IR 05000413/1989007

Insp Repts 50-413/89-07 & 50-414/89-07 on 890226-0325. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Surveillance Observation,Maint Observation & Review of Licensee Nonroutine Event Rept

ML20245G323
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	04/20/1989
From:	Lesser M, William Orders, Shymlock M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20245G264	List: IR 05000413/1989007 ML20245G259 ML20245G298
References
50-413-89-07, 50-413-89-7, 50-414-89-07, 50-414-89-7, NUDOCS 8905030119
Download: ML20245G323 (13)

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Do NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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.p % n REGloN il g, j 101 MARIETTA STREET, * 't ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323 ' '

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Report No /89-07 and 50-414/89-07 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, N.C. 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-5 Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2 Inspection Con & n ed: February 26, 1989 - March 25, 1989 Inspectors:/

W.1. OFders b %te/ Signed I 89 l /

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Approve /M b #M M. B. Shymiock, Section Chief Sat ( Signed

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Projects Branch 3 l

Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine, resident inspection was con @cted on site inspecting in the areas of review of plant operatio- ; arveillance observation; maintenance observation; review of lics esc' nonroutine event reports; and followup of previously identified iun l l

Results: In the areas inspected the licensee's programs were determined to be adequate. One violation was identified with thret examples involving ,

failure to follow procedure Each example resulted in a safety  :

injection and is briefly described belo ]

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A failure to adequately evaluate the consequences of placing a 1 jumper during troubleshootin A failure to maintain adequate knowledge of plant status during 1 a controlled cooldown evolutio .

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Inattention to detail resulting in closing the wrong valv > 'j PDR ADOCK 05000413 '.i O PDC -

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One licensee identified violation was reported involving operation of j the Residual Heat Removal System with less than the Technical ]

Specification required flow rat ;

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The licensee experienced two failures of Control Components In (CCI) steam generator power operated relief valves and initially was unable to determine the root cause. As plans were being made to open !

the valve and inspect, the licensee became aware of events at Palo I Verde nuclear facility involving failures of similar CCI valve I With the vendor on site providing assistance, a corroded piston ring j was determined to have caused the failures. While licensee actions ;

eventually appeared to be conservative with regards to correcting the CCI failures, increased attention may be necessary when component failures occur and the cause is not initially identifie An j additional example of a valve failure (2NM-190) where no apparent i cause was found is described in the inspection repor .!

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REPORT DETAILS Persons' Contacted Licensee Employees H. Barron, Operations Superintendent W. Beaver, Performance Engineer R. Charest, Station Chemistry Supervisor T. Crawford, Integrated Scheduling Superintendent W. Deal, Health Physics Supervisor J. Forbes, Technical Services Superintendent

• R. Glover, Compliance Engineer T. Harrall, Design Engineering '

R. Jones, Mafetenance Engineering Services Engineer q F. Mack, Project Services Engineer-W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance. Engineer I

• W. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent .j

• T. Owen, Station Manager .)

J. Stackley, Instrumentation and Electrical Engineer j R. Wardell, Station Services Superintendent l

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne NRC Resident Inspectors

• Orders

• M. Lesser

'l Accompanying Personnel

• Herdt, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II j

• Attended exit intervie . Unresolved Items l An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required'to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation. There were no unresolved items identified in this repor . Plant Operations Review (71707 and 71710). The inspectors reviewed plant operations - throughout the reporting -

period to verify conformance with' regulatory requirements,-Technical Specifications (TS), and administrative ' controls. Control room logs, danger tag logs, Technical' Specification Action Item Log, and- the -

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removal and restoration log were routinely reviewed. Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedure The inspectors verified by observation and interviews, that the measures taken to assure physical protection of the facility met current requirement Areas inspected included the security organization, the establishment and maintenance of gates, c'cors, and isolation zones in the proper conditions, and that access control and badging were proper and procedures followe In addition to the areas discussed above, the areas toured were cbserved for fire prevention and protection activitie These included such things as combustible material control, fire protection systems and equipment and fire protection associated with maintenance activitie The inspectors reviewed Problem Investigation Reports .

