ML20135C260

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Insp Repts 50-413/96-16 & 50-414/96-16 on 960908-1019.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint, Engineering & Plant Support
ML20135C260
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/15/1996
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20135C258 List:
References
50-413-96-16, 50-414-96-16, NUDOCS 9612060251
Download: ML20135C260 (21)


See also: IR 05000413/1996016

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION II

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Docket Nos:

50-413, 50-414

License Nos:

NPF-35. NPF-52

Report Nos.:

50-413/96-16. 50-414/96-16

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Licensee:

Duke Pcwer Company

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Facility:

Catawba Nuclear Station. Units 1 and 2

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Location:

422 South Church Street

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Charlotte. NC 28242

Dates:

September 8 - October 19, 1996

Inspectors:

R. J. Freudenberger, Senior Resident Inspector

P. A. Balmain, Resident Inspector

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R. E. Carroll, Project Engineer. Region II

R. L. Franovich Resident Inspector

C. W. Rapp, Senior Reactor Inspector, Region II

Approved by:

L'. D. Wert, Acting Chief

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Reactor Projects Branch 1

Division of Reactor Projects

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ENCLOSURE

9612060251 961115

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PDR

ADOCK 05000413

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PDR

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Catawba Nuclear Station. Units 1 & 2

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NRC Inspection Report 50-413/96-16, 50-414/96-16

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This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations

maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers.a 6-week

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period of resident ins)ection; in addition, it includes the results of

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announced inspections ay regional reactor safety and reactor projects

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inspectors,

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Ooerations

Unit 1 restart observations were generally positive in the areas of

containment cleanliness. the conduct of zero power physics testing, and

the licensee's resolution of an intermediate range reactor trip setpoint

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discrepancy (Section 01.1).

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Because of ineffective communications between the operations and

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chemistry organizations. Unit 1 entered Technical Specification (TS)

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3.5.4.b action statement when fueling water storage tank boron

concentration slightly exceeded its TS maximum limit (Section 01.2).

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Minimal entries in operations logs precluded their use as a diagnostic

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tool that may have led to the earlier isolation of a reactor coolant

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system filter leak on Unit 1 (Section M1.1).

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Maintenance

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Non-Cited Violation 50-413/96-16-01 was identified because an inadequate

leak test resulted in leakage from a reactor coolant system letdown

purification filter not being identified and subsequent contamination of

the 560 foot level of the Auxiliary Building and some areas of the 543'

foot level (Section M1.1).

Unit 1 restart was appropriately delayed to evaluate the cause of

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pressurizer pressure control problems and its impact on safe operation

of the facility (Section M1.2).

The licensee identified that the surveillance test for determining

controlled reactor coolant system leakage rate was not being performed

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in accordance with the TS basis for the test.

The actions to correct

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the specific deficiency were timely and appropriate.

Pending review of

long-term corrective actions, this issue was identified as Unresolved

Item 50-413.414/96-16-02 (Section M3.1).

Testing of control rods performed during the Unit 1 outage complied with

NRC Bulletin 96-01 Control Rod Insertion Problems (Section M8.1).

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ENCLOSURE

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Executive Summary

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Enaineerina

The licensee adequately addressed two issues associated with the Service

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Water System Operational Performance Inspection (Sections E8.2 and

E8.4).

Two other issues from the same inspection remain open: (1)

Violation 50-413.414/94-17-02 remained open pending NRC review of

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thermal performance modeling, and (2)

Inspector Followup Item 50-

413.414/94-17-10 remained open pending additional radiographs to be

performed on the nuclear service water to auxiliary feedwater line since

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records of a previous radiograph could not be located (Sections E8.1 and

E8.3).

Plant Sucoort

An isolated case of an inattentive fire watch was identified by NRC

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inspectors.

Licensee followup actions were appropriate (Section F4.1).

The delay in correction of a probable ficor drain system clog prior to a

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reactor coolant system filter leak reflected a lack of operational focus

within the chemistry organization (Section M1.1).

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ENCLOSURE

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Reoort Details

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Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 was in a refueling / steam generator replacement outage until October 2.

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when unit restart commenced,

The unit outage ended on October 4, when the

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. reactor entered Mode 1.

The unit reached full power on October 10 and

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operated at or near 100% power for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 operated at or near 100% power for the duration of the inspection

period.

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Review of UFSAR Commitments

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A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary

to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) description signified the

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need for a special focus review that compares plant practices, procedures.

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and/or parameters to the UFSAR descriptions. While performing inspections

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discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of

the UFSAR that related to the areas ins)ected.

