conference as a unique isolated event.
NRC believed this to be the case. In the past, incidents of sleeping or inattentiveness of licensee personnel have been difficult for NRC ,
inspectors to detect because licensee employees may have been notified or otherwise became aware of NRC's presence or.3ite. The NRC has issued a proposed rule which would ensure that the presence of NRC inspectors on site is not announced or otherwise comunicated to licensee and contractor personnel witijout the expressed request to do so by the inspector. This change will allow NRC inspectors who are badged at the facility to observe ongoing activities as they are being performed, without possible changes to attention and performance levels based on employees' knowledge of NRC surveillance and should enhance NRC's ability to detect problems such as that which occurred at Peach Bottom.
QUESTION 6A_.(Continued) Because of the poor SALP ratings, inspection hours were increased at Peach Bottom, as they would be at any problem plant. In cddition, the number of resident inspectors was increased from two to three late in 1986, and a fourth inspector was assigned-for the months of January and February 1987.
As a point of comparison, we are providing the following information.
Available NRC inspection resources in the Region I (Philadelphia) office are allocated among 29 power reactor units located at 20 reactor sites. Three of these sites (Peach Bottom, Calvert Cliffs, Salem) are somewhat similar in that each site has two large reactor units which have been in commercial power operation for more than five years. The following table shows the approximate number of NRC inspection hours devoted to these three sites from 1982 througn 1987. The inspection hours for calendar years 1985 and 1987 are split to show the "before" and "after" hours associated with Peach Bottom events invc,1ving an inattentive operator in early 1985 and the plant shutdown in early 1987:
DIRECT INSPECTION HOURS i
i 1985 1985 1987 1987 )
PLANT 1982 1983 1984 l (3 MO) (9 M0) 1986 (3 M0) (9 MO)
Peach Bottom 4,019 2,729 2,423 1,786 3,778 3,724 994 4,871 l Calvert Cliff: 3,930 2,973 3,042 667 2,749 2.997 329 2,525 l l
Salem 3,684 3,420 3,441 977 2,476 2,258 602 2,620 3 Site Avg. 3,878 3,041 2,969 1,143 3,001 2,993 642 3,339 l
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QUESTION 6A. (Continued) The above data shows that, during 1982, NRC's inspection resources at these three similar facilities were allocated on approximately an even basis.
Operational events involving the failure of the reactor protection system at Salem in early 1983 resulted in inspection emphasis at this facility during 1983 and 1984. Since 1984, indications of operational problems at Peach Bottom have in each year resulted ir. additional NRC inspection effort beyond that applied to Calvert Cliffs or Salem.
These figures speak to the relative inspection efforts at three Region I facilities. The absolu+.e level of inspection at any facility during any given year is also dependent upon regulatory performance and the status (construction, preoperational testing, startup, operations) of the other 23 power reactor units in Regior
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QUESTION 68. At the time of Peach Bottom's shutdown, had the number of !
inspectors on site been increased to reflect the situation -- that is, the poor perfomance and violations at the plant? If not, why not?
ANSWER.
l As indicated in Question 6A above, NRC increased the number of resident 1 l
inspectors from two to three in late 1986. Also, the number of specialist l inspections was increased. On March 24, 1987, the NRC received an allega-tion that operators were sleeping on duty and fnunediately stationed l l
inspectors in the control room around the clock. The allegation was l l
investigated and substantiated, and the plant was shut down on March 31, 1987. At midnight on April 2, 1987, the 24-hour inspector coverage was I stopped.
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i QUESTION 6C. Did NRC inspectors know about the problems that led to the shutdown? When did they become aware of these problems? l ANSWER. l Although the NRC inspectors were aware of problems of poor perfomance at Peach Bottora for some time, they were not aware of pervasive licensed .
l operator inattentiveness on the backshift until an allegation was received or March 24, 1987.
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f QUESTION 6D. When the NRC inspectors became aware of the problems, did they report them? When? To whom?
ANSWER.
The NRC inspectors were aware of the problems of pont performance at Peach Bottom for some time. The findings of the Resident Inspectors were reported to NRC Region I management in their routine monthly inspection reports.
Several other specialist inspect on teams were sent to Peach Bottom in 1985-87,
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and their findings were reported o NRC management in formal inspection reports. As stated in the answer to Question 6C, the NRC inspectors were not aware of pervasive licensed operator inattentiveness on the backshift l until an allegation was received in the NRC Incident Response Center at Headquarters on March 24, 1987.
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QUESTION 6E. Were these reports read at the regional level?
ANSWER.