(PIR) to determine if the licensee was appropriately documenting

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problems and impicmenting corrective action b. Unit 1 Summary Unit I started the reporting period at 100% power. On. March 5 the unit tripped on overpower delta temperature (OPDT) and safety injected when an operator inadvertently shut the 1A Main Steam Isolation Valve. One of the Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (ISV-13) failed to open (see paragraph 5b). The unit started up on March 7 and continued to operate at 100% power for the remainder of the reporting pr-io c. Unit 2 Summary l

Unit 2 started the reporting period operating at 93% power. On I March 4 the unit started to "coastdown" in preparation for its end of cycle (EOC) 2 refueling outage. The unit shut down on March 10. On March 15 with the unit in mode 5, procedures to vent the reactor i vessel head to the pressurizer relief tank (PRT) were in progress, I when as the reactor vessel head vent valves were opened, pressurizer level decreased from 18% to 4% over the period of about 10 minutes. A preliminary assessment by licensee personnel estimated that 1,000 gallons of water was displaced from the pressurizer to the reacto The inspectors requested the licensee to generate a PIR to obtain additional assistance in evaluating the problem. This is identified as Inspector Followup Item 414/89-07-01: Pressurizer Level Loss When Venting Reactor Vessel Due to Possible Gas Bubble in Vessel pending i evaluation by the licensee, l

Major outage activities include an Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT)

of the containment and an Integrated Engineered Safeguards Features tes On March 16, while pressure in containment was increasing

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I for the ILRT, operators discovered the 2A Containment Air Return Fan j (VX) operating with its associated discharge damper closed. The' fan j is designed to start 10 minutes after- a - containment high high i pressure (Sp) signal with a permissive from the Containment Pressure I Control System (CPCS). It appears that when the ILRT commenced and containment pressure reached the CPCS permissive '(approximately psig) the 2A VX fan had started. The licensee suspects the Sp logic signal may have been . sealed in and not reset from previous' testing i activity. The inspectors were concerned with past operability of the '

l system considering the fan would have started out of . sequence and before the discharge damper opened. The licensee is continuing their investigatio The licensee has written PIR 2-C89-0117 to investigate the issue and will submit a courtesy. LER describing the event. This is identified as Inspector Followup Item 414/89-07-02:

2A VX Fan Found Operating Due to Sealed In Start Logic, pending determination of the cause and its potential effects by the license The unit ended the reporting period in mode No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance Observation (61726) i 1 During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations were in compliance with various TS requirements. Typical of these requirements were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, emergency power systems, safety injection, emergency safeguards systems, control room ventilation, and direct current electrical power source The inspector verified . that surveillance testing was performed in 1 accordance with the approved written procedures, test instrt:mtation was calibrated, lin.i ting conditions for operation were met, appropriate removal and restoration of the affected equipment was i accomplished, test results met acceptance criteria and were reviewed by personnel other .than the individual ' directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed  ;

and resolved by appropriate management personnel, On March 5,1989 the licensee was testing the isolation feature of ,

the Unit I main steam isolation bypass valves and.the Steam Generator (S/G) Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) per PT/1/A/4200/09A, 1 Auxiliary Safeguards Test Cabinet Periodic Tes Step 8.1.2 of enclosure 13.1 requires the operator to shut ISV-27A, S/G 1A POR Isolation Valve as one of the test prerequisite The operator '

attempted to shut ISV-27A on two occasions without succes On the third attempt the operator accidentally shut ISM-7, S/G 1A Main Steam ,

Isolation Valve-(MSIV). (Work request 50079 OPS was used to late '

repair ISV-27 which had a slipping drive bushing). The MSIV switch is located adjacent to -the switch for '1SV-27 on the control board.

