ML20198R885

Insp Repts 50-424/86-31 & 50-425/86-15 on 860401-0513. Violations Noted:Failure to Establish Appropriate Procedures to Properly Control Filling & Venting of Safety Related Sys & to Follow Procedures for Protecting Equipment

ML20198R885
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	05/30/1986
From:	Livermore H, Rogge J, Schepens R, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198R811	List: ML20198R810 ML20198R817 ML20198R885
References
50-424-86-31, 50-425-86-15, NUDOCS 8606100249
Download: ML20198R885 (30)

See also: IR 05000424/1986031

Text

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UNITED STATES

[p me3,,Do NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[ , ,/ p REGION 11

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j 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.

• , 2 AT4 ANTA.GEORGlA 30323

%, * . . 4. ,6 '

Report Nos. 50-424/86-31 and 50-425/86-15

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Licensee: G(orgia Power Company

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P.O. Box 4545

Atlanta, GA 30302

Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: CPPR-108 and CPPR-109

Facility.Name: Vogtle 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: April 1 - May 13, 1986

Inspectors: N -R4 Y'34/ M

prt H. H. Livermore, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed

Construction

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f,1N wt sho/8s

ge J. F. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed

Operations j

[ S/3a/$ (:,

gg R. J. Schepens, Resident Inspector Date Signed

ConstrctionfndOprations

Approved By: ! lA4fl M

M.7. Sif ktfle, Section Chief Date Signed

Division of Reactor Projects

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SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 485 Resident and Region

Inspection-hours on site (109 hours0.00126 days <br />0.0303 hours <br />1.802249e-4 weeks <br />4.14745e-5 months <br /> were on backshifts) inspecting. containment

and safety related structures, piping systems and supports, safety related

components, auxiliary systems, electrical equipment and cables, instrumentation,

preoperational test program, quality programs and administrative controls

affecting quality, and follow-up on previous inspection identified items.

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Readiness Review Modules 7 and 17 were examined. The residents participated in

the NRC graded Emergency Exercise.

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Results: Two violations were identified - Failure to Establish Appropriate

Procedures to Properly Control the Filling and Venting of Safety-Related

Systems - Paragraph 20 and Failure to Follow Procedures for Protecting Installed

Equipment / Components - Paragraph 22.

8606100249 860602 4

PDR ADOCK 0500

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted -

Licensee Employees

• R. E. Conway, Senior Vice-President, Vogtle Project Director

D. O. Foster, Vice-President, Project Support

R. H. Pinson, Vice-President, Project Construction

W. T. Nickerson, Assistant to the Project Director

• R. W. McManus, Readiness Review

• M. H. Googe, Project Construction Manager

• G. Bockhold, Jr. , General Manager Nuclear Operations

• H. P. Walker, Manager Unit Operations

• R. M. Bellamy, Manager Test & Outage

• C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality Assurance Manager

• C. E. Belflower, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Operatioris

• E. D. Groover, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Operations

W. E. Mundy, Quality Assurance Audit Supervisor

D. M. Fiquett, Project Construction Manager - Unit 2

• B. C. Harbin, Manager Quality Control

• G. A. McCarley, Project Compliance Coordinator

• W. C. Gabbard, Regulatory Specialist

• C, F. Meyer, Operations Superintendent (Acting)

T. Dannemiller, Senior QA Engineer

• R. M. Odom, Plant Engineering Supervisor

C. L. Coursey, Maintenance Superintendent

M. A. Griffis, Superintendent-Maintenance

• N. R. Harris, Quality Control Assistant Manager

• W. R. Duncan, Readiness Review

D. McCary, Engineering Supervisor, GPC/PKF

• G. E. Spell, Quality Assurance Engineer / Support Supervisor

• R. E. Spinnatu, NSEG Supervisor

• S. A. Bradley, NSEG Member

• R. M. Bellamy, Manager Test & Outage

Other licensee employees contacted included craftsmen, technicians,

supervision, engineers, inspectors, and office personnel.

Other Organizations

H. M. Handfinger, Preoperational Test Superintendent - Bechtel

D. L. Kinnsch, Project Engineering - Bechtel

Other NRC Personnel

• M. V. Sinkule, Section Chief 3C, Division of Reactor Projects - Region II

• P. T. Burnett, Test Program Section Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety,

Region II

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• Attended Exit Interview

2. Exit Interview (30703C)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 13, 1986, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the

areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding listed below.

, No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did

not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by

the inspector during this inspection.

(0 pen) Violation, 50-424/86-31-01 " Fail ure to Establish Appropriate

Procedures to Properly Control the Filling and Venting of Safety-Related

Systems" - Paragraph 20

(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-424/86/31-02 " Review Implementation of

Negative Logic Testing" - Paragraph 19C

(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-424/86-31-03 " Review Licensee Program for

Separation of Unit 2 Construction Activities from Unit 1 to Prevent

Interference with Unit 1 Operation" - Paragraph 22

(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-424/86-31-04 " Review Minimum Shift Crew

Requirements" - Paragraph 22

(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-424/86-31-05 " Review Authorization Levels

That May Approve Overtime" - Paragraph 22

(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-424/86-31-06 " Review Site Procedure

00402-C, Licensing Document Change Request, for Resolution of Comments" -

Paragraph 22

(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-424/8631-07 " Review Maintenance Procedure

20427-C for Incorporation of the ANSI Requirement to Document Closeout

Inspection Results" - Paragraph 22

(0 pen) CDR 86-93 " Process and Root Valves" - Paragraph 4

On April 18, 1986, Mr. M. D. Hunt presented the results of his inspection

pertaining to electrical readiness review. The licensee was informed that

the following item would be documented in the resident inspector report.

(0 pen) Violation, 50-424/86-31-08 " Failure to Following Procedures for

Protecting Installed Equipment / Components" - Paragraph 22

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The following NRC exit interviews were attended during the inspection period

by a resident inspector:

Date Name

April 18 L. E. Nicholson

W. Gloerson

J. T. Lenahan

J. R. Harris

M. D. Hunt

April 25 G. L. Troup

W. Ross

L. H. Jackson

R. Gibbs

R. W. Wright

May 2 A. L. Cunningham, Et. al

May 9 G. A. Halstrom

G. L. Troup

J. T. Lenahan

J. York

J. H. Moorman

J. R. Harris

S. J. Vias

A. Tillman

D. Thompson

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

Not inspected.

4. Followup on Previous Inspection Items (92701)

(0 pen) CDR 86-93 Process and Root Valves. On April 15, 1986, the resident

inspectors attended a followup meeting with the licensee pertaining to

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actions taken into the investigation of the Valve Designator List (VDL) and

the Quantity Tracking System (QTS). The results of the licensee's 2000

valve walkdown were a comparison check of the design requirements to the

warehouse records and the actual valves installed in the plant was also

presented during this meeting. In conclusion the licensee presented actions

to be taken as a result of their investigation to date. This item continues

to remain open until final corrective action is implemented.

