ML20153G400
| ML20153G400 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 08/30/1988 |
| From: | Davis A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Hall D ILLINOIS POWER CO. |
| References | |
| EA-88-090, EA-88-90, NUDOCS 8809080147 | |
| Download: ML20153G400 (2) | |
See also: IR 05000461/1988010
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AUG 3 01933
Docket No. 50-461
EA 88-90
Illinois Power Company
ATTN: Mr. D. P. Hall
Vice President
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Illinois Power Company
Clinton Power Station
PO Box 678
Clinton, IL 61727
SUEJECT: ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION VIOLATIONS AT CLINTON
This is in response tn your letter of June 1,1988, concerning our Inspection
Report No. 50-461/88010(DRS) dated April 20, 1988 on environmental qualification
findings at the Illinois Power Company (IPC) Clinton Facility. Your letter
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states that clarification is required on certain points in the inspection report
j concerning the enforctment conference held on March 31, 1988. Those matters are
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addressed below. In addition to raising questions about the documentation of
the enforcement conference, your letter raised the issue regarding the adequacy
of your AMP KYNAR butt splice testing. That testing issue will be addressed in
our evaluation of the other technical issues raised in your letter of June 29,
l 1988 which responded to our Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil
Penalties.
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First, you noted that the inspection report can be read to indicate that the
staff took a final position and rejected IPC arguments during the enforcement
conference of March 31, 1988. We did not explicitly comunicate our position
on your arguments during the enforcement cenference. The inspection report
- which was issued after the enforcement corforence comunicated our position on
l these matters. The past tense used in the inspection report may have led to
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the confusion over the timing of our decision.
l Second, your letter noted that the inspection report incorrectly indicates that
l IPC stated in the enforcement conference that the AMP KYNAR splices were not
i originally tested in a configuration which is consistent with the plant
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application. Instead, you state that the position IPC took in the enforcement
conference was that the test configuration was consistent with field configura-
tion. We agree that you stated this position. However, in the enforcement
conference discussion, you acknowledged that there were no restraints on the
installed splices to assure that they will not contact metal enclosures or other
, conductors. While as you indicate in your letter, splites examined in the field
l were found not to be in contact with metal enclosures or other conductors, it is
possible that in the past as well as a result of future maintenance activities,
contact could take place (in fact the reason for insulating materials being used
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in the splices is to preclude grounding of connectors). We also iecollect your
l acknowledgirg in the enforcement conference that, in hindsight, you recognized
such testing would be appropriate. In conclusion, we ag,'ee that the phrasing of i
our inspection report may not have fully conveyed your position on this matter;
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this resulted from the brevity of our sumary and was not intentional. l
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Illinois Power Company 2 AUG 3 n 1988 ,
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If you have any further questions or concerai ont this matter, please contact i
me or Mr. H. J. Mit!re, Director, Division of hector Sai'ety, Region III. j
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A het Davis
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7,. Ret.ox1 Adpinistrator i
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Enclosure: Letter dated 8, l
7/29/88 ,
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J. Lieberman, OE
L. J. Chandler, OGC ;
F. J. Miraglia, NRR !
D. P. Hall, Vice President
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R. D. Freeman, Manager, i
Nuclear Station !
Engineering Department
DCD/DCB (RIDS)
Licensing Fee Management Branch
Resident Inspector, RIII ;
Richard Hubbard
J. W. McCaffrey, Chief, Public
Utilities Division !
H. S. Taylor, Quality Assurance
Division, Sargent & Lunoy
Engineers .
David Rosenblatt, Governor's ;
Office of Consumer Services !
Sheldon ?abel, Esquire, l
Schiff, Hardin, & Waite !
