IR 05000413/2015001
| ML15119A359 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 04/29/2015 |
| From: | Frank Ehrhardt Division Reactor Projects II |
| To: | Henderson K Duke Energy Corp |
| References | |
| IR 2015001 | |
| Download: ML15119A359 (44) | |
Text
April 29, 2015
SUBJECT:
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000413/2015001, 05000414/2015001
Dear Mr. Henderson:
March 31, 2015
SUBJECT:
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000413/2015001, 05000414/2015001
Dear Mr. Henderson:
On March 31, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. On April 6, 2015, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.
The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Frank Ehrhardt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.:
50-413, 50-414 License Nos.:
Enclosure:
Integrated Inspection Report 05000413/2015001, 05000414/2015001 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.:
50-413, 50-414
License Nos.:
Report Nos.:
05000413/2015001, 05000414/2015001
Licensee:
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
Facility:
Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
York, SC 29745
Dates:
January 1, 2015 through March 31, 2015
Inspectors:
A. Hutto, Senior Resident Inspector L. Pressley, Resident Inspector W. Loo, Senior Health Physicist (Sections 2RS7, 2RS8, 4OA1)
C. Dykes, Health Physicist (Section 2RS1)
R. Kellner, Health Physicist (Sections 2RS6)
M. Coursey, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R08)
R. Williams, Senior Reactor Inspector (Section 1R08)
S. Sanchez, Sr. Emergency Preparedness Inspector (Sections 1EP2, 1EP3, 1EP4)
C. Fontana, Emergency Preparedness Inspector (Sections 1EP5, 4OA1)
Approved by:
Frank Ehrhardt, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000413/2015-001, 05000414/2015-001; 1/1/2015 - 3/31/2015; Catawba Nuclear Station,
Units 1 and 2; Integrated Inspection Report
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by the resident inspectors and seven regional reactor inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process Revision 5. No NRC or self-revealing findings were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 operated at or near 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at or near 100 percent RTP until February 28, 2015, when the unit was shutdown for a refueling outage. On March 31, 2015, Unit 2 startup to Mode 2 was completed with zero power physics testing in progress at the end of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
==1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Adverse Weather Conditions:==
The inspectors reviewed the licensees severe weather actions following freezing temperatures on January 7, 2015. This included a review of actions required by OP/0/B/6700/015, Weather Related Activities and PT/0/B/4700/038, Cold Weather Protection, to ensure measures were taken to protect mitigating systems from adverse weather effects. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
Flood Protection Measures - External: The inspectors reviewed the licensees external flood protection features. The inspectors performed a walkdown of external site areas including designated Type I and Type II inlet catch basins, cooling tower yard berms, and diesel generator (DG) room access curbs and seals which are designed to protect safety-related facilities from flooding during a local probable maximum precipitation event. The walkdown included observing that the steel gratings on four sides and top of the basins were intact. To the extent possible, the inspectors visually observed the basins and pipe cavities to determine that the areas were free of debris accumulation and that no significant blockage of the drains was apparent. The inspectors also observed the condition of berms and seals to verify that their physical condition had not degraded and they were capable to fulfill their designed functions. The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program documents to ascertain that the licensee was identifying issues and resolving them. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial Walkdowns:==
The inspectors performed three partial system walkdowns during the activities listed below to assess the operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety-related equipment was inoperable. The inspectors performed walkdowns to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and, therefore, potentially increased risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures and walked down system components, selected breakers, valves, and support equipment to determine if they were in the correct position to support system operation. The inspectors reviewed protected equipment sheets, maintenance plans, and system drawings to determine if the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- 2B nuclear service water (RN) train while the A RN pit was de-watered for planned maintenance
- 2A DG with 2B out of service for pre-outage maintenance
- 2B DG with 2A out of service for pre-outage maintenance
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Fire Protection Walkdowns:==
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the five plant areas listed below to assess the licensees control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures. The inspectors observed the fire protection suppression and detection equipment to determine whether any conditions or deficiencies existed which could impair the operability of that equipment. The inspectors selected the areas based on a review of the licensees safe shutdown analysis probabilistic risk assessment and sensitivity studies for fire-related core damage accident sequences. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 1 residual heat removal (ND) pump rooms (Fire Area 1)
- Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater (CA) pump room (Fire Area 3)
- Unit 1 auxiliary building 543 level (Fire Area 4)
- Unit 1 CA turbine driven pump pit (Fire Area 40)
- 2B DG room (Fire Area 28)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed raw water inspections and associated preventive maintenance activities associated with the Unit 2 refueling outage. Areas reviewed were the 2A and 2B component cooling (KC) system heat exchangers and 2B containment spray (NS)system heat exhanger. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities
a. Inspection Scope
==
Non-Destructive Examination Activities and Welding Activities
From March 09, 2015, through March 18, 2015, the inspectors conducted an onsite review of the implementation of the licensees inservice inspection (ISI) program for monitoring degradation of the reactor coolant system boundary, risk-significant piping and component boundaries, and containment boundaries in Unit 2.