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5. Allegations

a. During the course of an inspection, the inspector conducted a review of

GPC Quality Concern 85-V-0490 and found that there were no records

indicating that GPC went into the field and checked if a containment

liner plate was dropped during installation, as was alleged. As a

result, a followup by GPC revealed that a check was made but that the

records were lost. GPC again investigated the allegation finding that

no DRs were written and that no one had ever seen a faulty lift. GPC

also obtained a letter from CB&I, the installing agency, that no

incidents had ever taken place and that a correct installation lift was

made. The inspector was satisfied with the corrective action and final

disposition of the allegation.

b. Allegation RII 84-0169-04, Concerns with the Installation of the

Containment Dome and/or Containment Spray Ring, Unit 2

The Unit 1 & 2 Containment Dome lifts were classified as major lifts

and were, therefore, required to have QC signoffs. Rigging and Setting

records (HRP-43 and 54) were reviewed in detail. The inspector

conducted personal interviews with the engineer in charge of the lifts

and installations, the QC inspectors and the QC Supervisor, all of whom

visually monitored the lifts and installations of both Containment

Domes (1 & 2). The inspector reviewed movies taken of the Containment

Dome lift and installation (setting in place). In all cases not one

person saw or heard of of any abnormalities with the lift or installa-

tion, such as dropping or bumping the domes. A review of records did

not reveal any abnormalities.

The Containment #1 spray rings were installed in pieces, whereas

Containment #2 spray rings were installed completely assembled as

individual rings (6). All were installed from jack stands while the

Containment Domes were on the ground. The spray ring lifts were not

classified as major lifts, therefore, did not require QC record

signoffs. The inspector conducted personal interviews with numerous QC

inspectors who were present during the lifts in a random surveillance

capacity. A telecon interview was conducted with the Field Engineer

who was present and in charge of the installations. Personal

interviews were conducted with the two Craft Superintendents that were

present and in charge of both lifts and installations. In all cases

not one person saw or heard of any abnormalities with the lifts and

installations of any of the spray ring assemblies, such as dropping or

bumping the rings. Allegation RII 84-0169-04 is considered unfounded

and therefore closed.

c. On April 29, 1986, the inspector accompanied two craft workers for the

administration of a lie-detector test. This action was in response to

their request and with RII approval. The purpose of the accompaniment

by the inspector was one of moral support, not of representation or

technical support. In attendance also were employees of the GPC

Quality Concerns Program,

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6. General Construction Inspection - Units 1 & 2

Periodic random surveillance inspections were made throughout this reporting

period in the form of general type inspections in different areas of both

facilities. The areas were selected on the basis of the scheduled

activities and were varied to provide wide coverage. Observations were made

of activities in progress to note defective items or items of noncompliance

with the required codes and regulatory requirements.

On these inspections, particular note was made of the presence of quality

control inspectors, supervisors, and evidence of quality control in the form

of available process sheets, drawings, material identification, material

protecticn, performance of tests, and housekeeping. Interviews were

conducted with craft personnel, supervisors, coordinators, quality control

inspectors, and others as they were available in the work areas.

The inspector reviewed numerous construction deviation reports to determine

if requirements were met in the areas of documentation, action to resolve,

justification, corrective action, and approval signatures in accordance

with GPC Field Procedure No. GD-T-01.

The inspector attended the following GPC meetings as an observer for

informational purposes:

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Board of Directors Meeting on April 4, 1986

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Monthly Drug Program Administration Meeting on April 24, 1986

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Vogtle Personnel Policy Meeting on April 25, 1986

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RCS Overfill Event Meeting on April 18, 1986

The inspector has conducted numerous meetings with the licensee with the

purpose of attaining a more coordinated and real-time status of open items

that are ready for NRC closure. The licensee has implemented a folder

concept whereby all backup documentation necessary for an NRC closure

inspection will be available in one place. Publication of monthly status of

CDR's Bulletins, and Circulars has been added to that of NRC items (e.g.,

IFI,URI,etc.). Additional improvements are being considered.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Fire Prevention / Protection and Housekeeping Measures - Units 1 & 2

(42051C)

The inspector observed fire prevention / protection measures throughout the

inspection period. Welders were using welding permits with fire watches and

extinguishers. Post indicator valves were being maintained in the open

position. Fire fighting equipment is in its designated areas throughout the

plant.

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The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following procedures

pertaining to the fire prevention / protection measures and housekeeping

measures to determine whether they comply with applicable codes, standards,

NRC Regulatory Guides and licensee commitments.

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SD-T-05, Rev. 6 Fire-Protection Equipment Inspection and Testing

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GD-T-15, Rev. 5 Welding and Cutting

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GD-T-17, Rev. 3 Housekeeping

The inspector observed fire prevention / protection measures in work areas

containing safety related equipment during the inspection period to verify

the following:

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Combustible waste material and rubbi.sh was removed from the work areas

as rapidly as practicable to avoid unnecessary accumulation of

combustibles

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Flammable liquids are stored in appropriate containers and in

designated areas throughout the plant

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Cutting and welding operations in progress have been authorized by an

appropriate permit, combustibles have been moved away or safely

covered, and a fire watch and extinguisher was posted as required

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Fire protection / suppression equipment was provided and controlled in

accordance with applicable requirements

The inspector also conducted specific inspections of fire barriers

consisting of sealant penetration installation activities in the diesel

generating building.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Structural Concrete - Unit 2 (47053C)

a. Procedure and Document Review

The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following

procedures pertaining to the placement of concrete to determine whether

they comply with applicable codes, standards, NRC Regulatory Guides and

licensee commitments.

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CD-T-02, Rev. 17, Concrete Quality Control

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CD-T-06, Rev. 9, Rebar and Cadweld Quality Control

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CD-T-07, Rev. 8, Embed Installation and Inspection

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CD-T-20, Rev. 6, Installation and Inspection of Trumpets,

Rigid Extensions, and Duct Sheathing

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b. Installation Activities

The inspector witnessed portions of the concrete placement indicated

below to verify the following:

(1) Forms, Embedment, and Reinforcing Steel Installation

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Forms were properly placed, secure, leak tight and clean.

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Rebar and other embedment installation was installed in

accordance with construction specifications and drawings,

secured, free of concrete and excessive rust, specified

distance from forms, proper on-site rebar bending (where

applicable) and clearances consistent with aggregate size.

(2) Delivery, Placement and Curing

- Preplacement inspection was completed and approved prior

to placement utilizing a Pour Card (Procedure Exhibit

, CD-T-02*18).