L. Larson, Project Manager,
General Electric Company
Chairman of DeWitt County
Illinois Department of l
Nuclear Safety :
D. Schopfer, Project Manager,
Sargent & Lundy Engineers
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Docket No. 50-461 fME ^9-
Mr. James Lieberman, Director
Office of Enforcement
ATTN: Document Control Desk
U.S. fluelear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject: Response to Notice of Violation and Proposed
Imposition of Civil Penalty Dated June 1, 1988,
Docket No. 50-461, EA 88-90
Dear Mr. Lieberman:
On June 1, 1988, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) ,
insued a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil I
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Penalty, EA 88-90, to Illinois Power Company (IP). That Notice .
was based upon items described in NRC Inspection Reports No.
87026 and 88010. The Notice proposes to impose a civil penalty l
upon IP in the amount of $75,000.
Attachment A to this letter provides IP's reply to the items
listed in the Notice of Violation, and Attachment B provides IP's
answer to the Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty. These
attachments describe the actions IP has taken to correct the
noted items, to address their generic implications, and to
prevent their recurrence.
As described in Attachments A and B, two of the conditions,
those relating to electrical butt splices and wire caps, cited by
the NRC as the basis for the Notice of Violation and subsequent
civil penalty, involve a new interpretation by the NRC of
environmental qualification regulations and standards. IP was
not notified of this new interpretation prior to the time the NRC
identified these conditions during its inspection of IP's
Environmental Qualification Program in August 1987. IP believes
that it was in compliance with the standards ap>11 cable to these i
items that existed at the time and notes that the NRC did not I
identify any noncompliance during prior inspections of the l
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components containing the wire caps. Also, as described in
Attachment A, testing of the butt splices and wire caps
demonstrated that there was no ic=ediate safety concern and that l
continueJ operation was justified. Therefore, although IP has
taken extensive action in response to the NRC's concerns with
respect to the butt splices and wire caps, IP denies that a
violation occurred with respect to these two g ms* *
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IP also subcits that issuance of a violation relating to the ,
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butt splices and wire caps was inconsistent with sound regulatory
practice. To the extent that the NRC identified a previously
unknown safety concern that was serious enough to warrant a civil
penalty, it would have been appropriate for the NRC to notify
licenseer so that they would have the opportunity to resolve this
concern as soon as possible. Some form of generic notification,
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such as a telegram, or an IE Information Notice, Bulletin or
Generic Letter would have given licensees appropriate notice of
this issue and would have provided the speediest means to address
the issue on an industry-wide basis. Instead, the NRC imposed a
civil penalty on an individual licensee based upon a new
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interpretation of the industry standards applicable to the
environmental qualification of these items, without providing any
prior notice of the NRC's concerns. This is a
less-than-effective method for resolving safety concerns in a
timely fashion.
As noted in Inspection Report 87026, the NRC has found IP's
environmer.tal qualification program to be generally sound, with
limited exceptione. In addition, IP has caken vigorous
corrective action to resolve the issues identified in the Notice.
As a result, IP is requesting remission of the proposed civil
penalty.
I trust that this response is satisfactory. If you have any
questions, please call me or Frank Spangenberg, Manager of ,
Licensing and Safety.
Sincerely yours,
,s ;
D. . Hall
Vice President
DPH/krm
Attachments
cc: Regional Administrator, Region III, USNRC
NRC Clinton Licensing Project Manager >
NRC Residt:nt Office
Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
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STATE OF ILLINOIS
COUNTY OF DEWITT
DONALD P. HALL, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: I
am the Vice President of Illinois Power Company. The foregoing >
Response to Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition 1988, and
of Civil
the
Penalty (Letter No. U-601218), dated June ,
attached Reply to Notice of Violation (Attac ent A) and Answer
to Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Attachment 5), were
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prepared under my sumervision and direction. I know the contents
thereof, and to the iest of my knowledge and belief the facts
contained therein are true and correct.
.!
