ML20198R885
| ML20198R885 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 05/30/1986 |
| From: | Livermore H, Rogge J, Schepens R, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198R811 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-86-31, 50-425-86-15, NUDOCS 8606100249 | |
| Download: ML20198R885 (30) | |
See also: IR 05000424/1986031
Text
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UNITED STATES
[p me3,,Do NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[ , ,/ p REGION 11
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j 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
- , 2 AT4 ANTA.GEORGlA 30323
%, * . . 4. ,6 '
Report Nos. 50-424/86-31 and 50-425/86-15
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Licensee: G(orgia Power Company
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P.O. Box 4545
Atlanta, GA 30302
Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: CPPR-108 and CPPR-109
Facility.Name: Vogtle 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: April 1 - May 13, 1986
Inspectors: N -R4 Y'34/ M
prt H. H. Livermore, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed
Construction
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f,1N wt sho/8s
ge J. F. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed
Operations j
[ S/3a/$ (:,
gg R. J. Schepens, Resident Inspector Date Signed
ConstrctionfndOprations
Approved By: ! lA4fl M
M.7. Sif ktfle, Section Chief Date Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
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SUMMARY
Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 485 Resident and Region
Inspection-hours on site (109 hours0.00126 days <br />0.0303 hours <br />1.802249e-4 weeks <br />4.14745e-5 months <br /> were on backshifts) inspecting. containment
and safety related structures, piping systems and supports, safety related
components, auxiliary systems, electrical equipment and cables, instrumentation,
preoperational test program, quality programs and administrative controls
- affecting quality, and follow-up on previous inspection identified items.
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Readiness Review Modules 7 and 17 were examined. The residents participated in
the NRC graded Emergency Exercise.
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Results: Two violations were identified - Failure to Establish Appropriate
Procedures to Properly Control the Filling and Venting of Safety-Related
Systems - Paragraph 20 and Failure to Follow Procedures for Protecting Installed
Equipment / Components - Paragraph 22.
8606100249 860602 4
PDR ADOCK 0500
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REPORT DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted -
Licensee Employees
- R. E. Conway, Senior Vice-President, Vogtle Project Director
D. O. Foster, Vice-President, Project Support
R. H. Pinson, Vice-President, Project Construction
W. T. Nickerson, Assistant to the Project Director
- R. W. McManus, Readiness Review
- M. H. Googe, Project Construction Manager
- G. Bockhold, Jr. , General Manager Nuclear Operations
- H. P. Walker, Manager Unit Operations
- R. M. Bellamy, Manager Test & Outage
- C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality Assurance Manager
- C. E. Belflower, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Operatioris
- E. D. Groover, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Operations
W. E. Mundy, Quality Assurance Audit Supervisor
D. M. Fiquett, Project Construction Manager - Unit 2
- B. C. Harbin, Manager Quality Control
- G. A. McCarley, Project Compliance Coordinator
- W. C. Gabbard, Regulatory Specialist
- C, F. Meyer, Operations Superintendent (Acting)
T. Dannemiller, Senior QA Engineer
- R. M. Odom, Plant Engineering Supervisor
C. L. Coursey, Maintenance Superintendent
M. A. Griffis, Superintendent-Maintenance
- N. R. Harris, Quality Control Assistant Manager
- W. R. Duncan, Readiness Review
D. McCary, Engineering Supervisor, GPC/PKF
- G. E. Spell, Quality Assurance Engineer / Support Supervisor
- R. E. Spinnatu, NSEG Supervisor
- S. A. Bradley, NSEG Member
- R. M. Bellamy, Manager Test & Outage
Other licensee employees contacted included craftsmen, technicians,
supervision, engineers, inspectors, and office personnel.
Other Organizations
H. M. Handfinger, Preoperational Test Superintendent - Bechtel
D. L. Kinnsch, Project Engineering - Bechtel
Other NRC Personnel
- M. V. Sinkule, Section Chief 3C, Division of Reactor Projects - Region II
- P. T. Burnett, Test Program Section Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety,
Region II
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- Attended Exit Interview
2. Exit Interview (30703C)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 13, 1986, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding listed below.
, No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did
not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by
the inspector during this inspection.
(0 pen) Violation, 50-424/86-31-01 " Fail ure to Establish Appropriate
Procedures to Properly Control the Filling and Venting of Safety-Related
Systems" - Paragraph 20
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-424/86/31-02 " Review Implementation of
Negative Logic Testing" - Paragraph 19C
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-424/86-31-03 " Review Licensee Program for
Separation of Unit 2 Construction Activities from Unit 1 to Prevent
Interference with Unit 1 Operation" - Paragraph 22
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-424/86-31-04 " Review Minimum Shift Crew
Requirements" - Paragraph 22
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-424/86-31-05 " Review Authorization Levels
That May Approve Overtime" - Paragraph 22
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-424/86-31-06 " Review Site Procedure
00402-C, Licensing Document Change Request, for Resolution of Comments" -
Paragraph 22
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-424/8631-07 " Review Maintenance Procedure
20427-C for Incorporation of the ANSI Requirement to Document Closeout
Inspection Results" - Paragraph 22
(0 pen) CDR 86-93 " Process and Root Valves" - Paragraph 4
On April 18, 1986, Mr. M. D. Hunt presented the results of his inspection
pertaining to electrical readiness review. The licensee was informed that
the following item would be documented in the resident inspector report.
(0 pen) Violation, 50-424/86-31-08 " Failure to Following Procedures for
Protecting Installed Equipment / Components" - Paragraph 22
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The following NRC exit interviews were attended during the inspection period
by a resident inspector:
Date Name
April 18 L. E. Nicholson
W. Gloerson
J. T. Lenahan
J. R. Harris
M. D. Hunt
April 25 G. L. Troup
W. Ross
L. H. Jackson
R. Gibbs
R. W. Wright
May 2 A. L. Cunningham, Et. al
May 9 G. A. Halstrom
G. L. Troup
J. T. Lenahan
J. York
J. H. Moorman
J. R. Harris
S. J. Vias
A. Tillman
D. Thompson
3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
Not inspected.
4. Followup on Previous Inspection Items (92701)
(0 pen) CDR 86-93 Process and Root Valves. On April 15, 1986, the resident
inspectors attended a followup meeting with the licensee pertaining to
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actions taken into the investigation of the Valve Designator List (VDL) and
the Quantity Tracking System (QTS). The results of the licensee's 2000
valve walkdown were a comparison check of the design requirements to the
warehouse records and the actual valves installed in the plant was also
presented during this meeting. In conclusion the licensee presented actions
to be taken as a result of their investigation to date. This item continues
to remain open until final corrective action is implemented.
