IR 05000413/1990028
| ML20058F628 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 10/26/1990 |
| From: | Ennis J, Mcguire D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058F622 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-90-28, 50-414-90-28, NUDOCS 9011090037 | |
| Download: ML20058F628 (6) | |
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. UNITE) STATES
+4 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '
8" REGION il
k 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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g ATLANTA, CEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-413/90-28 and 50-414/90-28'
Licensee: Duke Power Company:
422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242'
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Docket Nos.:
50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.:.NP.F-35 and NPT-52
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Facility Name:
Catawba 1 and 2 Inspection [
ed: October 1-4,'1990 Inspector:
/0/2 5/fC NInnis, Safeguards Inspector Date Signed Accompanying Inspector:
B. Orders, Senior Resident t
inspector, Catawba
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10/3.6 '90 Approved by:
3g David R. KcGuire, hief Dat4! Signed
Safeguards Sec on i
Nuclear Materia afety and Safeguards Branch-Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY'
Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was' conducted in the area of Physical Security Program for Power Reactors with emphasis on Compensatory Measures and Records and Reports.
The inspector reviewed the circumstance surrounding a safeguards event reported by the licensee on September 11, 1990.
l Results:
It was confirmed that the event reported on September 11, 1990, involved an apparent violation of regulatory requirements.
Plant operations personnel failed to recognize the plant's Standby Shutdown Facility was degraded and, as a result, failed to notify security to take required compensatory measures.
9011090037 901026 PDR ADOCK 05000413 Q
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REPORT DETAILS
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Persons Contacted i
Licensee Employees
- D. F. Caldwell, Station Services Superintendent, Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS)
- R. N. Casler, Operations Superintendent, CNS-
- W. R. Cross, Regulatory Compliance, Nuclear Production Dept (NPD) Duke
. Power Company (DPC)
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- J. W. Hampton, Station Manager, CNS
- C, L. Hartzell, Compliance Manager, CNS
- J. G. Helms, Nuclear Security Specialist, CNS
- V. King, Compliance Specialist, CNS
- W. R. Proctor, Member, Catawba Safety Review Group, CNS-
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- J. H. Roach, Security Manager, CNS NRC Personnel
- M. Shymlock, Section Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, Region 11
- W. Orders, Senior Resident inspector
- J. Zeiler, Resident Inspector
- Attended October 4, 1990 exit interview
- Attended October 4 and October 23, 1990 exit interview
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- Attended October 23, 1990 exit interview-
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2.
Compensatory Measures (81064)
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On September 11, 1990, the licensee reported, via the Emergency Notifica-
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tion System, that the Catawba Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) had been in a degraded condition from 3:55 p.m.,
September 8, to 5:30 p.m.,
September 10, without having had security compensatory measures implemented.
Subseque.nt investigation revealed that the.. degraded condition had actually existed intermittently since 11:55 p.m. on
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September 5, 1990.
Detailed below are the circumstances surrounding this event:
Executive Summary On September 11,1990, at 1:35 p.m., Unit 2 was in Mode 3. Hot Standby.
During an Operations review of tagout sheets, it was discovered that
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Removal and Restoration tag number (R&R) 20-1315 had not been cleared..
This R&R tagged out breaker SMXG R04E, rendering the-Standby Makeup Pump P
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With this pump inoperable, the SSF~ was inoperable and security compensatory measures were required.
Unit 2 had entered Mode 3 on September 5, 1990, at 11:55 p.m. with'R&R 20-1315 outstanding. -SSF Technical Specification 3.7.13 was not violated when Mode 3 was entered, because with the SSF inoperable Technical Specification 3.0.4 was not applicable.
The unit did however enter a 7 day Action Statement which.
required the SSF to be restored to operability.
Operations personnel did not recognize that the SSF was inoperable: and as a result. security compensatory measures were not established as required..When the problem was detected on September 11, Operations.immediately notified Security of the degraded condition and R&R 20-1315 was cleared.
Security, at the time of notification, was performing SSF degrade compensatory measures for another unrelated activity.