The inspectors either directly observed or reviewed the following non-destructive examinations (NDEs), mandated by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC) (Code of Record: 1998 Edition with 2000 Addenda) to evaluate compliance with the ASME Code,Section XI and Section V requirements, and if any indications or defects were detected, to evaluate if they were dispositioned in accordance with the ASME Code or an NRC-approved alternative requirement. The inspectors also reviewed the qualifications of the NDE technicians performing the examinations to determine whether they were current, and in compliance, with the ASME Code requirements.
The inspectors reviewed the following welding activities, qualification records, and associated documents in order to evaluate compliance with procedures, and the ASME Code,Section XI and Section IX requirements. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the work order, repair and replacement plan, weld data sheets, welding procedures, procedure qualification records, welder performance qualification records, and NDE reports.
During non-destructive surface and volumetric examinations performed since the previous refueling outage, the licensee did not identify any relevant indications that were analytically evaluated and accepted for continued service; therefore, no NRC review was completed for this inspection procedure attribute.
Pressurized Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities
The inspectors verified that for the Unit 2 vessel head, a bare metal visual (BMV)examination, and a volumetric examination were not required during this outage, in accordance with the requirements of ASME Code Case N-729-1 and 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D). The inspectors reviewed the calculation of effective degradation years, the previous examination history, and reviewed the results of the visual testing (VT) examination performed under the vessel head insulation, to verify that the examinations were performed in accordance with the requirements of ASME Code,Section XI, Article IWA-2212 requirements, and the frequency was consistent with the code case.
The licensee did not identify any relevant indications that were accepted for continued service. Additionally, the licensee did not perform any welding repairs to the vessel head penetrations since the beginning of the last Unit 2 refueling outage; therefore, no NRC review was completed for these inspection procedure attributes.
Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities
The inspectors reviewed the licensees boric acid corrosion control program (BACCP)activities to determine if the activities were implemented in accordance with the commitments made in response to NRC Generic Letter 88-05, Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR Plants, and applicable industry guidance documents. Specifically, the inspectors performed an onsite records review of procedures, and the results of the licensees containment walkdown inspections performed during the current refueling outage. The inspectors also interviewed the BACCP owner, conducted an independent walkdown of containment to evaluate compliance with licensees BACCP requirements, and verified that degraded or non-conforming conditions such as boric acid leaks, were properly identified and corrected in accordance with the licensees BACCP and corrective action program (CAP).
The inspectors reviewed the following engineering evaluations, completed for evidence of boric acid leakage, to determine if the licensee properly applied applicable corrosion rates to the affected components; and properly assessed the effects of corrosion induced wastage on structural or pressure boundary integrity, in accordance with the licensee procedures.
- C-14-07036 - 2-NB-VA-503 active boron leak from pipe cap
- C-14-08870 - Leakage rate increase from 2-FW-VA-27A packing
- C-14-11568 - Excessive boron accumulation on 2-NV-FT-5320 fittings
The inspectors reviewed the following condition reports and associated corrective actions related to evidence of boric acid leakage, to evaluate if the corrective actions completed were consistent with the requirements of the ASME Code and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
- C-15-01764 - Boron deposits on reactor vessel BMI tube 22
- C-15-02187 - Self-identified leaks during boric acid walkdown
Steam Generator Tube Inspection Activities
The inspectors reviewed the eddy current (EC) examination activities performed in Unit 2 steam generators (SGs) A, B, C and D during this current refueling outage, to verify compliance with the licensees technical specifications (TSs), ASME BPVC Section XI, and Nuclear Energy Institute 97-06, Steam Generator Program Guidelines.
The inspectors reviewed the scope of the EC examinations and the implementation of scope expansion criteria to verify these were consistent with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Pressurized Water Reactor Steam Generator Examination Guidelines, Revision 7. The inspectors reviewed documentation for a sample of EC data analysts, probes, and testers to verify that personnel and equipment were qualified to detect the applicable degradation mechanisms, in accordance with the EPRI Examination Guidelines. This review included a sample of site-specific examination technique specification sheets (ETSSs) to verify that their qualification and site-specific implementation were consistent with Appendix H and I respectively, of the EPRI Examination Guidelines. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of EC data for SG tubes A-R44C23, B-R29C38, B-R11C58, D-R29C75, D-R20C107, and D-R20C75 with a qualified data analyst, to confirm that data analysis and equipment configuration were performed in accordance with the applicable ETSSs, and site-specific analysis guidelines. The inspectors verified that recordable indications were detected and sized in accordance with vendor procedures.