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5. Allegations
a. During the course of an inspection, the inspector conducted a review of
GPC Quality Concern 85-V-0490 and found that there were no records
indicating that GPC went into the field and checked if a containment
liner plate was dropped during installation, as was alleged. As a
result, a followup by GPC revealed that a check was made but that the
records were lost. GPC again investigated the allegation finding that
no DRs were written and that no one had ever seen a faulty lift. GPC
also obtained a letter from CB&I, the installing agency, that no
incidents had ever taken place and that a correct installation lift was
made. The inspector was satisfied with the corrective action and final
disposition of the allegation.
b. Allegation RII 84-0169-04, Concerns with the Installation of the
Containment Dome and/or Containment Spray Ring, Unit 2
The Unit 1 & 2 Containment Dome lifts were classified as major lifts
and were, therefore, required to have QC signoffs. Rigging and Setting
records (HRP-43 and 54) were reviewed in detail. The inspector
conducted personal interviews with the engineer in charge of the lifts
and installations, the QC inspectors and the QC Supervisor, all of whom
visually monitored the lifts and installations of both Containment
Domes (1 & 2). The inspector reviewed movies taken of the Containment
Dome lift and installation (setting in place). In all cases not one
person saw or heard of of any abnormalities with the lift or installa-
tion, such as dropping or bumping the domes. A review of records did
not reveal any abnormalities.
The Containment #1 spray rings were installed in pieces, whereas
Containment #2 spray rings were installed completely assembled as
individual rings (6). All were installed from jack stands while the
Containment Domes were on the ground. The spray ring lifts were not
classified as major lifts, therefore, did not require QC record
signoffs. The inspector conducted personal interviews with numerous QC
inspectors who were present during the lifts in a random surveillance
capacity. A telecon interview was conducted with the Field Engineer
who was present and in charge of the installations. Personal
interviews were conducted with the two Craft Superintendents that were
present and in charge of both lifts and installations. In all cases
not one person saw or heard of any abnormalities with the lifts and
installations of any of the spray ring assemblies, such as dropping or
bumping the rings. Allegation RII 84-0169-04 is considered unfounded
and therefore closed.
c. On April 29, 1986, the inspector accompanied two craft workers for the
administration of a lie-detector test. This action was in response to
their request and with RII approval. The purpose of the accompaniment
by the inspector was one of moral support, not of representation or
technical support. In attendance also were employees of the GPC
Quality Concerns Program,
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6. General Construction Inspection - Units 1 & 2
Periodic random surveillance inspections were made throughout this reporting
period in the form of general type inspections in different areas of both
facilities. The areas were selected on the basis of the scheduled
activities and were varied to provide wide coverage. Observations were made
of activities in progress to note defective items or items of noncompliance
with the required codes and regulatory requirements.
On these inspections, particular note was made of the presence of quality
control inspectors, supervisors, and evidence of quality control in the form
of available process sheets, drawings, material identification, material
protecticn, performance of tests, and housekeeping. Interviews were
conducted with craft personnel, supervisors, coordinators, quality control
inspectors, and others as they were available in the work areas.
The inspector reviewed numerous construction deviation reports to determine
if requirements were met in the areas of documentation, action to resolve,
justification, corrective action, and approval signatures in accordance
with GPC Field Procedure No. GD-T-01.
The inspector attended the following GPC meetings as an observer for
informational purposes:
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Board of Directors Meeting on April 4, 1986
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Monthly Drug Program Administration Meeting on April 24, 1986
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Vogtle Personnel Policy Meeting on April 25, 1986
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RCS Overfill Event Meeting on April 18, 1986
The inspector has conducted numerous meetings with the licensee with the
purpose of attaining a more coordinated and real-time status of open items
that are ready for NRC closure. The licensee has implemented a folder
concept whereby all backup documentation necessary for an NRC closure
inspection will be available in one place. Publication of monthly status of
CDR's Bulletins, and Circulars has been added to that of NRC items (e.g.,
IFI,URI,etc.). Additional improvements are being considered.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7. Fire Prevention / Protection and Housekeeping Measures - Units 1 & 2
(42051C)
The inspector observed fire prevention / protection measures throughout the
inspection period. Welders were using welding permits with fire watches and
extinguishers. Post indicator valves were being maintained in the open
position. Fire fighting equipment is in its designated areas throughout the
plant.
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The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following procedures
pertaining to the fire prevention / protection measures and housekeeping
measures to determine whether they comply with applicable codes, standards,
NRC Regulatory Guides and licensee commitments.
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SD-T-05, Rev. 6 Fire-Protection Equipment Inspection and Testing
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GD-T-15, Rev. 5 Welding and Cutting
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GD-T-17, Rev. 3 Housekeeping
The inspector observed fire prevention / protection measures in work areas
containing safety related equipment during the inspection period to verify
the following:
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Combustible waste material and rubbi.sh was removed from the work areas
as rapidly as practicable to avoid unnecessary accumulation of
combustibles
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Flammable liquids are stored in appropriate containers and in
designated areas throughout the plant
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Cutting and welding operations in progress have been authorized by an
appropriate permit, combustibles have been moved away or safely
covered, and a fire watch and extinguisher was posted as required
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Fire protection / suppression equipment was provided and controlled in
accordance with applicable requirements
The inspector also conducted specific inspections of fire barriers
consisting of sealant penetration installation activities in the diesel
generating building.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8. Structural Concrete - Unit 2 (47053C)
a. Procedure and Document Review
The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following
procedures pertaining to the placement of concrete to determine whether
they comply with applicable codes, standards, NRC Regulatory Guides and
licensee commitments.
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CD-T-02, Rev. 17, Concrete Quality Control
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CD-T-06, Rev. 9, Rebar and Cadweld Quality Control
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CD-T-07, Rev. 8, Embed Installation and Inspection
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CD-T-20, Rev. 6, Installation and Inspection of Trumpets,
Rigid Extensions, and Duct Sheathing
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b. Installation Activities
The inspector witnessed portions of the concrete placement indicated
below to verify the following:
(1) Forms, Embedment, and Reinforcing Steel Installation
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Forms were properly placed, secure, leak tight and clean.
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Rebar and other embedment installation was installed in
accordance with construction specifications and drawings,
secured, free of concrete and excessive rust, specified
distance from forms, proper on-site rebar bending (where
applicable) and clearances consistent with aggregate size.
- (2) Delivery, Placement and Curing
- Preplacement inspection was completed and approved prior
to placement utilizing a Pour Card (Procedure Exhibit
, CD-T-02*18).
- Construction joints were prepared as specified.
- Proper mix was specified and delivered.
- Temperature control of the mix, mating surfaces, and
ambient were monitored. l
- Consolidation was performed correctly.
