IR 05000321/1987008

Insp Repts 50-321/87-08 & 50-366/87-08 on 870328-0424.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters,Operational Safety Verification,Maint & Surveillance Observations & ROs

ML20214N424
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	05/22/1987
From:	Cantrell F, Holmesray P, Menning J, Nejfelt G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214N412	List: IR 05000321/1987008 ML20214N410
References
50-321-87-08, 50-321-87-8, 50-366-87-08, 50-366-87-8, NUDOCS 8706020173
Download: ML20214N424 (8)

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UNITED STATES

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/ ,7, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION ll

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y y,j 101 MARIETTA STR EET, N.W.

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Report Numbers: 50-321/87-08 and 50-366/87-08

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! Licensee: Georgia Power Company l P.O. Box 4545

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Atlanta, GA 30302 i Docket Numbers: 50-321 and 50-366 License Numbers: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2 Inspection Dates: March 28 - April 24, 1987

Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia Inspectors

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, Peter Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident inspector Date Signed 6 fti 6f2

! Gregory H. Nejfelt, Resident Inspector l ate Signed l

V80d$dn e2 John E. Menning, Resident inspector 6/22l89 Date Signed Approved by:

Floyd S.dfk Cantrell,fgChief, Project Section 6 e 2T ! 7at[_22 bl Signed I Division of Reactor Projects l

l SUMMARY Scope: This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters, Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observation, Surveillance Observation, and Reportable i Occurrence Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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) REPORT DETAILS

! Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

! T. Seckham, Vice President, Plant Hatch l H.C. Nix, Plant Manager

• D. Read, Plant Support Manager H.L. Sumner, Operations Manager

• P.E. Fornel, Maintenance Manager

• T.R. Powers, Engineering Manager R.W. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager C. Coggin, General Support Manager

• M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager

• 0.M. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance (QA) Manager

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C.T. Moore, Training Manager

• S.B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance ,

' Attended exit interview J

I Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, j mechanics, security force members and office personne NRC regional management on site during inspection period to attend the i Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) meeting on April 6, i 1987, were:

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M.L. Ernst, Deputy Regional Administrator

) L.A. Reyes, Director, Olvision of Reactor Projects (DRP)

F.S. Cantrell, Chief Project Section 20, DRP l R. Croteau, Reactor Engineer, Project Section 28, DRP

Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 24, 1987, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov The licensee did not j identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee acknowledged the findinga

.! and took no exceptio (CLOSED) Inspector Followup Item (IFI), 50-366/85-38-01 - Procedural Incorporation of Design Change Requests (DCRs). High pressure coolant

injection (HPCI) surveillance procedure, 3450-E41-001-2, and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) surveillance procedure, 3450-E51-001-25, have 3 been corrected respectively by revisions 3 and 1 to indicate the equipment

! relocated by Appendix "R" work, DCR 83-144. To prevent similar l

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reoccurrences, the " Preparation and Control of Procedure" procedure,

! 10AC-MGR-003-05, Section 8.5.1.14, was revised by Revision 5 to provide a means to validate procedures. The validation process will formally verify the equipment location prior to issuing a procedur (CLOSED) IFI, 50-321,366/86-36-05 - Potential Failure of the Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) Negative Power Supply Fuse. IRM instrument functional surveillance procedures - 57SV-H11-001-1, Revision 0, and 57SV-H11-001-2, Revision 0 - are performed: weekly, within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of a reactor startup, and following IRM instrument repair. These functional tests would detect i a blown IRM negative power supply fuse. The licensee has initiated, as a long term corrective action, DCR 86-377, to replace 0.75 ampere IRM i chassis fuses with 1.5 ampere fuse These fuse replacements were in keeping with the General Electric (GE) Services Information Letter (SIL)

No. 445 recommendatio (CLOSED) IFI, 50-321/87-02-04 - Chemical Surface Contamination of Control

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Rod Drive (CRD) Piping. High levels of chlorides and sulfides were found

on the stainless steel CRD pipin The source of this chemical contamination was a cleaning fluid used routinely for general cleaning and i radiological decontamination - Zepac. The reactor water cleanup (RWCU)

l room, above the CRD piping, was not adequately wiped to remove the Zepac I used (i.e., poor housekeeping); and eventually the chemical contamination

was deposited on the CRD piping below. The Itcensee has prohibited the

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use of Zepac on stainless material; and has initiated an investigation of

) alternate cicaning fluids to use in the plant. Also, the CRD piping in

question has boon inspected and was found undamaged. A second inspection of this CRD piping is being scheduled before July 30, 1987, to ensure that additional chemical contaminates have not leached on the pipin , Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

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(CLOSED) Violation, 50-366/86-15-02 - Failure to Declare a Snubber Inoperable, because of Procedural Revision Problem. Amendment No. 72 of

