IR 05000321/1987010
| ML20235M168 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 07/06/1987 |
| From: | Blake J, Crowley B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235M110 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-87-10, 50-366-87-10, TAC-64777, NUDOCS 8707170088 | |
| Download: ML20235M168 (22) | |
Text
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ATLANTA, oEORGIA 30323 %, d .....s . Report Nos.: 50-321/87-10 and 50-366/87-10 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: May 4-8 and 18-22, 1987 R. ['A& 7//$ 7 Inspector: B. R. Crowley ( Date Signed Approved by: . - 7/[[87 J. J. Blak'e, Section Chief Date Signed i Materials and Processes Section ' Division of Reactor Safety , SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of inservice inspection (Units 1 and 2), licensee action on previous enforcement matters (Units 1 and 2), I. E. Bulletins (Units 1 and 2) and Inspector Followup Items (IFI) (Units 1 and 2).
, Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
i 8707170088 G70709 PDR ADOCK 05000321 G PDR _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - _ _.
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. ! ! . . I REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- H. C. Nix, Plant Manager
- R. Dedrickson, Assistant to Vice President
- T. R. Powers, Manager of Engineering
- S. B. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance (NSC) Manager
- D. S. Read, Plant Support Manager i
- A. L. Fraser, Quality Assurances (QA) Site Manager l
- L. Sumner, Manager of Operations
- P. E. Fornel, Manager of Maintenance
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- M. H. Googe, Manager of Outages and Planning l
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- G. A. Goode, Superintendent of Plant Engineering Services l
D. A. McCusker, Superintendent of Quality Control (QC) I
- S. J. Bethay, NSC Supervisor
- D. J. Vaughn, Senior QA Field Representative P. P. Norris, Senior Plant Engineer - Welding
- G. K. McElroy, Senior Engineer S. R. Brunson, Plant Engineer - Operations Experience E. M. Burkett, Engineer - Pump and Valve T. S. Huckaby, Senior Plant Engineer
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- G. M. Creighton, Regulatory Specialist
! Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, security force members, and office personnel.
. Other Organizations
- T. N. Epps, Manager of Inspection, Testing and Engineering (ITE) -
Southern Company Services (SCS)
- A. G. Maze, ITE NDE Supervisor - SCS
- G. A. Loftus, Lend Inspector - Level III Examiner - SCS
- G. R. Brinson, Engineer - SCS D. M. Swan, Engineer - SCS H. G. Sherman, Supervisor - CTS Power Services C. F. Toegel, ANII, Hartford Steam and Boiler NRC Resident Inspectors
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- P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector j
- J. Menning, Resident Inspector
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- Attended exit interview on May 8, 1987
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- Attended exit interview on May 22, 1987
- Attend both exit interviews.
- Attended exit interview on May 22, 1987
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2 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 8 and 22,1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
At the close of the inspection, the violation discussed in paragraph 9 was identified to the licensee.
After further in-office evaluations, it was determined that the violation was licensee identified and should not be cited.
However, a question was raised relative to corrective action and Unresolved Item (UNR) 321/87-10-01 was identified.
This information was presented to the licensee by telephone (B. Crowley to S. Bethray on ' June 2, 1987). In addition, in-office review of licensee actions relative i to IFI 366/84-27-02 revealed UNR 366/87-10-01.
This information was presented to the licensee on July 6,1987.
! (0 pen) UNR 321/87-10-0., Adequate Corrective Action Relative to Welder Qualification Discrepancies - Paragraph 9.
(0 pen) UNR 366/87-10-01, Adequacy of Measures to Assure that Information Provided by a Service Contractor is Accurate and Correct - Paragraph 10.e.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702) (Units 1 and 2) a.
(Ciosed) UNR 321, 366/85-14-02, Resolution of Requirements for Increase l in Inspection Scope When Corrective Actions are Required for Pipe Supports.
This item was opened to resolve questions relative to the licensee's program for re-examination of problem supports and expansion of inspection scope when results of pipe support examinations required corrective actions. See RII Inspection Reports 50-321, 366/85-35 and 50-321, 366/86-11 for documentation of previous inspections of this item. As of the 85-35 inspection, procedure 45QC-INS-001-0S itad been revised to cover scope expansion when problems were found.
Since the 85-35 inspection, procedure 459C-INS-001-0S has been revised to add requirements for re-examination when problems are found, b.
(Closed) Violation 366/86-32-02, Failure to Follow Procedure to Assure Correct Welds are Examined During ISI.
Georgia Power Company's letter of response (SL-1766), dated December 22, 1986, has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region II.
The inspector examined corrective actions as stated in the letter of response and discussed corrective actions with responsible licensee and contractor personnel. The inspector verified: That isometric drawings were being carried to the inspection - area to ensure accurate weld identification.
That training checklists were being used.
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c.
(Closed) UNR 321, 366/86-05-02, NUREG-0619 Examinations.
This item pertained to the fact that weld IC11-2CRD-3-R-2 was not in the licensee's long term or modified inspection interval plan. According to NUREG-0619, the welded connection joining the rerouted control rod
drive return line (CRDL) to the system which returns flow to the reactor vessel is to be inspected.
