IR 05000321/1987012
| ML20235U587 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 07/14/1987 |
| From: | Holmesray P, Menning J, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235U509 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-87-12, 50-366-87-12, IEB-86-001, IEB-86-002, IEB-86-1, IEB-86-2, NUDOCS 8707220525 | |
| Download: ML20235U587 (9) | |
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UNITrD STATES
[@ M0g#'o NUCLEAH REGULATORY COMMb5SION
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REGloN 11 g
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.: 50-321/87-12 and 50-366/87-12
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Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.:
DPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name:
Hatch I and 2
Inspection Conducted: May 27 - July 3,1987 h.
7/M87 Inspectors:
Peter Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed
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. John Menriing, Resident' Ins;&ctor Date Signed Approved by:
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MarvinV.'Sinkule,ChieffProKctSection2C Date Signed Division of Reacto-Projects SUMMARY
l Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters, Operation 21 Safety Verifica-tion, Maintenance Observation, Surveillance Observation,- Radiological Protection, Pnysical Security, Reportable Occurrences, Reactor Startup af ter Refueling Outage, General Employee Training, and IE Bulletins.
Results: Two violations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS l
1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees T. Beckham, Vice President, Plant Hatch
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- H.C. Nix, Plant Manager D. Read, Plant Support Manager H.L. Sumner, Operations Manager
- P.E. Fornel, Maintenance Manager T.R. Powers, Engineering Manager R.W. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager C. Coggin, General Support Manager
- M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager
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- 0.M. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance (QA) Manager C.T. Moore, Training Manager S.B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and firdings were summarized on July 2,1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
The licensee acknowledged the findings and took no exception.
(0 pen) Violation 50-321/87-12-01.
Inadequate operations and surveillance procedures.
(Paragraphs 5 and 7)
(0 pen) Violation 50-321/87-12-02.
Failure to follow equipment clearance procedures.
(Paragraph 6)
(0 pen) Unresolved Item 50-321/87-12-03.
Disconnected LPRM strings on Unit 1.
(Paragraph 4)
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-321/87-08-1 Inadvertent.isolations of the HPCI and RCIC system during EFCV testing. As ' discussed in paragraph 7, this matter is now considered part of Violation 50-321/87-12-0) and the URI is close.
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Unresolved Item *
(0 pen) URI 50-321/87-12-03 Disconnected LPRM strings in Unit 1.
During startup from the recent Unit I refueling outage, Shift Technical Advisors discovered that five pairs of LPRMs had interchanged signal cables. These improper connections were confirmed and corrected by instrumentation and control personnel on June 28, 1987. The licensee's review of this matter is continuing. Pending completion of the licensee's review, this matter is identified ar an URI.
5.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations. Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on equipment, controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily journals and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access controls. This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisors.
Weekly, when on site, selected Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) systems were confirmed operable.
The confirmation was made by verifying the following:
accessible valve flow path alignment, power supply bre der and fuse status, instrumentation, major component leakage, lubrication, cooling, and general condition.
General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basis.. Portions of the control building, turbine building, reactor building, and outside areas were sisited.
Observations included general plant / equipment conditions, safety related tagout verifications, shift turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection equipment, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security, problem identification systems, missile hazards, instrumentation and alarms in the control room, and containment isolation.
During this reporting period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's use of overtime for compliance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.2.2.g.
The licensee's procedural controls for overtime are currently contained in Section 8.4 of procedure 30AC-0PS-003-05, " Plant Operations".
The inspector reviewed time sheets for selected licensed operations personnel for April and May of 1987 and determined that technical specification requirements were met for these individuals..In reviewing overtime, the inspector noted that the licensee did not have a written procedure for the monthly review of individual overtime by the General
- An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
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Manager - Plant. Hatch or his designee.
The inspector determined via interviews with management personnel and the review of documentation that monthly reviews of overtime have been conducted by the licensee as part of routine administrative practices. The need to formalize requirements for the monthly review by the General Manager was discussed with the license.
The licensee is currently revising procedure' 30AC-0PS-003-0S to establish formal requirements for these monthly reviews of individual overtime.
On April 22, 1987, while operations personnel were attempting to. place the Unit 1
"B" loop of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system in the shutdown cooling mode, approximately 8,000 gallons of reactor water were inadvertently drained from the reactor vessel to the "B" RHR loop. At the time of this event Unit I was in a hot shutdown condition at approximately 0 percent of rated thermal power.