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The Regional offices maintain very close contact with the site resident I inspectors and a current knowledge of the problems and activities at each site. Resident inspector and specialist inspector inspection reports are reviewed and approved by at least two levels of management at the Region.
In the Peach Bottom case, the inspectors' findings were reviewed and discussed among senior NRC managers on a regular basis.
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QUESTION 6F. If the reports were being read at the regional level, were the personnel at the regional office relaying the information to headquarters? Why did it take the NRC so long to take action against the plant? !
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ANSWER.
l As stated in the answer to Question 6E, the senior managers in NRC Headquarters r.nd Region I regularly reviewed the reports about problems at Peach Bottom, including the findings of NRC inspectors. As a result of these meetings, NRC increased its inspection coverage of Peach Bottom and met with licensee senior management in August 1986 in Bethesda, Maryland, to clearly state its concerns and demand tnat improvements be made in operations at the site.
When the NRC identifies long-standing, poor performance trends at a nuclear power plant, the first step is to increase inspection activities and also meet with licensee management to determine what the problem is and how the licensee proposes to correct it. Far-reaching NRC actions, such as ordering a plant shut down, are not usually taken unless other enforcement avenues (e.g., management or enforcement conferences, civil penalties for identified violations) have been exhausted or unless a specific condition exists that is in itself clearly adverse to nuclear safety. In late 1986, Peach Bottom was clearly identified as a poor performer; however, it was the judgment of NRC management that Peach Bottom was sufficiently safe to justify continued operation while known conditions were being corrected.
Once NRC substantiated operator inattentiveness as a condition adverse to safety, the staff acted promptly to order the plant shut down.
/ M30 Feder:1 Register / Vob 53/ No; 561 Wedne2 4 ay. March 13, 1988
/
- Rules and Reguisticene ~ " -
} 186. 234. es Stat 955. 63 Stat.M4. as amended try:CTws DATs:nia Final Pohey "Activities Which Forra the Basia bta (42 USC 2236,22a2E sec. 20e6 86 Stat 1246 Statement is effective March 23,1968. Maintenance Program."
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(42 USC 5846). Sections 2.000 '.806 also issued s,nder sec.102 Pub. L 9: .190. 83 Stat. FOR PUltTHER 18sPOMs4ATMH4 C08CACT: Maintenanca PrograrnJ 653 as amended (42 U.S C 4332s. Sections jack W. Rne. Director. Diviolon of 2.7oos,2.719 also issued under 5 U S.C. 554. 1.icensee Petformance and Qeahty Each commealal nucleat power plant .
Sections 2754,1780.177o also issued under 5 Evaluation. Office of Nuclear Reactor a,houl.$ develop and troplemeut a well-USC 557. Sect)on 2.790 also issued under Regalation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory cefMed ud effective program to assure sec.103,68 Stat. 936 as amended (42 USC Commission Weshing'on, DC 20555, thsi maintenance activities are 2133) and 5 USC 552. Sectione 2.800 and telephone (301) 492-1004. ccnducted to preserve or testore the 2.806 also issued under 5 USC 553. Section availability, ' performance and reliability 2.809 also issued under 5 USC 553 and sec Poucy of plant structures, systems, and
- 29. Pt b. L 85-256. 71 Stat. 579, as amended (42 U.S C 2o39). Subpart K also isned under Background con,ponenis.De program should cleatly L sec. t es, es Stat. S55 (42 USC 2239). sec.134, defim the components and activities
, %e Cornmission has a progrant to induded, as well as tha management p nd A so as p ce n er w p ts' f e gra h I e Appendts 8l also issued under sec 10L Pub. L 8 P" '"U 8 feedback of specific resulta to ensure shown that.In some cases, nuclear 99-24o,99 List.1442 (42 U.S.C 2021b et seq.), correctis actions, provisions for overall
- 2.Section V.F. of Appendix C (s Progr4m evaluation, and the (a$ a le revised to read as follows: with a high de e of a ' lability. that the P "'"
' sy8 2m d" Sn Pm ems, equipment wil pedorm its intended APPeddMeneral Statmet of Pokc7 funcdon when required. A limited NRC Aclivities Which Forrn the Basis of a and Precedure for NRC Enfortament Actma exemination of nuclear power plant Maintenance Program maintenance programa has found a wide An adequate program should V. Eniorcement Actiona . . . Variadon in the eIfectiveness of these consider:
programs. Inad uste maintenance at E Reopening Closed Enforcement Actions some l en a significant
- Technol 8Y in th' '" f If significant new information to remived or tor contribants ha to plant reliability problems -Comun maMenanca.