- Construction joints were prepared as specified.

- Proper mix was specified and delivered.

- Temperature control of the mix, mating surfaces, and

ambient were monitored. l

- Consolidation was performed correctly.

- Testing at placement location was properly performed in

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accordance with the acceptance criteria and recorded on a

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Concrete Placement Pour Log (Procedure Exhibit CD-T-02*20).

- Adequate crew, equipment and techniques were utilized.

- Inspections during placements were conducted effectively

by a sufficient number of qualified personnel.

- Curing methods and temperature was monitored.

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Pour No. Location Inspection Activity

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2-59A-017 Aux. Feedwater Placement & Curing

2-010-024E Containment #2 Preplacement, Placement

Construction Opening & Curing

A-111-114 Control Bldg. Placement

A-113-007 Control Bldg. Preplacement &

Placement

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A-081-33X1 Aux. Bldg.-Unit 1 Placement

The inspector notes that the Unit 2 Containment Construction Opening

Placement is now complete,

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(3) Installation of Tendon Sheaths for Containment Pour Only

- Tendon Sheaths were oriented properly, installed within

specified tolerances, clear and free of damage.

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c. Rebar Splicing

The inspector witnessed cadwelding operations to verify the following:

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Inspections are performed during and after splicing by qualified

QC inspection personnel.

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Each splice was defined by a unique number consisting of the bar

size, splice type, the position, the operator's symbol, and a

sequential number.

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Process and crews are qualified.  !

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The sequential number and the operator's symbol are marked on all

completed cadwelds.

The inspector also conducted random inspections of completed cadwelds

to verify the following:

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Tap hole does not contain slag, blow out, or porous metal.

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Filler metal was visible at both ends of the splice sleeve and at

the tap hole in the center of the sleeve. No voids were detected

at the ends of the sleeves.

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The sequential number and the operator's symbol are marked on all

completed cadwelds.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Containment (Prestressing) - Unit 1(47063C)

a. Procedure and Document Review

The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following

specification, procedure, and drawings pertaining to the installation

of horizontal tendons, to determine whether they with applicable codes,

standards, NRC Regulatory Guides and licensee commitments.

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X2AF04 Technical Provisions for Containment

Post-Tensioning System

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AX2AF04-100-12 Field Instruction Manual for Installation

of VSL E5-55 Post-Tensioning System Within

Nuclear Containment Structures, Rev. 9

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b. Installation Activities

The inspector witnessed portions of the installation activities to

verify the following: -

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The latest issue (revision) of applicable drawings or procedures

are available to the installers and were being used.

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Tendons were free of nicks, kinks, -corrosion; were installed in  ;

designated locations; and that the installation sequence and

technique was per specified requirements.

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Installation crew was properly trained and qualified.

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QC inspection was properly performed by qualified personnel in

accordance with applicable requirements.

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Adequate protective measures were being taken to ensure mechanical

and corrosion protection during storage, handling, installation,

and post installation.

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Tendons were stressed in the proper sequence.

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All strands in the tendon were moving together during the

stressing and the tendon is being stressed from both ends

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simultaneously.

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Elongation measurements were being taken properly and being

j compared to the calculated elongation.

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Anchor head lift-off force was being taken and documented

properly.

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The stressing operation was being monitored to identify any

strand slippage.

The inspector notes that the post tensioning effort of Unit 1 Containment

was completed as of May 2, 1986.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Containment (Steel Structures and Supports) - Units 1 & 2 (48053C)

Periodic inspections were conducted to observe containment steel and support

installation activities in progress, to verify the following:

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Components were being properly handled (included bending or

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straightening).

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Specified clearances were being maintained.

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Edge finishes and hole sizes were within tolerances.

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Control, marking, protection and segregation were maintained during

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storage.

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Fit-up/ alignment meets the tolerances in the specifications and

drawings.

One of the more specific structural steel installation activities inspected

was the pipe racks in Unit 2 containment building on "C" Level (Elevation

143'). f

No violations or deviations were identified.

11. Safety-Related Structures (Structural Steel and Supports) - Units 1 & 2

(48063C)

Periodic inspections were conducted to observe construction activities of

safety-related structures / equipment supports for major equipment outside the

containment to verify that:

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Materials and components were being properly handled to prevent damage.

- Fit-up/ alignment were within tolerances in specifications and drawing

requirements.

- Bolting was in accordance with specifications and procedures.

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Specified clearances from adjacent components were being met.

No violations or deviations were identified.

12. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping - Observation of

Work and Work Activities - Unit 1 (49053C) (49063C) (37301)

Periodic inspections were conducted to observe construction activities of

Reactor Coolant Boundary and other safety-related piping installations

inside and outside Containments No.1 & 2. Verifications included but were

' not limited to the following:

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- Material and components were being properly handled and stored in order

l to prevent damage.

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Fit-ups and alignments were within tolerances per specifications and

drawings.

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Specified clearances from pipe to pipe and adjacent components were

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Piping was installed and inspected in accordance with applicable

drawings, specifications, and procedures.

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Those people engaged in the activity are qualified to perform the

applicable function.

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Drawing and specification changes (revisions) are being handled and

used correctly.

No violations or deviations were identified.

13. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping Welding -

Unit 1 & 2 (55073C) (55083C)

Periodic inspections were conducted during daily plant surveillances on

safety-related pipe welding at various stages of weld completion. The

purpose of the inspection was to determine whether the requirements of

applicable specifications, codes, standards, work performance procedures and

QC procedures are being met as follows:

- Work was conducted in accordance with a process sheet which identifies

the weld and its location by system, references procedures or

instructions, and provides for production and QC signoffs.

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Welding procedures, detailed drawings and instructions, were readily

available in the immediate work area and technically adequate for the

welds being made.

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Welding procedure specification (WPS) were in accordance with the

applicable ASME Code requirements and that a Procedure Qualification

Record (PQR) is referenced and exists for the type of weld being made.

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That the base metals, welding filler materials, fluxes, gases, and

insert materials were of the specified type and grade, have been

properly inspected, tested and were traceable to test reports or

certifications.

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That the purge and/or shielding gas flow and composition were as

specified in the welding procedure specification and that protection

was provided to shield the welding operation from adverse environmental

conditions.

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That the weld , joint geometry including pipe wall thickness was

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specified and that surfaces to be welded have been prepared, cleaned

and inspected in accordance with applicable procedures or instructions.

- That a sufficient number of adequately qualified QA and QC inspection

personnel were present at the work site, commensurate with the work in

progress.

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- That the weld area cleanliness was maintained and that pipe alignment

l and fit-up tolerances were within specified units.

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That weld filler material being used was in accordance with welding

specifications, that unused filler material was separated from other

types of material and was stored in heated cans, and stubs properly

removed from the work location.

