IR 05000413/1986019
| ML20203B968 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 07/02/1986 |
| From: | Brownlee V, Lesser M, Skinner P, Van Doorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203B944 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-86-19, 50-414-86-22, IEIN-85-045, NUDOCS 8607180327 | |
| Download: ML20203B968 (6) | |
Text
.
-_
(AHYoq'
UNITED STA TES
/
o NUCLEAR REGULATORV COMMISSION
["
7.,
REGION ll
,j 101 MARIETTA STF EET, N.W.
t.
ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323
'"
%,
/
.....
Report Nos.:
50-413/86-19 and 50-414/86-22 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.:
50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.:
,
Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: April 26 - May 25, 1986 fu Is 7/'/k[
Inspectors:
,
P. K. Van'Do'orn
~
//
Dpe G/gried" L4sh J.$
Yl l
s
~ g
/f'
Da(e S4gn~ed P. Y. S ki'n6e'r
&
Sw D
7A/><
,
~
/g Da(e pigned
~
M. S. Letser T[#
Approved by:
oc b
+
/
Date S4gned V. L. Brownle'e, Chief, Proj s Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projec
SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted on site in the areas of review of plant operations (Units 1 & 2); surveillance observation (Units 1 & 2); maintenance observation (Units 1- & 2); review of licensee nonroutine event reports (Units 1 & 2); and followup of previously identified items (Units 1 & 2).
Results: Of the six (6) areas inspected, no apparent violations or deviations were identified.
,
- 8607180327 860703 DR ADOCK 05000413 PDR j
-
a
. _
.-
-.
__
.
.
.
i
REPORT DETAILS
'
1.
Licensee Employees Contacted
.
J. W. Hampton, Station Manager E. M. Couch, Construction Maintenance Central Manager H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent
,
W. H. Bradley, QA Surveillance I
- A. S. Bhatnager, Performance Engineer T. B. Bright, Construction Engineering Manager
S. Brown, Reactor Engineer i
B. F. Caldwell, Station Services Superintendent
- J. W. Cox, Superintendent, Technical Services T. E. Crawford, Operations Engineer
'
B. East, I&E Engineer
- C. S. Gregory, I&E Support Engineer
,
- C. L. Hartzell, Licensing and Projects Engineer
- J. Knuti, Operating Engineer
.
i
- P. G. LeRoy, Licensing Engineer i
W. W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor W. R. McCullum, Superintendent, Integrated Scheduling i
C. E. Muse, Operating Engineer K. W. Reynolds, Construction Maintenance
- F.
P. Schiffley, II, Licensing Engineer
- G. T. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent
- J. Stackley, I&E Engineer
- D. Tower, Operating Engineer J. W. Willis, Senior QA Engineer, Operations
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 23, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Units 1 & 2) (92701)
(92702)
a.
(CLOSED) Unresolved Item 414/85-56-02: Evaluation of cold spring in
,
safety-related piping.
Final licensee personnel action was pending relative to this issue. The licensee has reprimanded the involved supervisor and restricted him from ever being assigned to work at a nuclear station. These licensee actions are considered acceptable.
,
, _
.-
.
--
-
-
-
._
-
--.-
-.. -
_ _ _ _
..
.
.
.
1
b.
(CLOSED) Deviation 413/85-05-03: Failure to have Reactor Vessel Level Indicating System (RVLIS) fully operational by initial criticality.
The licensee responded to this deviation in correspondence to Region II
' on October 30; 1985.
The licensee stated that the FSAR would be changed to address this deviation by November 1, 1985. The change was submitted to NRC on October 1, 1985. The inspector reviewed this section of the change with the licensee since a specific dat( was not provided in the FSAR change. The licensee stated the RVLIS would be operational by initial criticality for Unit 2.
This was discussed with Region II management and determined to be acceptable.
,
4.
Unresolved Items *
New unresolved items are identified in paragraphs 5.b and 10.
5.
Plant Operations Review (Units 1 & 2) (71707 and 71710)
a.
The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, Technical Specifications (TS), and administrative controls.
Control room logs, danger tag logs, Technical Specification Action Item Log, and the removal and restoration log were routinely reviewed.
Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures.
The inspectors verified, by observation and interviews, the measures taken to assure physical protection of the facility mat current requirements. Areas inspected included the security organization, the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors, and isolation zones in the proper condition, that access control and badging were proper and procedures followed.
In addition to the areas discussed above, the areas toured were observed for fire prevention and protection activities. These included such things as combustible material control, fire protection systems and materials, and fire protection associated with maintenance activities.
,
b.
The inspectors conducted initial reviews of reactor trips to determine if appropriate licensee actions were being taken, to review the circumstances regarding the trip and to determine if enforcement action is necessary. Trips reviewed during this inspection period included:
Unit 1 on May 14 and May 17, 1986, caused by lo-lo steam generator level indication and negative rate, respectively, and; Unit 2 on May 17 and May 18, 1986, caused by lo-lo steam generator level and a manual trip in reaction to a turbine trip caused by hi-hi steam generator level, respectively.
)
- An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to I
determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
<
_
.
_
.
..
.
.
During review of the Unit 1 trip which occurred on May 17, 1986, the inspector noted that the licensee did not have a procedure established for conducting repairs to the rod control system.