Previous to a recent QA audit, ! SCS had not been incorporating augmented inspections such as 0619 inspections into the long term plans.
Presently, the long term plans I are being updated to include all ISI requirements.
Weld IC11-2CRD-3-R-2 is included.
The inspector verified that the weld had been 'i included in the current and previous outage plans.
Also, it should be noted that Hatch has a different configuration from that discussed , in NUREG-0619 and the thermal cracking covered in NUREG-0619 would j ' not be expected at the weld in question.
d.
(Closed) UNR 321, 366/86-11-01, Performance of System Leakage and Hydrostatic Tests Using Nuclear Heat.
This item pertained to the fact the Georgia Power Company (GPC) uses nuclear heat during plant startup to achieve pressure and temperature for performing system ! leakage and hydrostatic tests on the reactor vessel and Class 1 systems. GPC has used nuclear heat (reactor critical) for performing system leakage tests since the beginning of operations for both units.
Note 5 of ASME Code Table IWB-2500-1 states that "the system leakage test (IWB-5221) shall be conducted prior to plant startup following each refueling outage." GPC's interpretation, as outlined in their SL-689 letter, dated April 30, 1986, is that " Plant Startup" means prior to placing the unit in service or admitting steam to the turbine.
The NRC's position is that system pressure tests (leakage and hydrostatic) used to be performed before the reactor goes criti-cal from the refueling outage.
By letter (NRC to GPC dated May 5, 1986), the NRC granted GPC relief from the requirements for Unit 1 on a one time basis.
By letter, dated February 19, 1987, the NRC's position that the leakage test was to be performed prior to going critical was re-affirmed.
GPC, by letter, dated Ma~ch 13, 1987, ! requested an appeal meeting to discuss the issue. The appeal meeting
was held April 1,1987.
By letter, dated April 10, 1987, the NRC re-affirmed the original position that pressure tests were to be perf ormed with the reactor non-critical.
During the current Unit 1 outage, the inspector reviewed plant procedure 421T-TET-006-1S, Revision 0, which had been issued to perform the system leakage test after the refueling outage prior to going critical.
The inspector also verified by review of the Unit 1 1987 Refueling Outage Schedule, i dated April 16, 1987, that the leakage test was scheduled prior to criticality.
, e.
(Closed) Violation 321, 366/86-11-02, Failure to Perform Section XI Pressure Tests.
Georgia Power Company's letter of response (SL-1100C), dated August 28, 1986, has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region II.
The inspector examined corrective
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i actions as stated in the letter of response and discussed the corrective { actions with responsible licensee and contractor personnel. Deviation " No. 004 had been issued for the Hatch Unit 1 and 2 40 year ISI plans to include Class 2 and 3 pressure tests.
The current Unit 1 outage , plan schedules the tests for the current outage.
Plant procedure l 421T-TET-001-0S has been revised (Revision 2) to specifically address j ASME Section XI pressure tests.
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Unresolved Items j Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to j determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or l deviations.
Two unresolved items ioentified during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 9 and 10.e.
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Inservice Inspection - Review of Program (73051) (Unit 1} l The inspector reviewed the licensee's inservice i'nspection (ISI) program l for the current outage in the areas indicated below.
In accordance with the updated program, the applicable Code is the ASME Boiler and Pressure i ' Vessel Code, Section XI,1980 Edition with Addenda thru W81.
Southern l l Company Services (SCS) has the responsibility as the ISI contractor.
l Lambert, McGill and Thomas (LMT) is a subcontractor for Nondestructive Examination (NDE) inspections.
Georgia Power Company's (GPC's) letter SL-1951, dated February 20, 1987, outlines GPC's proposed program for the current outage inspections of Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) susceptible welds.
The program is based on the draft Revision 2 of NUREG-0313, Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping.
In addition to the inspections described below for IGSCC welds, the inspector verified that the inspections proposed in the l GPC letter were included in the outage plan.
Also, paragraphs 6. and 7.
l below include review of procedures and observations of inspection for welds included in the IGSCC scope of work, i The following GPC and SCS documents relative to the ISI program were reviewed.
Many of the documents have been reviewed during previous inspections (See RII Inspection Report 50-321, 366/86-32 and 50-321, 366/85-35).
Only changes to previously examined documents were reviewed.
(1) SCS " Nondestructive Examination Outage Plan - Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 1 - Spring 1987 Refueling Outage" (2) HNP QA-03-02, Revision 14, " Training and Personnel Qualifications" - (3) HNP QA-05-01, Revision 16, " Field Audits" (4) Hatch Administrative Control (AC) Procedure 10 AC-MGR-003-0S, Revision 5, " Preparation and Control of Procedures" .