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That there were no evident signs of cracks, excessive heat input,

sugaring, or excessive crown.

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That welders were qualified to the applicable process, and that

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necessary controls and records were in place.

No violations or deviations were identified.

14. Reactor Vessel, Integrated Head Package, and Internals - Unit 1 & 2

(50053C & 50063C)

Periodic Unit 1 inspections consisted of examinations of the Reactor Vessel

and the installed integrated head package. -

The Unit 2 inspections consisted of examinations of the Reactor Vessel

installed in containment, the Reactor Vessel head with the installed control

rod drive mechanisms that are located on the refueling floor, and the upper

and lower internals in their designated laydown area. Inspections also

determined that proper storage protection practices were in place and that

entry of foreign objects and debris was prevented.

The inspector also observed cleanup activities in Unit #2 Reactor Vessel

after completion of Lower Radial Core Support machining in preparation for

fitup of the lower internals.

No violations or deviations were identified.

15. Safety Related Components - Units 1 & 2 (50073C)

The inspection consisted of plant tours to observe storage, handling, and

protection; installation; and preventive maintenance after installation of

safety-related components to determine that work is being performed in

accordance with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee

commitments.

During the inspection, the below listed areas were inspected at various

times during the inspection period to verify the following as applicable:

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Storage, environment, and protection of components were in accordance

with manufacturer's instructions and/or established procedures.

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Implementation of special storage and maintenance requirements such as:

rotation of motors, pumps, lubrication, insulation testing

(electrical), cleanliness,etc.

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Performance of licensee / contractor surveillance activities and

' documentation thereof was being accomplished.

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Installation requirements were met such as: proper location, placement,

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orientation, alignment, mounting (torquing of bolts and expansion

anchors), flow direction, tolerances, and expansion clearance.

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Appropriate stamps, tags, - markings, etc. were in use to prevent

oversight of required inspections, completion of tests, acceptance, and

the prevention of inadvertent operation.

Safety-Related piping, valves, pumps, heat exchangers, and instrumentation

- were inspected in the following Unit 1 and 2 areas on a random sampling

basis throughout the inspection period:

- Residual Heat Removal Pump Rooms

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Diesel Generator Building

- Containment Spray (CS) Pumps

- Auxiliary Feedwater Pu~ phouse

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- Containment Spray Pump Rooms

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Pressurizer Rooms

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Main Coolant Pump Areas

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Steam Generator Areas

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Safety Injection Pump Rooms

- RHR and CS Containment Penetration Encapsulation Vessel Rooms

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Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchangers, Surge Tanks

and Pump Rooms

- Cable Spreading Rooms

- Accumulator Tank Areas

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Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Letdown Heat Exchanger

Pump Room

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Battery & Charger Rooms

- Nuclear Grade Piping, Valves & Fittings Storage Areas

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Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Rooms

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Pressurizer Relief Tank Area

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CVCS Centrifugal Charging Pumps & Positive Displacement

Pump Rooms

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Bottom Mounted Instrumentation (BMI) Seal Table trea

- BMI and Supports Under Reactor Vessel

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NSCW Tower Pump Rooms and Pipe Tunnels

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Containment;-Auxiliary, and Fuel Building auxiliary (secondary)

areas

[ Some of the more specific equipment installation activities inspected were

l the Refueling Machine in the Spent Fuel Handling Building and the " Sigma"

Refueling Machine in the Containment Building.

l No violations or deviations were identified.

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16. Safety Related Pipe Support and Restraint Systems - Units 1 & 2 (50090C)

Periodic random inspections were conducted during the inspection period to

observe construction activities during installation of safety-related pipe

supports to determine that the following work was performed in accordance

with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee commitments:

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Spring har.gers were provided with indicators to show the approximate

" hot" or " cold" position, as appropriate.  :

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No deformation or forced bending was evident.

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Where pipe clamps are used to support vertical lines, shear lugs were

welded to the pipe (if required by Installation Drawings) to prevent

slippage.

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Sliding or rolling supports were provided with material and/or

lubricants suitable for the environment and compatible with sliding

contact surfaces.

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Supports are located and installed as specified.

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The surface of welds meet applicable code requirements and are free

from unacceptable grooves, abrupt ridges, valleys, undcrcuts, cracks,

discontinuities, or other indications which can be observed on the

welded surface.

No violations or deviations were identified.

17. Electrical and Instrumentation Components and Systems - Units 1 & 2

(51053C) (52153C)

Periodic inspections were conducted during the inspection period to observe

safety related electrical equipment in order to verify that the storage,

installation, and preventive maintenance was accomplished in accordance with

applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee commitments.

During the inspection period, an inspection was performed on various pieces

of electrical equipment during storage, installation, and cable terminating

phase in order to verify the following as applicable:

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Location and alignment

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Type and size of anchor bolts

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Identification

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Segregation and identification of nonconforming items

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Location, separation and redundancy requirements

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Equipment space heating ,

'

.

.

15

-

Cable identification

-

Proper lugs used

-

Condition of wire (not nicked, etc.), tightness of connection

-

Bending radius not exceeded

-

Cable entry to terminal point

-

Separation

,

One of the more specific instrumentation installation activities inspected

was the installation of the drive units for the Teleflex Flux Mapping System

on Unit #1 in the Containment Building.

No violations or deviations were identified.

18. Electrical and Instrumentation Cables and Terminations - Unit 1 and 2

(51063C) (52063C)

a. Raceway / Cable Installation

The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following

procedures pertaining to raceway / cable installation to determine

whether they comply with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides and

licensee commitments.

- ED-T-02, Rev. 8 Raceway Installation

- ED-T-07, Rev. 9 Cable Installation

Periodic inspections were conducted to observe construction activities

of Safety Related Raceway / Cable Installation.

In reference to the raceway installation, the following areas were

inspected to verify compliance with the applicable requirements:

-

Identification

-

Alignment

- Bushings (Conduit)

- Grounding

-

Supports and Anchorages

In reference to the cable installation the following areas were

inspected to verify compliance with the applicable requirements:

- Protection from adjacent construction activities (welding, etc.)

-

Coiled cable ends properly secured

- Non-terminated cable ends taped

-

Cable trays, junction boxes, etc., reasonably free of debris

- Conduit capped, if no cable installed

- Cable supported

- Bend radius not exceeded

- Separation

.

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16

The inspector pointed out to the licensee the abundance of trash, metal

objects, and an HVAC door that were present in the overhead electrical

cable trays in Cable Spreading Room 44, Level A, Control Building.

b. Cable Terminations

The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following

procedures pertaining to cable termination to determine whether they

comply with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides and licensee

commitments.