- Testing at placement location was properly performed in
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accordance with the acceptance criteria and recorded on a
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Concrete Placement Pour Log (Procedure Exhibit CD-T-02*20).
- Adequate crew, equipment and techniques were utilized.
- Inspections during placements were conducted effectively
by a sufficient number of qualified personnel.
- Curing methods and temperature was monitored.
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Pour No. Location Inspection Activity
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2-59A-017 Aux. Feedwater Placement & Curing
2-010-024E Containment #2 Preplacement, Placement
Construction Opening & Curing
A-111-114 Control Bldg. Placement
A-113-007 Control Bldg. Preplacement &
Placement
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A-081-33X1 Aux. Bldg.-Unit 1 Placement
The inspector notes that the Unit 2 Containment Construction Opening
Placement is now complete,
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(3) Installation of Tendon Sheaths for Containment Pour Only
- Tendon Sheaths were oriented properly, installed within
specified tolerances, clear and free of damage.
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c. Rebar Splicing
The inspector witnessed cadwelding operations to verify the following:
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Inspections are performed during and after splicing by qualified
QC inspection personnel.
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Each splice was defined by a unique number consisting of the bar
size, splice type, the position, the operator's symbol, and a
sequential number.
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Process and crews are qualified. !
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The sequential number and the operator's symbol are marked on all
completed cadwelds.
The inspector also conducted random inspections of completed cadwelds
to verify the following:
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Tap hole does not contain slag, blow out, or porous metal.
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Filler metal was visible at both ends of the splice sleeve and at
the tap hole in the center of the sleeve. No voids were detected
at the ends of the sleeves.
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The sequential number and the operator's symbol are marked on all
completed cadwelds.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9. Containment (Prestressing) - Unit 1(47063C)
a. Procedure and Document Review
The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following
specification, procedure, and drawings pertaining to the installation
of horizontal tendons, to determine whether they with applicable codes,
standards, NRC Regulatory Guides and licensee commitments.
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X2AF04 Technical Provisions for Containment
Post-Tensioning System
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AX2AF04-100-12 Field Instruction Manual for Installation
of VSL E5-55 Post-Tensioning System Within
Nuclear Containment Structures, Rev. 9
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b. Installation Activities
The inspector witnessed portions of the installation activities to
verify the following: -
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The latest issue (revision) of applicable drawings or procedures
are available to the installers and were being used.
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Tendons were free of nicks, kinks, -corrosion; were installed in ;
designated locations; and that the installation sequence and
technique was per specified requirements.
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Installation crew was properly trained and qualified.
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QC inspection was properly performed by qualified personnel in
accordance with applicable requirements.
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Adequate protective measures were being taken to ensure mechanical
- and corrosion protection during storage, handling, installation,
and post installation.
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Tendons were stressed in the proper sequence.
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All strands in the tendon were moving together during the
stressing and the tendon is being stressed from both ends
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simultaneously.
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Elongation measurements were being taken properly and being
j compared to the calculated elongation.
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Anchor head lift-off force was being taken and documented
properly.
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The stressing operation was being monitored to identify any
strand slippage.
The inspector notes that the post tensioning effort of Unit 1 Containment
was completed as of May 2, 1986.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Containment (Steel Structures and Supports) - Units 1 & 2 (48053C)
Periodic inspections were conducted to observe containment steel and support
installation activities in progress, to verify the following:
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Components were being properly handled (included bending or
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straightening).
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Specified clearances were being maintained.
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Edge finishes and hole sizes were within tolerances.
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Control, marking, protection and segregation were maintained during
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storage.
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Fit-up/ alignment meets the tolerances in the specifications and
drawings.
One of the more specific structural steel installation activities inspected
was the pipe racks in Unit 2 containment building on "C" Level (Elevation
143'). f
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Safety-Related Structures (Structural Steel and Supports) - Units 1 & 2
(48063C)
Periodic inspections were conducted to observe construction activities of
safety-related structures / equipment supports for major equipment outside the
containment to verify that:
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Materials and components were being properly handled to prevent damage.
- Fit-up/ alignment were within tolerances in specifications and drawing
requirements.
- Bolting was in accordance with specifications and procedures.
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Specified clearances from adjacent components were being met.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping - Observation of
Work and Work Activities - Unit 1 (49053C) (49063C) (37301)
Periodic inspections were conducted to observe construction activities of
Reactor Coolant Boundary and other safety-related piping installations
inside and outside Containments No.1 & 2. Verifications included but were
' not limited to the following:
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- Material and components were being properly handled and stored in order
l to prevent damage.
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Fit-ups and alignments were within tolerances per specifications and
drawings.
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Specified clearances from pipe to pipe and adjacent components were
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Piping was installed and inspected in accordance with applicable
drawings, specifications, and procedures.
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Those people engaged in the activity are qualified to perform the
applicable function.
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Drawing and specification changes (revisions) are being handled and
used correctly.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping Welding -
Unit 1 & 2 (55073C) (55083C)
Periodic inspections were conducted during daily plant surveillances on
safety-related pipe welding at various stages of weld completion. The
purpose of the inspection was to determine whether the requirements of
applicable specifications, codes, standards, work performance procedures and
QC procedures are being met as follows:
- Work was conducted in accordance with a process sheet which identifies
the weld and its location by system, references procedures or
instructions, and provides for production and QC signoffs.
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Welding procedures, detailed drawings and instructions, were readily
available in the immediate work area and technically adequate for the
welds being made.
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Welding procedure specification (WPS) were in accordance with the
applicable ASME Code requirements and that a Procedure Qualification
Record (PQR) is referenced and exists for the type of weld being made.
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That the base metals, welding filler materials, fluxes, gases, and
insert materials were of the specified type and grade, have been
properly inspected, tested and were traceable to test reports or
certifications.
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That the purge and/or shielding gas flow and composition were as
specified in the welding procedure specification and that protection
was provided to shield the welding operation from adverse environmental
conditions.
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That the weld , joint geometry including pipe wall thickness was
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specified and that surfaces to be welded have been prepared, cleaned
and inspected in accordance with applicable procedures or instructions.
- That a sufficient number of adequately qualified QA and QC inspection
personnel were present at the work site, commensurate with the work in
progress.
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- That the weld area cleanliness was maintained and that pipe alignment
l and fit-up tolerances were within specified units.
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That weld filler material being used was in accordance with welding
specifications, that unused filler material was separated from other
types of material and was stored in heated cans, and stubs properly
removed from the work location.
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That there were no evident signs of cracks, excessive heat input,
sugaring, or excessive crown.