obtained by NRC which indicates that an and, henes 6s of safety concern. We
+vendu nain%am, enforcement sanction was incorrectly applied. consideration may be givm' Commission believes safety can be enhanced by improving the
-Prodic dve maintenanc e,
- S M Hance; :
g fc7,"d[,'n N N t [o $ 7 8 efrectiveness of maintenance ptogrars
- inee&q support and olant decrease the seventy of a sanction or to throughout the nuclear industr} , he inod cxtions, ,
correct the recorc. Reopening decuions will Ccmmisalon la proceeding idl't
- Quah amce and qt1@
be made on a case.by. case basis, are rulemaking consistent with tins W f. control; ,
expected to occur rarely, and require the %Is Policy Staternent la t dag Leeued to
- Equiptnet.t % story end trending: -
specif:c approval of the Deputy E.secutive provida gul.ier.ce to the laAmtry while
- Maintenance records, Director for Regional Operations. the rulemaking proceeds
- Ma tat,etaent of parts. wh, and
- 4 Dated at Weshington. DC this 17th dav of P4 Statement
- Procedures:
March 1968. liis the objective el the Ccc.m!sshn e Post-tIWsitilana' ce testing and For the Nuclear Regulatory Comr nssion. that au componeG rf4tems and return to-servir s ac'ivities; ggyg structures of nedAr power plants be
- Measures of overall program reaintained so ht plant equipment will i
y ., effectiveness:
[m Doc 8m3 N 3-22-88. 8 45 azal u. o 1 o Ove.
suseo coot rsa 4ws oe lon in t e areas c f each licensee sin!d rbelop and g,nning, implement a mamtenance program' -Schtdeling.
which provides for 6e periodic M CFR Part H avaluation, and pr sapt repalt of plant components, eystetn:.. and structurse to
_ggyi[8,'
_gg g ensure their availh%ty. -Resource allocatfore ' ,
- Final Commission Policy statement on
- Contal of cr,ntracted maintrenance Maintenance of Nuclea- Power Plants '
MetMon of Ma!nauance. .
services:
We Commission defines maint, rmace
- Radiological exnsure control Aomcy: Nuclear Regulatory as the a te of thou functions (AIARAh Commission. req to preserve or restwo safey..
- Pe sonnel qualGca' lor and training:
Acnoec Final policy statement. rehability, and avellability of plant .
- Internalcornowticatiws hetween
- structures, systema, and correonce a, . , the natt: nance agentzt; ion and plari .
amm a=Y:%e Comuniastom believes . Maintenance indude a set u I) act.6vttW opernWr a a ac! sgott ype .
safety con M enhanced by improvin; ,
traditionally assemewt uth 64 stif; a.g i
- Carismunicatione betwww! ant and the effecttveness of oaintenance- sind correcting actual w poteca - corptaite manecernent ar f Ce prosieins throughoet the rmelet+
- degraded conditions,i.: a repde. ~- malntenance organ'artic W industry. De Commisalon is pror* e&g sur *iaince, diar:n exarainatione. . Mutena:n reememandstiens or with rulemaking conalatent wit!, thia sw.i prevutin maessures; but est te"8, to requirernents of individual vendora belief. Dis Policy Statement ta beleg iU spportty Sunctions far the cm le t shouki reesve ar; opdata attendon in ,
issued to provide guidance to il i. of these activities. 'Ihe activRies ud - the devalupar tt t.? the maletanance industry while N rulemaking procr.eds. functions are listed thw t,.nder e e, proaram. y k
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Federal Reglster / Vol. 53, No. 56 / Wednesday, Ma'rch 23, 1988 / Rules and Regufatisns' 9431 N'uture Commission Action erroneous PT speed eignal during ground one engme as a failure of the other ne Commission Intends this Policy operat:on with the bottoming governor engine.nis AP supersedes AD 86-W F.",tement to provide guidance to the (BG) enabled. 51, Amendment 394473 (5117 44439, r idustry in improving maintenance DAfts: Effective-May 9,1988. December e,1986).