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This action caused ISM-7 to close, the reactor tripped on Overpower delta temperature (OPDT) and a safety injection occurred on the subsequent steam pressure rate decrease after a S/G code safety j lifted. .This event was attributed to operator inattentiveness and is -)

an example of violation 413,414/89-07-03: Failure to Follow !

Procedures on Three Occasions Resulting in Safety Injection )

One example of a violation was identified in paragraph 4 . Maintenance Observations (62703) )

l Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components j were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in !

accordance with the requirement The inspector verified licensee I conformance to the requirements in the following areas of inspection: )

the activities were accomplished using approved procedures, and j functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to j returning components or systems to service; quality control records j were maintained; activities performed were accomplished by qualified j personnel; and materials used were properly cert lfied. Work requests )

were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure !

that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance i which may effect system performanc On February 6,1989, the Unit I turbine was tripped and condenser )

vacuum broken due to high vibration of the turbine rotor. Since the -

turbine bypass valves to the condenser (steam dumps) could not be used without condenser vacuum, the operators used the Steam Generator (S/G) Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV) as the reactor's heat sin The PORV for S/G 18, ISV-13, failed to initially open upon demand )

from the operator. After the transient, the operators isolated the i valve and again attempted to open ISV-13. It opened only after full demand was applied for about 1 minut I The S/G PORV'S are safety related and are used to meet the requirements of NRC Branch Technical Position 5-1 to enable the plant to achieve cold shutdown using only safety related equipmen The pneumatically actutaed valves are manufactured by Control Components Inc. (CCI) and have a 6 inch inlet port, a 10 inch outlet with an 8 inch pisto Work Request 44716 OPS was generated to determine why ISV-13 failed to ope Maintenance technicians Sund no apparent problem and successfully stroked the valve with no differential pressure (dp) across i They next opened the isolation valve to apply a dp and opened ISV-13 "just enough to verify the valve came off its seat". Based on this the valve was declared operabl _

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5 i On March 5,1989 Unit 1 tripped and again -1SV-13 failed to ope Subsequent investigation again revealed no problems. The licensee initiated PIR 1-C89-0111 to ' assign evaluation of the failure to i design engineering. The valve was later stroked to' 30% open with a '

dp of approximately 1076psig and declared operabl The inspector met with licensee representatives to discuss planned I correctise actions for ISV-13. The licensee suspected a possible problem with the ability of the pilot valve to equalize ~ pressure across the PORV piston when the valve is demanded ope q The pilot valve opens on demand and allows steam pressure in the bonnet proportional to main steam header pressure to equalize across ]I

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the piston to allow for fine modulating control, If pressure _ cannot I equalize the piston would remain closed on the sea Higher main steam header pressure, 'as would occur during plant transients, would require a longer time for pressure to equalize across the PORV piston. This may explain the inability of the valve to open at high pressures but its apparent operability at lower ,

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J On March 23 the inspectors became aware of failures of similar CCI J valves at the Palo Verde Nuclear Plant (reference Preliminary Notification PNO-V-89-078 of 3/23/89). This information was forwarded 3 to the licensee later that same day. The inspectors also forwarded a i letter from CCI to Arizona Nuclear Power Project- dated January 4, i 1989, which described two enhancements to the valves . involving an l improved piston ring design and a larger pilot port configuratio )

Excessive bonnet pressure due to leakage by the piston ring is a suspected cause for valve sticking. An improved piston ring would minimize this effect. Additionally to further reduce bonnet pressure the pilot port capacity would be modified from 2.5 to 4.9 square inches to allow the bonnet to be vented faste On March 27 the licensee disassembled ISV-13 and inspected the piston rin The ring was corroded and was identified as the cause for ISV-13 failing to function due to excessive steam leak by into the bonnet. The licensee is currently planning to replace . the ' piston rings and perform the pilot port capacity modification.on the FlRV'S on both unit This is identified as Inspector Follow-up Item 413/89-07-04:

Corrective Action Regarding two Failures of PORV ISV-13, pending completion of licensee modifications, On January 12, 1989 following a Unit 2 trip (see LER 414/89-01) valve 2NM-190, Steam Generator 2A Blowdown Sampling Containment Isolation Valve failed to close. Work- Request 42592 OPS was generated to l

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repair the valve, which is a 1/2 inch globe valve with a Rotork motor actuato Maintenance technicians manually operated the valve and j verified limit switches were set correctl The valve stem was ;

greased and the valve was successfully stroked and timed and declared j operabl No apparent problems could be identified other than the !

apparant lack of adequate stem lubricatio The inspectors were concerned that the valve was not tested with a differential pressure across it and the root cause of the failure was not identified. The i licensee discussed with the inspectors their efforts to upgrade the preventive maintenance program for motor operated valves j)

(specifically stem lubrication) and plans for performing MOVATS {

testing on 2NM-190 during the current refueling outage. Limitorque I valves are lubricated on an 18 month frequency but the Rotork program ]

has yet to be establishe This issue is identified as Inspector i Follow-up Item 414/89-07-05: 2NM-190 Valve Failure Cause I l

Determination, pending licansee MOVATS testing and preventive maintenance revie No violations or deviations were identifie . Review of Licensee Non Routine Event Reports (92700) The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC requirement The determination included: adequacy of description, verification of ;

compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements, '

corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems, satisfaction of reporting requirements and the relative safety significance of each even Additional inplant reviews and discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for those reports indicated by an (*). The following LERs are closed:

• 413/88-19 Inoperability of Diesel Generator Due to Manufacturing Design Deficiency

• 413/88-27 Technical Specification Violation Due to Reduced Residual Heat Removal Flow 413/89-02 Technical Specification Violation Because of Inoperable Fire Barrier Penetration Seals Due to Design Deficiency 413/89-03 Auxili ary Feedwater Actuation Following a Manual Turbine Trip

• 414/88-28 Manual Reactor Trip Caused by a Loss of Main Generator Status Coolant Flow Due to Personnel Error

• 414/89-01 Reactor Trip Following Failure of Main Feedwater Control Valve Fuse

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7 On December 30, 1988, while Unit I was in mcde 6 operators reduced reactor coolant-(NC) level to 61/2% to facilitate rem' oval of the Steam Generator nozzle dams. Operators noticad a discrepancy between the control room NC level indication and tne NC sightglass in containmen The operator's high sensiti'. Ity to industry events  !

involving loss of Residual Heat Removal N ) due to vortexing raised a concern that ND flow was too high > % flow was reduced to'less than 3000 gpm. -Technical Specification 4.9.8.1 requires ND flow to be at least 3000 gpm when in mode 6. The operator justified his decision to reduce ND flow to less than 3000 gpm by referring to Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal. It .was incorrect to interpret the letter as authorization to violate the Technical Specification requiremen The licensee is currently in the process of preparing a Technical Specification Amendment Request to remove the 3000 gpm requirement in order to minimize the potential for vortexing and increase reactor safety. The licensee reported this-event in LER 413/88-27. This violation meets the criteria specified in Section V of the NRC Enforcement Policy for not issuing a Notice-of Violation and is not cite This is documented as Licensee Identified Violation LIV 413/88-07-06: Residual Heat Removal Flow Less Than Technical Specification Requiremen One licensee identified violation is described in paragraph 6 . Follow-up on previous Inspection Findings (92701 and 92702)- (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item 413/88-22-05: Excess Frosting of -l Ice Condenser Flow Passages. The' licensee has taken steps to improve the effectiveness of cleaning flow passages during refueling outage The cleaning will encompass 100*4 of .the flow passages and should prevent excess frosting from building up and potentially clogging the passage Some fuzzy frost is expected to occur during unit operation between refueling outages, howevtr, this will not restrict flo q (Closed) Unresolved Item 414/89-05-01: Personnel Errors Causing Two  !

