IR 05000413/1986033

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Insp Repts 50-413/86-33 & 50-414/86-36 on 860825-29.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Radiation Protection,Including Organizational Changes,Health Physics Staffing & IE Bulletin & Info Notice Followup
ML20206T895
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/18/1986
From: Hosey C, Troup G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206T858 List:
References
50-413-86-33, 50-414-86-36, IEB-78-08, IEB-78-8, IEIN-86-024, IEIN-86-042, IEIN-86-043, IEIN-86-044, IEIN-86-046, IEIN-86-24, IEIN-86-42, IEIN-86-43, IEIN-86-44, IEIN-86-46, NUDOCS 8610070220
Download: ML20206T895 (8)


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p afou- UNITED STATES

'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON

['\ , REGION 11 j 101 MARIETTA STREET, *I f, 2 ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

%,,,,, SEP 2 2 1986 Report Nos.: 50-413/86-33 and 50-414/86-36 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242

. Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52 Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: August 25-29, 1986 Inspector: M G. L. Troup N e 7//]/Jl Date Signed Approved by: b h 7// y /dd C. M. NdsF/ , Sectipn Chief 'Dhfe Signed Division of Radiattion Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted 'in the areas of radiation protection including: organizational changes,' health physics staffing, training, external exposure control and dosimetry, program for maintaining occupational radiation exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), special radiation surveys, and followup on IE Information Notice Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

l 8610070220 860922 PDR ADOCK 05000413 G PDR

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted

' Licensee Employees

  • J. W. Hampton, Station Manager
  • J. W. Cox, Technical Services Superintendent
  • W. P. Deal, Station Health Physicist A. J. Duckworth, Radwaste Chemistry Coordinator G. T. Mode, HP Support Functions Coordinator G. L. Courtney, HP Staff Coordinator P. N. McNamara, Health Fhysicist L. D. Schlise, Health Physics Supervisor (S&C)

F. W. Wilson, Health Physics Supervisor (R&IC)

D. E. Sexton, ALARA Supervisor G. G. Bennett, Training Supervisor

  • P. b. Leroy, Licensing Engineer F. P. Schiffley, Licensing Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, and office personne NRC Resident Inspectors
  • P. H. Skinner, Senior Resident Inspector
  • P. K. VanDoorn, Senior Resident Inspector

, * Lesser, Resident Inspector

  • Attended exit interview l Exit Interview l The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 29, 1986, with I those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings and observation No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

l Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspectio . Containment High Airborne Activity - Unit 1(83725)

, On August 24, 25, and 26, while opening the primary side manways on the l Unit 2 steam generators, alarms were received from the containment Gas Monitor (1-EMF-39). In each instance, a containment purge was

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occurring using the Vent Purge (VP) syste Each time the alarm was received, the VP flow was secured and the containment evacuate Samples of the containment atmosphere were taken and VP flow reestablishe On August 26, when the alarm was received, the containment equipment hatch was partially open to permit entrance of equipment. During the period between the VP flow being stopped and the equipment hatch being closed, there was a possible release pathway through the hatc The cause of the alarms was radioactive gas (predominantly xenon-133)

being released when the manways were removed. Particulate and iodine samples collected on the platform at the steam generator on August 28 showed several corrosion and activation products in concentrations less than the unrestricted area limit An air sample which was being routinely collected outside of the equipment hatch during this time did not show any particulate or iodine activity.

, The inspector reviewed the situation with licensee representative The monitor setpoint for 1-EMF-39 (purging the containment with the VP system) where specified in Technical Specification Table 3.3-6 as twice the ambient concentration. This resulted in a very low setpoint (200 counts / minute) compared to background level When no purge is taking place, the setpoint is base.d on the concentration which would give a submersion dose of 2 mrem /hr, which correlates to approximately 4,500 counts / minut At the end of the inspection, the licensee was evaluating the potential release and the consequence However, the preliminary evaluation was that the release was of a small magnitude and would result in a negligible dose to anyone outside the containment or offsit The inspector acknowledged this but advised licensee management at the exit interview that this should be quantifie Senior licensee management acknowledged thi On September 10, 1986, the inspector discussed the final evaluation results with the cognizant personnel by telephon Using very conservative assumptions and methodologies, a total release of 0.11 Curies of xenon-133 was calculated. This would result in a dose commitment at the site boundary of less than 0.01 mrem. _ The release will be included in the quarterly gaseous effluent repor Details of the calculations and compliance with the effluent technical specifications and the offsite dose calculation manual will be reviewed by the appropriate Region II technical section at a later dat No violations or deviations were identifie . Organization Changes (83722) The licensee made an organizational change within the health physics group to provide additional coverage and better coordination on each

