ML20245F342
| ML20245F342 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 05/23/1989 |
| From: | Cunningham A, Rankin W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245F330 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-89-12, 50-414-89-12, 50-414-89-14, NUDOCS 8906280107 | |
| Download: ML20245F342 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000413/1989012
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARlETTA STREET,N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-413/89-12 and 50-414/89-14
Licensee:
Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414
License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52
Facility Name:
Catawba 1 and 2
Inspection Condu Ad:
Fil 25-28,1989
Inspector:
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B~Je?-/f[
A. L. Cunningham
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Date Signed
Accompanying Personnel:
B. R. Bonser
C. R. Van Niel
. M. Will
Approved by
(cuvdM
05-2989
W. H. Rankin, Chief
Date Signed
Emergency Preparedness Section
Emergency Preparedness and Radiological
Protection Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope
This routine, announced inspection involved observation and evaluation of the
annual radiological ercergency response exercise.
The limited participation
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exercise commenced at 7:15 a.m. on April 27, 1989.
Federal, State and county
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participation was limited to receipt and acknowledgement of emergency
notifications throughout the exercise.
The exercise was terminated at
4:00 p.m. on the above refsrenced date.
The medical and fire drills were
performed on April 25 and 26,1989, respectively.
Offsite local support and
resources were limited to performance of the med:: cal caergency and fire drills.
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The status ci outstanding emergency preparedness open items was reviewed.
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Results
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Nc- violations or devictiors were identifien.
The exercise was fully
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successful, and the licensee demonstrated the capability to effectively assess,
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control, and mitigate the postulated casualty presented in the exercise
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scenario.
Additionally, onsite and offsite protective action recommendations
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were promptly made and determined to be consistent with the Emergency Plan,
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8906280107 890524
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ADOCK 05000413
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respective procedures, and prevailing radiological conditions.
Exercise
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' objectives were fully implemented. .One concern was identified and tracked as
. an inspector followup item, namely: provision of specific guidance for review,
approval, and implementation of nonprocedural emergency actions during plant
emergencies (Paragraph 8.b)
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- T. Crawford, Integrated Scheduling Superintendent
- S. Deskevick, Design Engineer
- J. Forbes, Technical Services Superintendent
- M. Garrick, Safety Engineer
- R. Glover, Compliance Manager
- R. Harris, System Emergency Planner
- J.
Hill, Shift Supervisor
- E. Kuhr, Corporate Emergency Planner (CNS)
- D. Lee, Health Physicist
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- W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance Manager
- W. McRee, Corporate Emergency Planner
- G. Mitchell, Nuclear Production Specialist
- T. Owen, Station Manager
- D. Simpson, Station Emergency Planner
NRC Resident Inspector
- W. Orders
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that
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provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion
of the basic elements defined in the licensee's Emergency Plan and
organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E
to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II N of
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Hl! REG-0654.
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The scenario was reviewed in advance of the exercise and discussed in
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detati with licensee representatives on several occasions. While no major
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scenaric problems were identified, several inconsistencies became apparent
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during the exercise. The inconsistencies, however, failed to detract from
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the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organization.
The scenario develcped for this exercise was & tailed, and fully exercised
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the onsite emergency organization.
The scenario provided sufficient
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information to the States, counties, local governments and Federal
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agencies consistent with the scope of their participation in the exercise.
The licensee demonstrated a significant commitment to training and
personnel through use of controllers, evaluators, and specialists
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participating in the exercise. The controllers provided adequate guidance
throughout the exercise.
Neither prompting nor undue interaction between
controllers and playe.3 was observed.
The scenarios develcped for the medical emergency and fire drills were
reviewed in detail,. and determined to be adequate.
Both drills fully
integrated the required . response activities of licensee and offsite
. support groups including effective management of combined resources, where
applicable. The scope and objectives of the subject drills were met.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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3.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for
emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that
adequate stcff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to
10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.A of NUREG-0654.
The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments were made for
the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff
was available to respond to the simulated emergency. The initial response
organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives;
however, because of the scenario scope and conditions, long-term or
continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not
required. Discussions with licensee representatives and a detailed review
of the site Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) indicated that a sufficient
number of trained technical persanel were available for continuous
staffing of the emergency organization, if needed.
The inspector also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the
emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC) and
Operations Support Center (OSC).