- ED-T-08, Rev. 7 Cable Termination

In reference to cable terminations the following areas were inspected

to verify compliance with the applicable requirements.

- Cable identification

- Proper lugs used

-

Condition of wire (not nicked, etc.), tightness of connection

- Bending radius not exceeded

- Cable entry to terminal point

- Separation

One of the more specific cable termination installation activity

inspected was the Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) cable connector

installation to the Integrated Head Package on Unit #1.

No violations or deviations were identified.

19. Containment and Safety Related Structural Steel Welding - Units 1 and 2

(55053C) (55063C)

Periodic inspections were conducted during daily plant surveillances on

safety-related steel welding at various stages of weld completion.

The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether the requirements of

applicable specifications, codes, standards, work performance procedures and

QC procedures are being met as follows:

1

1 -

Work was conducted in accordance with a process sheet or drawing which

identifies the weld and its location by system, references procedures

or instructions, and provides for production and or signoffs.

-

Welding procedures, detailed drawings and instructions, were available

in the immediate work area and technically adequate for the welds being

made.

-

Welding procedure specification (WPS) were in accordance with the

'

applicable Code requirements and that a Procedure Qualification Record

(PQR) is referenced and exists for the type of weld being made.

,

-- -- , - ..-. , . - . , _ _ , , ,e, ,-,--_,..m,. _ , _ . - - -, _-

-

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17

-

Base metals and welding filler materials were of the specified type and

grade, were properly inspected, tested, and were traceable.

-

Protection was provided to shield the welding operation from adverse

environmental conditions.

-

Weld joint geometry including thickness was specified and that surfaces

to be welded were prepared, cleaned and inspected in accordance with

applicable procedures or instructions.

-

A sufficient number of adequately qualified QC inspection personnel

commensurate with the work in progress were present at the work site.

-

Weld area cleanliness was maintained and that alignment and fit-up

tolerances were within specified units.

-

Weld filler material being used was in accordance with welding

specifications, unused filler material was separated from other types

of material and was stored and controlled properly, and stubs were

properly removed from the work location.

-

That there were no visual signs of cracks, excessive heat input, or

excessive crown on welds.

-

That welders were qualified to the particular process and thickness;

and that necessary controls and records were in place.

No violations or deviations were identified.

20. Preoperational Test Program Implementation / Verification - Unit 1

(70302) (71302)

The inspector reviewed the present implementation of the preoperational test

program. Test program attributes inspected included review of

administrative requirements, document control, documentation of major test

events and deviations to procedures, operating practices, instrumentation

calibrations, and correction of problems revealed by testing.

Periodic inspections were conducted of Control Room Operations to assess

plant condition and conduct of shift personnel. The inspector observed that

Control Room operations were being conducted in an orderly and professional

manner. Shift personnel were knowledgeable of plant conditions, i.e.,

ongoing testing, systems / equipment in or out of service, and alarm /

annunciator status. In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers on

various occasions to verify the continuity of plant testing, operational

problems and other pertinent plant information during the turnovers.

Control Room logs were reviewed and various entries were discussed with

operations personnel.

,

- -- .-, . . - . -.,y. , - - , - - - . - . .

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18

Periodic facility tours were made to assess equipment and plant conditions,

maintenance and preoperational activities in progress. Schedules for

program completion and progress reports were routinely monitored.

Discussions were held with responsible personnel, as they were available, to

determine their knowledge of the preoperational program. The inspector

reviewed numerous operation deviation reports to determine if requirements

were met in the areas of documentation, action to resolve, justification,

corrective action and approvals. Specific inspections conducted are listed

below:

a. Flushing Program

System

Auxiliary Feedwater System

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System

b. Preoperational Tests

(1) Chemical & Volume Control System Test (CVCS) Preoperational Test

Witnessing (70433)

The inspector witnessed test portions of the Boric Acid Blender

Preoperational Test Procedure listed below. These tests verified

proper pump, valve, and tank level operation from the Control Room

and Remote Shutdown Panel (as applicable) with the accompanying

activation of annunciators. The inspector attended pre-test

briefings held by the test supervisor to observe the coordination

and general knowledge of the procedure with all participants.

Problems encountered during performance of the test were verified

to be adequately documented, evaluated and dispositioned.

Pre-op Test

Procedure Title Activity Observed

1-38G-04 Boric Acid Blender -Boric Acid Transfer Pump Lock

Verification

-Boric Acid Storage Tank Lock

Test

-Boric Acid Tank to Charging

Pump "A" Valve HV8104

Control Lock Verification

.

.

19

(2) Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System Test -

Preoperational Test

Procedure Review (70338)

The inspector reviewed the motor driven and steam driven Auxiliary

Feedwater (AFW) System Preoperational Test Procedure (1-3AL-01 and

1-3AL-02) and the Condensate Storage Tank Vacuum Degasifier System

Preoperational Test Procedure 1(1-3AL-04) to verify technical

adequacy. A review of licensee commitments from applicable FSAR

Chapters, Regulatory Guide 1.68 and the Safety Evaluation Report

was performed and compared with requirements contained in the test

procedure. This included verifying that pertinent prerequisites

were identified, initial test conditions and system status were

specified, acceptance criteria were specified and performed with

management approval indicated.

(3) Chemical Volume & Control System (CVCS) Test - Preoperational Test

Procedure Review (70333)

The inspector reviewed the Boric Acid Blender Preoperational Test

Procedure (1-3BG-04) to verify technical adequacy. A review of

licensee commitments from applicable FSAR Chapters, Regulatory

Guide 1.68 and the Safety Evaluation Report was performed and

compared with requirements contained in the test procedure. This

included verifying that pertinent prerequisites were identified,

initial test conditions and system status were specified,

acceptance criteria were specified, and performed with management

approval indicated.

Based on review of the above procedures and discussions with test

supervisors the inspector noted that some preops do not contain

Negative Logic Testing. Discussions with the licensee's Preop

Procedure Group confirmed that this item had been previously

! identified. The licensee's Preop Procedure Group has identified

! areas where Negative Logic Testing was not initially covered and

! will be issuing them to be tested in the Common Annunciator

'

Preoperational Test Procedure (1-300-15) due to be issued in

approximately one (1) month. This matter will be identified as

Inspector Followup Item 50-424/86-31-02 " Review Implementation of

Negative Logic Testing".

Accumulator Preoperational Test Results Evaluation (70322) The

inspector reviewed preliminary results of the Accumulator Blowdown

Calculation and acceptance criteria per Preoperational Testing

l Procedure 1-3BJ-03.

c. A resident inspection was conducted of the event of April 9,1986,

pertaini'ng to the licensee test personnel inadvertently filling

the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) while performing the filling and

venting of the Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) Train A. The

. . - _ .-

.

.