The inspectors verified that

the UFSAR wording was consistent with cle observed plant practices.

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procedures, and/or parameters.

No deficiencies were identified.

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I. Ooerations

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01

Conduct of Operations

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01.1 Unit 1 Restart Observations (61726. 71707. 40500)

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Containment Cleanliness Walkdown

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The inspector conducted two cleanliness tours of the reactor building

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and pipe chase perimeter before the unit entered Mode 4.

The inspector

noted during the first tour, performed on Seatember 21. that a number of

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items had not been removed from the reactor Juilding or secured to

structures.

Water covered 'most of the containment floor at that time.

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as flushing was in progress in the overhead to wash loose articles and

debris to the containment floor for easy retrieval and removal.

The inspector entered containment again on September 22. The

containment floor was dry and much cleaner, but several items (i.e.,

nails. wire, a hand towel, and a pipe end) were identified and carried

out of the building.

The inspector also made note of some material

condition discrepancies and communicated those items to the Reactor

Building Coordinator.

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The above housekeeping tours were conducted prior to the licensee's

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final Mode 4 closecut. The inspector found the condition of the reactor

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building to be much improved from the first tour and considered the

controls for containment cleanliness to be effective.

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ENCLOSURE

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Loose Parts Monitor Indications Durina HeatuD

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On September 26, the licensee suspended Unit 1 heatup at approximately

420 degrees F because of frequent loose parts monitor alarms in the

reactor vessel head area.

The licensee utilized the data acquisition

and retrieval features of the recently installed loose parts monitoring

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system to determine that the alarms resulted from thermal expansion of

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piping in the vicinity of the loop B hot leg. An industry expert

reviewed the data and determined that no reactor coolant system damage

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resulted because of the small magnitude of the thermal expansion events.

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Based on these evaluations the licensee resumed Unit 1 heatup. The

inspector considered these actions an example of effective engineering

support to operations.

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Zero Power Physics Testino

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The inspector attended the prejob briefing for zero power physics

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testing.

The briefing handout provided a detailed plan for the testing,

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discussion of applicable requirements, and clearly delineated

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responsibilities. The briefing was conducted in the control room.

However, the high noise level created by the control room ventilation

system in conjunction with testing and maintenance activities in the

vicinity of the briefing, caused multiple distractions.

For these

reasons, the designated management lead for the infrequently performed

testing requested that the briefing be repeated in a conference room

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outside the control room, where the noise level was lower and the

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environment was more conducive to successful communication.

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inspector considered this action to be indicative of conservative and

conscientious management oversight.

The inspector observed portions of zero power physics testing. The

licensee's im)lementation of several improvements to the test program

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continued to 3e effective. These included locating test equipment in

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the control room horseshoe area and face to face communications between

test personnel, control room supervisors and operators. The inspector

observed an example of conservative actions when testing was suspended

to repair a cable problem with an information only reactivity chart

recorder located at the " operator at the controls" desk. The inspector

reviewed data collected and results for the isothermal moderator

temperature coefficient measurement (PT/0/A/4150/12A).

The increased

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heat transfer characteristics of the new Unit 1 steam generators were

evident to the operators performing the test. The inspector verified

that the reactor coolant temperature and core reactivity changes were of

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sufficient magnitude to generate acceptable test results. The inspector

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concluded that testing was well coordinated and controlled.

Evaluation of Intermediate Rance Trio Setooint Discreoancy

The inspector reviewed the licensee's resolution of a reactor trip

setpoint discrepancy associated with intermediate range channel N35.

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ENCLOSURE

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Technical Specification (TS) Table 2.2-1 indicates an intermediate range

trip setpoint of 5 25% Rated. Thermal Power (RTP), with an allowable

value of 5 31% RTP. The purpose of this trip is to provide core

protection during reactor startup to mitigate the consequences of an

uncontrolled rod withdrawal from a subcritical condition-

Power range

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low setpoint trip also provides redundant protection to the intermediate

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range trips.

During a setpoint verification performed at approximately 20% power per

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PT/0/A/4150/01. Controlling Procedure for Startup Physics Testing,

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licensee estimated that the N35 trip setpoint would have exceeded the TS

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allowable limit of 31%. With N35 blocked, measurements of current

values were collected as )ower approached 31%.

The licensee

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subsequently determined tlat the actual trip setpoint of N35 was greater

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than 25% RTP. but was less than the TS allowable limit of 31% RTP.