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That welders were qualified to the applicable process, and that
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necessary controls and records were in place.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14. Reactor Vessel, Integrated Head Package, and Internals - Unit 1 & 2
(50053C & 50063C)
Periodic Unit 1 inspections consisted of examinations of the Reactor Vessel
and the installed integrated head package. -
The Unit 2 inspections consisted of examinations of the Reactor Vessel
installed in containment, the Reactor Vessel head with the installed control
rod drive mechanisms that are located on the refueling floor, and the upper
and lower internals in their designated laydown area. Inspections also
determined that proper storage protection practices were in place and that
entry of foreign objects and debris was prevented.
The inspector also observed cleanup activities in Unit #2 Reactor Vessel
after completion of Lower Radial Core Support machining in preparation for
fitup of the lower internals.
No violations or deviations were identified.
15. Safety Related Components - Units 1 & 2 (50073C)
The inspection consisted of plant tours to observe storage, handling, and
protection; installation; and preventive maintenance after installation of
safety-related components to determine that work is being performed in
accordance with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee
commitments.
During the inspection, the below listed areas were inspected at various
times during the inspection period to verify the following as applicable:
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Storage, environment, and protection of components were in accordance
with manufacturer's instructions and/or established procedures.
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Implementation of special storage and maintenance requirements such as:
rotation of motors, pumps, lubrication, insulation testing
(electrical), cleanliness,etc.
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Performance of licensee / contractor surveillance activities and
' documentation thereof was being accomplished.
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Installation requirements were met such as: proper location, placement,
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orientation, alignment, mounting (torquing of bolts and expansion
anchors), flow direction, tolerances, and expansion clearance.
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Appropriate stamps, tags, - markings, etc. were in use to prevent
oversight of required inspections, completion of tests, acceptance, and
the prevention of inadvertent operation.
Safety-Related piping, valves, pumps, heat exchangers, and instrumentation
- were inspected in the following Unit 1 and 2 areas on a random sampling
basis throughout the inspection period:
- Residual Heat Removal Pump Rooms
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Diesel Generator Building
- Containment Spray (CS) Pumps
- Auxiliary Feedwater Pu~ phouse
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- Containment Spray Pump Rooms
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Pressurizer Rooms
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Main Coolant Pump Areas
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Steam Generator Areas
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Safety Injection Pump Rooms
- RHR and CS Containment Penetration Encapsulation Vessel Rooms
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Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchangers, Surge Tanks
and Pump Rooms
- Cable Spreading Rooms
- Accumulator Tank Areas
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Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Letdown Heat Exchanger
Pump Room
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Battery & Charger Rooms
- Nuclear Grade Piping, Valves & Fittings Storage Areas
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Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Rooms
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Pressurizer Relief Tank Area
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CVCS Centrifugal Charging Pumps & Positive Displacement
Pump Rooms
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Bottom Mounted Instrumentation (BMI) Seal Table trea
- - BMI and Supports Under Reactor Vessel
1 -
NSCW Tower Pump Rooms and Pipe Tunnels
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Containment;-Auxiliary, and Fuel Building auxiliary (secondary)
areas
[ Some of the more specific equipment installation activities inspected were
l the Refueling Machine in the Spent Fuel Handling Building and the " Sigma"
Refueling Machine in the Containment Building.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
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16. Safety Related Pipe Support and Restraint Systems - Units 1 & 2 (50090C)
Periodic random inspections were conducted during the inspection period to
observe construction activities during installation of safety-related pipe
supports to determine that the following work was performed in accordance
with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee commitments:
-
Spring har.gers were provided with indicators to show the approximate
" hot" or " cold" position, as appropriate. :
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No deformation or forced bending was evident.
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Where pipe clamps are used to support vertical lines, shear lugs were
welded to the pipe (if required by Installation Drawings) to prevent
slippage.
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Sliding or rolling supports were provided with material and/or
lubricants suitable for the environment and compatible with sliding
contact surfaces.
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Supports are located and installed as specified.
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The surface of welds meet applicable code requirements and are free
from unacceptable grooves, abrupt ridges, valleys, undcrcuts, cracks,
discontinuities, or other indications which can be observed on the
welded surface.
No violations or deviations were identified.
17. Electrical and Instrumentation Components and Systems - Units 1 & 2
(51053C) (52153C)
Periodic inspections were conducted during the inspection period to observe
safety related electrical equipment in order to verify that the storage,
installation, and preventive maintenance was accomplished in accordance with
applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee commitments.
During the inspection period, an inspection was performed on various pieces
of electrical equipment during storage, installation, and cable terminating
phase in order to verify the following as applicable:
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Location and alignment
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Type and size of anchor bolts
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Identification
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Segregation and identification of nonconforming items
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Location, separation and redundancy requirements
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Equipment space heating ,
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Cable identification
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Proper lugs used
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Condition of wire (not nicked, etc.), tightness of connection
-
Bending radius not exceeded
-
Cable entry to terminal point
-
Separation
,
One of the more specific instrumentation installation activities inspected
was the installation of the drive units for the Teleflex Flux Mapping System
on Unit #1 in the Containment Building.
No violations or deviations were identified.
18. Electrical and Instrumentation Cables and Terminations - Unit 1 and 2
(51063C) (52063C)
a. Raceway / Cable Installation
The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following
procedures pertaining to raceway / cable installation to determine
whether they comply with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides and
licensee commitments.
- ED-T-02, Rev. 8 Raceway Installation
- ED-T-07, Rev. 9 Cable Installation
Periodic inspections were conducted to observe construction activities
of Safety Related Raceway / Cable Installation.
In reference to the raceway installation, the following areas were
inspected to verify compliance with the applicable requirements:
-
Identification
-
Alignment
- Bushings (Conduit)
- Grounding
-
Supports and Anchorages
In reference to the cable installation the following areas were
inspected to verify compliance with the applicable requirements:
- Protection from adjacent construction activities (welding, etc.)
-
Coiled cable ends properly secured
- Non-terminated cable ends taped
-
Cable trays, junction boxes, etc., reasonably free of debris
- Conduit capped, if no cable installed
- Cable supported
- Bend radius not exceeded
- Separation
.
'
.
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16
The inspector pointed out to the licensee the abundance of trash, metal
objects, and an HVAC door that were present in the overhead electrical
cable trays in Cable Spreading Room 44, Level A, Control Building.
b. Cable Terminations
The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following
procedures pertaining to cable termination to determine whether they
comply with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides and licensee
commitments.
- ED-T-08, Rev. 7 Cable Termination
In reference to cable terminations the following areas were inspected
to verify compliance with the applicable requirements.
- Cable identification
- Proper lugs used
-
Condition of wire (not nicked, etc.), tightness of connection
- Bending radius not exceeded
- Cable entry to terminal point
- Separation
One of the more specific cable termination installation activity
inspected was the Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) cable connector
installation to the Integrated Head Package on Unit #1.
