ML20206K435

Discusses NRC OI Investigation Rept 3-99-002 Re 981018 Personnel Error Which Resulted in Loss of Offsite Power Which Caused Loss of Only Operating Shutdown Cooling Subsystem (a RHR Pump)

ML20206K435
Person / Time
Site:	Clinton
Issue date:	05/07/1999
From:	Dapas M NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	Mcelwain J ILLINOIS POWER CO.
References
EA-99-047, EA-99-47, NUDOCS 9905130162
Download: ML20206K435 (4)

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.May 7.'1999 w

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l EA 99-047 '

Mr. John P. McElwain -

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Chief. Nuclear Officer E

iClinton Power Station ?

lilinois Power Company Mail Code V-275 P. O. Box 678 Clinton,IL 61727

SUBJECT:

NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 3-99-002

Dear Mr. McElwain:

-The Office of Investigations (01) conducted an investigation to determine if licensed operators at -

- the Clinton Power Station willfully violated a technical specification (TS) during a plant transient.

- On October 18,1998, a personnel error resulted in the loss of offsite power which caused a loss of the only operating shutdown cooling subsystem ('A' Residual Heat Removal [RHR) pump).

ETechnical Specification 3.4.10 requires verification of reactor coolant circulation by an attemate method within one hour of discovery that no reactor coolant circulation exists. - For.a variety of valid reasons, the licensed operators violated that requirement when they were unable to restore forced circulation operation within the time specified. The restoration process implemented by the control room operators involved placing an RHR subsystem in operation concurrent with the restoration of an offsite power source.

. The operations crew took approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 13 minutes to restore an RHR subsystem

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to ready status. Just prior to the RHR pump's planned start, the Director of Operations raised a

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concem regarding the additional loadhg that would be placed on the emergency diesel i

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.. generator (EDG) and the subsequent transfer of loads to the offsite power source. Because

offsite power was the preferred source of power and it was expected to be restored within

- 15 minutes, the licensed operators delayed the start of the RHR pump until offsite power was

restored to the electrical bus. That evolution took an additional 60 minutes to accomplish.

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. Based on the evidence developed during the investigation, Ol concluded that the Shift Manager ~

and Control Room Supervisor did willfully violate the continuing TS 3.4.10 requirement to restore forced circulation at 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 13 minutes into the event. That conclusion was based upon

the individuals' failure to place an RHR' pump, which had just become available, in service. The L synopsis from the 01 report is enclosed.

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9905130162 990507 I

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. J. McElwain ~

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.Considering all the circumstances of this case, including: (1) TS 3.4.10 is ambiguous in that

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it does not specifically state what action is required when compliance with the one hour completion time for establishing reactor circulation cannot be achieved; (2) delaying the establishment of forced circulation given the minimal decay heat load that existed, is not

- considered to be safety significant; (3) the intentions of individual actions were based on establishing a more reliable power source which could reduce the risk of repeating the RHR pump restoration process (fill and vent) if the transfer of bus power from the EDG to offsite was unsuccessful; and (4) the operating crew decided to focus on restoring offaite power when operations supervision thought that the action statement for TS 3.8.10, pertaining to the restoration of offsite power, was of a more immediate nature than the action statement for TS 3.4.10, the NRC has concluded that it is unnecessary to make a determination of willfulness in this case as enforcement action is not appropriate.

If you have any questions or comments regarding this matter, please contact David Hills of the NRC Region lli staff at telephone number (630) 829-9733.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Sincerely, Original /s/ M. Dapas Marc Dapas, Lsputy Director Division of Rea: tor Projects Docket No. 50-461

. Licensee No. NPF-62

Enclosure:

As stated See' Attached Distribution

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OFFICE Rill

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NAME RBailey:tb#$ DHills Itf6-HClaytonkRPaul ***

MDapas @i i DATE 05/7/99 05/'//90 05#//99R 05/~1/99 05/7/99

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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

• " OI: Rill concurrence authorizes the pubiic release of the 01 report synopsis 4, y p. } & Ja w = A W cJ+y k f kW VW

Il ab J. McElwain -,

cc w/ encl:

G. Hunger, Station Manager R. Phares, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Performance improvement J. Sipek, Director-Licensing M. Aguilar, Assistant Attomey General

~ G. Stramback, Regulatory Licensing Services Projoct Manager General Electric Company Chairman, DeWitt County Board State Liaison O#icer Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission Distribution:

D. Dambly, OGC, w/enci

'J. Lieberman, OE, w/enci B. Boger, NRR, w/enci M.' Banerjee, NRR w/enci

- RPC (E-Mall)'

' Project Mgr., NRR w/enci J. Caldwell, Rlli w/enci '

B. Clayton, Rill w/ encl.

. SRI Clinton w/enci

DRP w/enci -

DRS w/enci Rill PRR w/eryd PUBLIC IE-p1 w/ encl Docket Fildw/enci GREENS LEO (E-Mail)-

DOCDESK (E-Mail) 130014

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SYNOPSIS 9

This investigation was initiated on January 4,1999, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office ofInvestigations, Region III, to determine whether the licensed reactor operators at the Clinton Power Station willfully violated a technical specification during a plant transient event on October 18-19,1998.

l Based on the facts developed during this investigation, it is concluded the Shift Manager and Control Room Supervisor, both Senior Reactor Operators, deliberately violated the technical specification in that they failed to immediately restore forced core coolant circulation to the reactor when they were capable of so doing, as required.~

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Case No.' 3-1999-002 ij