From discussions with engineering personnel, the inspector discerned

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that a slight asymmetry in core power contributed to the N35 setpoint

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3roblem. The intermediate range setpoints are developed and calibrated

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3ased on the assumption of uniform core aower. Actual core power in the

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area adjacent to detector N35 was less tlan anticipated, which resulted

in an apparent low setpoint when compared to total core calorimetric

power.

The inspector determined that the licensee took appropriate

actions to declare N35 inoperable (PIP 1-C96-2700), and verified that

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intermediate range N36 and power range (low) channels were within the TS

trip setpoint of 5 25% RTP.

The licensee continues to investigate the

cause of the core power tilt and anticipates that it will be reduced

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later in core life.

The inspector concluded that the licensee took

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appropriate actions to identify and evaluate the N35 trip setpoint

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discrepancy.

01.2 Fuelina Water Storaae Tank Boron Concentration

a.

Insoection Scooe (71707)

On October 2, with Unit 1 in Mode 2 during zero power physics testing,

the weekly sample of boron concentration in the fueling water storage

tank (FWST) revealed that boron concentration was in excess of the upper

limit referenced in TS 3.5.4.b and specified in the Core Operating

Limits Report (COLR).

Zero power physics testing was temporarily

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suspended. demineralized water was transferred to the FWST. and boron

concentration was returned to its allowable limits within the time

period of TS 3.5.4.

The inspector discussed the issue with licensee

personnel and reviewed the TS the TS Basis, the COLR. and test results

from previous samples during the past two months.

b.

Observations and Findinas

The COLR specifies a boron conrentration lower limit of 2475 ppm and an

u)per limit of 2575 ppm in modes 1 through 4.

The inspector determined

tlat boron concentration had been as high as 2644 on September 14 after

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ENCLOSURE

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highly borated water from the refueling cavity had been transferred to

the FWST following the completion of refueling operations.

Demineralized water makeup to the FWST reduced boron concentration to

2494 ppm on September 16.

Between September 16 and 19. FWST level

dropped by roughly 30% for reactor coolant system fill and vent.

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Blended makeup to the FWST was calculated to result in a final boron

concentration of 2525 ppm. the limit mid-range.

However, on September

20, boron concentration was 2570 ppm and fluctuated between that

concentration and 2558 ppm until September 25.

On October 2. boron

concentration reached 2579 ppm. and Unit 1 entered TS action 3.5.4 to

restore boron concentration within allowable limits within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be

in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

The licensee took immediate corrective actions to lower FWST level by

transferring inventory to the spent fuel pool so that a calculated

dilution could be initiated.

Once the dilution was completed, the FWST

was recirculated via the A containment spray pump and another sample was

obtained.

Boron concentration had dro

ed to 2559, and FWST operability

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wasrestoredwithinthe6-hoursallowad)ebyTS.

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Considering the length of time that boron concentration was close to the

u)per limit and the o)portunity to reduce boron concentration to avoid

tie potential inopera)ility of the FWST. the inspector questioned the

effectiveness of communications between the Operations and chemistry

organizations. The inspector discussed the issue with plant personnel

and determined that, although the chemistry staff had notified the

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control room that FWST boron concentration was high and needed to be

reduced, operations personnel did not recognize the operational impact

of any further baron concentration increase.

The licensee determined that operations personnel did not exercise a

questioning attitude to ensure that they understood how boron

concentration affected FWST operability, and that the chemistry

organization did effectively communicate the consequences of failing to

reduce FWST boron concentration. To effect im)rovement in the interface

between these two organizations, the licensee las designed several

initiatives to: (1) hold daily meetings between the two groups.

(2) designate an o)erations point of contact for chemistry concerns.

(3) draft status sleets for monitoring critical chemistry parameters and

communicating items with immediate or impending impact to plant status

during the daily operations meeting.

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Conclusions

The inspector concluded that this issue was indicative of ineffective

communications between chemistry and operations.

A second example of

interface issues between chemistry and operations is discussed in

section M1.1 of this inspection report.

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ENCLOSURE

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Operations Organization and Administration

06.1' Administrative Control of Keys

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Insoection Scooe (71707)

On September 4. the inspector signed out keys for access to the Nuclear

Service Water System pumphouse and the switchyard.

The key issued from

the Work Control Center to access the pumphouse was not the proper key

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to unlock the pumphouse door.

The keys for the switchyard were correct.

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The inspector informed the licensee.

The licensee initiated PIP C96-

2399 to address the discrepancy. The inspector reviewed the PIP

corrective actions.