The inspectors selected a sample of degradation mechanisms from the Unit 2 degradation assessment report (i.e., anti-vibration bar wear and axial inside diameter stress corrosion cracking), and verified that their respective in-situ pressure testing criteria were determined in accordance with the EPRI Steam Generator Integrity Assessment Guidelines, Revision 3. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed EC indication reports to determine whether tubes with relevant indications were appropriately screened for in-situ pressure testing. The inspectors also compared the latest EC examination results with the last condition monitoring and operational assessment report for Unit 2, to assess the licensees prediction capability for maximum tube degradation and the number of tubes with indications. The inspectors verified that the licensees evaluation was conservative, and that current examination results were bound by the operational assessment projections.
The inspectors assessed the latest EC examination results to verify that new degradation mechanisms, if any, were identified and evaluated before plant startup.
The review of EC examination results included the disposition of potential loose part indications on the SG secondary side, to verify that corrective actions for evaluating and retrieving loose parts were consistent with the EPRI Guidelines. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of primary-to-secondary leakage data for Unit 2, to confirm that operational leakage in each SG remained below the detection or action level threshold during the previous operating cycle.
The inspectors review included the implementation of tube repair criteria and repair methods to verify they were consistent with plant TSs and industry guidelines. The inspectors verified that the licensee had selected the appropriate tubes for plugging based on the required plugging criteria. The inspectors reviewed the tube plugging procedure and directly observed tube plugging activities for tube B-R24C49, to determine if the licensee installed the tube plugs in accordance with the applicable procedures.
Furthermore, the inspectors interviewed licensee staff and reviewed a sample of inspection results for the secondary side internals of SGs A, B, C, and D, to verify that potential areas of degradation based on site-specific operating experience were inspected, and appropriate corrective actions were taken to address degradation indications. This review included the results of foreign object search and retrieval (FOSAR) activities in all SGs.
Identification and Resolution of Problems
The inspectors reviewed a sample of ISI-related issues entered into the CAP to determine if the licensee had appropriately described the scope of the problem, and had initiated corrective actions. The review also included the licensees consideration and assessment of operating experience events applicable to the plant. The inspectors performed this review to ensure compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requirements.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (LOR) Program and Licensed Operator Performance
==
.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector LOR Activity Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed active simulator exam ASE-12 to assess the performance of licensed operators during a license operator requalification simulator training session.
The exercise included a loss of a nuclear service water pump, a feedwater pump problem, a reactor coolant pump seal degradation, and a steam line break inside containment. The inspectors assessed overall crew performance, clarity and formality of communications, use of procedures, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics and supervisory oversight. The inspectors observed the post-exercise critique to determine whether the licensee identified deficiencies and discrepancies that occurred during the simulator training. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Quarterly Resident Inspector Licensed Operator Performance Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed operators in the main control room and assessed their performance during operations to shutdown and cooldown Unit 2 to begin the end of cycle 20 refueling outage. The inspectors assessed the following:
- operator compliance and use of procedures
- control board manipulations
- communication between crew members
- use and interpretation of plant instruments, indications and alarms
- use of human error prevention techniques
- documentation of activities, including initials and sign-offs in procedures
- supervision of activities, including risk and reactivity management
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed the two activities listed below for items such as:
- (1) appropriate work practices;
- (2) identifying and addressing common cause failures;
- (3) scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the maintenance rule;
- (4) characterizing reliability issues for performance;
- (5) trending key parameters for condition monitoring; (6)charging unavailability for performance;
- (7) classification and reclassification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2); and
- (8) appropriateness of performance criteria for structures, systems, and components (SSCs)/functions classified as (a)(2)and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs/functions classified as (a)(1). For each item selected, the inspectors performed a detailed review of the problem history and surrounding circumstances, evaluated the extent of condition reviews as required, and reviewed the generic implications of the equipment and/or work practice problem. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed the following five activities to determine if the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment for work. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors reviewed the risk assessment to determine that the plant risk was promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors reviewed the use of the licensees risk assessment tool and risk categories in accordance with Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 415, Operational Risk Management (Modes 1-3), to verify there was appropriate guidance to comply with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- equipment protection plan for the 2A ND pump while the 2B ND pump was out of service for maintenance (yellow risk condition)
- risk mitigation actions for Orange risk condition associated with unplanned inoperability of 2A DG
- equipment protection plan for the B RN train while the A RN pit was de-watered for maintenance (yellow risk condition)
- equipment protection plan for 2B DG and 2B RN pump out of service for planned maintenance (yellow risk condition)
- Unit 2 refueling outage risk evaluation and mitigation during lowered inventory of the reactor coolant system (defense in depth yellow risk condition)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the seven operability evaluations or functionality assessments listed below to determine if TS operability was properly justified and the subject components and systems remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations to verify that they were made as specified by NSD 203, Operability.
