IR 05000321/1987009
| ML20216D988 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 06/17/1987 |
| From: | Garner L, Holmesray P, Menning J, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216D835 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-87-09, 50-321-87-9, 50-366-87-09, 50-366-87-9, NUDOCS 8706300625 | |
| Download: ML20216D988 (8) | |
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UNITED STATES j,
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslON
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, ATL ANTA, GEORGI A 30323 (,
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Report Numb'ers:
502321/87-09 and 50-366/87-09
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' Licensee:
Georgia Power Company P.O. Box 4545 I
Atlanta. GA-30302 Docket Numbers:
50-321 and 50-366
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License Numbers: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name:
Hatch 1 and 2
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Inspection Dates: April 25 - May 26, 1987
Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia r
Inspectors:
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Peter Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed j
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,,WI7/87 FOR John Menning, Resident Inspector Date Signed
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y Tite igned y Larry Garner, Resident inspect e t
. Approved by:
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/7 6~7 Martin V. Sinkule, Chief, Project Section 2C
, Dat'e Signed
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Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of ~
l Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters, Operational Safety
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Verification, Maintenance Observation, Plant Modification and Surveillance Observation, Radiation Protection, Physical Security, Reportable' Occurrences',
Refueling Activities and Maintenance Program Implementation.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified, i
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8706300625 870618 PDR ADOCK 05000321 l
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees ;
T. Beckham, Vice f resident, Plant Hatch
- H. C. Nix, Plant Manager
- D. Read, Plant Support Manager
- H. L. Sumner, Operations Manager
- P. E. Fornel, Maintenance Manager
- T. R. Powers, Engineering Manager R. W. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager C. Coggin, General Support Manager
- M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager
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- 0. M. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance (GA) Manager
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C. T. Moore, Training Manager
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- S. B.Tippr,, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance i
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and office personnel.
NRC management on site during inspection period:
F. S. Cantrell, Jr., Chief, Project Section 2B, Region II M. V. Sinkule, Chief. Project Section 20 Region 11 G. C. Lainas, Ass't Director for Region II, NRR/DRP B. J.
bungblood, Directorate II-3-Director, NRR/DRP L. P. Crocker, Project Directorate 11-1, NRR/DRP
- Attended exit interview 2.
ExitInterview(30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 5 & 26, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector (s) during this inspection.
The licensee acknowledged the findings and took no. exception.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
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(Closed) Inspectbr Followup Item (IFI) 366/85-38-01, Procedure Incorpo ration of Design Changes.
The discrepancies noted in the IFI were resolved by changes to the applicable procedures.
Engineering reviewed Design Change Request (DCR)83-144 for any other errors of incorporation and found none. This item is closed.
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I (Closed). IFI-321, 366/ 86-36-05, IRM Negative Power Supply Fuse Failure.
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- General Electric -(GE) Service Information Letter (SIL) 445 of
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September 10, 1986, recommended that procedures be reevaluated pertaining
'to replacement of ' blown fuses and restoration of inoperative safety l
related-channels and replacement of.75 Amp IRM chassis fuses with 1.5 j
Amp 1 fuses in certain IRM channel designs.
DCR 86-377 was completed l
March.2,.1987 to change the fuses to 1.5 Amp.
Surveillance is performed j
weekly and before startup and will detect blown power supply fuses. This
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item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 366/86-15-02 Failure to Recognize an Inoperable Snubber.
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GpC' letters dated July 30, 1986 and August 25, 1986 were reviewed. The applicable procedures were revised.
A TS amendment was submitted to -
delete the requirement that a snubber was inoperable due to visual signs of leakage.
TS Amendment 72 dated March 5,1987 was issued to delete the visual leakage requirement. This item is closed.
4.
Unresolved Item * (URI)
(Closed)URI' 321/86-12-02, Tagging Shut the RHR Minimum Flow Valve During Shutdown Cooling.n The inspector reviewed the safety signif.icance of the licensee's practice of tagging closed the RHR minimum flow valve during shutdown cooling.
The loop of RHR placed in the shutdown cooling lineup is, at that time, no longer available to' automatically align to the Low Pressure Coolant Injection mode of RHR and a Limited Ccadition of Ope-ration (LCO) is written.
