ML20247J789

Forwards Synopsis of Ofc of Investigations Rept 3-83-018 Re Possible Tampering W/Structural Steel Beam Connections. Although Region Agrees That Repts Falsified by Contractor,No Action Taken Since Inspector No Longer Employed at Plant

ML20247J789
Person / Time
Site:	Clinton
Issue date:	07/24/1989
From:	Greenman E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Hall D ILLINOIS POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 8907310323
Download: ML20247J789 (4)

Text

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idVL 2 4 sag Docket No. 50-461 Illinois Power Company ATTN: Mr. D. P. Hall Senior Vice President Clinton Power Station Mail Code V-275 P. O. Box 678 Clinton, Illinois 61727 Gentlemen:

This letter forwards the synopsis of the Office of Investigations (01) Report 3-83-018 which investigated an allegation of possible tampering with  !

structural steel beam connections at Clinton Power Station (CPS) in February 1983.

We agree with the 01 report conclusions which determined that the quality assurance (QA) inspection reports were falsified by the contractor inspector.

However, due to the lack of safety significance, the age of the case, and considering the fact that the subject inspector is no longer employed at CPS, no further action will be pursued by the NRC.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's Regulations, a copy of this with enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

We will gladly discuss any questions you may have concerning the report.

Sincerely,

- Original cicned by E G caccrm n Edward G. Greenman, Director Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure:

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J. S. Perry, Assistant Vice President D. L. Holtzscher, Acting Manager,

. Licensing and Safety Department DCD/DCB (RIDS)

Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII J. B. Hickman, NRR Project Manager J. W. McCaffrey, Chief. Public l Utilities Division David Rosenblatt, Governor's Office of Consumer Services Sheldon Zabel, Esquire, Schiff Hardin, & Waite Chairman of DeWitt County Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety Nec ', 01 CDH V*" 0

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SYNOPSIS

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On February 25, 1983, NRC Region III (NRC:RIII) referred an allegation of possible tampering with structural steel beam connections at the Clinton Power Station, Clinton, Illinois.

Between February 15-17, 1983, the licensee, Illinois Power Company (IP) conducted a surveillance walkdown of structural steel beam connections in the eest and west heat exchenger bays within the containment building. The surveillance. resulted in the discovery of several deficiencies or nonconformances (missing bolts, missing nuts, threads not crimped on bolts,

. plate washers not covering clip angles, etc.). A review of the inspection reports disclosed that the deficient connections had been inspected and l accepted by Baldwin Associates (BA) Ouality Control (QC) Civil / Structural l (C/S) department between January 10-13, 1963. 1 The IP Quality Assurance (QA) inspector who had discovered the nonconformances contacted the BA:QC inspector who had signed the inspection reports certifying '

the connections were acceptable and infomed him of the deficiencies. The '

BA:QC inspector went to the heat exchanger bays and observed the deficiencies and stated that tampering must have occurred after he inspected and accepted {

the connections. '

. BA management issued a nonconfomance report on the deficiencies and conducted J

c surveillance of other steel beam connections in the containment building.

'- BA management & nd other defirlencies in the heat exchanger bays, but none in the rest of c a tainment. BA managernent concluded that the the deficiencies found in the heat exchanger bays were an isolated occurrence and that they j were caused by tampering. I The Office of Investigations (01:RIII) investigation revealed that the BA:QC inspector performed fourteen inspections by himself in one day in the east heat exchanger bay, and fourteen inspections with the help of a second BA:QC inspec cc in the west heat exchanger bay. A majority of BA:QA/QC personnel knowley,eable with the inspection methods claim tSat it was either impssible or very unlikely the BA:QC inspector could adequately. perform that many inspections in one day. The second QC inspector stated that he observed the BA:QC inspector improperly performing inspections in the west heat exchanger bay while he was working with the BA:QC inspector. The investigation also revealed that a majority of the other BA:QC:C/S inspectors interviewed felt the BA:QC inspector performed inspections "too quickly" and that the BA:QC inspector was counselled "several" times by his supervisor for " rushing" inspections.

The BA:QC inspector stated it only took about ten (10) minutes to perform a steel beam connection inspecticn. Tb BA:QC inspector also said that only one or two bolts needed to be removed froe cach connection in order to perform the inspection. The second BA:QC inspector refutes this contention, along with other BA:QC inspectors and supervisory w r onnel. The second BA:QC inspector said the EA Quality Control Instruction 203, dated August 4, 1982, instructs the BLQC inspectus to remove all bolts and nuts on the connections in order '

to properly perform the inspection.

l Case No. L-83-01B 1

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The 01:RT11 investigation concluded that the BA:QC inspector failed to perform the inspections of the steel beam connections in the east and west heat (

exchanger bays and willfully falsified the inspection reports. (

1 Case No. 3-83-018 2

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