The RHR loop was being placed in the shutdown cooling mode in accordance with procedure 34S0-E11-010-1S, Revision 0, " Residual Heat Removal System". Just prior to the event, the
"B" loop of RHR had been flushed and preheated and operators had attempted to refill the loop as required by the procedure.
Refilling is accomplished by introducing water from the condensate transfer system into RHR system.
A four-inch water fill line is valved into the "B" RHR loop by opening valves 1E11-F083 and IE11-F084.
The procedure required personnel to listen for inlet flow into the system and to close the two fill valves when water could no longer be heard coming into the RHR system.
This condition was assumed to indicate that the piping system was full.
However, personnel performing refilling operations were unaware that a condensate transfer system supply valve (IP11-F020B) suppling water to l
1E11-F083 and IE11-F084 was tagged closed.
Personnel did not hear any
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rushing water when the two fill valves were opened and assumed the "B"
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loep was filled with water when in fact it was not. Consequently, when j
valve 1E11-F009 was subsequently opened as part of the shutdown cooling
procedure, reactor vessel water drained rapidly into the
"B" loop.
Although operations personnel soon noticed that vessel level was dropping j
af ter IE11-F009 was opened, the control circuitry of this valve limited i
their ability to rapidly terminate the loss of reactor vessel water.
Valve 1E11-F009 is a gate valve which must open completely before it can
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close and has an open cycle of 24 seconds or less.
During this event reactor vessel level dropped from approximately plus 6S.4 inches to plus i
12 inches above instrument zero.
The event on April 22, 1987, was caused by inadequacies in procedure 34S0-E11-010-15.
More specifically, the procedure did not provide a positive method of assuring that the
"B" loop piping was full following the transfer of water from the condensate transfer system.
Failure to have an adequate procedure for operation of the RHR system is considered to be a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a which requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained for activities recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978.
Regulatory Guide 1.33. recommends written procedures for the operation of shutdown cooling systems.
This matter is identified as
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part of Violation 50-321/87-12-01 - Inadequate Operating and Surveillance l
Procedures.
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6.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
l During the report period, the inspectors observed selected maintenance
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activities. The observations included a review of the work documents for
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adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical I
specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements,
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and adherence to the appropriate quality controls.
The inspector reviewed repair procedures for welds 1G31-RWCV-6-D-6, 1G31-RWCU-6-D-14, And 1G31-RWCV-6-D-17. These circumferential welds are in six-inch, stainless steel piping in.the Unit 1 Reactor Water Cleanup
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(RWCU) system.
The three welds were found to contain rejectable j
indications during recent ultrasonic examinations, and repair was j
accomplished by overlaying each of the welds with two layers of weld l
material.
The repair procedures were containt in the documentation j
for Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 1-87-4146.
The review was conducted
to determine whether elements of the complete repair cycle included:
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identification of the nondestructive examination (NDE) method that l
revealed the indications and description of the indications; procedure for
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weld and welder qualifications prior to work authorization; provision for Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector involvement in the repairs; and description of the NDE program to be used af ter the completion of repairs.
The inspector also observed the final liquid penetrant (PT) examination of i
weld 1G31-RWCU-6-D-6 after completion of the weld overlay repair process.
l The observations were compared with applicable requirements in the i
following areas:
specified method, penetrant materials identified; penetrant materials analyzed for halogens and sulfur; acceptable pre-examination surface; drying time; method of penetrant application; penetration time; surface temperature; solvent removal; dry surfac.e prior i
to developing; type of developer; and examination technique.
The
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inspector reviewed the qualification documentation for the GPC examiner performing this PT examination in the following areas:
employer's name; j
person certified; activity qualified to perform; effective period of
certification; signature of employer's designated representative; basis j
used for certification; dnd annual visual acuity, color vision examination and periodic decertification.
During the period June 20-21, 1987, maintenance was performed on Unit 1 Drywell Cooler IT47-8008A. The equipment clearance for this wo d required the closing of Plant Service Water system valves IP41-F018A, '055A and F056A.
In an effort to stop leakage that was being experf aced with the component isolation provided by the equipment clearance, maintenance personnel jacked closed the (already closed) air-operated valves i
IP41-F045A and B.
