IR 05000311/2004001

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Insp Repts 50-348/85-18 & 50-364/85-18 on 850311-0401.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters,Monthly Maint & Surveillance Observation & Independent Insp Effort
ML20127G343
Person / Time
Site: Salem, Farley  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 04/18/1985
From: Bradford W, Cantrell F
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127G316 List:
References
50-348-85-18, 50-364-85-18, NUDOCS 8505210039
Download: ML20127G343 (8)


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UNITED STATES

[AR 887 o ~

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[" p REGION 88 101 MARIETTA STREET, ,

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Report'Nos.: 50-348/85-18 and 50-364/85-18

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Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, AL ;35291

Docket Nos.: -50-364 and 50-348- License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8

- Fac'lity Name: Farley 1 and 2 ~

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Inspection Conducted: March 11 - April 1, 1985 Inspection at Farley site near Dothan, Alabama Inspector: _

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Bradiorc; b

v iI(!I5 Date Signed i Appro'ved _ by: / D

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F. 3. Cantrell, Sectiori e

'f ' Date Signed Division of. Reactor Pro cts SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 116 inspector-hours on site in the areas of licensee action on previous enforcement matters, monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, opearational safety verification, independent inspection effort, engineered safeguards ' system walkdown inspection, onsite followup of events, and plant start-up from refuelin c Results: There were no violations or deviations identified during this

. inspection perio $DR ADOCK 05000348 PDR

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L REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted '

Licensee Employees J. D. Woodard, Plant Manager D. N. Morey, Assistant Plant Manager W. D. Shipman, Assistant Plant Manager R. D. Hill, Operations Superintendent C.'D. Nesbitt, Technical Superintendent R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Superintendent L. A. Ward, Maintenance Superintendent L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Superintendent

~ J. E. Odom, Operations Sector Supervisor B. W. Vanlandingham, Operations Sector Supervisor T. H. Esteve, Planning Supervisor J. B.' Hudspeth, Document Control Supervisor L'. K. Jones, Material Supervisor R. H. Marlow, Technical Supervisor L. M. Stinson, Plant Modification Supervisor W. G. Ware, Supervisor, Safety Audit Engineering Review Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operations personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members, and offic . personne . Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management inter-views throughout the report period and on April.1,1985, with the. plant manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection findings were discussed in detail. The licensee identified as proprietary one' drawing which was provided for review to the inspector. No proprietary material from that drawing is included in the repor . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspectio . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed and reviewed Technical Specification required-surveillance testing and verified that -testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; that test instrumentation was calibrated; that limiting conditions were met; that test results met acceptance criteria and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing tl : test; that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed

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and resolved by appropriate management personnel; and that personnel conducting the tests were qualifie The inspector witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:

-FNP-1/2-STP- Operations daily and shift surveillance requirement FNP-1-STP- Borated water sourc FNP-1-STP-3 Safeguards Test Cabinet Train Functional Tes FNP-1-STP-1 ECCS flow path verificatio FNP-2-ETP-3605 -

Startup and power ascension procedur FNP-2-STP-121 -

Power range axial offset calculatio FNP-2-STP-7. 0 -

Quadrant power tilt calculatio FNP-2-STP-2 Shutdown margin calculatio FNP-0-AP-16 -

Unit 2 return to service checklis No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and were in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during the review: limiting condition for operations were met while components or systems were removed from i service; approvals were obtained prior to the initiating the work; I activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were insp.ected as )

applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning - components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities'were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente Work request were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs to assure that priority was assigned.to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance. The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

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IA condensate pum '

2C component cooling water pum ' Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump steam admission valve HV-322 Unit 2 post accident hydrogen analyze Unit 2 MSIV-3370 A main feedwater regulating valv No violations or deviations were identifie '6; Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and -conducted discussions- with control room operators during the report period. :The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems,' reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary, diesel, and turbine buildings were conducted .to' observe plant equipment conditions, including fluid leaks and excessive vibration The inspectors -verified compliance with selected Limited Condition for Operations (LCO) and results of selected surveillance tests. The verifica-' '

tions were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, . switch positions and review of completed logs, records, and chemistry results. -The licensee's compliance with LOC 0 action statements were reviewed as they happene The following system and components were observed / verified operational:

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Station electrical boards in the control room and various electrical boards'throughout the plant for proper electrical alignmen Certain accessible hydraulic snubber Accessible portions of service water . and component cooling water system Units 1 and 2 suction and discharging piping and valves to and from the charging /high head safety injection pump The inspectors verified compliance with selected Limited Condition for Operations (LCO) and results of selected surveillance tests. The verifi-cations were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumenta-tion, valve positions, switch positions and review of completed logs, records, and' chemistry.results. The . licensee's compliance with LCO actions statements were reviewed as they happene The following systems and components were observed / verified operational:

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Station electrical boards in the control room and various electrical boards throughout the plant for proper electrical alignmen .

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Certain accessible hydraulic snubber Accessible portions of service water and component = cooling water system . Units 1 and 2 suction and discharging piping and valves on auxiliary

.feedwater syste Diesel generators and support system Certain accessible portions of CVCS piping and valves to and from the charging /high head safety injection pump Certain portions of RHR and containment spray system Portions of various other systems (safety-related and nonsafety-related).