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shif The organizational change resulted in the promotion of a new coordinator and several new supervisors. As the change was below the level shown in Section 6 of the Technical Specifications, prior NRC approval was not required. The distribution of staff and assignment of responsibilities is a management functio Section 6.3.1 of the Technical Specifciations requires that each member of the unit staff shall meet or exceed the minimum qualifications of ANSI N18.1-1971, except for the Radiation Protection Manager (Station Health Physicist). ANSI N18.1-1971 states that supervisors not requiring an NRC license should have four (4) years experience in the discipline he supervises. The inspector reviewed the qualifications of four new supervisors who had been promoted as the result of the organization change. All four individuals met or exceeded the minimum requirements of ANSI N18.1-197 No violations or deviations were identifie . Staffing (83722)

To provide additional health physics support during the Unit 1 refueling outage, approximately 85 vendor technicians and supervisors are being utilize The inspector discussed the qualification, training and testing of these technicians with various supervisors. The basic requirements are specified in procedure HP/0/8/1000/19, Vendor Health Physics Technician Training / Qualification. Many of the vendor technicians have previous experience at licensee plants and have current training in effec New technicians are required to achieve a minimum score on a one hundred question test before being accepted into the radiation worker trainin The inspector reviewed approximately twenty test papers for vendor technicians; those who had not achieved a passing score had not been accepte No violations or deviations were identifie . Training (83723) The inspector attended a training session which is part of radiation worker training and indoctrination, and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3) for site specific training of NRC inspectors. The principal method of training was a series of video tapes, supplemented by hand-outs and discussions by the instructor. Certain aspects covered by the tapes, such as badging and designation of access authority to different zones, were out of date and did not reflect current practices. However, the instructor adequately identified and addressed these point The inspector discussed this with the cognizant supervisor, who acknowledged this and stated that the lesson plans and the tapes were being reviewed and would be updated, since they are used at all of the licensee's sites and for the General Office training. The inspector had no further question . . _ _ - . - _ _ _ . -.

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i i The licensee reacires training for unescorted access to the radiation

. controlled area and -annual retraining. The inspector selected ten individuals who had received radiation exposures greater than 100 mrem

for the calendar quarter from the daily dosimeter printout and verified

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that their training was current from a review of the training and l

access authorization printou No violations or deviations were identifie <

j 8. External Occupational Exposure Control and Personnel Dosimetry (83524)

I Use of Dosimeters and Controls

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The licensee was required by 10 CFR 20.202, 20.201(b), 20.101, 20.102, 20.104, 20.402, 20.403, 20.405, 19.13, 20.407, and 20.408 to maintain worker's doses below specified levels and keep records of and make

reports of doses. The licensee was required by 10 CFR 20.203 and j Technical Specification 6.12 to post and control access to plant areas.

i FSAR Chapter 12 also contained commitments regarding dosimetry and dose

, control During tours of the facility, the inspector observed the  ;

! wearing of Thermoluminescent Dosimeters (TLDs) and pocket dosimeters by

workers. During plant tours, the inspector observed the posting of 4 areas and reviewed posted survey results to determine that postings 1 were in accordance with 10 CFR 20.

t l Frisking

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, During tours of the plant, the inspector observed the exit of workers

. and movement of material from contamination control to clean areas to

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determine if proper frisking was performed by workers. Workers were i observed frisking in accordance with the training instructions and posting , Instrumentation l During tours of the plant, the inspector observed the use of survey 1 instruments by the plant staff. The inspector obsersed instruments in use by technicians, ready for issue in the laboratory, and installed at

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various exits were within the current calibration period and had been

' response checked daily in use. The inspector also checked the battery response of several instruments which were available for use.

Special Dosimetry Requirements

! Work to be performed during the Unit 1 outage will involve entries into i non-uniform radiation fields which have the potential for highly

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variable dose rates. Licensee supervisors discussed the need for multiple dosimetry with the inspector and stated that special packages j had been prepared for use in jobs such as steam generator sludge

, The j lancing, where highly variable inspector also reviewed the radiation work permits fields are routinely (encountered.RWPs) for severa

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4 of these jobs and verified that special dosimetry requirements (multiple badging) was specified on the RWP No violations or deviations were identified.

