ML17325B631

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LER 99-S03-00:on 990430,vital Area Barrier Degradation Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Insp & Maint of Vital Area Barrier.Repairs & Mods Were Made to Barriers to Eliminate Degraded & Nonconforming Conditions
ML17325B631
Person / Time
Site: Cook American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 06/01/1999
From: Berry L
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17325B629 List:
References
LER-99-S03, LER-99-S3, NUDOCS 9906070066
Download: ML17325B631 (3)
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Text

4RC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGU Y COMMISSION APPRO Y OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001 I6-1998)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information LtCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (TW F33). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory (See reverse for required number of Commission. Washington, DC 205554001, and to the Paperwork Reduction digits/characters for each block) Project (31500104), Oirice of Management and Budget, Washington. DC 20503.

If an information collection does not display a currentry veld OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person'hr not required to respond to. the information cogection.

FACILITYNAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)

Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 05000-315. 1 OF 3 TrTLE I4)

Nonconforming Vital Area Barriers EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORTS DATE l7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

MONTH DAY SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FACll.lTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2 05000-316 99 1999 03 FACrLIIYNAME DOCKET NUMBER OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQU IREMENTS OF 10 CFR II: (Check one or moro) (11)

MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a) (2) (v) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)

POWER 20.2203(a) (1) 20.2203(a) (3)(i) 50.73(a) l2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2) (x)

LEVEL (10) 20,2203(a) (2) (i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a) Lz) (iii) X 7371 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a) (2) (iii) 50.36(c)(l ) 50.73(a)(2)(v) Spemfy in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2](iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a) (2)(vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER Rnc4de Area Code)

Lyle R. Berry, Regulatory Compliance Engineer (616) 465-5901 X 1623 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DES CRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX To EPIX SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES X No (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On April 30, 1999, at approximately 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> EDT, with both units'in Mode 5, a vital area (VA) barrier degradation was discovered in a penetration in the floor of the common hallway of the Auxiliary Feed Pump Rooms for Units 1 and 2. This consisted of missing and corroded fasteners on a penetration barrier. At 0910 hours0.0105 days <br />0.253 hours <br />0.0015 weeks <br />3.46255e-4 months <br /> EDT, it was determined that this was reportable as a safeguards event pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR73, Appendix G, paragraph l(c) and 10CFR73.71(b)(1). An Emergency Notification System (ENS) report was made to NRC at 0956 hours0.0111 days <br />0.266 hours <br />0.00158 weeks <br />3.63758e-4 months <br /> EDT on April 30, 1999.

The apparent cause for this event was inadequate inspection and maintenance of the VA barrier.

On May 14, 1999, at approximately 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT, with both units in Mode 5, VA barrier nonconformances were discovered 'n cable tray openings between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 4 KV Rooms and their respective Reactor Cable Tunnels. These consisted of openings which did not meet NUREG 0908 criteria. At 1227 hours0.0142 days <br />0.341 hours <br />0.00203 weeks <br />4.668735e-4 months <br /> EDT, it was determined that this event was reportable pursuant to the same criteria as above. An ENS update report was made to NRC at 1326 hours0.0153 days <br />0.368 hours <br />0.00219 weeks <br />5.04543e-4 months <br /> EDT on May 14, 1999. The apparent cause for this second event was inadequate plant design.

Each of the above barrier degradations and nonconformances were identified during a Security Restart Readiness Self-Assessment team inspection. Upon identification, security compensatory measures were promptly implemented to prevent unauthorized access. Repairs or modifications will be made to the barriers to eliminate the degraded or nonconforming conditions. Compensatory measures will remain in place until the vital area barriers are restored to conforming conditions.

Follow-up investigations provided reasonable assurance that these vital areas had not been compromised. Therefore, there were minimal implications to the health and safety of the public as a result of these events.

9906070066 99060i PDR ADOCK 050003'i5 anr

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR ULATORY COMMISSION 16-1998)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACIUTY NAME I1) t DQGKET I2) LER NUMBER I6) PAGE I3)

Cook Nu lear Plant Unit 1 05000-315 YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION 2 OF 3 NUMBER 1999 S003 00 TEXT /Ifmore speceis required, use edditionel copies of NRC Form 366Ai I17)

Conditions Prior To Event Unit 1 Mode 5 in Cold Shutdown Unit 2 Mode 5 in Cold Shutdown Descri tion Of The Event On April 30, 1999, at approximately 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> EDT, a vital area (VA) barrier degradation was discovered in a penetration in the floor of the common hallway of the Auxiliary Feed Pump Rooms for Units 1 and 2 during a Security Restart Readiness Self-Assessment walkdown inspection. This consisted of missing and corroded fasteners on a penetration barrier. With the barrier removed, the penetration did not meet NUREG 0908 size criteria. At 0910 hours0.0105 days <br />0.253 hours <br />0.0015 weeks <br />3.46255e-4 months <br /> EDT, it was determined that this nonconformance constituted a discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a VA for which compensatory measures have not been employed.