Technical Specification (TS) 4.7.4, concerning a snubber visual inspection

! acceptance criterion change, was incorporated into surveillance procedure,

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52SV-SUV-001-25, Revision To preclude the likelihood of failing to j incorporate future TS amendments into plant procedures, the licensee j issued " Technical Specification Surveillance Program" procedure, 40AC-REG-001-05, Revision 0; and " Revision to Licensing Documents" procedure, 43RC-CPL-001-05, Revision Also, GPC Ictters of July 30, ;

i 1986, and August 25, 1986, were reviewed and were determined to be ;

acceptable by the inspector verifying the licensee's response l 1 (CLOSED) Unresolved Item *, 50-321/86-12-02 - Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

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Pump Minimum Flow Valve Tagged Shut during Shutdown Cooling Mode. The RHR i minimum flow valves,1E11-F007A and -F0070, were routinely closed by the j licensee in the RHR shutdown cooling mode to ensure that water was not

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, bypassed to the suppression poo The procedure upgrade program (PUP)

34S0-E11-010-15, Revision 0

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procedure, Section 7.2.3, to replace

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3450-E11-005-IS, Revision 2, was issued with an operator caution to frequently ensure that the RHR flow rate is maintained greater than 1,000 gpm. This practice - to deenergize the RHR minimum flow valve closed - ,

was also found to be the standard practice at five other boiling water reactor plants that were canvassed by the license (CLOSED) Unresolved Item, 50-321/86-15-01 - Inoperability of Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System Train, because of Wet Charcoal Filter. This URI

was upgraded to a violation in escalated enforcement action (EA) 87-27 Also, additional information is contained in inspection report

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50-321/86-43.

~ Unresolved item (URI)*

(OPEN) URI, 50-321/87-08-01 - The licensee reported inadvertent isolations of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems during operability testing of reactor coolant

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system instrument line excess flow check valves (EFCVs) in Unit 1 on April 18, 1987. This testing was being performed in accordance with surveillance procedure 575V-SUV-004-15 Revision 2. The HPCI system isolation occurred during testing of EFCV IE41-F024C. The RCIC system isolation occurred subsequently during the testing of EFCV 1E51-F044 '

The licensee's initial review of this procedure revealed that the jumper installation and link opening instructions contained in Table 1 of the procedure were incorrec Previous revisions of this procedure did not contain the current jumper installation and link- opening instructions.

] Similar system isolations were therefore not exportenced during previous

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EFCV operability testing. In reviewing this matter, the inspectors noted that this procedure had not yet been validated as part of the licensee's t

Procedure Upgrade Program (PUP). The licensee's review of theso

inadvertent system isolations is continuing. Pending completion of the

, licensee's review, this matter is identified as an UR . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

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The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant

operations. Daily discussions were held with plant management and various

members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room. Observations u cluded instrument readings, setpoints i and recordings, status of operath j systems, tags and clearances on l equipment, controls and switches, innunciator alarms, adherence to

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timiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily

! journals and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access

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controls. This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisors. Wookly, when on site, selected l.

j 'An Unresolied Item is a matter about which more information is required to

! determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.

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! Engineering Safety Feacure (ESF) systems were confirmed operable. The confirmation was made by verifying the following: accessible valve flow

. path alignment, power supply breaker and fuse status, instrumentation, l major component leakage, lubrication, cooling, and general condition.

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General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basis. Portions J of the control building, turbine building, reactor building, and outside areas were visited.

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Observations included safety related tagout verifications, shift turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection equipment, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security, problem

+ identification systems, and containment isolation.

On April 17, 1987, the inspector found that the Unit-1 turbine butiding

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water analysis room sample hood exhaust fan was off with the hood open, j Procedure 62HI-0CB-001-0, Revision 0, required that a minimum flow i velocity of 100 f t3/ min be maintained for this sample hoo No i explanation could be provided by the licensee as to why the exhaust fan 1 was turned of f. The actual safety significance with the given plant

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conditions was negligible, i

j In the area of housekeeping the following discrepancies were observed by l the inspector:

I (1) Equipment was lef t af ter work had been performed (e.g., ladder, wire coil, hack saw, and leather glove behind North wall electrical panels in Unit-2 reactor.butiding, 130' elevation).  ;

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i (2) Anti-contamination clothing was not placed into the proper receptacle j contrary to procedure 60AC-HPX-004-05, Revision 3 Attachrint I Cloth boot covers, rubber boots, and rubber gloves were fownd in i noncontaminated areas in the Unit 2 Southeast diagonal on the 106'

I and 118' elevations on April 20, 1987. It did not appear that the ;

j clothing had been used in a contaminated area.

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j (3) A health physics (HP) capture bottle used to collect potential

contaminated water was Icf t in an uncontaminated area in the Unit-2 i Southeast diagonal,106' elevation on April 20, 1987. Leaving a potential source of radiological contamination in a clean area, although a radiological restricted area by 10 CFR 20, is considered a [

poor practice. This bottle was removed af ter the inspector talked with a HP supervisor. However, no previous HP action was taken to i

remove this capture bottlo even though a shift supervisor found it i during a plant tour and reported it to HP approximately a week earlie (4) On April 17, 1987, a prominently marked control building emergency i

. fire protection equipment box was found on the 147' elevation in the i

control building outside the cable spreading room.