A Safeguards Event Report was completed by Security and the NRC was notified.
Background The Standby Shutdown System (SSS)'provides an alternate and independent means to achieve and maintain a-Hot Standby condition.for one or' both units.
Capability to maintain Hot Standby on both units for a period of
three days without damage control measures is provided, j
The SSS supplies makeup to the Reactor Coolant (NC) System by utilizing
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the Standby Makeup Pump to supply borated water to the NC pump seals in a
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quantity adequate enough to accommodate normal system leakage, and provide l
NC System makeup.
1l The SSF controls the secondary side volume by ) utilizing the Auxiliary'
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Feedwater (CA) System Turbine Driven. Pump (CAPT which takes suction from
the Condenser Circulating Water System piping.
This supplies feedwater to l
the B and C Steam Generators thereby providing a heat. sink.for the NC i
System, i
All instrumentation and controls are provided to allow the operator initiation and control of the orderly progression of each Unit to Hot
Standby, These instruments and controls are located in the SSF. The SSF l
also contains a Diesel Generator to provide assured power for SSS
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operations should external power sources be lost.
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The SSS is required to be operable in Modes 1, 2 ~and 3.-
Should any of.
the mechanical or electrical equipment utilized by the SSS become i
inoperable, Operations must notify Security immediately, per Operations
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Management Procedures (OMP) 2-29, such that SSF degrade compensatory-i measures can be established, i
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Event Details On June 11, 1990, at 6:05 p.m., with Unit 2 in Mode 4, the breaker feeding the Unit 2 Standby Makeup Pump, SMXG R04E, was white tagged open per R&R
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20-1315.
The pump was removed from service due to the loss of a suction source from the Spent Fuel Pool.
This action was entered into the Technical Specification Action item Log (TSAIL) at that time as entry number 1188.. However, on June 14, Operations deleted this entry.
During outages, Operations tracks only items required to be operable in Modes 5-and 6.
On September 4,1990, the Control Room Senior Reactor Operator (CRSRO)
completed a handwritten list of R&Rs required to be cleared prior to entering Mode 3.
The Unit Supervisor, also an SRO, began clearing items from this list concentrating primarily on CA items. - At the end of the shift, prior to entering Mode 3, R&R 20-1315 was still outstanding but the handwritten list was discarded.
On September 5, 1990, the same CRSRO performed;another pre-mode 3 review.
Once again, a handwritten list was developed and presented to the same-
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Unit. Supervisor.
He was told that R&R 20-1315 was not required to be cleared prior to entering Mode 3, but that security would have to be notified of the SSF degrade.
During that shift, the Unit Supervisor
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cleared all items precluding Mode 3 entry from the list, but did not clear R&R 20-1315.
Again the list was discarded.
Later that day, after checking with the Unit Supervisor, the CRSR0 initialed steps 14, 26, and
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26A on OP/2/A/6100/01- (Controlling Procedure for' Unit Startup -
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Enclosure 4.4), which verified that the SSF.was operable, and that items preventing entry.into Mode 3-had been cleared.
Unit 2 entered Mode 3 at 11:55 p.m.
As stated previously, Technical Specification 3.7.13 was not violated by entering Mode 3 with the SSF inoperable in that Technical Specification 3.0.4 was not applicable.
On September 11,1990, at 1:35 p.m., with Unit :2 in Mode 3, the Shift l
Supervisor, who was performing an R&R~ review in preparation for entering-l Mode 2, discovered R&R 20-1315 outstanding.
Operations immediately notified Security of the SSF degrade.
Actions ~were then taken to clear R&R 20-1315, At the time of notification, compensatory measures had already been established for an unrelated activity.
Security notified the NRC of the event at 2:20 p.m.
l From the time Unit 2 entered Mode 3, at 11:55 p.m. on September 5, 1990,
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l until the Shift Supervisor notified Security on September 11, 1990, at l
1:35 p.m., 5 days, 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> and 40 minutes had elapsed. H.owever, during l
this period, SSF compensatory measures had been established on several
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occasions due to CAPT tests.