20

purpose of this inspection was to review the licensee's actions

4 which led to the event so as to determine, first the root cause,

';

and second that the licensee's report of the event properly

identified the root cause and corrective action to prevent

reoccurrence.

! The inspector reviewed and examined the following documents:

-

Reactor Operator and Shift Supervisor Logs

-

Memo Dated 4/9/86 from M. Aj1 uni, Operations Supervisor on Shift

(OSOS) to C. Meyer, Operation Superintendent (Acting) (0S)

-

Letter Dated 4/11/86 from D. Schreiber, Operations Supervisor to

All Shift Personnel

-

Operations Procedure No. 11011-1 "RHRS Alignment for Startup and

Normal Operation"

-

Operations Procedure No. 13011-1 " Residual Heat Removal System"

-

SUM-3, Rev. 3 "Preoperational Test Program Organization,

Responsibilities, and Interfaces"

-

SUM-12C, Rev. 2 "Preoperational Test Implementation"

-

SUM-37, Rev. 0 " Initial Test Program Conduct of Shift Operations"

Background information indicated that the RHR Train "A" was being

placed in service to obtain a RCS sample. The RCS Level was being

maintained at mid nozzle (188' elevation) with the Reactor Vessel Head

in place. The Test Supervisor (TS) was in the process of filling and

'

venting the RHRS to support system operation.

During the inspection, the inspector identified the following

discrepancies:

i

-

An approved procedure was not used to fill and vent the RHRS

system but rather verbal instructions were given by the TS to

Operations personnel. It should be noted that the Start-up Manual

does not state that the TS is authorized to direct system valve

lineups by verbal instructions nor to what extent are verbal

instructions authorized. Also, the licensee does have plant

l

procedures in place for filling and venting the RHRS.

-

Plant procedures 11011-1 and 13011-1 are the applicable procedures

for filling and venting the RHRS. However, these procedures do

not address filling and venting the section of pipe between Valves

,

!

l 8701A & 8701B (Train "A"), which was the evolution being

performed. This in turn, led to the inadvertently filling of the

l RCS. Had these procedures been used it would have been discovered

l that these procedures were inadequate for filling and venting the ,

i

RHRS in that the section of pipe between the 8701A & 87013

(Train"A") and the section of pipe between valves 8702A & 8702B

l (Train "B") were not covered.

l

l

-

-c , , - - , - , - . , - , , , , , - ,,--,--.-.-,--,-e--

-

- - . - - ,m-

.w,v, ,,,.mpe a ,, .a-. , , . . , , , , - . - - , - + , - - - . - - - - . - - - -

.

.

21

-

Per Procedure SUM-37 " Initial Test Program Conduct of Shift

Operations" Paragraph 4.2 the Operations Supervisor On Shift

(OSOS) is responsible for determining off-normal manner when not

covered by a plant procedure or a test procedure; Paragraph 5.5.3

states in part the TS is responsible for providing written

instructions to the SS when the system condition requires off

normal operation; & Paragraph 6.1,5,2 states "This instruction

should be in the form of a Start-up Operating Instruction, or

standing order. However, the SS responsibilities do not include

asking the TS for written instructions when operating a system in

an off normal condition.

The above condition is an example of failure to prescribe and use

appropriate procedures to control valve lineups for filling and venting

the RHRS, where improper performance could have detrimental effects on

safety-related equipment. This is considered to be in violation of

10CFR Part 50, Appendix 8, Criterion V, " Failure to Establish

Appropriate Procedures to Properly Control the Filling and Venting of

Safety-Related Systems", and will be identified as Violation

50-424/86-31-01.

The inspector noted the following discrepancies pertaining to the

licensee's report of the event and corrective action:

- The Memo Dated 4/9/86 from M. Aj1 uni, OSOS to C. Meyer, OS, which

documented the event was incorrect. This memo contained a drawing

of the valve arrangement which depicted an incorrect valve

configuration (i.e., the 8701B valve is upstream of the 8701A

valve, not downstream as shown in the memo). Consequently, the

description detailing the sequence of events pertaining to the

opening of valves is incorrect (i.e., the 87018 valve was the

valve actually opened which led to the inadvertent filling of the

,

RCS, not the 8701A as stated in the memo). Thus the memo did not

properly document the correct sequence of events pertaining to

which valves were open and in what sequence.

'

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The letter dated 4/11/86 from D. Schreiber, OSOS to All Shift

Personnel hi-lited " Operator Error". It stated in part that plant

operations is becoming more complex and that this requires each

operator and supervisor to stop and analyze each action he takes

for potential impact and expected as well as unexpected responses.

.

!

It identified two (2) examples in recent months, one being where

equipment was in operation without cooling water and the second ,

<

being the RCS was inadvertently filled. This did not properly

l identify the root cause nor did it address corrective action to

'

prevent recurrence.

i

!

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i.-. m, +_y . - - _

_

w ---r m--, , - - - - - - , y..,..v.,- , y -.- -

y -

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22

A meeting was held with the licensee on 4/18/86 to discuss the above

findings pertaining to the inadvertently filling of the RCS on 4/9/86.

Several followup meetings were conducted by the licensee with the

Resident Inspector's Office where the licensee presented a detailed

report containing the sequence of events which led to the event, shift

actions, followup action, NRC concerns / discussion, root cause, and

summary. This report identified the root cause as lack of communica-

tion.  !

Subsequently on May 6,1986 the NRC Resident Inspector's Office was

informed by the licensee that on May 5, 1986, the RCS was again

inadvertently filled. Background information indicated that the

Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS) was being lined up in preparation

for flushing the Reactor Coolant Pump Seals. The TS was in the process

of filling and venting the CVCS to support system operation. An

approved procedure was not used to fill and vent the CVCS system but

rather verbal instructions were given by the TS to operations

personnel. Plant Procedure 13006-1 is the applicable procedure for

filling and venting the CVCS. This is another example of the above

noted violation " Failure to Establish Appropriate Procedures to

Properly Control the Filling and Venting of Safety-Related Systems".

(50-424/86-31-01)

21. Plant Procedures - Unit 1 and 2 (42400B)

This inspection consists of a procedural review to verify that administra-

tive controls are established and implemented to control safety related

operations. Procedures are selected at random and reviewed for technical

adequacy and incorporation of requirements as appropriate for the proper

operation of a nuclear facility in the startup and operational phase. The

following requirements, guidance and licensee commitment were utilized as

appropriate:

10 CFR 50.59 Change, Tests, and Experiments

20 CFR 50 Appendix B Instructions, Procedures and Drawings

Criteria V

ANSI N18.7-1976 Administrative Controls and Quality

Assurance for the Operational Phase

Regulatory Guide 1.33 Quality Assurance Requirements for the

Rev 2, 1978 Operational Phase of Nuclear Power

Plants

FSAR Section 13 Conduct of Operations

NUREG 0737, et al TMI Task Action Plan

I

-. . . _ . _ -.