programs for their power reactor romplionce Schedu/e-As prescribed Interested persons have been afforded facilities. The Commission will continue in tha body of the AD. an opportunity to participate in the to enforce existin6 requirements IncorPorofion by Reference-- making of this amendment No including those cat address Approved by the Director of the Federal comments were received. Accordingly, maintenance practices and will take Register as of May 9,1988. the proposal is adopted wi'hout change. l whatever action that may be necessary Aconasses:ne applicable service AD 86-10-51, Amendment 39-5473 (51 '
to protect health and safety. bulletins (SB's) may be obtained from FR 44439), issued November 18,1968, ne Commission expects to publish a Dowty Rotol Limited, Cheltenham Road requires that the engine BC be disabled Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the East, Gloucester, England GL2 9QH: when the aircraft power lever la near future that will establish basic General Electric Company,1000 ' positioned in the beta range (below requirements for plant maintenanc, Western Avenue, Lynn, Massachusetta flight idle). ne AD was needed to programs. We believe that the contents 01910; and Saab-Scania AB S48188, prevent M overspeed and resulting and bounds of the proposed rule will fall Linkoping. Sweden. -
uncontaired failure caused by reaction within the general framework described A copy of each SB is contained in .
of the fuel control to an enoneous M in this Policy Statement; Rules Docket Number 86-ANE-21. In the speed signal during ground operation Consideration will also be given to OtTice of the Regional Counsel, Federal with tlue BG enabled. i Industry wide eIforts that already have Aviation Administration,New England AD 86-10-51 provides interim been initiated. We encourage interested Region,12 New England Executive Psk, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, and instructions to prevent M overspeed parties to provide their views on this may be examined between the hours of and uncontained failure. Since these important subject to the Commission, instructions require special aircraft and even at this early stage of the eso a.m. and 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. engine operating procedures which I rulemakirig process. Any notice of l increase crew workload and invalidate proposed rulemaking that is published FoR FVRTMR INFORadATION CONTACT: the constant torque on takeoff function, I will provide, of course, a period for Barbara Garlan, Engine Certification public comment on its contents. Branch ANE-141, Engine Certification the FAA has determined that a second overspeed protection system with an Dated at Wa Office, Aircraft Certification Division, u , shington. DC, this trth day of Federal Aviation Administration, New improved level of safety precludes the l England Region 12 New England need for these interim instructions and For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. returns the aircraft and engine to pre.
""'q - Executive Park, Burlington, AD 86.-10-51 operation.
Secretory of the Commission.
Ma ssachusetta 01803; telephone (617) 273-7066, Conclusion (FR Doc. 88-4334 Filed 3-22-63. 8 45 eml SwMasENTARY 8MF'ORaAAT)O4C A' i hae determined thet this a m eo coot neo " Re l AA L--
proposal to amend Part 39 of.the Federal regulauon affects 107 aircraft all of Aviation Reguladone (FAR) to include a which are in compliance with this AD,
- n 8 DEFMTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION second overspeed protection system on.not , Derefcre,I certify thatExecutive this action (1)la a "major rule" under Federal Aviation Administration certsin GE CI7-5A series turbopropellet Order 12291:(2)is not a significant engines as installed in Saab-Fairchild rule" under DOT Regulatory Policies 14 CFR Part 39 SP340A aircraft was published in the and Procedures (44 FR 11034; February (Dochat Number DC-AME-21; Amot. 39- ode Register on October 16,1967, (52 28,1979):(3) doe not warrant seenj }- preparation of a regulatory evaluation ne proposal was prompted by an as the anticipated impact is minimal:
l Airworthiness Directives; General en8i ne U overSpeed and resultina and (4) will net have a significant 1 Electric ('3E) CT7-S A, -5A1, and -5A2 unc ntained failure caused by reaction economic impact, poaltive or negative, l Turt>opropeller Engines as Insta;ied in f the fuel control to an erroneous M on a substantial number of small entities l Saat-Fairched SF340A Aircraft 8 Peed 81 8 n81 durin8 87 und Operation under the criteria of tl a Regulatory with the BG enabled. Flexibthty Act.- '
A ntwcy:Fednal AvMtion Since this condition is likely 'o exist Administration (FAA); DOT. or develop on o*her enginee of the same IJst of Subjects la 14 CFR Part 3e ACT)oec Fini' rule, type design, a new AD is being issued
. . , that requires installation of a second Engines, Air transporation, Aircraft, SUWhtARC This amendrnent adopts a overspeed protection system en GE Aviation safety, incorporation by new str+crthiness directive (AD) which CT74A series turbopropeller engines as . reference' .- ,
requires the installation of a second installed in Saab Fairchild SF340A AdoPtl an,af the A=ad==4.g overr ,ced protection eystem oa certain alteraft,This AD also requires ..