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Independent Inspection Effort (92706)

The inspectors routinely attended meetings with~ certain licensee management and observed various shift turnovers between shift supervisors, shift foreman, and licensed operators. These meetings and discussions provided a daily status of plant operating, maintenance, and testing activities in

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progress, as well as discussions of significant problem The. inspector verified by observation and interviews during the reporting interval that measures .taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current-requirements. Areas inspected included the organiza-tion of the security force; the establishment and maintenance of gates, <

doors, and . isolation zones; that access control and badging were proper; and procedures were followe During the reporting interval, the inspector -verified compliance with selected Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) and results of selected surveillance test The' verifications were accomplished by direct

. observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions and review of completed logs, records, and chemistry result The licensee's compliance with LC0 action statements were ' reviewed as they happene . Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71710)

The inspector examined the station batteries and DC distribution system to-determine operability of the systems.. The inspector verified switch positions,. operability of battery chargers, operation of inverters,

cleanliness, proper ventilation, and operability of local and remote instrumentation. The systems were reviewed against system drawings, procedures, training lecture notes and the FSAR.

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.The ' station battery maintenance records were reviewed to verify conformance with the following procedures:

FNP-1-STP-60 Auxiliary Building Battery Inspectio FNP-1-STP-60 Auxiliary Building Battery Test (Equivalent Load Profile Method).

FNP-1-STP-60 Auxiliary Building Battery Performance Test FNP-1-STP-60 Auxiliary Building Battery Weekly Verificatio FNP-1-STP-60 Auxiliary Building Battery Quarterly Verificatio FNP-0-STP-60 Service Water Building Battery Inspectio FNP-0-STP-60 Service Water Building Battery Performance Test 'FNP-0-STP-60 Service Water Building Battery Weekly Verificatio FNP-0-STP-60 Service Water Building Battery Quarterly Verificatio FNP-0-STP-60 Service Water Building Battery Service Test 18 month FNP-0-STP-614 -

Auxiliary Building Battery Charger Load Tes FNP-0-STP-61 Service Water Building Battery Charger Load Tes FNP-0-STP-619 -

Fire Pump Diesel Starting Battery Verificatio FNP-0-STP-620 -

Fire Pump Diesel Starting Battery Check (3 months).

FNP-0-GMP-52 -

Monthly Battery Verificatio FNP-0-GMP-5 Weekly Battery Chec FNP-0-GMP-5 Monthly Battery Inspection of Tech Spec Batterie On March 28, 1985, while performing a walkdown inspection of the station batteries and D.C. distribution systems, the inspector found no spacers between the cells on train A and train B 125 volt service water batteries, and Unit 1.and Unit 2 Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) 48 volt batterie The spacers had not been inserted between the cells during installation of the batterie gry ,

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s :The: manufacturer's i drawings Nos. U-184416 for the service water batteries, 6*

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No. 263216 and 216919 for the UPS batteries (this . drawing is marked

. proprietary), i show spacers installed between the cell The UPS Vendor Manuals, J U-263212 and U-216914, section 12-6000-1C, entitied "C and D

, Installation and Operating - Instructions for Safety Batteries,"c 3.2.2 -

Earthquake- Protected. Racks Assembly, Item #7 states, " Install cells, noting special requirements,' place- the furnished plastic spacer between each cell-

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(spacing-1/2 inch approx.)."

The.UPS is designed to supply a reliable source of control power, AC and DC,

'for the. turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (125 VDC pump control panel;

, :125 VDC control. power for steam admission valves HV-3235A, 3235B and 3226; .

-and pump _ speed control) in the event of a high energy pipe break with ~ the loss ; of ?all. off-site power - sources and the worst single failure. The battery, per section 8.3.3 of the FSAR, is a nominal 48V battery with an earthquake protected 2-tier battery rack. All components are designed to s conform tof Class IE electr ical system design criteria.and are capable of withstanding the safe shutdown earthquak The service water batteries supply control power for operation of service water. pumps local switch gear and service ' water valves. This system is required to 'be operable. in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4 per section 3.8.2.5 of the Technical Specification The ' licensee has installed the _ prescribed spacing material between the

. battery cell The licensee is performing a safety evaluation to determine if'the batteries

. would have met seismic requirements without. the spacers installed between cells. This-item is unresolved * pending outcome of the licensee's safety evaluation and subsequent NRC' revie (348/364/85-18-01)

H .Onsite Followup of Events (93702)

.. .On March 13,1985, Unit 1 tripped from '100% power due to lo-lo steam C generator levels. The trip was caused by a limit switch on Main Steam c-Isolation Valve (MSIV) 3370A which closed enough to pick up relay 20-20 PC which closes the turbine governor valves and intercept valves.- The ensuing load rejection caused the reactor to trip on lo-lo steam generator level The licensee believes a loose wire in the limit ~

switch could have been the proble . Unit 2 tripped from 20% power on March 28, 1985, while decreasing-loa .

for a turbine overspeed test. The cause of the trip was io-lo. level in

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2A steam generator-due to personnel error. 2A main feedwater pump had

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been taken off line for maintenance on control circuits. A technican pulled a card on 2B main feedwater pump which was operating, causing -

loss of. turbine speed contro * Unresolved items are matters about which more. information is required to

< determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviation .

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Unit 2 tripped from 95% power on March 30, 1985. The trip occurred during maintenance on 2B main feedwater pump. An instrument valve-allowed leakage to the low vacuum trip instrumentation during maintenance, tripping the feed pump turbin The reactor trip was caused by lo-lo steam g'anerator level The inspector has reviewed the licensee trip reports,' appropriate operator logs and interviewed operating personnel. Safety systems actuated as designed. The inspector judged the operators response to be adequat The inspector had no further questions. No violations or deviations were identifie . Plant Startup From Refueling (71711)

The inspector verified that certain systems disturbed or tested during the refueling outage were returned to operable status before plant start-up and that plant startup was performed according to approved procedure The verification ; included: review of licensee's administrative controls and start-up checklists; observation of nuclear instrumentation; and walkdown of the diesel generator The inspector witnessed portions of the unit startup to verify that Technical Specification requirements were me No violations or deviations were identifie . _ . -. __- - - . - . - . _ - _ _ - , . . _ _ - .