IR 05000321/1987026
| ML20236T943 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 11/20/1987 |
| From: | Holmesray P, Menning J, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236T936 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-87-26, 50-366-87-26, IEB-80-06, IEB-80-6, NUDOCS 8712020180 | |
| Download: ML20236T943 (7) | |
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p RE00 Ua!!TED STATES -
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'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslOM
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REGION 11
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j, 101 MARIETTA ST REET, N.W.
- I r ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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November 25, 1987
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Report Nos.:
50-321/87-26 and 50-366/87-26 Licensee:
Georgia Power Company P. O. Box.4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos.:
50-321 and 50-366
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License Nos.: OPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2
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Inspection Dates:
September 16 - October 26, 1987 Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia n AN ll / F1/U Inspectors:
g eter Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed l
7 -e K ~ A f3 M o Ii9 le7
% ohn E. Menning, Resident Inspector Date Signed Accompanying Personnel:
Randall Musser Approved by:
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//.74 F7 MarVih V. Sinkule, Chief, Project Section 2C Date~ Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters, Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observation, Surveillance Testing Observation,
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Radiological Protection, Physical Security, and IE Bulletin Followup.
Results: One violation was identified.
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8712O20100 871120
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PDR ADDCK 05000321 G
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November 25, 1987
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees T. Beckham, Vice President, Plant Hatch
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H. C. Nix, Plant Manager
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- D. Read, Plant Support Manager
- H. L. Sumner, Operations Manager
- P. E. Fornel, Maintenance Manager T. R. Powers, Engineering Manager
- R. W. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager C. Coggin, Manager of Training and Emergency Preparedness M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager
- 0. M. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance (QA) Manager
- S. B. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and office personnel.
NRC management on site during inspection period:
M. V. Sinkule, Chief, Project Section 2C, Region II i
L. P. Crocker, Project Directorate 11-1, NRR/DRP E. Butcher, Branch Chief, NRR
- Attended exit interview 2.
ExitInterview(30703)
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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 26, 1987,
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.. The licensee did not i
identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the
inspectors during this inspection. The licensee acknowledged the findings and took no exception.
(0 pen) Violation 50-366/87-26-01, Failure to Perform Monthly Caution Tag
Reviews (Paragraph 4).
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Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
(Closed) Violation 50-321/87-19-01, Inadequate Maintenance Procedure. The l
GPC letter of response dated September 11, 1987, was reviewed.
Licensee corrective action involved rectifying specific deficiencies in LPRM l
removal and installation procedures.
The inspector reviewed procedures l
52GM-C51-001-15 (Unit 1), Rev.1, and 52GM-C51-001-2S (Unit 2), Rev. 2 I
and determined that required changes had been made to these procedures.
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November 25, 1987
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The licensee noted in :the letter of response that the Procedure Upgrade Program (PUP) is the long term corrective action to detect, correct, and prevent procedure inadequacies. The resident inspectors'are following PUP activities.
Since the actions to correct the specifics of this violation have been completed, this item is closed.-
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Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors kept themselves informed.on a daily basis of the overall j
plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant
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operations.
Daily discussions were held with plant management and various j
mem' ers of the plant operating staff.
The inspectors made frequent visits o
to the control room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on j
equipment, controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to j
limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily
journals and data sheet entries, control room manning,. and access
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controls. This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisors.
Weekly, when on site, selected Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) systems were confirmed operable.
The confirmation was made by verifying the.following:
accessible valve flow
path alignment, power. supply breaker and fuse status, instrumentation, j
major component leakage, lubrication, cooling, and general condition, j
l General plant tours were conducted on at least.a weekly basis. Portions I
of the control building, turbine building, reactor building, and' outside
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areas were visited.
Observations included general. plant / equipment j
conditions, safety related tagout verifications, shift turnover, sampling
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program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection
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equipmnt, control of activities in progress, radiation protection
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contr is, physical security, problem identification systems, missile har.ds, instrumentation and alarms in the control room, and containment ir,lation.
In the area of housekeeping the following discrepancies were observed by the inspector and brought to the attention of licensee personnel:-
L Tools were left in the vicinity of the Unit 1 Standby Liquid Control
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system pumps following work.
These items were found within ~ a i
contamination control barrier.
This discrepancy was noted on l
October 13, 1987.
