ML17325B635

LER 99-S02-00:on 990428,vulnerability in Safeguard Sys That Could Allow Unauthorized Access to Protected Area Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Original Plant Design.Mods Were Made to Wall Opening to Eliminate Nonconforming Conditions

ML17325B635
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	05/28/1999
From:	Snodgrass D INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17325B634	List: ML17325B633 ML17325B635
References
LER-99-S02, LER-99-S2, NUDOCS 9906070103
Download: ML17325B635 (5)

Text

C FORM 366 U S NUCLEAR REGULA COMMISSION APPROV OMB No. 3150.0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to ktdustry. Forward comments regardlg burden (See reverse for required number of estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nudear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555400I. and to the Papenvork Reduction digits/characters for each block) project (3I50-OI04). 8frice, of Management and Budget, Washington, Dc 20503.

Il an ktformation coIIection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a pe son is not required to respond to, the information collection.

FACILITYNAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)

Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 05000-315 1 OF 3 TITLE Iel Vulnerability in a Safeguard System That Could Allow Unauthorized or Undetected Access to the Protected Area EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT, DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (6)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITYNAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2 05000-316 1999 FACILITYNAME DOCKET NUMBER OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT To THE REQU IREMENTS OF 10 CFR II: (Chock ono or more) (11)

MODE (9) 20.2201 (b) 20.2203(a) (2) (v) 50 73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a) (2) (viii)

POWER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a) (3) (i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)

LEVEL (10) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 20.2203(a) (2)(i) 20.2203(a) (3) (ii) 50.73(a) (2)(iii) X 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a) (2) (iv) OTHER 20.2203(a) (2) (in) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c) (2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER llnclude Ares Code)

Dennis D. Snodgrass, Compliance Engineer (616) 465-5901, X 1627 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DES CRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 'EPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX TO EPIX SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES X No (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.o., approximately 15 single. spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On April 28, 1999, at approximately 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> EDT, with both units in Mode 5, an opening in a wall contiguous with the Security Locker Room and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) was discovered by the Security Operations Supervisor. At 1510 hours0.0175 days <br />0.419 hours <br />0.0025 weeks <br />5.74555e-4 months <br /> EDT, it was determined that this nonconformance constituted a failure,'degradation or discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area or transport for which compensatory measures have not been employed and was reportable as a safeguards event pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR73, Appendix G, paragraph l(c) and 10CFR73.71(b)(1). An Emergency Notification System (ENS) report was made to NRC at 1557 hours0.018 days <br />0.433 hours <br />0.00257 weeks <br />5.924385e-4 months <br /> EDT on the same day.

The apparent cause for this condition was inadequate original plant design. Upon identification of the nonconforming wall opening, compensatory measures were promptly implemented to ensure unauthorized access did not occur. Modifications are being made to the wall opening to eliminate the nonconforming conditions. Compensatory measures will remain in place until the modifications are complete.

This condition was determined to be of minimal safety significance, since security personnel continuously man the SAS.

'll'IIOb070103 990528 PDR ADOCK 05000315 S PDR NRC FORM 366 I6.1998I

1 ltEC FORM 366A U.s. NUCLEAR LATORY COMMISSION (S.1 996)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

CONTINUATION 'EXT FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 05000-315 YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION 2 OF 3 NUMBER 1999 S002 00 TEXT llfmore spaceis required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A/ (17)

Conditions Prior To Event Unit 1 Mode 5 in Cold Shutdown Unit 2 Mode 5 in Cold Shutdown Descri tlon Of The Event On April 28, 1999, at approximately 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> EDT, an opening in a wall contiguous with the Security Locker Room and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) was discovered by the Security Operations Supervisor. At 1510 hours0.0175 days <br />0.419 hours <br />0.0025 weeks <br />5.74555e-4 months <br /> EDT, it was determined that this nonconformance constituted a failure, degradation or discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area or transport for which compensatory measures have not been employed.

Cause Of The Event The apparent cause for this event was inadequate original plant design. The investigation determined that the opening was part of original as-built condition of the SAS. Based on the available drawings, a barrier was never installed within this opening to prevent unauthorized access, and meet the Protected Area Barrier requirements for openings. The nonconforming wall opening was not readily visible from the SAS or Security Locker Room and remained undetected since original plant construction.

Anal sis Of The Event Commencing at approximately 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> EDT April 28, 1999, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 both in Mode 5, an opening in a wall contiguous with the Security Locker Room and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) was identified as nonconforming and vulnerable to possible compromise. The identified conditions constituted a failure degradation or discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area or transport for which compensatory measures have not been employed. This event was reported as a safeguards event pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR73, Appendix G, paragraph l(c) and 10CFR73.71(b)(1) (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ENS report). An ENS report was made to the NRC Operations Center at 1557 hours0.018 days <br />0.433 hours <br />0.00257 weeks <br />5.924385e-4 months <br /> EDT on April 28, 1999. This report is being made pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR73, Appendix G, paragraph l(c) and 10CFR73.71(d) (30 day report).

Compensatory measures were established by security upon identification of the wall opening vulnerabilities. Follow-up investigation of the building walls and ceiling resulted in no additional openings being discovered. This condition was determined to be of minimal safety significance, since security personnel continuously man the SAS.

NRC FORM 366A (6.1998)

IIRC FORM 366A U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I6.1998 l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DQGKET l2) LER NUMBER {6) PAGE I3)

Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 05000-315 YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION 3 OF 3 NUMBER 1999 S002 00 TEXT llfmore spaceis required, use additional copies of NRC Form 386A/ l17)

Corrective Actions Compensatory measures were established by security upon identification of the wall opening vulnerabilities. These actions included immediately posting an armed security officer. After investigation of the opening, compensatory measures were downgraded to observation of the area by a security officer, securing access patrols of the affected area and monitoring the access portals by the Access Control Officer. These compensatory measures will remain in place until the wall opening is conforming.

A plant modification will install a permanent barrier in the nonconforming wall opening.

An assessment team is walking down security vital barriers as part of the Restart Readiness Assessment Program.

Similar Events 316/99-S 001-00 NRC FORM 366A I6-1998)

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