In the jacked closed condition these valves could not open in response to cooler fan oper.ation and provide cooling water to l
the drywell cooler.
Personnel restoring the cooler to service after
maintenance were unaware that these air-operated valves had been jacked
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closed and the cooler remained in an inoperable condition._ The licensee l
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was subsequently unable to maintain acceptable drywell temperatures during l
the recent startup from the Unit I refueling outage. A forced outage was l
required and personnel confirmed that IP41-F045A and B were jacked closed
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during a drywell entry on June 28, 1987.
Equipment clearances are controlled by licensee procedure 30AC-0PS-001-0S, " Control of Equipment
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Clearances and Tags."
Maintenance personnel did not comply with this l
procedure in that clearance activities were performed that were not I
specified on the authorized Equipment Clearance Sheet.
In addition, Section 5.1.3.
of this procedure only. allows maintenance personnel to
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perform clearance activities involving Temporary Releases (TR).
Section 8.1.11 of this procedure defines a TR as a method of temporarily releasing j
a DANGER tagged component prior to releasing the entire clearance, i
Failure to follow procedure 30AC-0PS-001-0S is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a which requires that written procedures be I
implemented for activities recommended in Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33 recommends written procedure for equipment control activities.
This matter is identified as Violation 50-321/87-12-02 - Failure to Follow Equipment Clearance Procedures.
7.
Surveillance Testing Observations (61726)
The inspectors observed the performance of selected surveillance.
The observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, conformance to Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillance, removal from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria.
On April 18, 1987, while performing an excess flow check valve (EFCV)
surveillance procedure on the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) systems, inadvertent Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) partial valve Group 3 and 4
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isolations occurred.
Unit I was in the run mode and operating at approximately 100 percent of rated power at the time of these occurrences.
The surveillance testing was being conducted in accordance with procedure 57SV-SUV-004-1S, Revision 2, " Reactor Coolant Instrumentation Lines Excess Flow Check Valve Operability".
The resident inspectors init_iated review of this matter on the date of occurrence and originally tracked it as URI 50-321/87-08-01.
The licensee subsequently reported the occurrences to the NRC in LER 50-321/87-007.
Review of this matter has revealed that the inadvertent isolations were caused by inadequacies in surveillance i
procedure 575V-SUV-004-IS.
Table 1 of this procedure lists the jumpers that are required to be installed and the links that are required to be opened in order to correctly perform the procedure. This table contained errors, in that all jumpers and links necessary to prevent isolations during EFCV testing were not listed.
The inspectors noted that this procedure had not yet gone through the licensee's full Procedure Upgrade Program review, and that this was the first performance of the procedure l
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since the Analog Trip Transmitter System modification was completed on Unit 1.
This matter is considered a violation of TS 6.8.1. which requires that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained for surveillance and test activities of safety related equipment. The URI for these occurrences is being closed, and this matter is now identified as part of Violation 50-321/87-12-01 - Inadequate Operating and. Surveillance Procedures.
On June 15, 1987, approximately 36 inches of reactor vessel inventory was inadvertently drained from the Unit I reactor vessel to the suppression
pool during Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system surveillance testing. This event occurred near the completion of the recent Unit 1 outage. The core had been reloaded and the vessel was reassembled. The "B" loop of RHR was in a shutdown cooling lineup. The "A" loop of RHR was configured for the performance of procedure 42SV-E11-001-1S, Revision 2, Residual Heat Removal System - Low Pressure Coolant Injection Logic System Functional Test and Auto Actuation." Just prior to the event, operations personnel were attempting to perform an operability test on valve IE11-F078A, a 10-inch swing check valve in the RHR Service Water to RHR injection line.
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The valve operability testing was to be performed in accordance with procedure 34SV-E11-002-15, Revision 3,
"RHR Valve Operability".
This testing involves attaching a force measuring device to the valve lever arm, opening the valve with the lever, and recording the force required.
Personnel were initially unable to open the valve and decided that differential pressure was holding the valve closed.
A control room operator subsequently opened valve 1E11-F028A and then throttled open IE11-F028A to relieve pressure on the downstream side of IEl-F078A. The opening of these two valves created a flow path from the reactor vessel to the suppression pool and resulted in a rapid loss of vessel inventory.