The inspectors reviewed the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) to determine that the systems and components remained available to perform their intended function.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- PIP C-15-0176, Safe shutdown facility (SSF) DG coolant leak
- PIP C-15-0304, Follow-up investigations and evaluations from the measurement uncertainty recapture (MUR) uprate project related to open items for aux building dose values
- PIP C-14-10658, Degraded valve stem guide bracket bolts in A train RN pit
- PIP C-15-01142, 2A ND pump degraded pipe support
- PIP C-15-01394, Unit 1 spent fuel pool level decreasing
- PIP C-15-00987, B train RN operated at less than minimum flow requirements
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed the following two plant modifications to verify the adequacy of the modification package, and to evaluate the modification for adverse affects on system availability, reliability and functional capability. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- EC110307/000, Install New FLEX Connection on B Train Nuclear Service Water (RN) System Supply Header in Pump House
- EC114396/000, Add Hydraulic Accumulator to 1CF-42
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed the seven post-maintenance tests listed below to determine if procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the licensees test procedures and maintenance activities to determine if the procedures adequately tested the safety function(s) and function(s)important to safety that may have been affected by the maintenance activities, that the acceptance criteria in the procedures were consistent with information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents or appropriate standards, and that the procedures had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also witnessed the tests and/or reviewed the test data to determine if test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety function(s) and provides reasonable assurance of system operability considering the maintenance activity. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- 1A containment air return and hydrogen skimmer fan performance test following A train preventive maintenance (PM)
- 2A auxiliary feedwater pump functional test following PMs
- 2B diesel generator operability test following PMs
- 1B centrifugal charging pump functional test following PMs
- 1B diesel generator operability test following replacement of the power driven potentiometer
- Unit 2 zero power physics testing following refueling
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors conducted reviews and observations for selected outage activities to ensure that: 1) the licensee considered risk in developing the outage plan; 2) the licensee adhered to the outage plan to control plant configuration based on risk; 3)mitigation strategies were in place for losses of key safety functions; and 4) the licensee adhered to operating license and TS requirements. Between February 27, 2015, and March 31, 2015, the following activities related to the refueling outage were reviewed for conformance to applicable procedures and selected activities associated with each evaluation were witnessed:
- outage risk management plan/assessment
- clearance activities
- reactor coolant system instrumentation
- plant cool down
- mode changes from Mode 1 (power operation) to No Mode (defueled)
- shutdown decay heat removal and inventory control
- containment closure
- refueling activities
- plant heatup/mode changes from No Mode to Mode 1
- core physics testing
- fatigue management
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
==
For the seven tests listed below, the inspectors witnessed testing and/or reviewed the test data to determine if the SSCs involved in these tests satisfied the requirements described in the TSs, the UFSAR, and applicable licensee procedures, and that the tests demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their intended safety functions.
Surveillance Tests:
- PT/2/A/4350/002 A, Diesel Generator 2A Operability Test, 5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> run
- PT/2/A/4200/009, Engineered Safety Features Actuation Periodic Test
- PT/2/A/4350/002 A, Diesel Generator 2A Operability Test, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> run
- PT/0/A/4400/008 B, Nuclear Service Water (RN) B Train Flow Balance
Ice Condenser Tests:
- PT/0/A/4200/086, Ice Bed Analysis Periodic Test (Unit 2)
Containment Isolation Valve Tests:
- PT/2/A/4200/001 C, As Left Containment Isolation Valve Leak Rate Test for Containment Air Release (VQ) Penetration M386
In-Service Tests:
- PT/0/A/4400/022 A, Nuclear Service Water Pump 1A Performance Test
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees methods for testing the alert and notification system in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, 02, Alert and Notification System Evaluation. The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR Part 50.47(b)(5) and its related 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D requirements were used as reference criteria. The criteria contained in NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, were also used as a reference.
The inspectors reviewed various documents which are listed in the Attachment, interviewed personnel responsible for siren maintenance and verified placement of several sirens. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the alert and notification system on a biennial basis.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees emergency response organization (ERO)augmentation staffing requirements and process for notifying the ERO to ensure the readiness of key staff for responding to an event and timely facility activation. The qualification records of key position ERO personnel were reviewed to ensure all ERO qualifications were current. A sample of problems identified from augmentation drills or system tests performed since the last inspection were reviewed to assess the effectiveness of corrective actions.
The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, 03, Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System. The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), and its related 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements were used as reference criteria.
The inspectors reviewed various documents which are listed in the Attachment. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the ERO staffing and augmentation system on a biennial basis.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
a. Inspection Scope
Since the last NRC inspection of this program area, several changes were made to the radiological emergency plan and emergency action levels (EALs). The licensee determined that, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), the plan continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. The inspectors reviewed these changes to evaluate for potential reductions in the effectiveness of the plan. However, this review was not documented in a safety evaluation report and does not constitute formal NRC approval of the changes. Therefore, these changes remain subject to future NRC inspection in their entirety.