Required staffing and specific
assignment of responsibility at these facilities were consistent with the
Radiological Emergency Plan and respective iraplementing procedures.,
The
Crisis Management Center (CMC) and Emergency News Center (ENC) were not
activated during this exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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4.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that
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the
following
requirements
were
implemented
pursuant
to
10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),. Paragraph IV. A of Appendix E to 10 CFP,50, and
specific guidance
promulgated
in Section II.B of NUREG-0654:
(1) unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response;
(2) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident
response in key functional areas at all times; and (3) specification of
onsite and offsite support organizational interactions.
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The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was
adequately defined, and that staff was available to fill key functional
positions within the organization.
Augmentation of the initial emergency
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response organization was accomplished through mobilization of off-shitt
and available on-shift personnel.
The on-duty Shift Supervisor assumed
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the duties of Emergency Coordinator promptly upon commencement of the
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simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by
the Station Manager following declaration of the Alert emergency
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classification.
Required interactions between the licensee's emergency
response organization, State, and local support agencies were adequate and
consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
this area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification
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and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee
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pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,
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specific guidance promulgated in Section 11.0 of NUREG-0654; and guidance
developed in NRC Information Notice B3-28.
An Emergency Action Level (EAL) matrix was promptly used to identify and
properly classify the initiating emergency event and escalate it to more
severe emergency classifications as the simulated accident sequence
progressed. Licensee actions in this area were timely and effective.
Observations confirmed that the emergency classification system _ was
properly used and was consistent with the Emergency Plan and implementing
procedures.
The sytem was observed to be adequate for classification of
the simulated accident events.
The emergency procedures provided for
initial and continuing mitigating actions during the simulated casualty.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
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This erec was cbserved to ensure that procedures were established by the
Mcensee for rotificatior of State and local response organizations, and
emarcency personrel, and tt'at the content of initial and followup messages
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was disseminated te these organizations.
This area was further observed
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to ensure that means to provide early notification to the populace within
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the
plume
exposure
pathway
were
established
pursuant
to
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10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and
specific guidance promt.lgated in Sectico II.E of NUREG-0654.
An intpector observed that notification methods and prceedures were
establ'ished and available for use in providing infont,ation regereing the
simulated emergency ccnditions to Federal, State crd local response
organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response
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organizations, if required.
Inspection also disclosed that the licensee
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consistently implemen+ed prompt notification of the State and counties
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within the 15-minute time regime following declaration of each emergency
classification during the exercise.
Periodic updating of the State
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regarding plant status via telephone and hard copy was also consistently
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implemented.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to ensure that provisions existed for prompt
communications among principal response organizations and emergency
personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to
Sett nn II.F of
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10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in
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The inspector observed communications within and between the licensee's
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emergency response facilities (Control Room, TSC, and OSC,), the licensee
and offsite response organizations, and the offsite environmental
monitoring teams and the TSC.
The inspector also observed information
flow among the various groups within the licensee's emergency
organization.
Emergency communications and communication systems were
significantly effective, and consistent with emergency response
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requi rements.
A dedicated intercom / plant PA system linking the TSC with
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the Control Room and OSC was available for routine facility briefings by
the Emergency Coordinator, and other interfacility communications as
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required.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
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This area was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and
equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,
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and specific guidance promulgated in Section 1.H of NUREG-0654.
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The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the
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emergency response facilities, and observed the use of eouipment therein.
Emergency response facilities used by the licensee during the exercise
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included the Control Room, TSC, and OSC. The CMC was not activated during
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this exercise.
Control Room - Unit 1 Control Room was provided for the enrcise
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Shift Supervisor and his staff.
Required communications equipment,
Control Room procedures and dooments were readily available,
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inspector ebserved that, following review and analysis cf the
sequence of accident events, Control Room operations personnel
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promptly initiated required responses to the simulated casualty.
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Emergency procedures were readily available, routinely followed, and
factored into accident assessment and mitigation exercises.
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Control Room personnel involvement was essentially limited to those
personnel assigned routine and special operational duties. Effective
management of personnel gaining access to the Control Room precluded
overcrowding, and maintained an ambient noise level required for
orderly conduct of operations under emergency conditions.
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The Shift Supervisor and the Control Room Operators were cognizant of
their duties, responsibilities, and authorities.
These personnel
demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system
and the proficient use of specific procedures to determine and
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declare the proper emergency classification.
The staff also
demonstrated the capability to consistently and effectively assess
the initial conditions and implement required mitigating actions in a
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timely manner.
It was noted that a detailed log of Control Room
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activities was maintained by the Shift Supervisor throughout the
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exercise. The Shift Supervisor demonstrated effective management and
control of the facility and staff during the exercise.