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33 Rev. 2 clearly states that procedures shall be established for maintenance that can affect the performance of_ safety-related equipment but the system itself is not safety-related except for the trip breakers.
Regulatory authority is not clear as to applicability
,
of RG 1.33, Rev. 2 to non-safety related equipment. Therefore, further review will be conducted of this problem. It should also be noted that the licensee was aware of the need for a procedure at the time of the incident but had not yet issued the procedure.
It appears that some licensee procedures may be taking an excessively long time to be processed.
Licensee management was requested at the exit interview on May 23, 1986, to review this area.
This is Unresolved Item 413/86-19-01:
Review of licensee implementation of procedures.
c.
On May 1, 1986, the licensee experienced a failure of the turbine
'
,
driven auxiliary feedwater pump to meet its surveillance requirements.
This was attributed to recirculation valve problems. Since the repair of these valves were going to exceed the time allotted by the Action statement in Technical Specification 3.7.1.2, the licensee requested a temporary waiver of ninety six (96) additional hours of this requirement to avoid a cooldown to Hot Shutdown conditions which would preclude testing of the pump after repairs until the plant was returned to a Hot Standby status. This waiver was granted since Unit 2 had not been critical and therefore no decay heat was present. The valves were repaired on May 2, 1986, the surveillance test performed and the system returned to operational status.
,
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Surveillance Observation (Units 1 & 2) (61726)
During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations were in compliance with various TS requirements.
Typical of these requirements were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, emergency power systems, safety injection, emergency safeguards systems, control room ventilation, and direct current electrical power sources.
The inspector verified that surveillance testing was performed in accordance with the approved written procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, appropriate removal and restoration of the affected equipment was accomplished, test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test,. and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by i
appropriate management personnel.
No violations or deviations were identified.
!
y
-
-
-.-
_ _ ____. -__
.
.
7.
Maintenance Observations (Units 1& 2) (62703)
Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements.
The inspector verified licensee conformance to the requirements in the following areas of inspection:
the activities were accomplished using approved procedures, and functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities performed were accomplished by qualified personnel; and materials used were properly certified. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may effect system performance.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Review of Licensee Nonroutine Event Reports and Construction Deficiency Reports (Units 1 & 2) (92700)
a.
The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC requirements.
The determination included: adequacy of description, verification of compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety significance of each event.
The following LERs are closed:
414/86-01 Main Feedwater Isolation and Turbine Trip Due to Spurious Steam Generator Hi-Hi Level.
414/86-02 Containment Air Release and Addition System Release Terminated Due to Spurious Gas Monitor Alarm 414/86-04 Main Feedwater Isolation Due to Alarm From Solid State Protection System Caused by Construction Wiring Error.
414/86-05 Leak Rate Test not Performed on a Containment Isolation Valve.
414/86-06 Steam Generator Hi-Hi Level Caused by Overfeeding Due to Electrical Equipment Failure.
b.
(OPEN) CDR 413/84-16, 414/84-16: Unconsidered effects of superheated
- steam on safety-related components.
The inspectors observed safety related equipment in the Unit 2 exterior doghouse to verify that the licensee responses appropriately identified equipment possibly affected by superheated steam.
Final NRC approval of.the licensee analysis is pending and therefore this item remains open.
No violations or deviations were identified.
,
,
,-,
~ - -
~ = -.,.,. -
-
-
. - - -.,.
,a,,
e,
- -
-
,_m
,
,
$
9.
Seal Table / Flux Mapping System Interaction (Units 1 & 2) (25015)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to a Westinghouse letter dated June 10, 1985, and IE Notice 85-45, concerning potential seismic interaction involving the Movable In-Core Flux Mapping System used in Westinghouse designed plants. The utility in interdepartment correspondence dated October 21, 1985 and November 14, 1985, stated that an analysis was performed for both Catawba and McGuire Nuclear stations and a determination made that no seismically induced interaction between the incore frame assembly and the seal table existed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Special Allegation Followup (Unit 2) (99014)
A confidential allegation was made to the NRC that special welding inserts to be used for Upper Head Injection seal welds had not been properly controlled and further that the licensee had considered placing the inserts into the approved material control system after traceability had been lost.
A previous review of the technical aspects of this issue showed that a technical problem did not exist (see NRC Report 50-414/86-15 paragraph 13).
It did appear, however, that there may have been a consideration by construction personnel to place the material into the control system after traceability had been lost.
The NRC considers this to be a relatively isolated problem and, based on many construction inspections and investigations, considers that safety significant construction problems do not exist at Catawba.
However, further review of the possible attitude problem in construction appears warranted. Based on the minor significance of the issue and good past performance by the licensee relative to conducting special investigations, it appears appropriate to request the licensee to investigate this matter further.
NRC:RII management requested the licensee QA management to review this issue.
pending review of the licensee evaluation, this is Unresolved Item 414/86-22-01: Review of licensee actions concerning control of welding inserts.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Special Management Meeting (Units 1 & 2) (30702)
Commissioner Lando Zech and his Technical Assistant, Max Clausson, Virgil L. Brownlee, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2, and the licensee management met on April 28, 1986, to discuss readiness for initial criticality and testing on Unit 2.
A plant tour was conducted and discussions were held relative to status of construction, test status, staffing, diesel generator history, licensing issues and Unit 1 past operating history.
~
l