On May 14, 1999, at approximately 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> EDT, VA barrier nonconformances were discovered in cable tray openings between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 4 KV Rooms and their respective Reactor Cable Tunnels. These consisted of openings which did not meet NUREG 0908 size criteria. This determination was made after the openings had been measured and a review of engineering drawings confirmed that there were no additional barriers within the fire barrier material located within the ope'ning. At 1227 hours0.0142 days <br />0.341 hours <br />0.00203 weeks <br />4.668735e-4 months <br /> EDT, it was determined that this nonconformance also constituted a discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a VA for which compensatory measures have not been employed.

Cause Of The Event The apparent cause for the April 30, 1999 event was inadequate inspection and maintenance of the VA barrier. The penetration involved is an opening in the floor of the common hallway of the Auxiliary Feed Pump Rooms for Units 1 and

2. The investigation determined that the opening was identified some time in the past as requiring a security barrier. A barrier was installed, attached to the concrete by bolted clamps. When this barrier was inspected to insure barrier compliance, it was found that one mounting nutlclamp was missing and the remaining mounting bolts were rusted away.

The apparent cause for the May 14, 1999 event was inadequate plant design. Evaluation of the openings for the cable tray wall penetrations between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 4 KV Rooms and their respective Reactor Cable Tunnels identified that the these opening were not in conformance with the requirements of NUREG 0908: The nonconformance of the cable tray penetrations was not readily visible due to fire barrier materials in the openings.

Anal sis of the Event At approximately 0910 hours0.0105 days <br />0.253 hours <br />0.0015 weeks <br />3.46255e-4 months <br /> EDT April 30, 1999, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 both in Mode 5, a VA barrier in a penetration in the floor of the common hallway of the Auxiliary Feed Pump Rooms for Units 1 and 2 was identified as nonconforming and vulnerable to possible compromise. The identified conditions constituted a failure, degradation or discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, VA or transport for with compensatory measures have not been employed. This event was reported as a safeguards event pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR73, Appendix G, paragraph l(c) and 10CFR73.71(b)(1) (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ENS report).

An ENS report was made to the NRC Operations Center at 0956 hours0.0111 days <br />0.266 hours <br />0.00158 weeks <br />3.63758e-4 months <br /> EDT on April 30, 1999.

NRC FORM 366A i6-1998)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I6-1999)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITYNAME I1) DOCKET I2) LER NUMBER I6) PAGE {3)

Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 05000-315 YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION 3 OF 3 NUMBER 1999 S003 00 TEXT /lfmore spaceis required, use additional copies of IVRC Form 366A/ I17)

At approximately 1227 hours0.0142 days <br />0.341 hours <br />0.00203 weeks <br />4.668735e-4 months <br /> EDT May 14, 1999, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 both in Mode 5, VA barriers were identified as nonconforming and vulnerable to possible compromise. The identified conditions constituted a failure, degradation or discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, VA or transport for with compensatory measures have not been employed. This event was reported as a safeguards event pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR73, Appendix G, paragraph l(c) and 10CFR73.71(b)(1) (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ENS report). An ENS report was made to the NRC Operations Center at 1326 hours0.0153 days <br />0.368 hours <br />0.00219 weeks <br />5.04543e-4 months <br /> EDT on May 14, 1999.

This report, which addresses both of the above events, is being made pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR73, Appendix G, paragraph l(c) and 10CFR73.71(d) (30 day report).

Compensatory measures were established by security upon identification of the VA barrier vulnerabilities. Follow-up investigations provided reasonable assurance that these VA barriers.had not been compromised. Therefore, there were minimal implications to the health and safety of the public as a result of these events.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Compensatory measures were established by security upon identification of the VA barrier vulnerabilities. These actions included immediately posting an armed security officer upon discovery.

Temporary repairs were completed on the barrier for the opening in the floor of the common hallway of the Auxiliary Feed Pump Rooms at 1115 hours0.0129 days <br />0.31 hours <br />0.00184 weeks <br />4.242575e-4 months <br /> EDT on April 28, 1999, with permanent. repairs scheduled for implementation. Thiy secured the barrier sufficiently to allow reduction of compensatory measures to periodic patrols by security personnel. ~

The openings for the cable tray wall penetrations between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 4 KV Rooms and the Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Cable Tunnels will be modified to ensure compliance with NUREG 0908. Compensatory measures will remain in place until the VA barriers are restored to conforming conditions.

The ongoing Security Restart Readiness Self-Assessment team inspections will address the identification and correction of existing VA area barrier vulnerabilities due to design, materiel deficiencies or other causes prior to restart from the current outages of both units.

Security will prepare and implement a procedure for future refueling outages to inspect VA barriers to identify and correct degraded and nonconforming conditions.

SIMILAR EVENTS 315/99-S001-00 315/99-S002-00 NRC FoRM 366A 16-19991

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