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(5) Hatch AC Procadure 10 AC-MGR-002-0S, Revision 1, " Plant Review Board
Administrative Procedure" ' (6) Hatch AC Procedure 20 AC-ADM-001-0S, Revision 2, " Document Distribu- , ' tion and Control" (7). Hatch AC Procedure 20 AC-ADM-0002-0S, Revision 2 " Plant Record Management"
(8) Hatch AC Procedure 40 AC-ENG-01-0, Revision 1, " Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program" (9) SCS Inspection, Testing and Engineering (ITE) Procedure 09.1-2, Revision 0, " Manuals - Distribution and Return" (10) SCS ITE Procedure 09.1-3, Revision 0, " Manual Revisions" (11) SCS ITE Procedure 09.1-4, Revision 0, " Temporary Procedures - Preparation, Approval, and Distribution" (12) SCS ITE Procedure 09.1-50, Revision 0, " Request for Deviation" (13) SCS ITE Procedure 09.2-0, Revision 0, " Organization" (14) SCS ITE Procedure 09.2-1, Revision 0, " Identification and Training" (15) SCS ITE Procedure 09.3-50, Revision 0, " Outage Planning / Control / Revision" (16) SCS ITE Procedure 09.3-51, Revision 0, " Program Preparation and Revision" , , (17) (SCS) ITE Procedure 09.5-0, Revision 0, " Documents and Records" l (18) SCS ITE Procedure 09.5-50, Revision 0, " Inspection, Testing, and Engineering Files" (19) SCS ITE Procedure 09.5-5.', Revision 0, " Final Reports - Preparation, Approval, and Submittal" (20) SCS ITE Procedure 09.5-100, Revision 0, " Quality Assurance Record Control" . (21) SCS ITE Procedure 09.6-51, Revision 0,. " Control of Contractor Services" (22) SCS ITE Procedure 09.6-53, Revision 0, " Contractor Procedure - Review and Approval"
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(23) SCS ITE Procedure 09.7-0,-Revision 0, " Quality Assurance" (24) SCS ITE Procedure 09.7-50, Revision 0, " Nonconforming Item" (25) SCS ITE Procedure 09.8-50, Revision 0, " Relief Requests - Preparation and Tracking" (26) SCS ITE Procedure 09.50-0, Revision 0, "On-site Activities Conducted by ITE" (27) SCS ITE Procedure 09.50-1, Revision 0, "On-site Data Review" (28) SCS ITE Procedure 09.50-2, Revision 0, "On-site Data Control" (29) SCS ITE Procedure 09.50-3, Revision 0, "On-site Control and Issuance of Nondestructive Examination (NDE) Documents and Equipment" (30) SCS ITE Procedure 09.50-4, Revision 0, " Indication Notifications" (31) SCS ITE Procedure 09.50-5, Revision 0, "On-site Receipt, Inspection, Control, and Storage of Nondestructive Examination (NDE) Equipment, Materials, and Supplies" (32) SCS ITEM Procedure 09.60-1, Revision 0, " Plant Hatch - Responsi-bilities for ITE Activities" (33) SCS Procedure AUX-H/F/V-300, Revision 3, " Procedure (Written Practice) for Qualification and Certification of Nondestructive Examination Personnel" (34) SCS-AUX-H-301, Revision 1, " Identification of Reference Points for Volumetric and Surface Examinations" (35) SCS-AUX-H-302, Revision 2, Preservice and Inservice Inspection Documentation" The documents were reviewed in the areas of: Conformance with ASME B&PV Code, Section XI and applicable code - cases - Approval of code cases - Use of an authorized nuclear inservice inspector (ANII) and approval of plan and procedures by the ANII - Review and approval of the ISI plan and procedures
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- Identification of commitments and regulatory requirements Procedures for preparing plans and schedules and filing with enforce-t - ment and regulatory authorities j Sufficient organizational staff to ensure performance of acceptable - ISI work Site administrative procedures to define authorities and respon- - sibilities for final evaluation and acceptance or ISI results Maintenance and retention of appropriate ISI records - - QA review including assurance that plans and procedures have been , reviewed by appropriate personnel and meet regulatory requirements Establish of procedures for corrective action - Procedures for auditing ISI activities by qualified QA personnel - - Corrective action of conditions adverse to quality Audits or surveillance of ISI activities - - Oversee contractor activities concerned with ISI Personnel qualification requirements - - Reporting requirements per ASME code and Technical Specifications Identification and processing of relief requests - Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
j 6.
Inservice Inspection - Review of procedures (73052) (Unit 1) The inspector reviewed the ISI procedures indicated below to determine whether the procedures adequately covered required aspects of the approved ISI program.
See paragraph 5 above for the applicable code.
Many of the procedures have been reviewed during previous inspections (See RII Inspection Reports 50-321, 366/86-32 and 50-321, 366/85-35). Only changes to previously examined procedures were reviewed, a.
The following procedures were reviewed in the areas indicated below: , (1) SCS-VT-H-400, Revision 6, " Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Full-Penetration Welds (Greater than 0.400 Inch)" m ... .... - _ . . . .