The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, 04, Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes. The applicable planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b), and its related requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.
The inspectors reviewed various documents that are listed in the Attachment to this report. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the emergency action level and emergency plan changes on an annual basis.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP5 Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions identified through the emergency preparedness program to determine the significance of the issues, the completeness and effectiveness of corrective actions, and to determine if issues were recurring. The licensees drill and exercise critique reports, self-assessments, and audits were reviewed to assess the licensees ability to be self-critical, thus avoiding complacency and degradation of their emergency preparedness program. The licensees 10 CFR 50.54(q)change process and selected evaluations of emergency preparedness document revisions were reviewed to assess adequacy. The inspectors toured facilities and reviewed equipment and facility maintenance records to assess licensees adequacy in maintaining them. During tours of the main control rooms, the inspectors observed licensee staff demonstrate the capabilities of selected radiation monitoring instrumentation used to detect dose rates of selected areas of the plant to adequately support declaration of the effected EALs. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee procedures and training for the evaluation of changes to the emergency plans.
The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, 05, Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness. The applicable 10 CFR 50.47(b) planning standards and related 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements were used as reference criteria.
The inspectors reviewed various documents which are listed in the Attachment. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the maintenance of emergency preparedness on a biennial basis.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed and evaluated an emergency planning drill conducted on January 8, 2015. The inspectors reviewed licensee activities that occurred in the simulator and the technical support center during the simulated event. The inspectors assessment focused on the timeliness and accuracy of the event classification, notification of offsite agencies, and the overall response of the personnel involved in the drills from an operations and emergency planning perspective. The performance of the emergency response organization was evaluated against applicable licensee procedures and regulatory requirements. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique for the drills to evaluate the licensee's self-assessment process for identifying potential deficiencies relating to failures in classification and notification. The inspectors reviewed the completed licensee critiques documenting the overall performance of the emergency response organization.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
(RS)
Cornerstones: Occupational Radiation Safety and Public Radiation Safety
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
a. Inspection Scope
Hazard Assessment and Instructions to workers During facility tours, the inspectors observed labeled radioactive material, postings for radiation areas, high radiation areas (HRAs), and locked high radiation areas (LHRAs) in the radiologically controlled area (RCA), Unit 2 (U2) containment, and other storage locations. The inspectors reviewed survey records for several plant areas including surveys for alpha emitters, hot particles, airborne radioactivity, gamma surveys within areas of high dose rate gradients, and pre-job surveys for upcoming tasks. Inspectors observed technicians independently survey areas in the plant and compared the results to radiological conditions and postings. The inspectors also reviewed air sample records and evaluated locations of continuous air monitors.
The inspectors discussed changes to plant operations that could contribute to changing radiological conditions since the last inspection. Inspectors attended pre-job briefings for selected U2 end of cycle 21 (EOC20) tasks and reviewed radiation work permits (RWPs)details to assess communication of radiological control requirements and current radiological conditions to workers to include radiography, steam generator, and pressurizer activities. Radiation work permits for work in airborne areas were also reviewed to assess airborne radioactive controls and monitoring to include steam generator (S/G) and core barrel move activities.
Hazard Control and Work Practices The inspectors evaluated access barrier effectiveness including key control for selected Unit 1 (U1) and U2 LHRAs, and very HRAs (VHRA) locations. Procedural guidance for LHRA and VHRA controls were discussed with radiation protection (RP) supervisors. The inspectors observed and evaluated controls for the storage of irradiated material within the spent fuel pool.
Controls for areas where dose rates could change significantly as a result of plant shutdown and refueling operations were also discussed. The inspectors observed activities in potential airborne areas associated with U2 S/G work activities for removal of manways and diaphragms and installation of nozzle dams; radiography of condensate feed line; and reactor head set.
Occupational workers adherence to selected RWPs and RP technician (RPT)proficiency in providing job coverage were evaluated through direct observations and interviews with licensee staff of selected U2 EOC20 activities. Electronic dosimeter (ED)alarm set points and worker stay times were evaluated against area radiation survey results for jobs in upper and lower containment, and the auxiliary and turbine buildings.
Electronic dosimeter alarm logs were reviewed and worker response to dose and dose rate alarms for selected work activities was evaluated. RPT coverage and actions at the U2 lower and upper containment single point of accesses (SPAs) were reviewed and discussed in detail.