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Spilled chemicals were observed on the floor under the Unit 1 Reactor
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Building Closed Cooling Water system Chemical Addition Tank on October 13, 1987.
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During a review of Unit 2 Caution Tag Index/ Audit Sheets on October 9, 1987, the inspector noted that the licensee had not consistently performed
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monthly reviews of these sheets as required by procedure 3AC-0PS-001-0S,
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Rev. 2, " Control of Equipment Clearances and Tags."
Section 8.13.1 of this procedure requires that reviews be conducted on a monthly basis and
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November 25, 1987
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I documented by signing and dating the next line of the Index/ Audit Sheet, j
In reviewing Index/ Audit Sheets for the period April 21 - October 11-1987, the inspector observed that monthly reviews had been conducted on July 5, August 3, and October 2, 1987.
Reviews had apparently not been conducted during the months of May, June, and September of 1987.
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6.8.1.a. of the Technical Specifications (T.S.) requires that written j
procedures be established, implemented and maintained in accordance with the recommendations of Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, i
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February 1978.
Appendix
"A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33 recommends.
administrative procedures for equipment control (e.g., locking and tagging).
This matter is considered a violation of T.S. 6.8.1.a and is.
identified as Violation 50-366/87-26-01 - Failure to Perform Monthly Caution Tag Reviews.
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's followup action on unusual sounds coming from the Unit 1 torus that were related to a leaking Main Steam Safety Relief Value (SRV).
Unusual ~ sounds were noticed coming from the j
Unit 1 torus on the morning of September 26,1987.
The sounds were
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intermittent metal against metal " banging" noises, with an approximate
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frequency of every three to four seconds.
Plant personnel noted that the
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sounds were coming from the vicinity of SRV B21-F013K discharge.line and T-quencher.
It was also noted that this SRV had been cycled open earlier j
that morning as part of scheduled surveillance, and that its tailpipe j
temperature had stabilized at a temperature about ten degrees higher (approximately 230 degrees F) than its temperature prior to cycling.
Personnel concluded that it was likely that steam leaking from the "K" SRV through the T-quencher was The Residual Heat Removal (providing the driving force for the sounds.RHR) syst Torus Spray mode in an attempt to determine the effect of SRV discharge
line cooling on the sounds.
When torus spray was initiated the noise'
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stopped but returned as soon as the spray was removed.
In order to j
evaluate the exact cause of the noise and the impact on' operability, a j
team was formed consisting of GPC personnel and representatives from
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Southern Company Services, Bechtel, and General Electric.
The team investigating the torus noise phenomenon concluded that the driving force causing the noise stemmed from the normal steam expulsion /reflood transient experienced during SRV discharge.
In this case, the repeating banging' was caused by the leaking "K" SRV pressuring the discharge line, expulsion of water and air legs, reflooding of-the i
line, and cycling of the discharge line vacuum breaker.
The team concluded that the noise appeared to be the result of an action that is within the bounds of analyzed conditions '(i.e., reflood transient / vacuum breaker cycling), and that there were no safety concerns ~ related to the noise. The team also considered the impact of continued use of RHR in the Torus Spray mode, and concluded that such use is' a designed mode of operation and would not result in significant equipment degradation. The team recommended continued use of torus spray and continued monitoring of the "K" SRV tailpipe temperature and torus area (for noise) twice a shift.
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'4 November 25, 1987 These recommendations have been adopted.
Th'e team also recommended repair
'of the leaking SRV and inspections of the discharge line vacuum breaker, discharge line, and.certain torus internals during the next Unit I shutdown of sufficient duration.
The investigation activities are
summarized in GPC letter LR-ENG-008-1087 dated October 8,1987.
The inspector reviewed this letter and discussed the. findings with cognizant -
licensee personnel.
One violation was identified.
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5.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
During the report period, the inspectors observed selected maintenance -
activities.
The observations included a review of the work documents for adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of.the actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and adherence to t,he appropriate quality controls.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Surveillance Testing Observations-(61726)
The inspectors observed the performance of selected surveillance.
The observation -included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, conformance to Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillance, removal from service and return to service of the system or components
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affected, and review of the data for acceptability based. upon the acceptance criteria.