Donald F. Hall ,
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Dated: June 4[,1988
Subscribed and sworn to
before me this d 4Vsday
of June, 1988
hc
Notary Public
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"mPFlel* L s e AL" l
Hy Co= mission Expires: u m e e e steuiu )
menne nw:. in or wueis
MY COMWill'3% (1h8:53'1190
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Attachment A
Illinois Power Company's Reply to
Notice of Violation (EA 88-90)
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The Notice of Violation describes three alleged examples of
violation of 10 CFR 50.49(f). These examples concern (1) AMP
KYNAR electric.31 butt splicess (2) electrical junction boxes: and
(3) Thomas and Betts nylon wire caps used inside Limitorque motor
operated valve actuators. Illinois Power Company's (IP) reply
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pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 is accordingly organized into three
parts, each corresponding to one of the cited examples. Within
each of these parts, the specific issues required to be addressed
by 10 CFR 2.201, the Notice of Violation ano the accompanying
cover letter are addressed.
I. AMP KYNAR Electrical Butt Splices
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The Notice of Violation states in part:
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Conteray to (10 CFR 50.49(f)], as of August 19, 1987,
the follows u equipment important to safety was not
qualified b, 'esting and/or analysis which reflected
the installe :onfiguration:
A. One hundred and ninety-six AMP KYNAR electrical .
butt splices installed in valve actuators,
solenoid valves and electrical junction boxes
affecting multiple safety systems.
This example was described in NRC Inspection Report No.
87026 as item 87026-02 and in NRC Inspection Report No.
88010 as item 88010-01,
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A. Admission or Denial of the Violation
The AMP KYNAR electrical butt splices were qualified by
testing and/or analysis which reflected the installed
configuration of thece items at the Clinton Power Station
(CPS). IP reviewed and accepted a qualification test report
that demonstrated that these butt splices would perform
their intended function under the most severe temperature,
pressure, humidity, and radiation conditions, including
thermal and radiation aging, anticipated in the event of a
design basis accident (DBA). (See Wyle Laboratories Test
Report Number 17955-1, Revision 0, dated January 29, 1988:
AMP Qualification Test Report 110-11004, Revision 0, dated 1
February 2, 1982.) The testing reviewed and accepted by IP
i was consistent with industry practices, and the butt splices
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were mounted, positioned and connected in a fashion similar i
i to their actual installation. Additionally, the AMP test !
conditions were more severe than worst case conditions )
expected during a Clinton DBA. As described in section C of l
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the attached Answer to Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty,
IP believes that the environmental qualification testing of
the butt splices met applicable NRC regulations and industry
standards. IP also believes that the NRC's view that
environmental qualification testing of these items was not
adequate is a result of a new interpretation by the NRC of
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industry standards, of which IP was not informed until
during the inspection (87026) in which the NRC identified
this item. Therefore, IP does not consider that there was a
violation for this item.
B. Reasons for the Condition Described
The AMP environmental qualification testing of the KYNAR
butt splices accounted for the most severe temperature,
pressure, humidity and radiation conditions expected to be
encountered at CPS, accounted for thermal and radiation
aging, and appropriately simulated the installed
configuration of the butt splices in the plant. The test of
the splices did not account for contact with a metal ground,
because the design use of the splices does not contemplate
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installation of the splices in a configuration in which they
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are in contact with a metal ground. When a walkdown of butt
splices used in high humidity areas was performed, none were
found in contact with a metal ground. The NRC informed IP,
during its inspection of the CPS environmental qualification '
program on August 17-21, 1987, that the reason for testing
the splices in contact with a metal ground is that there
exists some possibility that such a ground could occur
during accident conditions.