Control of Radioactive Material The inspectors observed surveys of potentially contaminated materials and personnel being released from the RCA and SPAs using small article monitors, personnel contamination monitors, and portal monitor instruments. The inspectors discussed equipment sensitivity, alarm setpoints, and release program guidance with licensee staff. In addition, the inspectors reviewed controls for hand surveying large tools and equipment for release from the RCA and SPAs. The inspectors compared recent 10 CFR Part 61 results for the dry active waste (DAW) radioactive waste (radwaste) stream with radionuclides used in calibration sources to evaluate the appropriateness and accuracy of release survey instrumentation. The inspectors also reviewed source inventory and discussed leak tests for selected sealed sources and discussed nationally tracked source transactions with RP staff.
Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed selected CAP reports associated with radiological hazard assessment and control. The reviewed items included selected CAP reports, self-assessments, and quality assurance audit documents. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve the issues in accordance with licensee procedures.
Radiation Protection activities were evaluated against the requirements of UFSAR Chapter 12; TS Section 5.7; 10 CFR Parts 19 and 20; and approved licensee procedures. Licensee programs for monitoring materials and personnel released from the RCA and SPA were evaluated against 10 CFR Part 20, and IE Circular 81-07, Control of Radioactively Contaminated Material. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
a. Inspection Scope
Radioactive Effluent Treatment Systems The inspectors walked down selected components of the gaseous and liquid radwaste processing and effluent discharge systems. To the extent practical, the inspectors observed and evaluated the material condition of in-place waste processing equipment for indications of degradation or leakage that could constitute a possible release pathway to the environment. Inspected components included liquid holding tanks, air cleaning systems for normal and emergency conditions, effluent monitoring equipment, and associated piping and valves.
The inspectors interviewed licensee staff regarding radwaste equipment configuration and effluent monitor operation. The inspectors also reviewed and discussed recent engineered safety feature (ESF) ventilation surveillance test results for the U1 and U2 auxiliary building (1VA and 2VA), U1 and U2 fuel handling building (FHB) (VF 1A1 and 1A2; and VF 1B1 and 1B2), and U1 and U2 containment purge (VP 1A, 1B, 2A and 2B)systems. During tours of selected U1 and U2 ESF ventilation systems, the inspectors discussed testing protocols and evaluated equipment material condition.
Effluent Sampling and Release The inspectors observed: pre-release sampling and analysis of U2 containment atmosphere particulate, iodine, and noble gas, and U1 and U2 condensate steam air ejector offgas noble gas; set-up and conduct of release activities; and post release permit closeout. The inspectors reviewed recent liquid and gaseous release permits including pre-release sampling results, effluent monitor alarm setpoints, and public dose calculations. The inspectors reviewed the 2012 and 2013 annual radioactive effluent reports (ARERR) to evaluate reported doses to the public, to review any anomalous events, to evaluate groundwater sampling results, and to review offsite dose calculation manual (ODCM) changes. The inspectors also reviewed compensatory sampling data for time periods when selected radiation monitors were out of service. The inspectors reviewed select results of the inter-laboratory comparison program. The inspectors also reviewed effluent source term evaluation and changes to effluent release points. In addition, the inspectors evaluated recent land use census results and meteorological data used to calculate doses to the public.
Ground Water Protection The inspectors reviewed the licensees continued implementation of the industrys ground water protection initiative [Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 07-07] and reviewed recent monitoring well results. The inspectors reviewed and discussed actions being taken for the recently identified low level soil contamination adjacent to the steam generator drain tank and the tritium levels associated with monitoring well C-213. The inspectors discussed program guidance for dealing with spills, leaks, and unexpected discharges with licensee staff and reviewed recent entries into the 10 CFR 50.75(g) decommissioning file. The inspectors reviewed and discussed the licensees program for monitoring of structures, systems, and components with the potential to release radioactive material to the environment.
Potential effluent release points due to onsite surface water bodies were also evaluated.
Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed selected CAP documents in the areas of gaseous and liquid effluent processing and release activities.
The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues in accordance with procedure AD-PI-ALL-0100, Corrective Action Program, Revision 2. The inspectors also reviewed recent self-assessment results.
Radwaste system operation, effluent processing activities, and groundwater protection efforts were evaluated against requirements and guidance documented in the following:
10 CFR Part 20; 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix I; ODCM; FSAR Sections 11 and 12; approved licensee procedures; TS Section 5.0, Administrative Controls; Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.21, Measuring, Evaluating, and Reporting Radioactivity in Solid Wastes and Releases of Radioactive Materials in Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants, RG 1.109, Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix I, NUREG-0133, Preparation of Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications for Nuclear Power Plants: A Guidance Manual for Users of Standard Technical Specifications, and NEI 07-07, Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative - Final Guidance Document. Procedures and records reviewed during the inspection are listed in the report Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS7 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP)
a. Inspection Scope
REMP Status and Results The inspectors reviewed and discussed recent and proposed changes applicable to radiological environmental and meteorological monitoring program activities detailed in the UFSAR and ODCM, as well as environmental monitoring sample results presented in the annual radiological environmental operating report (AREOR) for calendar years 2012 and 2013. REMP vendor laboratory cross-check program results, and select procedural guidance for collection, processing and analysis of airborne particulate and iodine, and dairy sampling were reviewed and discussed with knowledgeable personnel. Detection level sensitivities for environmental media analyzed by the offsite environmental laboratory were reviewed. The AREOR environmental measurement results were reviewed for consistency with the licensees ARERR data and evaluated for radionuclide concentration trends. Licensee actions for missed samples, including compensatory measures and availability of replacement equipment were reviewed and discussed.