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The Operations Support Center (OSC) was relocated and effectively
designed to separate the team staging and facility operations areas.
Configuration of the facility significantly reduced the ambient noise
level necessary to the conduct of required operations.
The OSC was
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promptly staffed following activation of the Emergency Plan by the
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Emergency Coordinator and declaration of the Alert.
An inspector
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observed that reentry teams were promptly assembled, briefed, and
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dispatched.
A health physics technician accompanied each team. The
OSC Supervisor appeared to be cognizant of his duties and
responsibilities.
During operation of the facility, radiological
habitability was routinely monitored and documented.
The OSC Supervisor established and maintained effective management
and control of the facility.
The facility staff was frequently
uptted regarding plant status.
The supervisor also assured that
investigation and repair teams were thoroughly briefed regLrding
their tasks prior to deployment to the accident areas.
During the
exercise, inspection disclosed a concern identified by the inspector
and licensee representatives regarding implementation of unapproved
nonprocedural emergency actions.
In response to loss of a second
residual heat removal (RHR) pump (consistent with the simulated
casualty), OSC management proposed restoration of the reactor water
storage tank (RWST) inventory via modification of an existing valve
alignment to provide transfer of water from the spent fuel pool to
the referenced tank.
Although concurrence was later given, the
action was initiated without prior concurrence of the Emergency
Coordinator and cognizant TSC staff.
This item was thori ughly
discussed with licensee representatives prior to and during the exit
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interview.
This concern will be tracked as an inspector follow-up
item (IFI).
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IFI 50-413. 414/89-12-01:
Provide specific. guidance- for review,
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approval, and' implementation of nonprocedural emergency actions
during plant emergencies.-
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Technical . Support Center (TSC) - The TSC was activated-and promptly
staffed following notification by the Emergency Coordinator of the
simulated emergency conditions and the declaration of an Alert.
The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of. their emergency
duties, authorities, and responsibilities. Required operation of the
tacility proceeded in an orderly manner.
The TSC was provided with
adequate equipment for support of the assigned staff and continued
mitigation.ot the postulated casualty.
During operation'of the TSC, radiological habitability was routinely
monitored and documented, and personnel dosimetry was distributed as
required.
Status boards and related visual aids.were strategically
located to facilitate viewing by the TSC staff.
Status boards were
maintained by communicators assigned to the facility.
Inspection
also disclosed the following additional
findinos, namely:
(1) engineering, maintenance, and other technical support functions
were readily implemented and factored into problem-solving exercises;
(2) assumption of du'.ies by the Emergency Coordinator.was definite
and firm: (3) transfer of certain emergency-responsibilities from the-
Control Room to the TSC. was firmly declared and announced to the TSC
staff; (4) simultaneous briefings of the.TSC.and.0SC' staffs by the
Emergency Coordinator's use of the dedicated intercom. system were
frequent, and consistent with changes in' plant status and related
emergencyconditions;(5) accountability,includingidentificationof
missing personnel, was readily implemented. within the ' required time
regime and was consistent with the scope and objectives 'of the
scenario; and-(6) TSC controllers were effective in identifying minor
scenario problems, and interacted with players without prompting.
The TSC dose assessment group demonstrated proficiency in manual and
computerized assessment methodologies.
Contact between the
-assessment group and offsite monitoring teams (OMTs)- were routinely
maintained.
OMTs were frequently cppraised of changing plant
conditions and casualty status.
Offsite dose assessment and dose
projections were consistent with the offsite radiological data
provided, and were performed in a timely manner.
Results provided by
the TSC dose assessment group were incorporated into offsite followup
notification messages.
The dose assessment staff demonstrated a
significant commitment to training throughout the exercise.
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Additionally, facility access and contamination control were
consistently maintained throughout the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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'AccidentAssessment(82301)
-This area .was observed to ~ assure that adequate methods, systems, and '
-equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential ~ offsite
consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required
- by 10 CFR' 50.47(b)(9), Paragraph IV.B .of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and
specific' guidance ~ promulgated-in Section 11.I of NUREG-0654.-
The. accident assessment program. included an engineering' assessment of
plant status, and an assessment. of radiological hazards - to onsite and
offsite personnel directly resulting from the casualty.
During the
exercise, accident' assessment teams functioned effectively in analyzing
plant status and providing ~ recommendations to the Emergency . Coordinator-
regarding the following:
(1) mitigating actions required to~ reduce damage
to plant .' systems and equipment; (2) prevention and/or control of
radioactive releases; and (3) prompt termination of emergency conditions.