No violations or deviations were identified.
19. Containment and Safety Related Structural Steel Welding - Units 1 and 2
(55053C) (55063C)
Periodic inspections were conducted during daily plant surveillances on
safety-related steel welding at various stages of weld completion.
The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether the requirements of
applicable specifications, codes, standards, work performance procedures and
QC procedures are being met as follows:
1
1 -
Work was conducted in accordance with a process sheet or drawing which
identifies the weld and its location by system, references procedures
or instructions, and provides for production and or signoffs.
-
Welding procedures, detailed drawings and instructions, were available
in the immediate work area and technically adequate for the welds being
made.
-
Welding procedure specification (WPS) were in accordance with the
'
applicable Code requirements and that a Procedure Qualification Record
(PQR) is referenced and exists for the type of weld being made.
,
-- -- , - ..-. , . - . , _ _ , , ,e, ,-,--_,..m,. _ , _ . - - -, _-
-
.
.
17
-
Base metals and welding filler materials were of the specified type and
grade, were properly inspected, tested, and were traceable.
-
Protection was provided to shield the welding operation from adverse
environmental conditions.
-
Weld joint geometry including thickness was specified and that surfaces
to be welded were prepared, cleaned and inspected in accordance with
applicable procedures or instructions.
-
A sufficient number of adequately qualified QC inspection personnel
commensurate with the work in progress were present at the work site.
-
Weld area cleanliness was maintained and that alignment and fit-up
tolerances were within specified units.
-
Weld filler material being used was in accordance with welding
specifications, unused filler material was separated from other types
of material and was stored and controlled properly, and stubs were
properly removed from the work location.
-
That there were no visual signs of cracks, excessive heat input, or
excessive crown on welds.
-
That welders were qualified to the particular process and thickness;
and that necessary controls and records were in place.
No violations or deviations were identified.
20. Preoperational Test Program Implementation / Verification - Unit 1
(70302) (71302)
The inspector reviewed the present implementation of the preoperational test
program. Test program attributes inspected included review of
administrative requirements, document control, documentation of major test
events and deviations to procedures, operating practices, instrumentation
calibrations, and correction of problems revealed by testing.
Periodic inspections were conducted of Control Room Operations to assess
plant condition and conduct of shift personnel. The inspector observed that
Control Room operations were being conducted in an orderly and professional
manner. Shift personnel were knowledgeable of plant conditions, i.e.,
ongoing testing, systems / equipment in or out of service, and alarm /
annunciator status. In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers on
various occasions to verify the continuity of plant testing, operational
problems and other pertinent plant information during the turnovers.
Control Room logs were reviewed and various entries were discussed with
operations personnel.
,
- -- .-, . . - . -.,y. , - - , - - - . - . .
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18
Periodic facility tours were made to assess equipment and plant conditions,
maintenance and preoperational activities in progress. Schedules for
program completion and progress reports were routinely monitored.
Discussions were held with responsible personnel, as they were available, to
determine their knowledge of the preoperational program. The inspector
reviewed numerous operation deviation reports to determine if requirements
were met in the areas of documentation, action to resolve, justification,
corrective action and approvals. Specific inspections conducted are listed
below:
a. Flushing Program
System
Auxiliary Feedwater System
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System
b. Preoperational Tests
(1) Chemical & Volume Control System Test (CVCS) Preoperational Test
Witnessing (70433)
The inspector witnessed test portions of the Boric Acid Blender
Preoperational Test Procedure listed below. These tests verified
proper pump, valve, and tank level operation from the Control Room
and Remote Shutdown Panel (as applicable) with the accompanying
activation of annunciators. The inspector attended pre-test
briefings held by the test supervisor to observe the coordination
and general knowledge of the procedure with all participants.
Problems encountered during performance of the test were verified
to be adequately documented, evaluated and dispositioned.
Pre-op Test
Procedure Title Activity Observed
1-38G-04 Boric Acid Blender -Boric Acid Transfer Pump Lock
Verification
-Boric Acid Storage Tank Lock
Test
-Boric Acid Tank to Charging
Pump "A" Valve HV8104
Control Lock Verification
.
.
19
(2) Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System Test -
Preoperational Test
Procedure Review (70338)
The inspector reviewed the motor driven and steam driven Auxiliary
Feedwater (AFW) System Preoperational Test Procedure (1-3AL-01 and
1-3AL-02) and the Condensate Storage Tank Vacuum Degasifier System
Preoperational Test Procedure 1(1-3AL-04) to verify technical
adequacy. A review of licensee commitments from applicable FSAR
Chapters, Regulatory Guide 1.68 and the Safety Evaluation Report
was performed and compared with requirements contained in the test
procedure. This included verifying that pertinent prerequisites
were identified, initial test conditions and system status were
specified, acceptance criteria were specified and performed with
management approval indicated.
(3) Chemical Volume & Control System (CVCS) Test - Preoperational Test
Procedure Review (70333)
The inspector reviewed the Boric Acid Blender Preoperational Test
Procedure (1-3BG-04) to verify technical adequacy. A review of
licensee commitments from applicable FSAR Chapters, Regulatory
Guide 1.68 and the Safety Evaluation Report was performed and
compared with requirements contained in the test procedure. This
included verifying that pertinent prerequisites were identified,
initial test conditions and system status were specified,
acceptance criteria were specified, and performed with management
approval indicated.
Based on review of the above procedures and discussions with test
supervisors the inspector noted that some preops do not contain
Negative Logic Testing. Discussions with the licensee's Preop
Procedure Group confirmed that this item had been previously
! identified. The licensee's Preop Procedure Group has identified
! areas where Negative Logic Testing was not initially covered and
! will be issuing them to be tested in the Common Annunciator
'
Preoperational Test Procedure (1-300-15) due to be issued in
approximately one (1) month. This matter will be identified as
Inspector Followup Item 50-424/86-31-02 " Review Implementation of
Negative Logic Testing".
Accumulator Preoperational Test Results Evaluation (70322) The
inspector reviewed preliminary results of the Accumulator Blowdown
Calculation and acceptance criteria per Preoperational Testing
l Procedure 1-3BJ-03.
c. A resident inspection was conducted of the event of April 9,1986,
pertaini'ng to the licensee test personnel inadvertently filling
the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) while performing the filling and
venting of the Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) Train A. The
. . - _ .-
.
.
20
purpose of this inspection was to review the licensee's actions
4 which led to the event so as to determine, first the root cause,
';
and second that the licensee's report of the event properly
identified the root cause and corrective action to prevent
reoccurrence.