i C. Steps Taken to Correct the Problem and Results Achieved
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Upon being notified by the NRC during the week of Au gust 17,
- 1987 that the fact that the failure to have tested the
materials in contact with a metal ground called into
i question the adequacy of the environmental qualification of
j the butt s On
August 21,plices, IP arranged for further testing.1987, Wyle Laboratorie
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- KYNAR butt splices. The test conditions simulated the most
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severe temperature, pressure and humidity conditions likely
~; to be experienced during a design basis accident at CPS, and
the butt splices were restrained in contact with a metal
! ground. All of the tested butt splicer performed
satisf actorily during these tests. Thus, the tests
! determined that there was no immediate safety concern with
i use of the butt splices. IP submitted these test results to
the NRC on August 28, 1987, in conjunction with IP's
- Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) which
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demonstrated that continued omeration of CPS was justified
' until further testing on the buit splices was performed,
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Because the qualification tests performed on August 21,
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1987, did not account for thermal or radiation aging of the
butt splices, IP commissioned further tests, which were
perforced by Wyle Laboratories on October 9 though November
19, 1067. These tests were performed using AMP KYNAR butt
splices that had been artificially aged for eight (8) years
Again, the splices were
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and for forty (40) years.
restrained in contact with a metal ground under the most
severe temperature, pressure and humidity conditions that
would be experienced during a design basis accident at CPS.
A number of the splices in both grouas failed to retain
adequate insulating capacity under these extended service
conditions. However, as discussed above, this presented no
immediate safety concern.
Umon learning of these test results on 3ovember 10, 1987,
while CPS was in cold shutdown, IP immediately initiated a
walkdown of electrical devices in areas where 1002 humidity
could occur. During this walkdown, 196 Each AMP KYNAR butt
of these was
splices in these areas were located.
reworked using qualified tape or Raychem tubing, resulting
in a configuration that the NRC agrees is qualified. See
NRC Inspection Report 88010, Item 88010-01. The walkdown
and rework of all butt splices in high humidity areas was
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completed on November 18, 1987, prior to the time power
ascension from the shutdown commenced.
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D. Corrective Steps to Avoid Further Violation
As described in C above, the scope of this problem has been
identified and it has been completely corrected. Therefore,
no additional specific action in response to this item is
required to avoid further violation.
However, it should be noted that, in addition to the
environmental qualification program that was audited by the
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NRC, IP is engaged in a number of activities to ensure that
plant equipment at CPS is properly qualified and h. conitor
industry sources that provide information that coutu affect
the qualification status of equipment at CPS. IP receives,
reviews, tracks and responds to Institute of Nuclaar Power
Operations (INPO) Significant Event Reports and Sagnificant
Operating Event Reports, General Electric Service
Information Letters, NRC Generic Letters, IE Information
Notices and IE Bulletins. Where requested, written
responses to these documents are provided to the NRC, Any
of these industry and NRC items containing information
relating to environmental qualification are provided to the
appropriate group within the CPS Nuclear Stetion Engineering
Departoont (NSED) so that the potential impact on the
environmental qualification of equipment at CPS can be
addressed. File packages documenting IP's actions it,
response to such items are prepared and maintained,
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IP also participates in industry groups that provide
information relating to environmental qualification issues.
For example, IP receives reports and attends meetings of the
Environmental Qualification Advisory Group of the Electric
Power Research Institute. IP also is a member of the
- Regional Utility Group for Region III. Environmental
qualification information obtained from IP's participation
in these groups is provided to appropriate personnel and
reviewed for applicability to equipment installed at CPS.
Finally, IP reviews violations issued in Region ~II to
determine whether they contain information that might
pertain to CPS. Such violations relating to environeental
qualification are provided to the appropriate hus, groupIPwithin
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NSED to review for potential impact at CPS. has in
place a number of programs designed to keep it abreast of
developments in the area of environmental qualification and
to assure that events that might affect the qualification of
equipment at CPS are addressed. IP believes that these
programs will help prevent environmental qualification !
violations in the future.
E. Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved
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IP is in compliance.
II. Electrical Junction Boxes ,
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The Notice of Violation states in part
contrary to [10 CFR 50.49(f)], as of August 19, 1987,
the following equipment important to safety was not
qualified by appropriate testing and/or analysis which
reflected the installed configuration:
B. One hundred and fif ty-six junction boxes without
drainage openings (weep holes) affecting multiple
safety systems.