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, The box was unlocked and stored various cleaning supplie Action was taken on April 20, 1987, by the licensee to correct this situatio ) The above discrepancies were discussed with plant management and

) corrective actions were taken. In the course of the monthly activities, j the resident inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of various shifts of the security force i was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital access controls, searching of personnel, packages and vehicles,

! badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols and

compensatory posts. On April 16, 1987, the central alarm station (CAS)

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was visited by the resident inspectors. The security officer on duty was ,

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attentive to his duties and the surveillance equipment was functioning  ;

f satisfactoril I No violations or deviations were identifie ; MaintenanceObservation(62703) ,

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During the report period, the inspectors observed selected maintenance *

I activities. The observations included a review of the work documents for j adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical

specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the actual work and/or retosting in progress, specified rotest requirements, and adherence to the appropriato quality control { Maintenance and lip housekeeping items that were found are discussed in paragraph 5.

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No violations or deviations were identifie :

Surveillance Testing Observations (61726)  !

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j The inspector observed the performance of selected surveillances. The

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observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy,

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ceiformance to Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument

et1 >bration, observation of all or part of the actual survoillances,

!' removal from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the i acco;tanco crlteria, i

The inadvertent isolations of the high pressure coolant injection (llPCI)

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and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems during Unit 1 EFCV

surveillances on April 18, 1987, was identified as URI 50-321/87-08-01 in j paragraph 4.

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On April 21, 1987, brass compression test plugs were found by the licensee to be badly corroded in the compression cylinders of the "2C" diosol generator-(0/0) - a 12 cylindor Fairbanks Morris engino. The licensee's I '

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investigation was prompted by the ejection of one "2C" D/G brass l compression plug on April 14, 1987, during a surveillance, No record of l

the use or removal of these brass plugs could be found within the last -

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five years for any of the five D/Gs on sit The licensee inspected the brass compression plugs in all~ of the D/Gs and replaced brass plugs as necessar The licensee notified the vendor, Fairbanks Morris / Colt Industry, of this potential generic problem; and placed this information on the industry nuclear information network. Samples of the corroded brass plugs found in the "2C" D/G were provided to regional specialists for evaluatio No violations or deviations were identifie . ESF System Walkdown (71710)  !

The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room to ensure that lineups were in accordance with operability requirements and that equipment material conditions were satisfactor '

Within the areas inspected, no s tolations or deviations were identifie . Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)

A number of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether correctivo actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were i also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical Specifications were being mot and consideration of the offect on public health and safety was evaluate Unit 1: N/A

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Unit 2: 85-22*(SeeViolation 86-15-02. This violation, which is closed in this report, also concerned a failure to incorporate now T$

amendments into plant proceduros.)

• In-depth review performed 10, Operating Roactor Events (93702) ,

The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the below listed reactor oyent The review includod datormination of cause, safoty significance, performance of personnel and systems, and corrective actio The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer printouts, operations journal entries, scram reports and had discussions with operations maintenance and engincoring support personnel as appropriato, ,

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On April 23, 1987, while attempting to fill the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) shutdown cooling piping, a low level condition in the reactor vessel occurred. The method for filling the RHR piping is to provide fill water from the condensate transfer system to the RHR system, listen for flow noise and when the flow noise stops, secure filling by shutting the fill valves. The condensate transfer system was not in the normal line up in that a normally open manual valve was tagged shut to stop leakage through the RHR system to the torus from the condensate transfer system. When the RHR fill valves were opened no flow noise was heard and the incorrect assumption that the RHR system was full was made. When the isolation valve from the reactor vessel to the RHR suction was opened flow from the reactor vessel filled the RHR system and resulted in the low reactor vessel indication. The resident inspectors are following the licensee's analysis of this event and any corrective which may result from this analysi On April 23, 1987, Unit 2 scramed due to loss of the 2C condensate pump. The resulting low reactor vessel level caused automatic start of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system which injected to the vessel. As required by the emergency plan a Notice of Unusual Event (NUE)

was declared at 6:05 pm, CDT. The reactor vessel water level was stable and the NUE was terminated at 6:45 p.m., COT, April 23,1987. The plant functioned as designe Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Review of Licensee Actions Taken in Response to GE Service Information Letter (SIL) No. 402 (T! 2500/12) (25012)

The resident inspector reviewed records and held discussions with cognizant licenseo personnel to assess the adequacy of the licensee's responses to GE SIL 402. The $1L was issued subsequent to the torus vent header cracking event at Hatch Unit 2 in February 1984, and provided five recommendations to BWR licensees which had used their liquid nitrogen based inerting systems. In summary; thn $1L recommended the evaluation of inerting system designs, evaluation of inerting system operations, testing for drywell / votwell bypass leakage, nondestructive inspection of nitrogen lines and visual inspection of portions of the containment. The resident inspector completed a review of licensee responses to all of the GE recommendations with the exception of the recommendation for thn nondestructive inspection of the nitrogen line Review of Itconsee actions taken in response to GE $1L 402 remains open pending completion of the review of the licensee's response to this recommendatio Within this area, no violatinns or deviations Woro identifie l

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