! The inspector reviewed and examined the following documents:
-
Reactor Operator and Shift Supervisor Logs
-
Memo Dated 4/9/86 from M. Aj1 uni, Operations Supervisor on Shift
(OSOS) to C. Meyer, Operation Superintendent (Acting) (0S)
-
Letter Dated 4/11/86 from D. Schreiber, Operations Supervisor to
All Shift Personnel
-
Operations Procedure No. 11011-1 "RHRS Alignment for Startup and
Normal Operation"
-
Operations Procedure No. 13011-1 " Residual Heat Removal System"
-
SUM-3, Rev. 3 "Preoperational Test Program Organization,
Responsibilities, and Interfaces"
-
SUM-12C, Rev. 2 "Preoperational Test Implementation"
-
SUM-37, Rev. 0 " Initial Test Program Conduct of Shift Operations"
Background information indicated that the RHR Train "A" was being
placed in service to obtain a RCS sample. The RCS Level was being
maintained at mid nozzle (188' elevation) with the Reactor Vessel Head
in place. The Test Supervisor (TS) was in the process of filling and
'
venting the RHRS to support system operation.
During the inspection, the inspector identified the following
discrepancies:
i
-
An approved procedure was not used to fill and vent the RHRS
system but rather verbal instructions were given by the TS to
Operations personnel. It should be noted that the Start-up Manual
does not state that the TS is authorized to direct system valve
lineups by verbal instructions nor to what extent are verbal
instructions authorized. Also, the licensee does have plant
l
procedures in place for filling and venting the RHRS.
-
Plant procedures 11011-1 and 13011-1 are the applicable procedures
for filling and venting the RHRS. However, these procedures do
not address filling and venting the section of pipe between Valves
,
!
l 8701A & 8701B (Train "A"), which was the evolution being
performed. This in turn, led to the inadvertently filling of the
l RCS. Had these procedures been used it would have been discovered
l that these procedures were inadequate for filling and venting the ,
i
RHRS in that the section of pipe between the 8701A & 87013
- (Train"A") and the section of pipe between valves 8702A & 8702B
l (Train "B") were not covered.
l
l
-
-c , , - - , - , - . , - , , , , , - ,,--,--.-.-,--,-e--
-
- - . - - ,m-
.w,v, ,,,.mpe a ,, .a-. , , . . , , , , - . - - , - + , - - - . - - - - . - - - -
.
.
21
-
Per Procedure SUM-37 " Initial Test Program Conduct of Shift
Operations" Paragraph 4.2 the Operations Supervisor On Shift
(OSOS) is responsible for determining off-normal manner when not
covered by a plant procedure or a test procedure; Paragraph 5.5.3
states in part the TS is responsible for providing written
instructions to the SS when the system condition requires off
normal operation; & Paragraph 6.1,5,2 states "This instruction
should be in the form of a Start-up Operating Instruction, or
standing order. However, the SS responsibilities do not include
asking the TS for written instructions when operating a system in
an off normal condition.
The above condition is an example of failure to prescribe and use
appropriate procedures to control valve lineups for filling and venting
the RHRS, where improper performance could have detrimental effects on
safety-related equipment. This is considered to be in violation of
10CFR Part 50, Appendix 8, Criterion V, " Failure to Establish
Appropriate Procedures to Properly Control the Filling and Venting of
Safety-Related Systems", and will be identified as Violation
50-424/86-31-01.
The inspector noted the following discrepancies pertaining to the
licensee's report of the event and corrective action:
- The Memo Dated 4/9/86 from M. Aj1 uni, OSOS to C. Meyer, OS, which
documented the event was incorrect. This memo contained a drawing
of the valve arrangement which depicted an incorrect valve
configuration (i.e., the 8701B valve is upstream of the 8701A
valve, not downstream as shown in the memo). Consequently, the
description detailing the sequence of events pertaining to the
opening of valves is incorrect (i.e., the 87018 valve was the
valve actually opened which led to the inadvertent filling of the
,
RCS, not the 8701A as stated in the memo). Thus the memo did not
properly document the correct sequence of events pertaining to
which valves were open and in what sequence.
'
-
The letter dated 4/11/86 from D. Schreiber, OSOS to All Shift
Personnel hi-lited " Operator Error". It stated in part that plant
operations is becoming more complex and that this requires each
operator and supervisor to stop and analyze each action he takes
for potential impact and expected as well as unexpected responses.
.
!
It identified two (2) examples in recent months, one being where
equipment was in operation without cooling water and the second ,
<
being the RCS was inadvertently filled. This did not properly
l identify the root cause nor did it address corrective action to
'
prevent recurrence.
i
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i.-. m, +_y . - - _
_
w ---r m--, , - - - - - - , y..,..v.,- , y -.- -
y -
9
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22
A meeting was held with the licensee on 4/18/86 to discuss the above
findings pertaining to the inadvertently filling of the RCS on 4/9/86.
Several followup meetings were conducted by the licensee with the
Resident Inspector's Office where the licensee presented a detailed
report containing the sequence of events which led to the event, shift
actions, followup action, NRC concerns / discussion, root cause, and
summary. This report identified the root cause as lack of communica-
tion. !
Subsequently on May 6,1986 the NRC Resident Inspector's Office was
informed by the licensee that on May 5, 1986, the RCS was again
inadvertently filled. Background information indicated that the
Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS) was being lined up in preparation
for flushing the Reactor Coolant Pump Seals. The TS was in the process
of filling and venting the CVCS to support system operation. An
approved procedure was not used to fill and vent the CVCS system but
rather verbal instructions were given by the TS to operations
personnel. Plant Procedure 13006-1 is the applicable procedure for
filling and venting the CVCS. This is another example of the above
noted violation " Failure to Establish Appropriate Procedures to
Properly Control the Filling and Venting of Safety-Related Systems".
(50-424/86-31-01)
21. Plant Procedures - Unit 1 and 2 (42400B)
This inspection consists of a procedural review to verify that administra-
tive controls are established and implemented to control safety related
operations. Procedures are selected at random and reviewed for technical
adequacy and incorporation of requirements as appropriate for the proper
operation of a nuclear facility in the startup and operational phase. The
following requirements, guidance and licensee commitment were utilized as
appropriate:
10 CFR 50.59 Change, Tests, and Experiments
20 CFR 50 Appendix B Instructions, Procedures and Drawings
Criteria V
ANSI N18.7-1976 Administrative Controls and Quality
Assurance for the Operational Phase
Regulatory Guide 1.33 Quality Assurance Requirements for the
Rev 2, 1978 Operational Phase of Nuclear Power
Plants
FSAR Section 13 Conduct of Operations
NUREG 0737, et al TMI Task Action Plan
I
-. . . _ . _ -.