This item was discussed in NRC Inspection Report No. 87026
as item 87026-03b and in NRC Inspection Report No. 88010 as
item 88010-02, and was described in Licensee Event Report
No. 87-066-00, submitted by IP to the NRC on December 4,
1987.
A. Admission or Denial of the Violation
IP adcits that this item occurred as st6ted in the Notice of
Violation.
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I B. Reason for the Violation
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This problem was caused by the failure of the constructor, i
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Baldwin Associates (BA), to install required weep holes in
the electrical junction boxes. BA failed to include the
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requirement for the weep holes in the construction travelers ,
j for these junction boxes. The requirement for the weep ,
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holes was not clearly defined by the architect / engineer, !
Sargent & Lundy, in the installation specification for the l
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junction boxes,
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j' In additior., corrective action for the nonconfomance !
s documents that initially identified junction box drainage j
l problems in some junction boxes, and corrective action for i
4 an NRC noncompliance (87026-03b) relating to a junction box i
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that lacked a drainage hole, was Id.mited to the junction
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boxes in question. ;
C. Steos Taken to Correct the Probles and Results Achieved f
This problem was identified as a generic condition on
November 5, 1987, while the plant was in cold shutdown. IP
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ordered that the plant remain in cold shutdown until all of
the junction boxes were repaired. A walkdown was conducted
to identify all junction boxes lacking required weep holes,
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A total of 156 boxes were identified as lacking weep holes.
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These were reworked by drilling a drain hole in each box. ,
j This work was completed on November 12, 1987, prior to
initiating power ascension from the shutdown.
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D. Corrective Steps to Avoid Further Violation
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Engineering Change Notices have been issued for the
construction drawings for the affected junction boxes to
show the requirement for weep holes in the boxes. In
addition, the CPS Quality Assurance and Nuclear Station
Engineering departments, and Sargent & Lundy, performed a
review of the Sargent & Lundy electrical installation
specification to determine whether other cases existed where
requirements in the installation specification might have
been misunderstood. No other instances were identified.
A training program was developed to ensure that engineering
and quality assurance personnel responsible for perfoming-
reviews of nonconformance documents and defining corrective
action are aware of the need to look for possible generic
implications of problems and to take a broadTheview of
training
remedial action for hardware deficiencies.
reinforced that all conditions, including those that are
themselves determined not to be significant, should be
evaluated for generic implications. In particular,
personnel were instructed to consider applications for
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similar items that are located elsewhere in the plant or in
a different environment, or that perform different
functions, as well as to consider the cause of the condition
to determine whether a widespread condition may be !
indicated. This training was administered pursuant to a
.. written plan. This training was completed on December 18,
1987. .
In addition, as described in subsection I.D above, IP is
engaged in a number of other activities to avoid
environmental qualification violations in the future.
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E. Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved ,
IP is in compliance.
III. Thomas and Betts Nylon Wire Caps Used Inside l
Limitorque Motor Operated Valve Actuator
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The Notice of Violation states in part:
, Contrary to (10 CFR 50.49(f)), as of August 19, 1987,
the following equipment important to safety was not l
qualified by appropriate testing and/or analysis which
reflected the installed configuration:
C. Twe hundred and seventy Thomas and Betts nylon .
wire caps installed in ninety dual voltage j
Limitorque actuators affecting multiple pieces of
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equipment important to safety. ;
! This item was discussed in NRC Inspection Report No. 87026 !
as item 87026-01 and in NRC Inspection Report No. 88010 as .
item 88010-03. j
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A. Admission or Denial of the Violation t
The Thomas and Betts nylon wire caps installed in Limitorque
motor operated valve actuators were qualified by appropriate i
, testing which reflected the installed configuration at CPS.
I The motor operated valve actuators were tested by Limitorque :
under temperature, pressure, humidity and radiation l
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conditions, including thermal and radiation aging, which
exceeded those anticipated to occur during their use at CPS.