They were as follows:
From September 6, 1990 at 4:30 a.m. to September 6, 1990 at
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11:00 p.m.
From September 7, 1990 at 4:30 a.m. to September 8,.1990-at 3:55 p.m.
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From September 10, 1990 at 5:30 p.m. to September 11, 1990 at
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1:35 p.m.
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Therefore, the total time that' the SSF was; degraded with no security i
compensatory measures in place was 59 hours6.828704e-4 days <br />0.0164 hours <br />9.755291e-5 weeks <br />2.24495e-5 months <br /> and 40' minutes.
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There are two issues of concern in the operations area associated with
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this event. First, on September 5,1990, the CRSR0 initialed' procedure
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steps which indicates that the SSF was' operable when in fact it wasLnot.
The second issue concerns the shif t turnover process during the period from September 5,1990 through September 11, 1990, when the unit was in Mode 3.
During this time, numerous shift changes occurred with at least 2 operators per shift performing Operations Management Procedure OMP 2-22
" Shift Turnover," without detecting that R&R 20-1315 was outstanding.
It appears that the intent and purpose of the aboveErequirements are to assist the operator in being knowledgeable of plant' status. However, during the numerous shift turnover evolutions : plant status was not known as it related to SSF operability.
Operations personnel failed to follow Operating Procedure OP/2/A/6100/01-i in that by initialling Steps 14, 26, and 26A, the CRSRO verified that the SSF was operable and that any item preventing entry into Mode 3. had been cleared when in fact neither was the case.
Thus the degraded condition of the SSF was not identified. This is another example of i
failure to follow procedure similar to that identified in NRC Inspection Report 90-24.
The licensee was also issued a violation for a similar SSF degraded l
condition occurrence in NRC Inspection Report 89-23.
The corrective actions identified t,/ the licensee in their response to this violation
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dated January 31, 1990, do not appear to have been effective in preventing reoccurrence.
This is identified as an apparent violation (50-414/
90-28-01).
3. Records and Reports (81038)
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The licensee's evaluation and reporting of the above event were reviewed.
The licensee correctly evaluated the event as requiring reporting via the ENS within one hour of discovery.-
Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of the original ENS call, the licensee identified an additional period of 4. hours 35 minutes during which the uncompensated condition existed._ A third period of 5'
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hours 30 minutes was later found. Licensee management personnel evaluated this additional information and concluded that it did not warrant additional ENS reporting. The licensee reasoned that, although.three time'
periods were involved, there was only one event with one root cause and that the addition of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> and 5 minutes to the total time of the SSF degrade did not affect their response and was unlikely to affect the. NRC's response to the event.
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4. Exit Interview Exit interviews were held on October 4 and October 23, 1990, with those i
persons listed in paragraph one of this report. The inspectors described
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the areas inspecteti and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below. Although reviewed during this inspection, this report does not
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contain proprietary or safeguards information. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
The licensee was informed that the safeguards event reported on September 11, 1990, had. been reviewed at length and that all available information indicated that the event was caused solely by the failure of plant operations personnel to realize that the Unit' 2 Standby Makeup Pump was unavailable when Unit 2 entered Mode 3. As a result, operations personnel failed to realize that the SSF was degraded and, therefore, did not notify Security that compensatory' measures were needed. No failure to perform was identified on the part of any member of the security organization.
The licensee was also' informed of the concern with the CRSRO initialling procedure steps inappropriately and the corrective actions to a previous similar violation.
The licensee was advised that
failure to notify Security to implement compensatory measures for a degraded SSF was an apparent violation of regulatory requirements.
The licensee was also advised of a potential violation regarding the reporting of this event. Security management personnel concluded that information developed during the licensee's investigation that the degraded condition existed for some ten hours longer than first reported to the NRC did not-constitute significant additional information. The licensee was informed that this conclusion would be reviewed-with Region 11 management.
On October 11, 1990, the licensee was notified that the NRC did not take exception to their evaluation of the significant of the additional information as it related to additional reporting under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 73.71.
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