ML20052E526

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RO SI-06:on 820329,safety Injection Occurred While Performing Surveillance Test on Solid State Protection Sys. Caused by Steam Line Isolation Safety Injection Block Not Being Reinstated Prior to End of Test
ML20052E526
Person / Time
Site: Cook American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 04/29/1982
From: Will Smith
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To: James Keppler
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
References
RO-SI-06, RO-SI-6, NUDOCS 8205110204
Download: ML20052E526 (3)


Text

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m<n vstem-lNDIANA_& M!CH]GAN POWER COMPANY DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT

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P.O. Box 458, Bridgman, Michigan 49106 f)\ (4 (616) 465-5901 y HECg-l: -

E b!AY101993 w :1 April 29,1982 5

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I$t Mr. J.G. Keppler, Regional Administrator United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 Operating License DPR-74 Docket No. 50-316 Special Report *!o. SI-06

Dear Mr. Keppler:

The purpose of this letter is to forward to you the attached Special Report in compliance with Appendix A Technical Specifications, Section 3.5.2, Emergency Core Cooling Systems.

Sincerely, lA)/

W.G. Smi th, Jr.

Plant Manager

/bab cc: J.E. Dolan R.S. Hunter R.W. Jurgensen NRC R0:III Resident Inspector R.C. Callen MPSC PNSRC J.F. Stietzel E.L. Townley K.R. Baker W. Lavallee - EPRI 8205110204 820429 3 ifI PDR ADOCK 05000316 i3

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O, INDIANA AND MICHIGAN ELECTRIC COMPANY DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT Operating License: DPR-74 Docket No.: 50-316 Special Report: SI-06 SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION - MARCH 29, 1982 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE The reactor was in Mode 4 with thg Reactor Coolant System being maintained at approximately 700 psig and 344 F. The Unit was in the process of heating up to go to Mode 3 and the RCS was still borated to cold shutdown concentration. All control and shutdown rods were fully inserted.

DESCRIPTION 0F OCCURRENCE C&I Technicians were performing Surveillance Test Procedure THP.4030.STP.145 on the Solid State Protection System, Train A". The Safety Injection occurred when the C&I Technician requested the Control Room Equipment Operator to block Safety Injection. The Equipment Operator blocked both Trains on the " Pressurizer Low Pressure Safety Injection" but did not understand that he was also to block the Steam Generator Steam Line Break Safety Injection". When the C&I Technician returned the " Input Error Inhibit" switch to the normal" position, the S.S.P.S. "saw" a low steam line pressure and initiated a Safety Injection on Train "A".

DESIGNATION OF CAUSE OF OCCUP.RENCE As stated in the " Description of Occurrence",_ a surveillance test on Train "A" of the S.S.P.S. was being performed. The steam line Isolation Safety Injection Block was not reinstated prior to returning the " Input Error Inhibit" switch to the normal" position, a Safety Injection Actuation occurred due to system parameters during the start up conditions exceeding their actuation values.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

! The following is a list of major items that were reviewed for their safety implication:

(a) Reactor Coolant System Cooldown Rate The Reactor Coolant System Temperature was 344 F at the time of the injection and remained at this temperature during the injection.

(b) Thermal Effects of Safety Injection During this occurrence the East Centrifugal Charging Pump injected to the Reactor through the Safety Injection path (13s" nozzles) for a period of 2 minutes. The primary system pressure was approximately 700 psig with a corresponding flowrate from the Centrifugal Charging Pump of approx. 530 gpm with a resultant injection of approx.

1060 gallons. The injection of approx.1060 gallons corresponds to approx. 3.5 minutes injection of the design base used'in the FIRL report F-C4542 which calls for 2 charging pumps each hiving an injection flowrate of 150 gpm. This is the sixth inadvertant Safety Injection into the Reactor Coolant System and conservatively constitute less than 2.6/10,000 of allowable cycles. This is conservativefromthefactthatthedesigntemperatureofthe primary coolant is 540 F while the nprimary coolant temperature at the time of this injection was 344 F which would result in lower temperature gradients than design. The total accumulated cycles to date are 15.05/10,000.

(c) Effects on the Emergency Core Cooling System Piping (ECCS)

The piping and supports in the ECCS were given a thorough visual inspection to determine if any mechanical damage was experienced during the Safety Injection. There was no evidence of any mechanical damage or abr.ormal movements of the piping.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS All applicable C&I Surveillance Procedures have been revised to include step signoffs for both Control Room Operators and C&I Technicians for those steps in the procedures that require blocking Safety Injection.

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