'
.
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23
Procedures reviewed were:
a. Administrative
.
Number Rev Title
00051-C 2 Procedure Review and Approval
00050-C 4 Procedure Development
00052-C 1 Temporary Changes to Procedures
00700-C 0 General Employee Training
00350-C 1 Maintenance Program
00254-C 1 Plant Housekeeping and Cleanliness Control
00653-C 0 Protected Area Entry / Exit Control
00800-C 4 Requisition of Materials and Services
00853-C 4 Material Identification, Control & Issue
00400-C 0 Plant Modifications
00204-C 0 Control of Special Processes
b. Operations
Number Rev Title
11011-1 1 RHR Alignment for Startup and Normal
Operation
,
13011-1 1 Residual Heat Removal System
13427-1 1 4160 VAC 1E Electrical Distribution System
c. Maintenance
Number Rev Title
22304-C 0 Electronic Differential Level
Transmitter Functional Test and
Calibration
23710-C 0 Generic Valve Stroking Procedure
20427-C 0 Maintenance Cleanliness and Housekeeping
Control
No violations or deviations were identified.
22. Readiness Review - Unit 1
a. During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the following
commitments as part of Readiness Review Module 7 " Plant Operations and
Support". The commitments were reviewed for accuracy between the
source document, Readiness Review Module and the implementing document.
4
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_ - - _ _ - , . - .~ . ._ _ . . - _ . _ _ _ _ , _ . . _ _ __. -
.
.
24
(1) Operations Area Reviewer
Commitment Implementing
- Number Source Document
2706.00 FSAR 1.2.2.B None
'
2707.00 FSAR 1.2.2.C 00653-C Rev 0
90112-C Rev 0
728.00 FSAR 1.2.2.E 11701-1 Rev 0
11743-1 Rev 0
764.01 FSAR 1.9.33 00002 Rev 3
10003-C Rev 0 and 1
765.01 FSAR 1.9.33 10010-C Rev 2 and 3
765.02 FSAR 1.9.33 10003-C Rev 0 and 1
765.04 FSAR 1.9.33 10001-C Rev 0
765.06 FSAR 1.9.33 00005-C Rev 1
00006-C Rev 0
00003-C Rev 0
"
00253-C Rev 0 and 1
00258-C Rev 1
765.08 FSAR 1.9.33 10000-C Rev 1
765.09 FSAR 1.9.33 10006-C Rev 1
765.10 FSAR 1.9.33 10000-C Rev 1
765.11 FSAR 1.9.33 10000-C Rev 1
765.12 FSAR 1.9.33 10000-C Rev 1
765.13 FSAR 1.9.33 10000-C Rev 1
765.15 FSAR 1.9.33 10000-C Rev 1
00054-C Rev 0
765.16 FSAR 1.9.33 00103-C Rev 0
00051-C Rev 2 and 3
765.17 FSAR 1.9.33 00052-C Rev 2
765.18 FSAR 1.9.33 10000-C Rev 1
765.19 FSAR 1.9.33 00053-C Rev 0
$ 765.20 FSAR 1.9.33 10000-C Rev 1
765.21 FSAR 1.9.33 00054-C Rev 0
765.22 FSAR 1.9.33 10002-C Rev 1
765.23 FSAR 1.9.33 10002-C Rev 1
765.24 FSAR 1.9.33 00050-C Rev 2
00053-C Rev 0
765.25 FSAR 1.9.33 00053-C Rev 0
765.26 FSAR 1.9.33 00350-C Rev 1
765.28 FSAR 1.9.33 00304-C Rev 1
i 00350-C Rev 1
765.29 FSAR 1.9.33 00304-C Rev 6
!
00308-C Rev 0
'
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25
765.31 FSAR 1.9.33 00307-C Rev 0
765.54 FSAR 1.9.33 00050-C Rev 4
00051-C Rev 3
-
00052-C Rev 2
765.75 FSAR 1.9.33 00050-C Rev 4
765.83 FSAR 1.9.33 10011-C Rev 7
765.84 FSAR 1.9.33 00050-C Rev 4
765.85 FSAR 1.9.33 E0P 0.1 Rev 1
765.86 FSAR 1.9.33 10011-C Rev 7
765.87 FSAR 1.9.33 10011-C Rev 7
765.88 FSAR 1.9.33 10011-C Rev 7
765.89 FSAR 1.9.33 10011-C Rev 7
765.90 FSAR 1.9.33 10011-C Rev 7
765.91 FSAR 1.9.33 10001-C Rev 1
765.92 FSAR 1.9.33 10001-C Rev 1
765.93 FSAR 1.9.33 10001-C Rev 1
765.96 FSAR 1.9.33 10000-C Rev 1
Commitments in the 765.XX series pertain to the implementation of
ANSI N18.7-1976/ANS 3.2 " Administrative Controls and Quality
Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants".
During the review of commitment numbers 2706, 2707 and 728, the
inspector identified that the i.mplementing documents were not
correct to control the separation of Unit 1 and 2 upon licensing
of Unit 1. For commitment 2706, Procedure 1-500-01 " Initial Fuel
Load Test Sequence" Step 5.20 does not satisfy this commitment.
Commitment 728 incorrectly lists the sections of the actual
procedures verified and appears to be short on scope in that only
two systems out of twenty-three shared systems identified in FSAR
Section 1.2.2.2. have been addressed. From discussions with the
licensee, the overall program has been established to control the
separation of Units 1 and 2, was developed by Southern Company
Services, Inc. and access to the plan will be provided. This item
will be tracked as Inspector Followup Item 50-424/86-31-03 " Review
Licensee Plan for Separation of Facilities and Systems Between
Unit 1 Operation and Unit 2 Construction".
,
Commitments 765.01 and 765.02 concern the designation of positions
! requiring R0 and SR0 licenses and the establishment of minimum
!
staffing levels. Site Procedure 10003-C " Manning the Shif t" and
l
10010-C " Operator Qualification Program" were reviewed. In
discussions with the Readiness Review Team, the inspector was
informed that Procedure 10003-C was only verified to ensure
l
minimum crew levels were specified, but no judgment was made as to
adequacy of the numbers specified. The inspector reviewed various
! source documents of minimum requirements such as 10 CFR 50.54(M),
,
NUREG 0737 I.A.1.3, Generic Letter 82.12 and the Standard Review
I
!
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26
i
Plan. The inspector determined that the procedure does not
adequately discuss minimum manning for a defueled state. Final
minimum shift crew will be established by Technical Specifications
upon license issuance. Inspector Followup Item 50-424/86-31-04
" Review Minimum Shift Crew Requirements as Implemented in
Procedure 10003-C for a Defueled Status".