Safety Injections. On February 21, 1989 operations personnel were i testing Main Steam Isolation Valve 2SM-3 on -Unit 2 using PT/2/A/4250/01A. The procedure requires the operator to push the j

"90*J open" test push button until the "90% open" light is o The ,

"90*4 open" light failed to energize and Work Request 42760 OPS was )

generated to inspect and repair applicable equipmen i Instrument and Electrical (IAE) technicians began trouble-shooting using IP/0/A/3890/01, Controlling Procedure for Trouble-Shooting and i Corrective Maintenance. The technicians attempted to identify failed components in the circuit using electrical drawing CNEE 0270-01.03 '

with jumpers and a voltmete Various components were checked i satisfactoril The technicians then attempted to verify that

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l contacts 1 and la of relay device 2SMAR 10(EH) were closing when the I test pushbutton was pushed. Zero voltage was observed across the contacts, however, this was not enough information to conclude the contacts were closing. The technicians next inappropriately placed a jumper between terminal points F-11 and F-12 in an attempt to verify the contacts closed. This effectively short circuited the power supply to the Main Steam Isolation Valve 2SM-3 control circuitry when the test purhbutton was closed and caused the valve to completely shut. The reactor tripped on steam generator low low level and a safety injection occurred on negative steam pressure rate after the code safety relief valves lifte Step 10.1.5 of IP/0/A/3890/01 requires the technicians to determine j specific limitations for anticipated work and to determine the effect

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of planned activity on plant operations. The technicians failed to adequately perform these steps in that the effects of placing the jumper across points F-11 and F-12 were not adequately evaluated and 1 resulted in short circuiting the supply. This in turn caused the d reactor trip and subsequent safety injection. This is identified as one example of violation 413,414/89-07-03: Failure to Follow Procedures on Three Occasions Resulting in Safety injections, i l

At 1:26 p.m. that afternoon, the unit was in mode 3 recovering from '

the safety injection and reactor trip described above, when a second safety injection occurred on low steam line pressure. The unit was at approximately 530 degrees F and 800 psig steam pressure at the .

time of the event. A cooldown had been initiated earlier in the day 1 when the unit entered T.S. 3.0.3 based on information in post trip data which indicated both diesel generator sequencers were degrade A review of the circumstances surrounding this event revealed that at approximately 1:15 p.m., the shift supervisor, discussed the remaining cooldown requirements with the operators and instructed the operator at the controls (OATC) to cool down one more degree and hold steam presswe at 800 psig. At 1:20 p.m., the OATC opened condenser steam dump vc < o s 2SB9, 2SB18, and 2SB27 to initiate the cooldown ramp. At 1:24 p.m. , 3 of 4 main feedwater regulating bypass valves opened to maintain steam generator level. A safety injection (SI)

occurred at 1:26 p.m. on rate compensated steam line low pressure due to the operator induced transien Approximately 6 minutes tran=pired from the time the OATC began the cooldown ramp to the time of the SI. The licensee's review of the event revealed that the OATC was not attentive to the steam pressure l- after he placed the unit in the cooldown transien Catawba Operations Management Procedure 1-8, Authority and Responsibility of Licensed Operators, requires in section 7.2.B that the 0ATC " Shall be knowledgeable of unit status at all times."

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i Contrary to that requirement, the 0ATC was not knowledgeable of the 1 unit status at all times, specifically the. time between 1:20 p.m. and ]

1:26 p.m. on February 21, 1989 when his inattention resulted in the 1 unit sustaining an unnecessary safety system challeng This :is . i identified as another, example of Violation 413,414/89-07-0 j

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c .. (Closed) Unresolved Item 414/88-33-02: Improper Coupling Set Up of )