The actuators tested utilized the same tne of Thomas and i
Betts nylon wire caps as those used at CPS. Limitorque has !
confirmed that no other types of wire caps were ever used in !
its actuators. Thus, the Thomas and Betts nylon wire caps l
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were appropriately qualified in the same configuration as
i they are installed in the olant. As described in section C
of the attached Answer to ?roposed Imposition of Civil
Penalty, IP believes that the environmental qualification
! testing of the wire caps met applicable NRC regulations and
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industry standards. IP also believes that the NRC's view
that environmental qualification testing of these items was
not adequate is the result of a new interpretation by the
NRC of industry standards, of which IP was not informed
until during the inspection (87026) in which the NRC
- identified this item. Therefore, IP does not consider that
i there was a violation fer this item.
B. Reason for the Condition Described
Limitorque's environmental qualification testing of the
Thcmas and Betts wire caps accounted for the most severe
temperature, pressure, humidity, and radiation conditions
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expected to be encountered during a design basis accident at
CPS, accounted for thermal and radiation aging, and
simulated the installed configuration of the wire caps in
the plant. The test of the wire caps did not account for
contact with a metal ground because the design of the
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actuators does not contemplate use of the wire caps in a
confipration in which they are in contact with a metal
ground. The NRC informed IP during its inspection of the
CPS environmental qualification program on August 17-21,
1987 that the reason for testing the splices in contact with
a metal ground is that there exists some possibility that
such a ground could occur during accident conditions.
1 C. Steps Taken to Correct the Problem and Results Achieved .
U on being notified by the NRC during the week of August 17,
lh87that the fact that the wire caps were not tested in
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contact with a metal ground called into question the
adequacy of the environmental qualification of ti,e Thomas
j and Betts nylon wire caps, IP arranged for further testing.
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On August 21, 1987, Wyle Laboratories performed testing of
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the nylon wire caps. The test conditions aimulated the most
severe temperature, pressure and humidity conditions likely
to be experienced during a design basis accident at CPS, and l
the wire caps were restrained in contact with a metal
ground. All of the tested wire caps performed
satisfactorily during the tests. IP submitted these test i
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results to the NRC on August 28, 1987, in conjunction with
IP's JC0 which demonstrated that continued operation of CPS
was justified until further testing of the wire caps could
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be performed,
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l Because the qualification tests performed on August 21,
1987, did not account for thermal or radiation aging of the
nylon wire caos, IP commissioned further tests, which were
l performed by Yyle Laboratories on January 29, 1988. These l
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tests were performed using Thomas and Betts nylon wire caps i
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that had been artificially aged for eight years and forty
years. Again, the wire caps were restrained in contact with
a metal ground under the most severe te=perature, pressure
' and humidity conditions that would be experienced during a
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design basis accident at CPS. The test of wire caps in the
forty-year group was diacontinued after a number of wire
caps failed the test. All of the wire caps in the
eight-year group functioned properly. Analysis of the test
results demonstrated IP
a minimum
has
of areworked thequalified
either
9.9-year
wire caps
life
- for the wire caps.
with qualified okonite tape or will replace them prior to
the expiration of their qualified life.
D. Corrective Steps to Avoid Further Violation
As described in C above, the scope of this problem has been
identified and it has been completely corrected. Therefore,
no additional specific action in response to this item is
required to avoid further violation. However, as described
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in subsection I.D above, IP is engaged in a number of
activities that should prevent environmental qualification
violations in the future.
E. Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved
IP is in compliance.
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- ATTACHMENT B
Illinois Power Company's Answer to
Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (EA 88-90)
The Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty
describes three items which were collectively considered a single
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violation, and states:
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I).
Civil Penalty - $75,000.