In reviewing Commitment 765.06 it was noted that Procedure
00005-C, Rev 1 " Overtime Authorization" allows approval at the
department superintendent level for exceeding the guidelines
instead of the General Manager - Vogtle Nuclear Operations. The
procedure does not specify the paramount consideration that need
be made prior to approval of excess overtime. The procedure does
not control regular overtime to monitor the obtainment of a
40-hour week objective. The procedure references NUREG 0737
I.A.I.3 which has been replaced by Generic Letter 82-12 and 82-16.
In FSAR Change Submittal Number 22 the licensee has revised the
level of authorization to coincide with the Site Procedure
00005-C. It was noted that this issue will be resolved when the
Technical Specifications are issued. IFI 50-424/86-31-05 " Review
Implementation of Technical Specification Overtime Conflicts with
Procedure 00005-C.
In the review of Commitment 764.01 the inspector noted that the
word " body" had been deleted from the phrase " independent review
body". The listed implementing document, 00402-C " Licensing
Document Change Request" was not correctly verified in that other
procedure reviews were taking credit for implementing this
commitment instead of the " independent review body", namely the
Plant Review Bourd. Procedure 00402-C does not discuss the second
" independent review body" entitled the " Safety Review Board". The
inspector determined that this commitment had not been properly
verified nor implemented.
Procedure 00402-C was also noted as weak regarding the following:
(a) Step 4.2.1 limits the PRB review for potential USQ's
"Unreviewed Safety Questions" vice the full scope of a PRB
review to advise on all matters related to nuclear safety.
(b) The procedure does not coordinate reviews to the SRB.
(c) Section 4.2.9 states in the note "The superintendent of
Regulatory Compliance has 60 days from the date the NRC
approved the change to ensure the change is fully implemented
in the plant activities".
,
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.
27
The Readiness Review Team identified Procedure 00001-C " Plant
Review Board Duties and Responsibilities" as the appropriate
document for commitment 764.01. This item will be tracked as
Inspector Followup Item 50-424/86-31-06 " Review Licensee Changes ,
to Procedure 00402-C prior to license issuance". 1
(2) Maintenance Area Review
Commitment Implementing
Number Source Document
729.00 FSAR 1.9.6 13427-1 Rev 1
765.34 FSAR 2.9.33 00350-C Rev 1
765.35 FSAR 1.9.33 00350-C Rev 1
765.36 FSAR 1.9.33 00350-C Rev 1
765.37 FSAR 1.9.33 00350-C Rev 1
765.38 FSAR 1.9.33 00350-C Rev 1
765.43 FSAR 1.9.33 00254-C Rev 1
765.44 FSAR 1.9.33 00800-C Rev 4/
00853-C Rev 4
765.63 FSAR 1.9.33 00400-C Rev 0
765.70 FSAR 1.9.33 00204-C Rev 0
765.72 FSAR 1.9.33 00350-C Rev 1
765.75 FSAR 1.9.33 00050-C Rev 4
765.95 FSAR 1.9.33 00050-C Rev 4
765.97 FSAR 1.9.33 00050-C Rev 4
785.01 FSAR 1.9.39 00254-C Rev 1/
00350-C Rev 1
785.02 FSAR 1.9.39 00254-C Rev 1/
20427-C Rev 0
785.04 FSAR 1.9.39 00254-C Rev 1
785.05 FSAR 1.9.39 00254-C Rev 1/
00700-C Rev 0
785.06 FSAR 1.9.39 00253-C Rev 0/
00254-C Rev 1/
00653-C Rev 0
785.07 FSAR 1.9.39 00254-C Rev 1
785.08 FSAR 1.9.39 00254-C Rev 1/
00260-C Rev 0
785.09 FSAR 1.9.39 20427-C Rev 0
785.10 FSAR 1.9.39 00254-C Rev 1/
20427-C Rev 0
785.11 FSAR 1.9.39 20427-C Rev 0
785.11 FSAR 1.9.39 00254-C Rev 0
785.13 FSAR 1.9.39 00254-C Rev 1
During review of the above noted commitments in the maintenance
area, the inspector noted that commitment No. 765.43 referenced
Administrative Procedure No. 00254-C, Rev.1 " Plant Housekeeping
and Cleanliness Control" is the implementing document for ANSI
N18.7-1976 Paragraph 5.2.10. However, in review of the subject
,
. $
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28 l
l
,
procedure the inspector could not find where the procedure
implemented the statement "Immediately prior to closure an
inspection shall be conducted to assure cleanliness and the result
of such inspection shall be documented "per Paragraph 5.12.10 of
ANSI N18.7-1976. During the review of Maintenance Procedure No.
20427-C, Rev. 0 " Maintenance Cleanliness and Housekeeping
Control", the inspector noted that Paragraph 4.3.5.b.6 addressed
that an inspection be conducted prior to closure. However, there
was no requirement that the inspection results be documented.
This matter will be identified as Inspector Followup Item
No. 50-424/86-31-07 " Review Maintenance Procedure 20427-C for
Incorporation of the ANSI Requirement to Document Closeout
Inspection Results", i
No violations or deviations were identified.
b. During the inspection period, a Readiness Review, Module 17 " Raceways,"
inspection was conducted by a RII based inspector. Certain cable
trays, conduits and junction boxes installed in the containment building
were examined. It was discovered that a section of cable tray identified
as IBE 502 TRAA, installed at elevation 184'2", and between column
Nos. I and 2, above grating elevation 184', and below the electrical
penetrations, was damaged. The damage appears to have been caused by
personnel stepping, standing or walking in the tray. The cables in
this tray have been compressed such that they are depressed into the
openings of the cable tray bottom and could possible be damaged.
Specification No. X3AR01, Section E8.7.1, paragraph 5 states " Cable
trays shall not be used as walkways or working platforms. Where trays
are so located that such use is possible or might be attempted, it
shall be prohibited by clear and conspicuous signs, and prevented, if
necessary, by suitable physical barriers."
Contrary to this, on April 17, 1986, cable tray section 1BE 502 TRAA
was found to be damaged as evidenced by the distorted shape of the
bottom and sides. The damaged tray is located such that it should have
been protected by one of the methods defined in paragraph 5 of
Specification No. X3AR01, Section E8.7.1.
This is considered to be in violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
Criterion V, " Failure to Follow Established Appropriate Procedure to
Properly Protect Installed Equipment / Components" and will be identified
as violation 50-424/86-31-08.
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23. Emergency Preparedness Exercise
On April 30, 1986, the residents participated as players in.the NRC graded
exercise. Both the Technical Support Center and the Control Room were
manned in order to provide the NRC response that would be present for an
actual site event.
No violations or deviations were identified.