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(2) SCS-UT-H-408, Revision 1, " Ultrasonic Examination of Weld Overlays" (3) SCS-UT-H-409, Revision 2, " Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Dissimilar Metal No?zle to Safe-End Welds" (4) SCS-UT-H-410, Revision 4, " Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Pressure Vessel Welds (2 Inches to 12 Inches in Thickness)" (5) SCS-MT-H-500, Revision 2, " Dry Powder Magnetic Practical Examination: Yoke Method" (6) SCS-PT-H-600, Revision 2, " Color Contrast, Solvent-Removable Liquid Penetrant Examination Procedure" (7) SCS-VT-H-710, Revision 2, " Visual Examination (VT-1)" (8) SCS-VT-H-720, Revision 1, " Visual Examination (VT-2)" (9) SCS-VT-H-730, Revision 2, " Visual Examination (VT-3)" (10) SCS-VT-H-750, Revision 0, " Visual Examination of Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals" The procedures were reviewed in the areas of: Compliance with licensee commitments - Approval of procedures by the ANII - Qualification of NDE personnel - Recording, evaluating, and dispositioning findings - - Records retention - Specification of responsibilities of licensee and contractor personnel b.
UT procedures SCS-UT-H-400, SCS-UT-H-408, SCS-UT-H-409 and SCS-VT-H-410 were reviewed for technical content relative to: type of apparatus, extent of coverage including beam angles and scanning techniques, calibration requirements, search units, distance amplitude correction curves, reference level for monitoring discon-tinuities, method of demonstrating penetration, levels of evaluation and recording indications, and acceptance standards.
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In addition, procedures SCS-VT-H-400 and SCS-VT-H-408 were reviewed to determine whether the latest guideline necessary for detecting and , evaluation of IGSCC were included.
As noted in paragraph 7 below, ' crack-like indications were identified in three 6" RWCU welds that had previously-(after IHSI) been found to be free of IGSCC type indications.
The licensee considers that the flaws were probably ) l present during the previous inspection, but were not identified until the current inspection due to their short length and the use of a more sensitive procedure for the current inspection.
The following , changes to procedure SCS-VT-H-400 were in effect for the current inspec-j tion, and increased the sensitivity of the inspection:
The search unit overlap for scanning was increased from 10% to - 25%. - The sweep range was increased to better differentiate signals.
l - The scanning speed was further restricted.
! ) c.
PT procedure SCS-PT-H-500 was reviewed for technical content relative I to: method consistent with ASME Code, specification of brand names i of penetrant materials, specification of limits for sulfur and total halogens for materials, pre-examination surface preparation, minimum drying time following surface cleaning, penetrant application and
penetration time, temperature requirements, method of removing ! penetrant, method of surface drying prior to developer application, J type of developer and method of application, examination technique , and conditions, technique for evaluation, and acceptance CH teria.
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MT procedure SCS-MT-H-600 was reviewed for technical content relative ! to: examination method, surface preparation, use of color contrast I particles, surface temperature, light intensity, coverage, prod spacing, magnetizing current, yoke pole spacing, and acceptance criteria.
e.
VT procedure SCS-VT-H-750 was reviewed for technical content relative to: method (direct visual, remote visual or translucent visual);.how , visual examination is to be performed; type of surface condition available; surface preparation, if any; special illumination, instruments, or equipment to be used, if any; sequence of performing examination, when applicable; data to be tabulated, if any; acceptance criteria is specified and consistent with the applicable code section or controlling specification; and report form completion.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
Inservice Inspection - Observation of Work and Work Activities (73753) (Unit 1): The inspector observed the ISI activities and records described below to determine whether the activities were being performed in accordance with regulatory requirements and licensee procedures.
See paragraph 5 above for the applicable code.
a.
The inspector reviewed the examination plan for the current inspec-tion to determine if changes were being properly documented.
b.
Qualification and certification records for the following NDE examiners involved in the examinations identified in paragraph c., d., e. and 8.a. below were reviewed: - UT - Eight Level II Examiners One Level I Examiner - One Level III Examiner - - VT - Three Level II Examiners One Level II Examiner - MT - - PT Two Level II Examiners - In addition to qualification to SN-TC-1A, the inspector verified that the Level II and Level III UT examiners were qualified for IGSCC inspections at the EPRI NDE Center, c.
The inspector observed portions of the in-process ultrasonic (UT) inspections for the following welds / components: - Jet Pump Holddown Beams - Weld 1831-1RC-22BM-4 (0verlay) - Weld IE11-1RHR-208-D-3 (Overlay) Weld 1831-1RC-228M-1 (Overlay) - Weld 1G31-1RWCV-6-D-6 - - Weld 1G31-1RWCU-6-D-7 - Weld 1G31-1RWCU-6-D-8 - Weld 1G31-1RWCV-6-D-9 - _ _ _ _ _
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Weld 1G31-1RWCV-6-D-10 - The inspections were compared with applicable procedures in the following areas: - Specification of procedure to be used and availability of procedure at inspection area Required equipment and materials available - Specific areas, locations and extent of examination clearly - defined Test attributes as specified in applicable test procedure - - Evaluation of indications During NRC's obsce,ation of UT, the NDE examiner identified two short (one.100" long ar.d one.350" long) crack-life indications on the elbow side of weld IG31-1RWCV-6-D-6.