The inspectors observed and discussed implementation of selected REMP monitoring and sample collection activities for atmospheric particulates and iodine, and milk, as specified in the current ODCM and applicable procedures. The inspectors also observed selected locations of direct radiation measurements (environmental thermoluminescent dosimeters), as well as their material condition and placement. The inspectors observed selected air sampling equipment material condition and verified operability, including verification of flow rates for the weekly airborne particulate filter and iodine cartridge change-outs at five atmospheric sampling stations. The inspectors discussed and observed broadleaf vegetation and water sampling for selected ODCM locations. Monitoring and impact of licensee routine releases on offsite doses based on meteorological dispersion parameters and garden locations identified in the most current land use census were reviewed. A sample of pump calibration and maintenance records for the installed environmental air monitoring equipment were reviewed. In addition, the current status and completeness of the licensees 10 CFR 50.75(g) decommissioning files were reviewed and discussed, as well as structures, systems, and components that could potentially leak material into the groundwater.
Meteorological Monitoring Program The inspectors toured the primary meteorological tower and compared local data readouts with control room data. The inspectors observed the physical condition of the tower and associated instruments and discussed equipment operability, maintenance history, and backup power supplies with responsible licensee staff. For the meteorological measurements of wind speed, wind direction, and temperature, the inspectors reviewed applicable meteorological tower instrumentation semi-annual calibration records and evaluated meteorological measurement data recovery for CYs 2012 and 2013.
Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed and discussed selected CAP documents associated with REMP. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues in accordance with licensee procedures. The inspectors also reviewed recent self-assessment results.
Procedural guidance, program implementation, quantitative analysis sensitivities, and environmental monitoring results were reviewed against 10 CFR Part 20; 10 CFR Part 50, and Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50; TS Sections 5.4.1 Procedures, 5.5 Programs and Manuals, and 5.6 Reporting Requirements; ODCM; RG 4.15, Quality Assurance for Radiological Monitoring Programs, (Normal Operation) - Effluent Streams and the Environment; and the Branch Technical Position, An Acceptable Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program - 1979. Licensee procedures and activities related to meteorological monitoring were evaluated against the ODCM and RG 1.23, Meteorological Monitoring Programs for Nuclear Power Plants. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS8 Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and
Transportation
a. Inspection Scope
Waste Processing and Characterization During inspector walk-downs, accessible sections of the liquid and solid radwaste processing systems were assessed for material condition and conformance with system design diagrams. Inspected equipment included radwaste storage tanks, resin transfer piping, resin and filter packaging components, and abandoned reactor coolant sampling equipment. The inspectors discussed component function, processing system changes, and radwaste program implementation with cognizant licensee staff.
The 2012 and 2013 ARERRs and radionuclide characterizations from 2010 - 2014 for each major waste stream were reviewed and discussed with cognizant radwaste staff.
For primary resin and DAW the inspectors evaluated analyses for hard-to-detect nuclides, reviewed the use of scaling factors, and examined quality assurance comparison results between licensee waste stream characterizations and outside laboratory data. Waste stream mixing and concentration averaging methodology for resin and filter waste streams were evaluated and discussed with radwaste staff. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees procedural guidance for monitoring changes in waste stream isotopic mixtures.
Radioactive Material Storage During walk-downs of indoor and outdoor radioactive material storage areas, the inspectors observed the physical condition and labeling of storage containers and the posting of Radioactive Material Areas. The inspectors also reviewed licensee procedural guidance for storage and monitoring of radioactive material.
Transportation Selected shipping records were reviewed for consistency with licensee procedures and compliance with NRC and Department of Transportation (DOT)regulations. The inspectors reviewed emergency response information, DOT shipping package classification, waste classification, radiation survey results, and evaluated whether receiving licensees were authorized to accept the packages. Licensee procedures for opening and closing Type A shipping casks were compared to manufacturer requirements. In addition, training records for selected individuals currently qualified to ship radioactive material were reviewed. The inspectors observed the preparation of chemistry samples and shipment of DAW.
Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed CAP documents in the areas of shipping and radwaste processing. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve the identified issues in accordance with licensee procedures. The inspectors also reviewed recent self-assessment results.