The possibility for pumping the reactor vessel water to the torus through a not fully closed minimum flow valve exists.
.The tagging of the minimum flow valve shut does present the possibility of damage to the RHR pump if it is run for long periods in a no flow i
condition.
The LC0 that would be entered if the RHR pump.were declared inoperable due to the minimum flow valve being tagged shut is the same LC0 entered due to the. lineup for shutdown cooling.
It is concluded that less risk to safety is incurred if the minimum flow valve is tagged shut during shutdown cooling operations. This Item is closed.
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5.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
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.The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations. Daily discussions were held with plant management and various
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members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits I
to the control room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints
and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on equipment, controls-and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to l
An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to
determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
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-limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily journals and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access controls. This -inspection activity included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisors.
Weekly, when on site, selected Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) systems were confirmed operable.
The confirmation was made by verifying the following:
accessible valve flow path alignment, power supply breaker and fuse status, instrumentation,
. major component leakage, lubrication, cooling, and general condition.
General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basis. Portions of the control building, turbine building, reactor building, and outside areas were visited.
Observations included general plant / equipment conditions, safety related tagout verifications, shift turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection equipment, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security, problem identification systems, missile hazards, instrumentation and alarms in the control room, and containment isolation.
The inspector noted during a tour of the control room on April 28, 1987, that many light bulbs for the control rod " Full Out" and " Full In"
-indicators on the full-core disniays of both units were burned out. The full-core displays are on the vertical sections of panels 1H11-P603 and 2H11-P603 for Units 1 and 2 respectively.
The inspector discussed this condition with operations shift personnel and was told that these light bulbs burn out at a high frequency and require constant attention.
However, the operations personnel agreed with the inspector's' position that these indicators provide useful information to the operator, particularly following a reactor scram and during refueling operations.
Following_ these discussions, a maintenance work order was initiated to replace the burned-out bulbs in Unit 1 and a shift supervisor indicated that bulbs would be replaced in Unit 2.
During a plant tour on April 30, 1987, the inspector observed instructions on several doors that appeared to be inconsistent with current access control requirements and programs. A sign on a door on the 130' elevation of the Unit 2 reactor building (for access to the Northwest diag'onal)
indicated " Call Shift Foreman Before Entry".
Operations personnel who
- were questioned stated that notification of operations prior to entry into the diagonal is no longer required.
This sign was promptly removed.
A sign-on the door to the cable spreading room on the 147' elevation of the control building indicated that security personnel were to be notified prior to-entry.
Subsequent discussions with security personnel revealed that the instructions on this sign are no longer applicable.
This sign
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was also removed.
In following up on these matters, the inspector reminded operations and security personnel that posted instructions in the plant should only reflect current requirements.
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4-During the plant tour on April 30, 1987, the inspector also observed an
apparently expired Transient Combustible Permit (TCP) that was posted on the 203' elevation ef the Unit 2 reactor building, The TCP was identified as No.'86-2161 and had an expiration date of March 31, 1987.
Review of this matter with fire protection personnel revealed that the TCP had actually been closed out on March 26, 1987.
Close out action includes verification by fire protection personnel that combustible materials have been removed.
Personnel performing work had failed to remove 'the TCP.
The inspector determined that this matter did not represent a loss of combustible material control.
However, to help ensure that posted TCP's are properly removed, fire protection personnel have prepared a memorandum reminding workers of requirements to remove posted TCP's.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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MaintenanceObservation(62703)
During the report period, the inspector (s) observed selected maintenance activities.
The observations included a review of the work documents for adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical specifications, radiological controls!, observation of all or part of the actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and adherence to the appropriate quality controls.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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PlantModification(37700)
The inspector (s) observed the performance of selected plant modification Design Change Requests (DCRs).
The observation included a review of the DCR for technical adequacy, conformance to Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation of all or part of
the actual surveillances, removal from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria.
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i No violations or deviations were identified.
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Surveillance Testing Observations (61726)
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The inspector (s) observed the performance of selected surveillances. The observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, conformance to Technical Specifications (TS), verification of test instrument calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria.