One indication was circum-ferential and the other was axial.
Both were approximately 33% thru-wall.
Short ( 6".7") crack-like indications were found in two other RWCU welds, 1G31-RWCU-6-D-14 and 1G31-1RWCU-6-D-17.
After finding the 1st crack-like indication in weld 1G31-RWCU-6-D-14, the inspection scope was expanded from 50% of the 6" RWCU welds to 100% of the 6" RWCU welds.
The decision was made to repair the three welds having crack-like indications using a " Designed Overlay" in accordance with draf t Revision 2 of NUREG-0313.
The licensee and their consultants discussed the expanded inspection scope and the overlay details with NRR and regional personnel.
Since the overlay welding was to be accomplished manually, the inspector discussed with the licensee the need to assure that the welders were weld qualified and trained prior to start of the overlays. The licensee agreed that the welders would undergo special mockup training prior to overlay welding.
d.
In-process liquid penetrant inspection was observed for a "re-look" at indications in overlay weld 1E11-1RHR-24B-R-12.
The inspection was compared with applicable procedures in the area of: Specification or procedure to be used and availability of - procedure at inspection area Use of knowledgeable NDE personnel qualified to the proper level j -
Use of specified NDE equipment and materials - i _ _ - - - -
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l Specific areas, locations and extent of examination clearly - I defined
- Calibration requirements Interpretation / evaluation / acceptance of test results - Records - - Test attributes as specified in applicable procedure e.
The following in-process visual inspection (VT) activities were examined: (1) VT of reactor vessel internals was discussed with inspection personnel. The. inspection equipment and setup in the vessel was observed. A portion of the tape for the Reactor Pressure Vessel Core Spray Sparagers was reviewed.
(2) The systems were walked down and preparation examined for system leakage test for tests E11-PT-18 (RHR "A" Suction) and E11-PT-19 (RHR "C" Suction).
MW0s 187-1155 and 187-1146 covering the tests were reviewed.
The inspections were compared with applicable procedures in the areas of: - Specification of procedure to be used and availability of procedure at inspection area Use of knowledgeable NDE personnel qualified to the proper level - - Use of specified NDE equipment and materials - Specific area locations and extent of examination clearly defined Calibration requirements - Interpretation / evaluation / acceptance of test results - Records - Test attributes as specified in applicable procedures - Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Inservice Inspection Data Review and Evaluation (73755) (Units 1 and 2) i The inspector reviewed the ISI NDE records indicated below to determine l whether the records were consistent with regulatory requirements and licensee procedures.
See paragraph 5 above for the applicable code.
a.
Unit 1 Current Outage - (1) NDE records for the following inspections were reviewed: VT-2 inspection records, " Hydrostatic Test Performance - Package," and " Hydrostatic Test Specification" for the following pressure tests: i Test C41-PT-3, MWO 1-87-1136, Standby Liquid Control . System Test C41-PT-1, MWO 1-87-1138, Standby Liquid Control - . System VT-3 inspection records for Hangers 1E11-RHRH-327 and - IE11-RHRH-326 - PT and UT inspection records for weld 1831-1RC-28B-8 MT inspection records for welds 1E11-2RHR-20A-D-10 and l - 1E11-2RHR-8-FPS-5 y UT inspection records for 6" RWCU welds 1G31-1RWCV-6-D-6, - 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 The records were reviewed to ascertain whether NDE records contained or provided reference to: Examination results and data sheets.
- - Examination equipment data.
Calibration data sheets.
- Examination evaluation data.
- Records on extent of examination.
- ' Records on deviation from program and procedures including - justification for deviation, if applicable.
Records on disposition of findings.
- Re-examination data after repair work, if applicable.
- Identification of NDE material such as penetrant, penetrant - cleaner, couplant, films, tapes, etc.
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(2) UT records for the following reactor pressure vessel welds were reviewed: Nozzle Weld NSB - Flange to Vessel Weld C-1 - Nozzle Weld N3A - The records were reviewed to determine whether: The method, extent, and technique of examination complied - with the licensee's ISI program and applicable NDE - procedure The examination data were within the acceptance criteria as - outlined in the applicable NDE procedure and applicable; '. Code requirements.
- The recording, evaluating, and.dispositioning of findings were in compliance with the applicable NDE procedure and applicable Code requirements.
Inservice NDE results were compared with the recorded - results of prior Section XI examinations.
The method used for NDE was sufficient to determine the full - extent of indication or acceptance.
