ML20199G035

Notice of Violation from Insp on 970831-1011.Violations Noted:Licensee Failed to Follow Procedures for Security Badge Access Control as Evidenced.On 970909,security Failed to Destroy & Unassign Access Badge of Terminated Individual

ML20199G035
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	11/10/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20199G029	List: IR 05000413/1997012 ML20199G024 ML20199G035
References
50-413-97-12, 50-414-97-12, NUDOCS 9711250076
Download: ML20199G035 (3)

Text

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NOTICE 0F VIOLATION Duke Energy Corporation-

. Docket Nos. 50-413. 50-414

-Catawba Nuclear Station License Nos. NPF 35. NPF-52 1

During an NRC' inspection l conducted from-August 31.[1997-- October 11. 1997.

violations of:NRC requirements:were identified.

In accordance with the.

" General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions."

NUREG-1600, the violations are listed below:

JA.

Technical Specification 6.8.1. requires.. in part, that written-procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained for applicable procedures in Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33. Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operations). Revision 2.~ 1978.

Appendix-A; specifies procedures for Security and Visitor Control.

Duke Energy Corporation Procedure Nuclear System Directive 218 of Nur. lear Policy Manual-Volume 2. requires management in the case of--

involuntary and voluntary termination, to be responsible for verbally notifying, site ' security and/or site staffing cont 6 cts to delete a terminated individuals' security badge.

For involu'itary terminations, security is to be notified prior to the terminatiorddischarge or simultaneously with the termination / discharge.

Catawba Nuclear Station Security Procedure Number 208. Badging Officer / Specialist. Revision 29, paragraph 6. requires badges to be.

destroyed and unassigned through the appropriate security computer, upon receipt of a Security Badge Transaction Request.

. Contrary to the above, the licensee' failed -to follow procedures for

. security badge access control as evidenced by the following:

1.

On September 9. 1996, security failed to destroy and unassign the access badge of a voluntarily (favorably) terminated individual.

No protected or vital areas were accessed.

2.

On September 26. 1996, one individual was voluntarily (favorably) terminated, and the responsible manager failed to notify' security.

No access to the protected-area was gained.

- 3.:

On'0ctober 24, 1996. vendors-failed to notify security of-the voluntary (favorable) termination of four individuals. There was.

na access to_ the protected-or vital-areas after their termination.

~

-4.

On November 13,1996. a site manager. failed to notify security of _'

the voluntary (favorable) termination of an individual.

There was no access to the protected or vital areas after t mination.

M o M 13 9

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5.

On January 31, 1997, a vendor failed to notify security of a voluntary (favorable) termination of two individuals.

No protected areas were accessed.

6.

On April 24, 1997, security failed to destroy and unassign the access badges of two voluntarily (fasorably) terminated individuals.

No protected or vital areas were accessed.

7.

On June 20. 1997, one individual was voluntarily (favorably) terminated, and the responsible manager failed to notify security.

No access to the protected area was gained.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement III).

B.

10 CFR 73.55 (d)(8) states to the effect that access control devices used 'o control access to protected and vital areas must be controlled to reduce the probability of compromise.

Duke Energy Corporation Nuclear Security and Contingency Plan.

Revision 6. Chapter 6. " Access " Paragraph 6.3 provides that protected area badges shall remain within the protected area.

Duke Energy Corporation Nuclear Policy Manual-2 Nuclear System Directive: 217. Nuclear Security Program. Revision 2. Paragraph 217.5.3.1. states to the effect that badges shall remain within the

)rotected area except when under the control of site security personnel.

urther. it requires security badges be dropped into the chute located at the exit turnstile prior to leaving the facility.

Nuclear Station Security Procedure No. 208. Revision 29. Paragraph 3.1.4. requires that prior to exiting the protected area, all badges shall be placed in the drop chute at the badging office.

Contrary to the above the licensee failed to follow Nuclear Station Security Procedure Number 208 on five occasions between the dates of January 6. 1997, and August 22, 1997, when the licensee failed to control protected area access badges, and the badges were taken outside the protected area.

This is a Sever,ty Level IV violation (Supplement III).

C.

10 CFR 73.71 requires licensees subject to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55 to maintain a current log and record the safeguards events described in paragraph II (a) and (b) of Appendix G to Part 73 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discovery by a licensee employee.

Appendix G to Part 73, paragraph II.(a), requires that any failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability in a safeguards system that l

4 Notice of Violition 3

could hava allowed unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area be recorded within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discovery in the safeguards event log.

Contrary to the above, failures, degradation or discovered vulnerabilities in safeguards systems that could have allowed unautMrized or undetected access to a protected area were not being recordad.

Specifically. Duke Energy Corporation Nuclear Security Manual. Reporting and Trending of Safeguards and Security Events.

Revis'on 11. Appendix B. inappropriately provided an exception to 10 CFR

73. Appendix G. in that it authorized the licensee to not report in the safeguards event log security badges available for issue to an individual whose access should have been restricted (under favorable conditions) and was identified and deleted during the licensee's 31-day review.

Thjs is a Seyerjty leye] ]y yjolation (Supplement III).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201. Duke Energy Corporation is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ATTN: Document Control Desk. Washington. D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator Region II. and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the Catawba Nuclear Station, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice).

This reply should be clearly marked as a "Realy to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) t1e reason for the violation or, if contested, the Dasis for disputing the violation. (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved. (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full com)liance will be achieved.

If an adequate reply is not received within t1e time specified in this Notice. an order or demand for information may be issued so as to why the license should not be modified. sus) ended, or revoked, or why such other action or may be proper should not )e taken. Where good cause is shown, consideratMn will be given to extending the response time.

Because your res)onse will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) to the extent possi)le, it should not include any personal privacy. 3roprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR witlout redaction.

However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the PDR. and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information from the public.

Dated at Atlanta. Georgia this 10th day of November, 1997