(Indicated vessel level decreased from approximately plus 46 to plus 10 inches during this event). The operator, seeing a rapid increase in loop flow, closed 1E11-F024A.
As the 1E11-F024A valve was baing closed, a reactor scram and one half Group 21 solation occurred. The isolation and closure of IE11-F024A terminated the invento ry loss at a level of approximately plus 10 inches.
The resident inspectors initiated review of the loss of. reactor vessel inventory event on the date of occurrence.
The primary cause of. this event is believed to be inadequacies in valve operability test procedure 34SV-E11-002-IS.
The current version of the procedure does not address the likelihood of differential pressure existing across valve IE11-F078A or provide instructions on how to relieve the differential pressure in a controlled manner. In the absence of such instructions, the control room operator chose a method to relieve differential pressure that provided for poor control and was inappropriate for the existing RHR system lineup.
The inspectors noted that this procedure had not yet gone through the licensee's full Procedures Upgrade Program review.
This matter 4s considered a violation of TS 6.8.1.a which requires that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained for surveillance and test activities of safety related equipment. This event is identified as part of Violation 50-321/87-12-01 - Inadequate Operating and Surveillance Procedures.
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ESF System Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room to ensure that lineups were in accordance with operability requirements and that equipment material conditions were satisfactory.
The Unit 2 Post LOCA Hydrogen Recombiner system was walked down in detail.
l Within the areas inspected, no. violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Radiological Protection (71709)
The resident inspectors reviewed aspects of the licensee's radiological protection program in the course of the monthly activities.
The performance of health physics and other personnel was observed on various shifts to include:
involvement of health physics supervision, use of radiation work permits, use of personnel monitoring equipment, control of high radiation areas, use of friskers and personal contamination monitors, and posting and labeling.
No violations or deviations were noted.
10.
Physical Security (71881)
In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: availability of supervision, availability of armed response personnel, protected and vital access controls, searching of personnel, package > and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols and compensatory posts.
The resident inspector verified the absence of obstructions in the isolation zone area on each side of the protected area (PA) fence that could conceal an unauthorized entry or interfere with the capability of the detection / assessment system.
The adequacy of illumination.in the PA was also verified. On June 7,1987, the resident inspector visited.the central and secondary alarm stations and determined that surveillance I
equipment was functioning properly.
No violations or deviations were noted.
11.
Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)
A number of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical-Specifications were being met and the public health and safety were of utmost-consideration.
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The following LERs are closed based on the violation for' inadequate procedures cited in this report, 50-321/86-12-01:
Unit 1: 87-007,87-008 Unit 2:
None 12. Reactor Startup After Refueling Outage (61707 and 71711)
Prior to the Unit 1 startup, the inspector performed a walk through of the control rod drive hydraulic system and "A" core spray loop to verify that this equipment had been returned to service in accordance with approved procedures. The inspector witnessed portions of the startup to verify that control rod withdrawals were properly controlled and that operations were conducted in accordance with approved procedures and the Technical Specifications. The inspector c5 served a high degree of direct management involvement in this startup.
Management representatives were frequently seen in the control room on all shifts. The inspector also observed that licensed operators were alert and professional.
Equipment problems that were encountered were methodically and effectively resolved.
Yhe inspector witnessed the shutdown margin demonstration that was performed in accordance with procedure 42FH-ENG-019-15, REV 1.
The demonstration was performed on June 23, 1987, soon after criticality was achieved. The inspector reviewed the procedure for technical adequacy, verified the licensee's calculations, and verified that data supplied by the fuel vendor was utilized.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
General Employee Training The licensee's two and half day general employee training (GET) was attended by the Licensing Project Manager.
He found that the level of detail and time allocated for instruction on each of the major topics -
plant emergencies, security, and radiological safety - were appropriate.
He also found the training facilities to be excellent and the instructors well qualified.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14.
IE Bulietins (92703)
(Closed) I&E 321,366/86-BU-01, Minimum Flow logic Problems That Could Disable RHR Pumps.
This Bulletin is not applicable to Plant Hatch as indicated in the licensee's response to Region 11 (SL 824-2760N), dated June 4, 1986.
(Closed)
I&E 321,366/86-BU-02, Static 0' ring Differential Pressure Switches.
This Bulletin is not applicable to Plant Hatch as indicated in the licensees response to Region II (SL 1034C-0635C), dated July 25, 1986.
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