(3) The following equipment certification records, relative to' the in-process inspections detailed in paragrap(h 7 above and the inspection records detailed in paragraphs 1);and (2) above, were reviewed: - UT Transducers - Serial Nos. 85-811. K06626, V10705, W1283, 016224, 016217,~15271,.15149 and 16217 - UT Instruments - Serial Nos. 371, 409/1, 27276-4314-2, 27276-4909-2, and 27276-4950 - UT Couplant - Batch Nos. 40/8558 and 40/8660 - Contact Thermometers -. Serial Nos. PTC 963, PTC 114. and PTC 945 - PT Cleaner - Batch Nos. 85J058 and 85M053 - PT Penetrant - Batch No. 84H027 ---_-__=_a
j . - . s .l . . 15 '- ! ~ I ,d - PT Developer - Batch No. 85K080 - MT Powder - Batch No. 85A054 - MT Yoke - Serial No. 6662 (4) The following Indication Notification Forms' (INFs) were . reviewed: 187H1010 187H1014 187H1015 187H1020 187H1021 187H1022 187H1023 , INFs 187H1020, 1022, and 1023 cover the l' SCC type indications G identified in the '6" RWCU welds (see paragraph 7.c above).
INFs 187H1010,1014,1015 and 1021 cover IGSCC type indications found in stainless welds that were identified ias cracked in previous inspections.
The current inspection fo-Jnd additional cracks or evidence that the cracks-had changed in some way.
b.
Unit 2 Owner.'s Data Report for 1986 Maintenance / Refueling Outage - The Unit 2 owner's data report for the fall.1986 maintenance refueling outage was submitted on March 10, 1987 (GPC ' letter . SL-2116). The report was reviewed by the inspector for completeness, clarity and compliance with Article IWA-6000 of ASME Section XI.
Within the areas inspected, no violations.or deviations were identified.
9.
Maintenance Welding and NDE (55050, 57090).(Units 1 and-2) The inspector examined the welding and NDE activities described below f relative to maintenance (including retrofit) to determine whether j the governing code is ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code-(B&PV) genera applicable code and regulatory requirements were being met.
In Section XI,1980 Edition, W81 Addenda.
In addition, various editions and addenda j of the following codes are being used: ASME B&PV Code Section III ASME B&PV Code Section V ASME B&PV Code Section IX-
ANSI Standard B31.7
. AWS Structural Welding Code D1.1 a i a ')
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) . k-j As noted in RII Inspection Reports 50-321, 366/85-26 and 50-321, 366/86-32, i the licensee has implemented a new welding program for maintenance / modification welding.
During the current Unit 1 outage, the
' licensee made seven safety-related pipe welds under the new welding program which required radiographic (RT) inspection. The seven welds are: MW0 1-87-3468, FW-3 , MWO 1-87-3858, FW-5601 and FW-5602 i MWO 1-87-728, FW-1 and FW-2 -} MWO 1-87-2904, FW-1 and FW-2 i The inspector reviewed the MW0s, Weld Process Sheets, RT film and welder qualification records (Welder Limitation Tables).
During review of the records, the inspector identified the following problem relative to qualification of welders for FW-3 on MWO 1-87-3468: The weld was initially made on May 6,1987, and rejected by RT on l May 9, 1987.
Yhe first repair was made on May 10, 1987 using the ' same welder as for the initial weld.
Repairs 2 and 3 were made on May 11 and 12,1987, using a different welder from that of the initial weld and the first repair. On May 11, 1987, the QC inspector issued Deficiency Report (DR) 1-87-428 stating that the initial welder was only qualified up to.374" in thickness for the process i I used and the pipe wall thickness was.500".
The DR was dispositioned ! ! on May 11, 1987 without addressing the reason for the welder being assigned to a weld he was not qualified for.
On May 21, 1987, the l NRC inspector noted that acccrding to the Welder Limitation Table, the welder who performed the second and third repairs was only qualified up to.374" in thickness. This second instance of a welder not being qualified was not identified in the licensee records.
Further investigation into old qualification records revealed that the second welder was actually qualified although the Welder Limita-tion Table, required to be used by procedure to determine qualifica-tion, indicated the welder was only qualified up to.374" wall thickness.
Paragraph 7.3.2.4 of licensee procedure 51GM-MNT-029-05 requires that the foreman assign a qualified welder based on the Welder Limitation Table.
Therefore, it appears that in both instances, the foreman either did not consult the table or did not understand the table. This failure to follow procedures is consider-ed to be in violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V as implemented by paragraph 17.2.5 of the Hatch FSAR.
This apparent violation appears to meet, with the possible exception of adequate ! corrective action, the requirements 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Section V.
Therefore, the violation will not be sited.
It is not clear that adequate _ corrective action was taken since the NRC identified, on the same weld, an identical problem to that cited in the licensee's DR.
' j However, the licensee's DR was issued and dispositioned in the same
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time frame as that of the occurrence, identified by the NRC (May 11, 1987 for issue and disposition of th DR versus May 11 and 12,1987, ! for the second and third repairs to the weld).
Since the Weld Process Sheets for the second and third repairs had not been final ' dispositioned, it was not clear that eil corrective action had been
identified.
Based on this fact and th. time frame noted above, the question of whether or not adequate corrective action was taken is considered unresolved pending further inspection to confirm the significance of the condition adverse to quality.
The unresolved items is identified as item number 321/87-10-01, Adequate Corrective Action Relative to Welder Qualification Discrepancies.