Borg-Warner Air Actuated Valves. Maintenance Engir.eering Services completed corrective action to identify other similar valves which could be incorrectly set up and actions to prevent future. recurrenc The maintenance history o s researched for all valves which were worked on by Instrument and Electrical (IAE) personnel using IP/0/A/3820/22, Maintenance Instructions for Miller Air and Hydraulic Cylinders. The licensee identified four valves on which maintenance was performed to the coupling between the actuator and valve. The 'l licensee was able to demonstrate by tests and/or operation performed after the maintenance that the valves are coupled correctl The licensee has taken steps to prevent recurrence by requiring Mechanical Maintenance to perform all uncoupling and coupling o J valves. IAE may assist if requested or when required to adjust the actuator to the correct position. Based on these corrective actions this item is considered close (Closed) Inspector Followup -Item 413,414/88-15-04: Evaluation of ;

Corrective Action for Diesel Generator Failure The licensee {

identified two primary root causes to the numerous valid failures of 1 the diesel engines 'during October 1987 to May 1988. The first problem was associated with a pressure sensor (P3) manufactured by Calcon and used to sense lube oil pressure. After several failures of the Catawba engines, the manufacturer identified a manufacturing flaw in the P3 sensor which caused the engines to trip. The flaw was reported to the NRC pursuant to 10CFR21 on April 29, 1988 with an-addendum dated May 12, 1988. Because of a tolerance stack up in the manufacturing of the. sensor, the pressure sensing diaphragm could be held solid against the pressure head, creating a smaller surface area. The smaller surface area requires a larger pressure to shut off the sensor's vent port. This caused the sensor to continuously vent control air and eventually trip the engine on erroneous low low lube oil pressure signal. The vendor modified the P3. pressure -

sensors to correct this proble The modified sensors were installed on all Catawba diesels. The licensee has subsequently replaced the pneumatic sensors and circuits that trip the engines during emergency operation with' electrical sensors on Unit 1. 'The same. modification is currently being installed on Unit The licensee identified a second root cause which potentiall contributed to premature failure of engine control component Excessive moisture in the engine's control air system caused the.P3 pressure sensor internals and other components to corrode' and stick.

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The licensee determined that moisture cm4 ymver from the air compressors to the air system was occurring cue to several problem j The licensee initiated the following correcU se > cti on :-

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The control panels on the desiccant air dryers has or is being l replaced with a Duke design to far:ilitate ease of maintenanc The compressor aftercooler condensate dump valves are being j replaced with automatic dump valve {

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Preventive maintenance and surveillance frequencies have been f increased on the desiccant drying tower and starting air ;

dewpoint measurement A nitrogen system was installed temporarily on the 1A diesel as a source of " control air" until problems with moisture in the i control air could be resolve This has since been remove l A more detailed description of the problems was reported by' the licensee in LER 413/88-19 and a Special Repcrt dated May 25, 198 The 1A Diesel Generator performed the worst having experienced 9 valid failures in 100 Unit ] valid tests up to May 1988. Since corrective actions were initiated only one valid failure has occurred on the engines. This was on January 27, 1989 when the IB diesel was j shutdown due to smoldering insulation on the turbocharger and was 4 unrelated to the previous engine failure Based on licensee corrective actions, this item is close Two examples of a violation are discussed in paragraph 7 ;

8. Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 30, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed belo No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials providea to or reviewed ty the inspectors during this inspectio Item Number Description and Reference IFI 414/89-07-01 Pressurizer Level Loss When Venting Reactor Vessel Due to Possible Gas Bubble in Vessel (paragraph 3c.)  !

IFI 414/89-07-02 2A VX Fan Found Operating Due to Sealed In ;

Start Logic (paragraph 3c.)

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Item Number Description and Reference (cont'd)

VIO 413,414,'99-07-03 Failure to Follow Procedures on Three Occasions Resulting in Safety Injections (paragraphs 4b. and 7b.)

IFI 413/89-07-04 Corrective Actions Regarding 2 Failures of ISV-13 (paragraph Sb. )

IFI 414/89-07-05 2NM-190 Valve Failure Cause Determination (paragraph Sc.)

LIV 413/89-07-06 Residual Heat Removal Flow Less Than Technical Specification Requirement (paragraph 6b.)

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