. Radiological assessment activities involved several groups.
An inplant-
group was effective in projecting the radiological impact within the plant
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based' upon inplant monitoring and onsite measurements.
Offsite'
radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to ' determine the level of
radioactivity in .those areas within the influence of the radioactive
plume.
Radiological effluent data provided by inplant and offsite ' teams
were received in the TSC where dose calculations were computed and
factored into the ' exercise.
All resultant data were consistent with
projected scenario parameters. . Offsite monitoring teams were neither
. observed nor evaluated by NRC during this exercise; however, inspectors
observed that the TSC Field Team Coordinator frequently briefed and
updated the offsite monitoring teams on periodic meteorological changes,
plant releases data, and plant casualty status.
Communications between
the subject entities were effective throughout the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Protective Measures (82301)
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This area was observed to determine whether guidelines for protective
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actions, consistent with federal guidance, were developed and in place,
and whether protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation
of nonessential personnel , were promptly implemented pursuant to
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10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654.
The protective measures decision-making process was observed by the
inspector.
For each emergency classification defined, appropriate inplant
and offsite protective measures were reviewed and implemented where
required.
Protective measures recommendations were consistent with the
accident conditions postulated during the exercise.
Protective action
recommendations were also consistent with the facility Radiological
Emergency Plan and respective procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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11. Radiological Exposure Control (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether methods for controlling
radiological exposures during an emergency were established and
implemented for amergency workers, and whether these methods included
exposure guidelines consistent with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
recommendations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11), and specific guidance
promulgated in Section II.K of NUREG-0654.
An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout
.the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency workers, and
conducting periodic radiological surveys in the emergency response
facilities.
Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of
emergency actions taken.
Adequate protective clothing and respiratory
protection were available for use as required.
Health Physics control of radiation exposure, contamination, and access to
radiation areas was determined to be adequate.
The Health Physics
Supervisor was observed to thoroughly brief OSC survey, investigative, and
r0 pair teams prior to their deployment into radiation controlled areas.
Dosimetry was available and effectively used. High-rance fosimeters were
also available, if needed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12. Public Education and Information (82301)
T..is area was observed to determined whether information concerning the
simulated emergency was made cvailable for dissemination to the public as
requiredby10CFR50.47(b)(7), Paragraphia.DofAppendixEto10CFR50,
and specific criteria promulgated in Section II.G of NUREG-0654.
Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the
exercise; however, this area was not evaluated during the exercise.
13. Status of Previous Findings (92701)
a.
(Closed) IFI 50-413,414/89-04-01:
Formalize a procedure for Alert
and Notification System ( ANS) testing, maintenance, and followup
actions.
Inspection disclosed that a detailed procedure was established and
implemented to ensure that sirens and related components of the alert
and notification system were operable and maintained as required,
b.
(Closed) IFI 50-413, 414/89-04-02:
Conduct an augmentation drill to
verify and document Figure B-1 staffing requirements and arrival
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times.
Inspection disclosed that an off-hour augmentation drill was
conducted.
Response of emergency organization personnel was
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consistent with Table B-1 of the Emergency Plan with regard to
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required staffing and arrival time at the plant site and designated
facilities f,ontrol Room. OSC, TSC)..
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Critique-(82301)
The licensee's' critique. of the emergency exercise was. observed to
determine whether deficiencies, weaknesses and required improvement items
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identified during the . exercise were brought to - the. attention : of -
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management, and documented for corrective action pursuant. to:
10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix. E - to .10 CiR 50, and
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.
.The licensee conducted a players' ' critique in each emergency facility
immediately' after the exercise, f ollowed by a comprehensive Controller /
Evaluator critique.
The' Licensee /NRC critique was conducted on
September 28, 1988, with these persons listed in Paragraph 1, above. The
. licensee's critique.was- detailed- and comprehensive and documented those-
~ items requiring review and corrective action.
Following'the licensee's
critique, the NRC inspector described the areas evaluated and discussed in
detail the inspection results contained in this report.
No. dissenting
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comments were received from tne licensee.
The licensee did .not identify
as proprietary any. materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector.-
during this inspection.'
Item Number.
Description and Reference
50-413,414/89-12-01
Provide specific guidance for: review,
approval,
and
implementation
of
nonprocedural emergency actions .during
plant emergencies (Paragraph 8.b).
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