GE CI7-5A series turbopropeller inco ration of engine BG deact!vation g g ' g ,, g g , g , g gy engines as installed in Saab-Fairchild awit in 'he power lever quadrant to delegated to ma the Federal Aviation GF340A aircraft,his AD aleo prevent an adverse yaw condition in the Administration (TAA) p to opersedes AD 86-10-51, Amerenent aircraft that could occur due to a - amend Part 30 of the Fede viation 3S-5473 ($1 FR 44439; December 9,1986). mismatched alttraft power condition . Regulations (FAR) as follows:
. .p his AD is needed to prevent erarine resulting from an unmmmanded power power turbine (im overspeed and increase of one engine.nia would also ' PART 394IMENDED)I *-
resulting unec,ntained failure caused by prevent the crew from misinterpreting 1.The authority citation for Part 3e reactior t.f the fuel control to an the uncommanded power increase of continues to read as follows:
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. Aaxa.oaa on<a CoedurfTit s. . A a.oNa 713$1 AGQlCVLTi>8tf NUTRITION. AND N>RESTRY $ $GMC ''''''o Lasartna on<s.
CoWgt SCigCE AND WASHINGTON. DC 20510 ,T;j ') ' e, ,e,pp IC RKS IIIsbeU4'87:
SPECIAL COMMITTit ON AGING wouos on.ca Apri1 15, 1988 *""tin;r'y^"ta=*
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Bonorable W. Zech, Jr. - w%**,",",',, ",L Chairman *oig=; $g;in Nuclear Regulatory Commission *g'gy,,y,joi 30 One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Md. 20555 .
Dear Mr. Chairman:
As a further follow-up to our recent hearing regarding the Commission's budget request for fiscal 1989, I have enclosed with this letter additional questions from Senator Mikulski. Your expeditious response to the enclosed would be deeply appreciated.
Sincerel ,
John Breaux Chairman
' Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation I
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OUESTIONS OF SENATOR MIKULSKI FOT THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION N kk (1)(a) What criteria will be applied by the NRC for measuring the changes that need to be taken before the Peach Bottom nuclear plant can be restarted?
(b) How will the NRC determine and apply these criteria?
(c) What will the involvement of the public be in the restart decision?
hj d(L (2) In November of last year, PECO submitted their original plan for the restart of Peach Bottom. On January 11 of this year, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) issued a report that was highly critical of the PECO plan, stating that it was "insufficient to bring about the necessary change." What actions have been taken by PECO since that time and have these actions been deemed adequate to address and correct the problems that have been identified by either the NRC or INPO?
h(jk (3)(a) It is my understanding that there areInnumerous fact, it is my maintenance items outstanding at Peach Bottom.
understanding that there are over 1,500 items in need of maintenance activities of one sort or another. How many outstanding maintenance items does the NRC believe 9xist at the plant?
(b) Please explain why there are so many outstanding i
maintenance items?
(c) Are the number of outstanding maintenance items at the Peach Bottom plant above average, average, or below average for the industry as a whole?
(d) Please provide a list of those outstanding maintenance items that the NRC believes have a significant safety related l implication.
(e) What type of improvements in the maintenance program at Peach Bottom will the NRC insist on before it allows the plant to reopen?
(4)(a) Employees at Peach Bottom have been indicted for gjg$;possession and/or use of illegal substances while on the job.
How does the NRC propose to correct the problem of drug abuse at Peach Bottom?
(b)' Is PECO's fitness-for-duty program adequate to detect drug abuse at Peach Bottom?
Il kIk (5)(a) What is the status of the NRC's current efforts to curtail drug abuse by personnel at nuclear power plants?
(b) Does the NRC believe that its current policy is an adequate way to implement fitness for duty programs, including drug testing, at nuclear power plants?
(c) What is the NRC's position on random testing?
(d) How many nuclear power plants have random testing programs in place?
(e) How many incidents, nationwide, of drug abuse at nuclear power plants is the NRC aware of? Is the problem getting worse or better over the past five years?
f(31hundreds (6)(a) Over the past few years, Peach Bottom has been issued of thousands of dollars in fines and has been listed by the NRC as one of the worst run plants in the U.S. Nevertheless, NRC inspectors never detected operators asleep, literally at the switch. It is further my understanding that power stations that are known as problem plants are assigned additional hours of inspection by the NRC. Is that correct?
(b) At the time of Peach Bottom's shut-down, had the number of inspectors on site been increased to reflect the situation--that is, the poor performance and violations at the plant? If not, why not? ,
(c) Did NRC inspectors know about the problems that led to the shut-down? When did they become aware of these problems?
(d) When the NRC inspectors became aware of the problems, did they report them? When? To whom?
(e) Were these reports read at the regional level?
(f) If the reports were being read at the regional level, were the personnel at the regional office relaying the information to headquarters? Why did it take the NRC so long to take action against the plant?
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