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23

Procedures reviewed were:

a. Administrative

.

Number Rev Title

00051-C 2 Procedure Review and Approval

00050-C 4 Procedure Development

00052-C 1 Temporary Changes to Procedures

00700-C 0 General Employee Training

00350-C 1 Maintenance Program

00254-C 1 Plant Housekeeping and Cleanliness Control

00653-C 0 Protected Area Entry / Exit Control

00800-C 4 Requisition of Materials and Services

00853-C 4 Material Identification, Control & Issue

00400-C 0 Plant Modifications

00204-C 0 Control of Special Processes

b. Operations

Number Rev Title

11011-1 1 RHR Alignment for Startup and Normal

Operation

,

13011-1 1 Residual Heat Removal System

13427-1 1 4160 VAC 1E Electrical Distribution System

c. Maintenance

Number Rev Title

22304-C 0 Electronic Differential Level

Transmitter Functional Test and

Calibration

23710-C 0 Generic Valve Stroking Procedure

20427-C 0 Maintenance Cleanliness and Housekeeping

Control

No violations or deviations were identified.

22. Readiness Review - Unit 1

a. During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the following

commitments as part of Readiness Review Module 7 " Plant Operations and

Support". The commitments were reviewed for accuracy between the

source document, Readiness Review Module and the implementing document.

4

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_ - - _ _ - , . - .~ . ._ _ . . - _ . _ _ _ _ , _ . . _ _ __. -

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24

(1) Operations Area Reviewer

Commitment Implementing

Number Source Document

2706.00 FSAR 1.2.2.B None

'

2707.00 FSAR 1.2.2.C 00653-C Rev 0

90112-C Rev 0

728.00 FSAR 1.2.2.E 11701-1 Rev 0

11743-1 Rev 0

764.01 FSAR 1.9.33 00002 Rev 3

10003-C Rev 0 and 1

765.01 FSAR 1.9.33 10010-C Rev 2 and 3

765.02 FSAR 1.9.33 10003-C Rev 0 and 1

765.04 FSAR 1.9.33 10001-C Rev 0

765.06 FSAR 1.9.33 00005-C Rev 1

00006-C Rev 0

00003-C Rev 0

"

00253-C Rev 0 and 1

00258-C Rev 1

765.08 FSAR 1.9.33 10000-C Rev 1

765.09 FSAR 1.9.33 10006-C Rev 1

765.10 FSAR 1.9.33 10000-C Rev 1

765.11 FSAR 1.9.33 10000-C Rev 1

765.12 FSAR 1.9.33 10000-C Rev 1

765.13 FSAR 1.9.33 10000-C Rev 1

765.15 FSAR 1.9.33 10000-C Rev 1

00054-C Rev 0

765.16 FSAR 1.9.33 00103-C Rev 0

00051-C Rev 2 and 3

765.17 FSAR 1.9.33 00052-C Rev 2

765.18 FSAR 1.9.33 10000-C Rev 1

765.19 FSAR 1.9.33 00053-C Rev 0

$ 765.20 FSAR 1.9.33 10000-C Rev 1

765.21 FSAR 1.9.33 00054-C Rev 0

765.22 FSAR 1.9.33 10002-C Rev 1

765.23 FSAR 1.9.33 10002-C Rev 1

765.24 FSAR 1.9.33 00050-C Rev 2

00053-C Rev 0

765.25 FSAR 1.9.33 00053-C Rev 0

765.26 FSAR 1.9.33 00350-C Rev 1

765.28 FSAR 1.9.33 00304-C Rev 1

i 00350-C Rev 1

765.29 FSAR 1.9.33 00304-C Rev 6

!

00308-C Rev 0

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25

765.31 FSAR 1.9.33 00307-C Rev 0

765.54 FSAR 1.9.33 00050-C Rev 4

00051-C Rev 3

-

00052-C Rev 2

765.75 FSAR 1.9.33 00050-C Rev 4

765.83 FSAR 1.9.33 10011-C Rev 7

765.84 FSAR 1.9.33 00050-C Rev 4

765.85 FSAR 1.9.33 E0P 0.1 Rev 1

765.86 FSAR 1.9.33 10011-C Rev 7

765.87 FSAR 1.9.33 10011-C Rev 7

765.88 FSAR 1.9.33 10011-C Rev 7

765.89 FSAR 1.9.33 10011-C Rev 7

765.90 FSAR 1.9.33 10011-C Rev 7

765.91 FSAR 1.9.33 10001-C Rev 1

765.92 FSAR 1.9.33 10001-C Rev 1

765.93 FSAR 1.9.33 10001-C Rev 1

765.96 FSAR 1.9.33 10000-C Rev 1

Commitments in the 765.XX series pertain to the implementation of

ANSI N18.7-1976/ANS 3.2 " Administrative Controls and Quality

Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants".

During the review of commitment numbers 2706, 2707 and 728, the

inspector identified that the i.mplementing documents were not

correct to control the separation of Unit 1 and 2 upon licensing

of Unit 1. For commitment 2706, Procedure 1-500-01 " Initial Fuel

Load Test Sequence" Step 5.20 does not satisfy this commitment.

Commitment 728 incorrectly lists the sections of the actual

procedures verified and appears to be short on scope in that only

two systems out of twenty-three shared systems identified in FSAR

Section 1.2.2.2. have been addressed. From discussions with the

licensee, the overall program has been established to control the

separation of Units 1 and 2, was developed by Southern Company

Services, Inc. and access to the plan will be provided. This item

will be tracked as Inspector Followup Item 50-424/86-31-03 " Review

Licensee Plan for Separation of Facilities and Systems Between

Unit 1 Operation and Unit 2 Construction".

,

Commitments 765.01 and 765.02 concern the designation of positions

! requiring R0 and SR0 licenses and the establishment of minimum

!

staffing levels. Site Procedure 10003-C " Manning the Shif t" and

l

10010-C " Operator Qualification Program" were reviewed. In

discussions with the Readiness Review Team, the inspector was

informed that Procedure 10003-C was only verified to ensure

l

minimum crew levels were specified, but no judgment was made as to

adequacy of the numbers specified. The inspector reviewed various

! source documents of minimum requirements such as 10 CFR 50.54(M),

,

NUREG 0737 I.A.1.3, Generic Letter 82.12 and the Standard Review

I

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26

i

Plan. The inspector determined that the procedure does not

adequately discuss minimum manning for a defueled state. Final

minimum shift crew will be established by Technical Specifications

upon license issuance. Inspector Followup Item 50-424/86-31-04

" Review Minimum Shift Crew Requirements as Implemented in

Procedure 10003-C for a Defueled Status".