Within the aren inspected, one violation was identified by the licensee.
10.
Inspector Followup Items (92701) (Units 1 and 2) a.
(Closed) IFI 321, 3E/85-14-04, Update of ISI. Plan Pipe Support Sketches to Reflect latest Design Information.
See RII Inspection Report 50-321, 366/86-11 for documentation of a previous inspection of this item.
All Unit 1 and Urit 2 systems have been walked down and sketches updated as. necessary.
QA audit finding (QAF) 85-ISI-1/62 on this subject has been closed out.
Procedure 42EN-ENG-001-0S for processing Design Change Request (DCR) has been revised to require design change input to the ISI program.
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(Closed) IFI 321, 366/85-26-01, Examination of New Welding Program.
See RII Inspection Reports 50-321, 366/86-11 and 50-321, 366/86-32 for previous inspections of this item.
At the time of the 86-32 inspection, the new welding program had been issued and was reviewed.
Report 86-32 identified two magnetic particle (MT) test procedures l (521T-MNT-006.0 and 007.0) that contained nonspecific code refer-ences.
These two procedures have been replaced by procedure 45QC-l INS-008-OS, R0, which contains specific code references.
' c.
(0 pen) IFI 321, 366/86-11-03, Review of Procedures Addressing ASME Section XI VT Requirements.
This item pertained to the fact the licensee's procedures for hydrostatic testing did not reference detailed ASME Section XI VT-2 leakage inspections.
Since the 86-11 i inspection, most of the hydrostatic and pressure tests have been l ' ! turned over to SCS.
SCS has a detailed procedure, SCS-VT-H-720, for VT-2 inspection. The licensee's procedure, 42IT-TET-001-0S, has been revised to provide some detail, but still does not cover all the requirements of IWA-5240 of ASME Section XI.
Since the licensee-might perform an inspection in certain cases, the detailed require-ments of ASME Section XI need to be incorporated into the licensee's procedures.
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(0 pen) IFI 321/86-05-03, Licensee Review of ISI Plans.
This item pertained to the inability of the site licensee personnel to answer the inspector's questions relative to the ISI program. The licensee is currently reorganizing their site staff.
This item will be reviewed further after completion of the reorganization.
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(Closed) IFI 366/84-27-02, Part 21 Repcrt on X-14 Penetration Flued l Head.
On May 8, 1984, National Supply Company (NSC) reported a Part 21 item concerning Unit 2 penetration X-14 flued head.
The item concerned the fact that an analysis for a spare Unit 1 penetration flued head, virtually identical to Unit 2 X-14 flued head, had shown that the flued head could only be qualified for 35 cycles of thermal transient as opposed to a specified 80 cycles.
The Unit 2 X-14 flued head required 80 cycles.
The spare Unit 1 penetration was procured to the 1977 edition, Summer 1979 addenda of Section III of the ASME Code.
The virtually identical Unit 2 X-14 penetration was procured to the 1971 edition of the code.
Basic Technology, Inc. (BTI), who performed the analysis, concluded, in part, as detailed in correspondence with GPC, dated August 20,' 1984, and NSC, dated August 16, 1984, that: - "If the number of limiting cycles is 35 based on the 77 Code, it l ' 1s 35 based on the 1971 Code as well."
"The Applications of Plastic Analysis (NB-3228) Section of - Reference (2-80) is more elaborate than that of either Reference (2-71) or (2-77), particularly incluoing Experimental Analysis (NB-3228.2) and Shakedown Analysis (NB-3228.4)."
" Based on 1-D Inelastic Analysis, 80 cycles are allowed using { - ' the Fatigue Curve (Fig. I-9.2.1) of the 1980 Code."
"2-D Inelastic Analysis could prove that 80 cycles 'are allowed - , for both the 1977 and for the 1971 Codes."
) "It was noted, however, that the fatigue curve of reference - 2-8a was more liberal and it would allow 80 cycles."
"However, if the broader definition of ' shakedown' as provided - in the 1980 Summer addenda to the code is invoked, the aforemen-tioned fatigue evaluation procedure can be followed.
In that case, the alternating stress amplitude is on the order of 100 ksi, which is less than the allowable 250 ksi for 80 cycles.
, - - - - our recommendation is to perform a two-dimensional ! " - finite element inelastic analysis."
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l Note - The references 2-80, 2-77 and 2-71 refer to the edition of ASME code.
GPC had Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel) review the issue, including the BTI study.
Bechtel determined, as noted in their letter to GPC date August 20, 1984, that: " Based on the above we conclude that the installed penetration meets the applicable require-ments of the Summer 1980 Addenda of the ASME Code and the base specification for the hardware (80 thermal cycles)." Bechtel further j stated in their letter that the Summer 1980 Addenda of the code had ! been approved by the NRC. Based on Bechtel's review, CPC closed this issue in their files and presented the files to the NRC for review.
j The NRC inspector's review of this issue revealed the following: BTI's and Bechtel's conclusion that the penetration can be i - qualified for 80 cycles based on a latter code edition appears ! to be correct. Therefore, the IFI and Part 21 are closed.