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The records of the visual inspection of Unit 1 Bregen-Paterson hydraulic l
snubbers performed in accordance with surveillance procedure I
52-SUV-001-05, Hydraulic Shock and Sway Arrester Inspection and Functional l
Test, Revision 3, were reviewed.
One snubber was identified by the i
licensee which was to be functionally tested as a result of having too. low
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a fluid. level.
Currently, Unit 1 TS 4.6.L states that if a hydraulic snubber is.found to contain less than the required minimum volume of j
reserve fluid, the snubber shall be determined inoperable and cannot be determined operable via functional testing for the purpose of establishing i
the next visual inspection interval.
The licensee has submitted an amendment to allow operability determination by functional testing and in
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the interim is-complying with current TS.
The inspector visually inspected several ' snubbers in the Unit I drywell.
No problems were observed.
Also, several accessible Unit 2, safety related snubbers were visually inspected with no problems identified.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Radiological. Protection (71709).
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The resident inspectors reviewed aspects of the licensee's radiological l
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. protection program in the course of the monthly activities.
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performance of health physics and other personnel was observed on various shifts ~ to include:
involvement of health physics supervision, use of radiation work permits, use of personnel monitoring equipment, control of
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high radiation areas,-use of friskers and personal contamination monitors, and posting'and labeling.
No violations or deviations were noted.
10. Physical Security (71881)
In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: availability of supervision, availability of armed response personnel, protected and vital access controls, searching of personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols and compensatory posts.
No violations or deviations were noted.
11. ESF System Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF systems.
Valve and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room to ensure that lineups were in accordance with operability requirements and that material conditions were satisfactory.
During this reporting period the Unit 2 Standby Gas
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Treatment system was walked down in detail.
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' No violation or deviations were noted.
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12. Reportable Occurrences-(90712 & 92700)
A' number of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to ' determine whether corrective actions' appeared appropriate. Events which were reported'immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical Specifications were being met and the public health and safety were of utmost consider-ation.. The following LERs are closed:
Unit 1:. -85-17, 85-24, 85-47, 85-50, 86-21, 86-23, 86-30, 86-38 and 86-40 Unit 2:
85-22, 86-09; 86-10, 86-22, 86-23 and 86-24 Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.
13. Refueling Unit 1(60710)
- During this. reporting _ interval _ the inspectors verified by observation, interviews and procedure review that the refueling was being conducted in
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accordance with.the TS:and approved procedures. Areas inspected included i
adequacy of procedures, fuel sipping, TS compliance, refueling floor housekeeping and staffing.
'No violations or deviations were identified.
14. Maintenance Program Implementation'(62700)
The licensee issued revision.0 of procedure DI-MNT-06-1086 N, Maintenance Work Order Functional Tests, on October 1,1986.
The procedure is a'.
guideline _ of what testing is required to ensure a component operates
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correctly for certain frequent types of maintenance activities. As stated in a precautionary note, this specified functional testing is not' the same as an operability test. The inspector reviewed the procedure and randomly j
selected corrective maintenance work orders which had been completed or
planned on the Unit I and 2 Core Spray and High Pressure Coolant Injection f
(HPCI) systems to verify compliance with the guidelines. No problems were
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noted.
The licensee indicated that they were in the process of expanding the list of activities as well as supplying additional details for some of the items.
The inspector also verified, on the selected work orders, that functional testing was specified to meet Inservice Inspection and Technical Specifi-cations requirements.
As part of this review, the interoffice correspon-dence' dated November 24, 1986 concerning HCPI system response time testing
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was reviewed.
The memorandum addressed the need to change some surveil-lance procedures to include, in the outboard discharge valve stroke time, the time associated with auxiliary oil pump and turbine stop valve limit i
switch actuation.
According to the system engineer, the refueling l
interval logic test is being revised to include this. However, discussion I
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with maintenance personnel indicates that the normal practice is to specify the HCPI Pump Operability test (quarterly) as functional testing required after maintenance on the system or its components.
The use of the quarterly operability test as a functional test was discussed with the system engineer. He indicated that measures would be taken to verify that the system response time is not adversely effected by system or component maintenance.
To verify that a method is in place to ensure that system response time is not affected by maintenance to the HCpl system is an Inspector Followup Item. (IFI 321,366/87-09-01)
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