Radwaste processing, radioactive material handling, and transportation activities were reviewed against the requirements contained in the licensees Process Control Program, UFSAR Chapter 11, 10 CFR Part 20, 10 CFR Part 61, 10 CFR Part 71, and 49 CFR Parts 172-178. Licensee activities were also evaluated against guidance provided in the Branch Technical Position on Waste Classification (1983) and NUREG-1608.
Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee data to confirm the accuracy of reported PI data for the eleven indicators during periods listed below. To determine the accuracy of the reported PI elements, the reviewed data was assessed against PI definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 6. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
- Unplanned Scrams with Complications, Unit 1 and 2
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Cooling Water Systems, Unit 1 and 2
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity
- Reactor Coolant System Activity, Unit 1 and 2
The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and methods for compiling and reporting the PIs including the reactor oversight program mitigating systems performance indicator basis document for Catawba. The inspectors reviewed the raw data for the PIs listed above for the period of January 1, 2014, through December 31, 2014. The inspectors also independently screened TS action item logs, selected control room logs, work orders and surveillance procedures, and maintenance rule failure determinations to determine if unavailability/unreliability hours were properly reported.
The inspectors compared the licensees raw data against the graphical representations and specific values contained on the NRCs public web page for 2014. The inspectors also reviewed the past history of PIPs for systems affecting the mitigating systems PIs listed above for any that might have affected the reported values.
Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone
- Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP)
- Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation (ERO)
- Alert and Notification System Reliability (ANS)
For the review period January 1, 2014 through December 31, 2014, the inspectors examined data reported to the NRC, procedural guidance for reporting PI information, and records used by the licensee to identify potential PI occurrences. The inspectors verified the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill and exercise performance through review of a sample of drill and event records. The inspectors reviewed selected training records to verify the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill participation for personnel assigned to key positions in the ERO. The inspectors verified the accuracy of the PI for alert and notification system reliability through review of a sample of the licensees records of periodic system tests. The inspectors also interviewed the licensee personnel who were responsible for collecting and evaluating the PI data. Licensee procedures, records, and other documents reviewed within this inspection area are listed in the Attachment. This inspection satisfied three inspection samples for PI verification on an annual basis.
Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone
The inspectors reviewed and evaluated PI data collected from June through December, 2014, for the Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness PI. For the reviewed period, the inspectors assessed PIP records to determine whether HRA, VHRA or unplanned exposures, resulting in TS or 10 CFR 20 non-conformances, had occurred during the review period. The review included evaluation electronic dosimeter alarms for cumulative doses and/or dose rates exceeding established set-points.
Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone
The inspectors reviewed the Radiological Control Effluent Release Occurrences PI results for the public radiation safety cornerstone from June through December, 2014.
For the assessment period, the inspectors reviewed cumulative and projected doses to the public and PIP documents related to radiological effluent TS/ODCM issues.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Daily Review
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program. This was accomplished by reviewing copies of PIPs, attending selected daily site direction and PIP screening meetings, and accessing the licensees computerized database.
.2 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the following issue within the mitigating systems cornerstone entered into the licensees CAP.
- PIP C-14-11776, 2EMXH, Incoming Breaker from Load Center 1ELXB would not close in during power swap
The inspectors reviewed the actions taken to determine if the licensee had adequately addressed the following attributes:
- complete, accurate and timely identification of the problem
- evaluation and disposition of operability and reportability issues
- consideration of previous failures, extent of condition, generic or common cause implications
- prioritization and resolution of the issue commensurate with safety significance
- identification of the root cause and contributing causes of the problem
- identification and implementation of corrective actions commensurate with the safety
significance of the issue
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities
World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) Peer Review Report Review
The inspectors reviewed the final report for the WANO Peer Review of Catawba Nuclear Station conducted in August 2014. The inspectors reviewed the report to ensure that issues identified were consistent with the NRC perspectives of licensee performance and to verify if any significant safety issues were identified that required further NRC follow-up. The inspectors determined that no additional NRC follow-up was required.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On April 6, 2015, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Kelvin Henderson and other members of licensee management. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- T. Arlow, Emergency Planning Manager
- D. Barker, Operations Manager
- E. Benfield, General Supervisor, Radiation Protection
- B. Callaway, RPV Head Exams
- D. Cantrell, Chemistry Manager
- C. Cauthen, SGISI Program Contact
- C. Fletcher, Regulatory Affairs Manager
- K. Henderson, Site Vice-President
- T. Jenkins, Maintenance Manager
- C. Kamilaris, Organizational Effectiveness Director
- L. Keller, Nuclear Engineer Manager
- B. Leonard, Training Manager
- K. Phillips, Work Management Manager
- P. Simbrat, Regulatory Affairs Specialist
- T. Simril, Plant Manager
- J. Smith, Radiation Protection Manager
- W. Suslick, Director, Nuclear Engineering
- D. Tollison, Site Welding Supervisor
- S. West, Director, Nuclear Plant Security