! However, it is not clear that the code changes that would allow - qualification of the penetration for 80 cycles are included in l i the Summer 80 addneda of the code as stated in the Bechtel i ! letter.
It appears that the changes were not included in the code until the Winter 1982 addenda. The Winter of.1982 addenda l was not approved until 1985 or after the Bechtel letter of , August 20, 1984.
If this is the case, the Bechtel letter I ! indicating that the penetration could be qualified for 80 cycles based on an NRC approved code addenda is misleading and incorrect.
Based on informal correspondence with GPC on June 25, 1987, GPC contends that Bechtel's analysis qualifying l the penetration for 80 cycles was in fact based on the Summer 1980 addenda of the code.
If this is not the case, as NRC's preliminary evaluation indicates, it appears that GPC's measures for assuring the adequacy of information provided by contractors are inadequate.
Pending further review to determine the code used, this matter is considered unresolved and is identified as UNR 366/87-10-01, Adequacy of Measures to Assure that Information Provided By Contractors is Accurate.
Relative to this item, the licensee was requested to obtain a copy of the calculation which justified the 80 cycles and make it available for review in a future NRC inspection.
The licensee was informed that a summary should be provided with the calculation that identifies any references used.
e.g., i references to ASME Code requirements.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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i 11. Licensee Identified Items (LII) (92700) (Unit 2).
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(Closed) Item 366/79-30-01,. Seismic Restraints for Service Water Pumps in the Intake Structure.. The licensee identified a problem with the design on the RHR Service Water and Plant Service Water pump seismic restraints in the intake structure.
The inspector reviewed closeout documentation showing that a new design restraint was- ' . installed in accordance with Design Change Request (DCR).79-492. The work was completed in May of 1982.. b.
(Closed) Part 21 366/P2184-02, Analytical Stess Analysis Techniques for X-14 Flued Head. See paragraph 10.e. above.
12.
IE Bulletins (ICB's) (92703) (Units 1 and 2) ' I a.
(Closed) 366/79-BU-15, Deep Draft Pump Deficiencies.
See RII-Inspection Report 50-321,- 366/86-10 for previous inspection of this item.
According to the February 22,1984,; RII memorandum referenced in the 86-10 report, the only remaining action for this IEB was to assess long term operability of the Unit' 2 core spray pump after accumulation of additional operating history.
During the current i inspection, the inspector discussed the operating. history and the Predictive Maintenance Program for the. core spray pumps with the - licensee Maintenance Engineering Supervisor.
In -addition, the. Maintenance History was reviewed.
The licensee developed the-operability history for the pump by review of the Electrical Log.
) Both pumps have been in service for approximately eight years and { accumulated run times of approximately 80 hours.
No significant problems.have been identified with the pumps.
b.
(0 pen) 321, 366/83-BU-03, Check Valve Failures in Raw Water Cooling Systems of Diesel Generators.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's letters of response NED-83-342, dated June 8,'1983.and SL-1155, dated October 6, 1986.
There are two Unit 1 valves, P41-F552A and P41-F552C and one Unit 2 valve, 2P41-321, involved. As noted in the October 6,1986 letter, the valves were disassembled in 1983 and some problems identified.
The inspector reviewed plant procedures 42SV-SUV-040-1S and 2S which were issued to periodically disassemble the valves for inspection.
The valves were disassembled and inspected by these procedures.
In addition, the inspector reviewed internal licensee correspondence.
showing that the licensee is in the process of adding'.the three valves to their pump and valve test. program.
The following correspondence was reviewed: i "E. I.- Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit -1 Inservice Pump and Valve i - Test' Plan", Revision 2, approved by the PRB cnd plant- ) management, whicn -includes the Unit 1 valves.
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- - . 21-Licensee letter (Nix to Bemis) LR-MGR-036-1186 dated - November 13, 1986 requesting the Unit 2 valve to be added to the pump and valve test plan.
This IEB remains open pending verification of addition of the subject valves to the pump and valve programs, c.
(0 pen) Item 321, 366/80-BU-08, Examination of Containment Liner Penetration Welds (See RII Inspection Reports 50-321,, 366/85-11 and 50-321, _366/86-32 for previous inspections of this item).
As indicated in report 86-32, the licensee has re-evaluated their bulletin responses in light of the recommendations in NUREG-CR3053.
. As indicated in licensee letter SL-865, certain penetration welds .were to be NDE inspected at the next refueling. outage.
The.
applicable Unit 2 welds were UT inspected during' the last Unit 2 outage. - The Unit I welds were included in the outage plan for UT ! and/or PT during the current outage.
The results of these inspec--
tions will be reported to the NRC after completion of the outage.
For the backing ring welds involved, it is not clear that UT inspection will satisfy the~ intent of the IEB for volumetric -
inspection using RT since the original problem reported' by the' bulletin. involved the failure of UT inspections to identify defects identified by RT for backing ring welds. This item will be reviewed-further during future inspections after licensee actions in response i to NUREG-CR3053 are complete.
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