The letter accompanying the Notice of Violation and Proposed
Imposition of Civil Penalty states that:
In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and
Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2,
l Alpendix C (Enforcement Policy), the violation described in
the enclosed Notice has been categorized at a Severity Level
III. The escalation and mitigation factors in the
Enforcement Policy were considered and the base civil
penalty amount has been increased by 50%. Your prompt and
extensive corrective action once the problem was identified
to you is offset by the ?rior notices you have had
concerning the junction ioxes in the form of IE Information
Notice 84-57, a previous NRC violation (50-461/87026-03(b)) '
and your own Nonconforming Material Report written on
September 16, 1986, and the multiple exampics found for each
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violation involving numerous safety-related systems.
1
The Civil Penalty Should Not Have Been Escalated: Remission of
l
the Civil Penalty is Appropriate
10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C describes factors to be considered by .
I
the NRC in determining whether to mitigate a proposed civil
penalty. These ine?.ude prompt and effective corrective action
and good past per.fe mance in the area where the violation
occurred. In addition, with respect to two of the items cited as
the basis for the violation in EA 88-90, IP believes that no
violation occurred and that other extenuating circumstancer, exist
,
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which make escalation of the civil penalty unwarranted and render
remission of the penalty appropriate.
A. Past Performance
IP's performance in the area of environmental qualification The staff
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(EQ) of equipment at CPS has been generally good.
l performed an audit of IP EQ files and a walkdown of Only one
installed equipment between March 11 and 14, 1985.
l file with discrepancies was identified, and no discrepancies
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- between the qualification files and the hardware were
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identified. Similarly, during Aupst-October of 1987, the
NRC conducted an in-depth evaluation of the EQ program for .
CPS, and found that IP s program complies with NRC EQ
requirements, and with Furthermore,
limited specific exceptions, was
NRC inspectors on
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properly implemented.
_
several occasions have remarked that IP has a "strong EQ
program." ;
B. Prompt and Effective Corrective Action ;
For two of the examples cited in the alleged violation (AMP f
KYNAR butt splices and the nylon wire caps). IP's corrective }
action, described in subsections I.C. and D. cnd III.C. and !
D. of the Reply to the Notice of Violation, was prog t and
effective, resulting in completion of correction action with l
no impact on plant operation. Corrective action was
designed to identify the scope of the problem and to ,
identify and correct each instance where the problem 4
appeared. In addition, IP is engaged in a number of
i
activities, described in subsection I.D. of the Reply to the .
)
Notice of Violation, that should prevent future violations.
The NRC recognized in the cover letter accompanying the
Notice of Violation that IP's corrective action in response
to these items was "prompt and effective."
As described in subparts II.C. and D, of IP's Reply to the
Notice of Violation, corrective action for the violation -
involving the electrical junction boxes included a
determination of the scope of the problem, included action
to assure that similar problems did not exist elsewhere, and i
included training to assure that personnel favolved in l
,
responding to nonconforming hardware conditions address IP J
possible generic implications of those conditions.
believes that it has taken thorouah corrective acticn which
should preclude this type of problem in the future.
C. Other Extenuating Circumstances
The citation of a violation involving the AMP KYNAR butt )
splices and the Thomas and Betts nylon wire caps represents
a change in the NRC's interpretation of its replations and
industry standards. As required by 10 CFR $ 50.49, the
environmental ualification testing of these items reviewed
IP accounted for the r.ost severe pressure,
and accepted b
temperature, h idity and radiation conditions that would be
experienced by these items in the event of a design basis
accident at CPS. In addition, these items were tested in a
configuration that appropriately simulated the mounting
method, positioning, and connection of these items as
installed at CPS.
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As noted on page 2 of the letter accompanying the Notice of i
i Violation, NRC Region III has concluded that the tests (
reviewed and accepted by IP were not adequate because the
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butt splices and wire caps were not tested while restrained
- to a grounded metal surface. However, as installed in the i
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plant, these items are not restrained to a grounded metal !
