ML17325B339
| ML17325B339 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 11/13/1989 |
| From: | Blind A INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG |
| To: | Davis A NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8911220107 | |
| Download: ML17325B339 (4) | |
Text
ACCELERATED DQHGBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:8911220107 DOC.DATE: 89/11/13 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-315 Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Indiana 05000315 50-316 Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Indiana 05000316 AUTH.NAME 'UTHOR AFFILIATION BLIND,A.A.
(formerly Indiana,
& Michigan Ele RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DAVIS,A.B.
Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Special rept re listed fire barriers inoperable longer than seven days allowed by Tech Spec.
DISTRlBUTION CODE:
IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER),
ncident Rpt, etc.
NOTES:
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-1 LA GIITTER,J.
INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON ACRS WYLIE AEOD/DS P/TPA B DEDRO NRR/DEST/ICSB 7
NRR/DEST/MTB 9H NRR/DEST/RSB 8E NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RES/DSIR/EIB'XTERNAL EG&G WILLIAMSg S LPDR NSIC MAYS,G NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES RECIPIENT LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME 1
1
~
PD3-1 PD 1
1 ACRS MOELLER AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DSP NRR/DEST/ESB 8D NRR/DEST/MEB QH NRR/DEST/PSB 8D NRR/DEST/SGB 8D NRR/DLPQ/PEB 10 N
/DREP/~PB 1 0 REG FILE~
02 GN3 FILE 01 4
4 L ST LOBBY WARD 1
1 NRC PDR 1
1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1
1 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 2,
2 1
1 2
2 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 2
2 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 38 ENCL 38
Indiana Michigan Power Company Cook Nuc!ear Pianr PO, Box 458 Bridgrnan. Ml 49106 616 465 590l INDM&M NICHIGAN POWM November 13, 1989 Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Plant Unit Nos.
1 and 2
Docket, Nos.
50-315 and 50-316 License Nos.
DPR-58 and DPR-74 Document Control One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike
- Rockville, Maryland 20852 Attn: A.B. Davis
Dear Mr. Davis:
This special report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10 action a, to 1) inform you that the following fire barriers have been inoperable longer than the seven days allowed by Technical Specification 3.7.10 action a, and'2) provide an update regarding inoperable fire doors reported in a previous letter dated May 16, 1989..
Fire barrier penetration seal W-9772, separating the Unit One Quadrant Two Pipe Tunnel (Fire Zone 12) and the Unit One West Centrifugal Charging Pump Room (Fire Zone 62C),
was declared inoperable on October 13, 1989 due to inadequate depth of sealing material.
It was returned to service on October 24, 1989.
A fire watch, as required by, Technical Specification 3.7.10 action a, was maintained while the seal was inoperable.
Fire barrier penetration seal W-9704, separating the middle section of the 587'evel Auxiliary Building (Fire Zone 6M) and the Unit Two West Centrifugal Charging Pump Room (Fire Zone 63C),
was declared inoperable on October 17, 1989 due to ongoing work on the penetration which violated the seal.
It was returned to service on October 25, 1989-.
A fire watch, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.10 action a, was maintained while the
seal was inoperable.
S9i1.220i07 Ssiil3 F'ErR ADOCK 05000315 PDC
United States gulatory Commission November 13, 1989 Page 2 of 3
Fire damper 2-HV-ACF-D3, in the Unit Two P-250 Computer Room was declared inoperable on October 19, 1989 due to the failure of its fire damper release mechanism during routine surveillance testing.
At that time, a fire watch, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.10 action a, was established and will remain in effect until the problem is resolved.
This problem, is the same as that experienced with fire dampers 1-HV-ACF-Dl, 1-HV-ACF-D2, 2-HV-ACF-D1, and 2-HV-ACF-D2 as reported in a previous letter dated September 19, 1989.
An engineering analysis/evaluation is being performed on the problems with this 'type of damper release mechanism.
We will inform you through a follow-up report when the engineering analysis/evaluation is complete and all of the affected dampers have been restored to operability.
Fire door 387, the Unit One Reactor Cable Tunnel Quadrant g2 door, was declared inoperable on October 25, 1989 due to the failure of its latching mechanism.
An evaluation of the door latching mechanism determined that more extensive repairs were required to reinforce the door latch attachment points.
It is anticipated that the door will be repaired and returned to operable status by November 29, 1989.
A fire watch, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.10 action a, is being maintained while the door is inoperable.
On October 26,
- 1989, a Civil Construction foreman noticed a 1/8" gap between the block ventilation duct for the control rod drive equipment room supply fan 2-HV-SGRS-4A and the ceiling interface at the 635'levation of the Engineered Safety System and NCC Room (Fire Zone 45).
After finding this condition, the foreman checked the ventilation ducts for fahs having a similar ventilation duct configuration and found gaps in the ducts for fans 2
HV SGRS 1A~
2 HV SGRS 2/
2 HV SGRS 3f 2
HV SGRX 1
2-HV-SGRX-2, 2-HV-SGRX-3, and 2-HV-SGRX-5.
At that time, a roving fire watch, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.10 action 1, was established for the affected fire zones.
This roving patrol will remain in effect until the problem is resolved.
An engineering analysis/evaluation is being performed to determine the best method of repairing the gaps.
We will inform you through a follow-up report when the engineering evaluation/analysis is complete
.and all of the effected fire barriers have been restored to operability.
In a letter dated May 16,
- 1989, we informed you that fire doors 349 and 471, in the Unit One 4KV Complex; and fire doors 350 and 472, in the Unit Two 4KV Complex, were declared inoperable due to an adverse trend of fire doors failing to. close during C02 system testing.
Following an engineering evaluation, which determined that the doors would
United States egulatory Commission November 13, 1989 Page 3 of 3 e
close on a
C02 system actuation, the doors were returned to operable status on October 13, 1989.
A fire watch, as
'equired by Technical Specification 3.7.10 a'ction a, was maintained while the doors were inoperable.
Respectfully, A.A. Blind Plant Manager AAB:clw cc:D.H. Williams, Jr.
A.B. Davis, Region III M.P. Alexich P.A. Barrett J.E.
Borggren R.F. Kroeger NRC Resident Inspector J.G. Giitter, NRC
.R.C. Callen G. Charnoff, Esq.
Dottie Sherman, ANI Library Hahn INPO PNSRC S.J.
Brewer/B.P.
Lauzau