In reviewing Commitment 765.06 it was noted that Procedure

00005-C, Rev 1 " Overtime Authorization" allows approval at the

department superintendent level for exceeding the guidelines

instead of the General Manager - Vogtle Nuclear Operations. The

procedure does not specify the paramount consideration that need

be made prior to approval of excess overtime. The procedure does

not control regular overtime to monitor the obtainment of a

40-hour week objective. The procedure references NUREG 0737

I.A.I.3 which has been replaced by Generic Letter 82-12 and 82-16.

In FSAR Change Submittal Number 22 the licensee has revised the

level of authorization to coincide with the Site Procedure

00005-C. It was noted that this issue will be resolved when the

Technical Specifications are issued. IFI 50-424/86-31-05 " Review

Implementation of Technical Specification Overtime Conflicts with

Procedure 00005-C.

In the review of Commitment 764.01 the inspector noted that the

word " body" had been deleted from the phrase " independent review

body". The listed implementing document, 00402-C " Licensing

Document Change Request" was not correctly verified in that other

procedure reviews were taking credit for implementing this

commitment instead of the " independent review body", namely the

Plant Review Bourd. Procedure 00402-C does not discuss the second

" independent review body" entitled the " Safety Review Board". The

inspector determined that this commitment had not been properly

verified nor implemented.

Procedure 00402-C was also noted as weak regarding the following:

(a) Step 4.2.1 limits the PRB review for potential USQ's

"Unreviewed Safety Questions" vice the full scope of a PRB

review to advise on all matters related to nuclear safety.

(b) The procedure does not coordinate reviews to the SRB.

(c) Section 4.2.9 states in the note "The superintendent of

Regulatory Compliance has 60 days from the date the NRC

approved the change to ensure the change is fully implemented

in the plant activities".

,

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27

The Readiness Review Team identified Procedure 00001-C " Plant

Review Board Duties and Responsibilities" as the appropriate

document for commitment 764.01. This item will be tracked as

Inspector Followup Item 50-424/86-31-06 " Review Licensee Changes ,

to Procedure 00402-C prior to license issuance". 1

(2) Maintenance Area Review

Commitment Implementing

Number Source Document

729.00 FSAR 1.9.6 13427-1 Rev 1

765.34 FSAR 2.9.33 00350-C Rev 1

765.35 FSAR 1.9.33 00350-C Rev 1

765.36 FSAR 1.9.33 00350-C Rev 1

765.37 FSAR 1.9.33 00350-C Rev 1

765.38 FSAR 1.9.33 00350-C Rev 1

765.43 FSAR 1.9.33 00254-C Rev 1

765.44 FSAR 1.9.33 00800-C Rev 4/

00853-C Rev 4

765.63 FSAR 1.9.33 00400-C Rev 0

765.70 FSAR 1.9.33 00204-C Rev 0

765.72 FSAR 1.9.33 00350-C Rev 1

765.75 FSAR 1.9.33 00050-C Rev 4

765.95 FSAR 1.9.33 00050-C Rev 4

765.97 FSAR 1.9.33 00050-C Rev 4

785.01 FSAR 1.9.39 00254-C Rev 1/

00350-C Rev 1

785.02 FSAR 1.9.39 00254-C Rev 1/

20427-C Rev 0

785.04 FSAR 1.9.39 00254-C Rev 1

785.05 FSAR 1.9.39 00254-C Rev 1/

00700-C Rev 0

785.06 FSAR 1.9.39 00253-C Rev 0/

00254-C Rev 1/

00653-C Rev 0

785.07 FSAR 1.9.39 00254-C Rev 1

785.08 FSAR 1.9.39 00254-C Rev 1/

00260-C Rev 0

785.09 FSAR 1.9.39 20427-C Rev 0

785.10 FSAR 1.9.39 00254-C Rev 1/

20427-C Rev 0

785.11 FSAR 1.9.39 20427-C Rev 0

785.11 FSAR 1.9.39 00254-C Rev 0

785.13 FSAR 1.9.39 00254-C Rev 1

During review of the above noted commitments in the maintenance

area, the inspector noted that commitment No. 765.43 referenced

Administrative Procedure No. 00254-C, Rev.1 " Plant Housekeeping

and Cleanliness Control" is the implementing document for ANSI

N18.7-1976 Paragraph 5.2.10. However, in review of the subject

,

. $

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28 l

l

,

procedure the inspector could not find where the procedure

implemented the statement "Immediately prior to closure an

inspection shall be conducted to assure cleanliness and the result

of such inspection shall be documented "per Paragraph 5.12.10 of

ANSI N18.7-1976. During the review of Maintenance Procedure No.

20427-C, Rev. 0 " Maintenance Cleanliness and Housekeeping

Control", the inspector noted that Paragraph 4.3.5.b.6 addressed

that an inspection be conducted prior to closure. However, there

was no requirement that the inspection results be documented.

This matter will be identified as Inspector Followup Item

No. 50-424/86-31-07 " Review Maintenance Procedure 20427-C for

Incorporation of the ANSI Requirement to Document Closeout

Inspection Results", i

No violations or deviations were identified.

b. During the inspection period, a Readiness Review, Module 17 " Raceways,"

inspection was conducted by a RII based inspector. Certain cable

trays, conduits and junction boxes installed in the containment building

were examined. It was discovered that a section of cable tray identified

as IBE 502 TRAA, installed at elevation 184'2", and between column

Nos. I and 2, above grating elevation 184', and below the electrical

penetrations, was damaged. The damage appears to have been caused by

personnel stepping, standing or walking in the tray. The cables in

this tray have been compressed such that they are depressed into the

openings of the cable tray bottom and could possible be damaged.

Specification No. X3AR01, Section E8.7.1, paragraph 5 states " Cable

trays shall not be used as walkways or working platforms. Where trays

are so located that such use is possible or might be attempted, it

shall be prohibited by clear and conspicuous signs, and prevented, if

necessary, by suitable physical barriers."

Contrary to this, on April 17, 1986, cable tray section 1BE 502 TRAA

was found to be damaged as evidenced by the distorted shape of the

bottom and sides. The damaged tray is located such that it should have

been protected by one of the methods defined in paragraph 5 of

Specification No. X3AR01, Section E8.7.1.

This is considered to be in violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,

Criterion V, " Failure to Follow Established Appropriate Procedure to

Properly Protect Installed Equipment / Components" and will be identified

as violation 50-424/86-31-08.

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23. Emergency Preparedness Exercise

On April 30, 1986, the residents participated as players in.the NRC graded

exercise. Both the Technical Support Center and the Control Room were

manned in order to provide the NRC response that would be present for an

actual site event.

No violations or deviations were identified.