Program for Maintaining Radiation Exposures ALARA (83528) ,

, CFR 20.1(c) specifies that ifcensees should implement programs to

- keep worker's doses ALARA. FSAR, Chapter 12, also contains licensee commitments regarding ALARA action The licensee has an ALARA group with the health physics organization comprised of five individuals involved in planning for outage wor All work with an estimated exposure greater than one man-rem required ALARA preplannin Through the preplanning review, shielding j recommendations were made, job surveys were delineated and overall evaluation of the work to be performed was made from a radiological

! point c' vie Post-job ALARA reviews were required for jobs whose i dose estimates exceeded 50 man-rem and for those jobs where dose

estimates were exceeded by 25 percent. Because of the changing scope of the work to be accomplished during the Unit 1 outage, the shielding

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requirements have been changing. The inspector reviewed two shielding requests and determined that engineering evaluation and authorization

had been provided for the Installation. A crew of approximately nine workers was assigned to shielding installation, maintenance and removal

. wor Plant management commitment to ALARA appeared to be stron ALARA j reports are sent to plant management monthly and include such data as

man-rem by work group, station dose distribution by work group and a

! graphic representation of estimated versus actual exposure received for l the year.

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i In addition to the ALARA planning for major jobs and the outage, an ALARA committee comprised of representatives from each plant work group is organized to review activities and initiate actions necessary to j implement the ALARA progra The inspector reviewed the meeting

reports for all of the meetings held in 1986 and discussed the actions J identified and taken with the chairman. As part of the actions to I bring ALARA issues forward, both an ALARA problem form and an ALARA

" hot line" with a recorder have been established to permit individuals l to identify problems. To be effective, continuing efforts by the ALARA i committee and supervision at all levels is necessary to get the plant staff involved in ongoing ALARA improvements.

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! No violations or deviations were identified.

l l 1 Special Radiation Surveys (83521, 83524)

l The inspector reviewed Procedure TP/2/B/2200/01, Biological Shield

Survey for the Unit 2 Power Ascension Program. The required neutron ,

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and gamma surveys had been performed at 0%, 30%, 50%, 75%, and 100%

power. During the survey at 100% power, the survey in the lower ice condenser was not completed due to high levels ( > l R/hr) encountered around the coolant piping at 75% power. This action was in accordance with section 6.4 of the procedure, which called for termination of the survey if.the general area radiation levels exceeded 500 mrem /hr. The inspector determined from the review that the sources of high levels were identified and that, when necessary, changes to the FSAR had been initiated to revise the radiation control zone classification based on the higher levels (generally based on the Unit 1 survey results). IE Bulletin 78-08, Radiation Levels from Fuel Element Transfer Tubes, described a situation where excessive radiation levels had been encountered during fuel transfer because of inadequate shielding. The licensee had evaluated the adequacy of the fuel transfer tube and provided locked access doors to restrict access to the tube in the annulus area. To assure that the shielding is adequate, a special radiation survey will be conducted during the first fuel element transfe The inspector reviewed TP/1/B/2200/02, Fuel Assembly Transfer Tube Shielding Survey, and discussed its implementation with licensee personnel. The inspector determined that a similar test procedure has been approved for Unit 2 and will be implemented during the first Unit 2 refuelin The inspector had no further questions at this tim The results of the survey will be reviewed during a subsequent inspectio No violations or deviations were identified.-

11. Breathing Air Quality (83525)

NUREG-0041 states that breathing air in compressed gas cylinders must meet at least Class D standards. Plant procedure HP/0/B/1005/05, Breathing Air Systems- Quality Assurance, requires that the air compressor outlet, which supplies the VB (breathing air system) system and refills breathing air cylinders for self-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBAs) be tested monthly for conformance with Class D air. The inspector reviewed the monthly test results from the contractor laboratory for the period March-July 1986. All results were within the limits set for Class D ai No violations or deviations were identifie . IEInformationNotices(92717)

The inspector determined that the following Information Notices (IENs) had been received by the licensee, reviewed for applicability, distributed to appropriate personnel and that action, as appropriate, had been take IEN 86-24 Respirator Users Notice: Increased Inspection Frequency for Certain Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus IEN 86-42 Improper Maintenance of Radiation Monitoring Systems

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IEN 86-43 Problems with Silver Zeolite Sampling of Airborne Radioiodine IEN 86-44 Failure to Follow Procedures When Working in High Radiation Areas IEN 86-46 Improper Cleaning and Decontamination of Respiratory Protection Equipment i

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