On October 5,1987, the IB Diesel Generator (D/G) tripped on reverse
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current while being unloaded during the final stages of ' testing in j
accordance with procedure 34SV-R43-001-S, Rev. 3, " Diesel Generator Manual Start." The 1A D/G had been tagged out for maintenance and the IB D/G was being tested to demonstrate operability. The licensee determined that the reverse current trip was caused by slow unloading of the IB D/G.
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reviewing this matter, the inspector noted that procedure 34SV-R43-001-S does address.the possibility of a reverse current trip on initial loading of the D/G.
More specifically, a CAUTION prior to Step 7.4.3.10 advises
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l the operator that upon closure of the D/G output breaker D/G speed is to i
J be immediately increased to load the D/G and decrease the probability of a reverse current trip.
However, this procedure does not provide similar guidance to the operator when unloading th4 D/G prior to opening the output breaker. The inspector discussed this matter with the licensee and
determined that the licensee had previously identified the need-to provide such guidance in the procedure and had initiated a-procedure change.
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On October 17, 1987, Unit 2 Main Steam Isolation Value (MSIV) 2B21-F022C
failed to meet technical specification closing time requirements during i
surveillance testing in accordance with procedure 34SV-B21-002-2S, " Main y
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Steam Isolation Valve Trip Test." This inboard MSIV on the "C" main steam line closed in 2.3 seconds.
Technical Specification 3.4.7 requires the i
closing time to be within 3 to 5 seconds.
In order to meet technical
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specification requirements for continued operation, the affected main i
steam line was isolated by deactivating MSIV 2B21-F022C in the closed i
position.
The licensee subsequently provided a safety evaluation j
supporting operation up to 100 percent thermal power with one MSIV closed.
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The inspector reviewed this report that was transmitted by licensee letter
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LR-ENG-020-1089 dated October 17, 1987.
The licensee also issued a
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Standing Order requiring reactor pressure and main steam line flows to be
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monitored any time reactor power increases are made above 75 percent power.
Current surveillance procedures also require these parameters to i
be monitored each shift.
The inspector reviewed this Standing Order (50-0PS-05-1087) dated October 17, 1987.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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ESF System Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve
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and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room to ensure that lineups were in i
accordance with operability requirements and that equipment material conditions were satisfactory.
Train B of the Unit 1 Low Pressure Coolant Injection System was walked down in detail.
j Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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Radiological Protection (71709)
The resident inspectors reviewed aspects of the licensee's radiological protection program in the course of the monthly activities.
The performance of health physics and other personnel was observed on various shifts to include:
involvement of health physics supervision, use of radiation work permits, use of personnel monitoring equipment, control of high radiation areas, use of friskers and personal contamination monitors, and posting and labeling.
During this reporting period, the resident inspector also reviewed implementation of the licensee's program to maintain personnel radiation exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).
Requirements for this program are currently described in procedure 60AC-HPX-009-0S, Rev.1,
"ALARA Program." The inspector interviewed a supervisor in the Operations Department to determine if this individual was aware of how his group's doses are tracked, the tasks that routinely contribute most to his group's dose, and actions that have been taken to reduce dose during the conduct of these tasks.
The inspector also interviewed selected health physics and operations personnel to assess their awareness of the ALARA program and of related individual responsibilities.
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No violations or deviations were noted.
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Physical Security (71881)
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In the course of the monthly activities,.the resident inspectors included a review of the licensee's' physical security program. -The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the. conduct of1 daily activities to include: availability of supervision, availability of armed response personnel, protected and vital access controls, searching of personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols and compensatory posts..
No violations or deviations were noted..
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IE Bulletin Followup (92703)
.The response to IE Bulletin (IEB) 80-06, Engineered. Safety Feature (ESF)"
Reset Controls, was submitted by the licensee' by letter of June 12,.1980.'
Georgia Power Company (GPC) recently' determined that two dampers' in the-Main Control Room Environmental Control system returned to their normal mode upon signal reset.
A. supplemental Response to IEB 80-06 was submitted _on May 4, 1987.
In addition to performing a modification to the offending dampers (which is complete), the licensee committed to have the AE review IEB 80-06 for compliance with the' IEB requirements.
The licensee currently estimates that this review by the AE will be completed by the end ofL 1987.
The NRC review of IEB 80-06 will be scheduled after the licensee's review and the completion of any corrective action necessary.
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