'- surface. When walkdowns of the 196 butt splices were
performed at CPS, no indication was found that these items !
were in contact with'a metal surface. Furthermore, when l
1 testing the nylon wire caps in the fashion required by the l
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NRC, the only way that the wire caps could be held in !
contact with metal was to physically restrain them to the
actuator casings otherwise contact could not be maintained. ;
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Thus, contact of these items with metal is only a
speculative possibility that is unsupported by the design i
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requirements or by the installations actually observed in j
the plant.
i t
l The NRC states that it.s position that the butt splices and t
I wire caps should have been tested in contact with metal is
supported by IEEE Standard 323-1974, "IEEE Standard for
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' Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating
Stations. That standard states that during environmental ;
i qualifications tests: l
6.3.3.2 Mountina. Equipment shall be mounted in a f
i manner and in a position that simulates its -
j expected installation when in actual use.... .
[
i 6.3.1.3 Connections. Equi !
l amannerthatsimu$mentshallbeconnectedin
ates its expected l
installation when in actual use....
I The qualification tests reviewed and accepted by IP l
j satisfied these requirements. Testing the butt s '
' wire caps while restrained in contact with metal,plices as nowand ;
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I required by the NRC, appears contrary to a straight-forward
1
interpretation of IEEE 323-1974, because these items are not j
l expected to be restrained in contact with metal in actual ;
use, and indeed have not been found in that configuration at ,
CPS. l
1
In the cover letter accompanying the Notice of Violation,
the NRC states that the butt spaices and wire nuts should
have been tested in contact with a ground "since that is a
possible configuration and failure mode" (emphasis added).
The requirement here imposed by the NRC is not supported by i
IEEE 323-1974 As noted above, that standard does not '
require testing of plant equipment in all "possible"
configurations, but the expected configuration. According
to Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1986),
"expect" means "to consider probable or certain." Based
vpon the design and installation of the butt splices and
wire caps, contact of these items to a metal ground was not
probable or certain, and in fact was not a condition found
in the t.lant. Thus, the argument that the butt splices and
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wire caps should have been tested in contact with metal is
inconsistent with the plain language of IEEE 323-1974.
IP is not aware that the NRC has applied this type of
interpretation to environmental qualification of items until
>
now, and believes it should not be penalized for this new
~
departure from the customary reading of the IEEE standard.
In this connection, it should be noted that in 1985 the NRC
audited the CPS environmental qualification file for the
Limitorque motor operated valve actuators, including
internal components of the actuators, and concluded in SSER
6 (after IP resolved certain discrepancies in the file) that
environmental qualification of the actuators and their
internal components
letter U-600429 fromhad been
F. A. adequately (demonstrated
Spangenberg IP) to W. R. EucTer (See IP '
' (NRC) dated February 14, 1986: CPS SSER 6 at pp. 3-8 to
3-9). Thus, the interpretation of EQ requirements being
proposed by the NRC is not only unprecedented, but is in
contradiction to findings made earlier by'the NRC. '.
IP has sought to be responsive to the NRC s concerns with
respect to the butt splices and wire caps, and has taken
4 action to bring CPS into conformance with the NRC's new
- interpretation of how these items should have been tested,
as described in subparts I.C and D and III.C and D of IP's
Reply to the Notice of Violation. However, IP believes that
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it is unf air to penalize individual licensees on the basis
of new interpretations of which the licensees were not
j notified, especially when these interpretations are not .
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consistent with earlier findings made by the NRC and are not
apparent from a plain reading of the interpreted standard.
I
IP therefore denies that any violation occurred with respect
to the AMP KYNAR butt splices and the nylon wire caps inside ,
Limitorque motor operated valve actuators. Thus, two of the
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three examples listed in the Notice of Violation should not
- be used in calculating the amount of civil penalty to be I
' assessed against IP. Based upon the one remaining item,
which has been thoroughly corrected by IP (see subsections
II.B. and C. of the Re s environmental qualification program and
i upon the fact that IP' ply to the Notice of Violation),
j is generally sound, IP submits that it is inappropriate to
escalate the civil penalty for the items contained in the
Notice of Violation, and that remission of the penalty is
j
warranted,
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