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Observations and Findinos

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Until recently, either of two keys would open the pum3 house door. The

lock sets on the Technical Support Center (TSC) and t1e 0)erations

Support Center (OSC) had been changed to make one of the ceys unique to

them. When this change had been made, the key log was updated to

reflect the correct keying for the TSC and OSC. but the entry for the

pumphouse was not updated to reflect that only one key would now fit the

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pumphouse door.

The cause of the problem was identified as' incorrect updating of the key

log. The licensee performed an audit of the key log and found no other

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discrepancies.

In addition, a change to the key log updating

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was initiated which included identification and evaluation of ceys that

have duplicate entries in the log.

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Conclusions

The inspector considered the error in the key log to be an isolated

instance. The licensee took appropriate corrective action.

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II. Maintenance

M1

Conduct of Maintenance

M1.1 Letdown Purification System Leak in Auxiliary Buildina

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Insoection Scooe (62703. 40500)

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On September 7.1996. Unit 1 core reload was delayed due to leakage in

the letdown purification loop which was in service for refueling cavity

purification. The leakage, which originated from the letdown 1B Reactor

Coolant (NC) filter that had been put in service, contaminated the 560

foot level of the Auxiliary Building and some areas of the 543 foot

level. The inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding the event.

ENCLOSURE

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assessed recovery actions. and evaluated the licensee's Failure

Investigation Process (FIP).

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Observations and Findinas

The estimated 20 gpm leak originated from the IB NC filter, which is

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between the letdown ion exchangers and Volume Control Tank (VCT) in the

Unit 1 Chemical Volume Control System.

Since the NC filter is put in

service remotely because of its location in a covered pit. the filter

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housing-to-cover leak that was draining to the 560 foot floor drain

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system went undetected when placed in service around 2:30 a.m. on

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September 7.

Approximately 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> later a portion of the 560 foot

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floor drains were found to be backing up, and they continued to do so

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until letdown was isolated at approximately 8:52 a.m.

Letdown NC Filter 1B Leak

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Based on a review of completed Enclosure 4.4 of OP/1/A/6200/01.

Transferring From NC filter 1B to 1A. the inspector confirmed that the

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18 NC filter had been placed in service for a leak test on Se]tember 3.

1996. following a filter cartridge change out.

After the leac test, the

filter was isolated /placed in standby, where it remained until being

placed in service on September 7.

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From photographs taken of the "as found" condition of the IB NC filter

cartridge, the inspector noted the existence of a slight downward bend

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Jart way around its top o-ring mounting lip (perhaps caused when the

linged filter housing cover was closed).

The photographs also revealed

that the grooved o-ring pulled away from the mounting lip directly

opposite the bend.

In view of these "as found" conditions, the

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inspector verified through record review that charging and letdown from

the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System were in progress during the leak

test on September 3.

Subsequently, in order to fully understand how the

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IB NC filter passed its leak test the inspector requested a plot of VCT

level for the time in question.

Although not conclusive, the plot

showed a relatively acute downward slope corresponding to the short time

(approximately 11 minutes) that the 1B NC filter was in service on

September 3.

A closer review of the aforementioned Enclosure 4.4

indicated that once the filter was valved into service, the leak test

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was performed in a very short period of time (approximately 1 minute).

In view of the short duration of this leak test. the fact that it was

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performed (like the cartridge replacement) from above looking down into

the pit, and that the pit cover (as indicated in Enclosure 4.4 ) was

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installed approximately one minute later, it is conceivable that the

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filter housing-to-cover leakage indicated by the VCT level plot went

undetected.

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To preclude such problems in the future, the licensee incorporated a

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filter leak test in associated Maintenance Procedure MP/0/A/7150/060.

Pall-Trinity Filter Removal and Replacement, which requires the filter

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to be under pressure for at least 10 minutes before inspecting for

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leaks.

This change reflects the ASME functional test requirements for

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class II (B) and III (C) systems att recuired to operate during normal

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31 ant operation. The inspector reviewec the revised procedure and.

laving confirmed that it is used on all such filters in the plant, found

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it appropriate. Additionally, the licensee implemented actions to-

determine if other maintenance procedures require similar changes. This

licensee-identified and corrected violation is characterized as Non-

Cited Violation 50-413/96-16-01. Inadequate Reactor Coolant Filter Leak

Test, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

560 Foot Floor Drain System

The cause of the 560 foot floor drain system backup was subsequently

found to be blockage caused by a ball of small diameter rope, several

welding rod stubs, some tie wraps, and approximately 5 gallons of resin.

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The inspector reviewed Problem Investigation Process (PIP) Report 0-C96-

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1795 (dated July 15. 1996) concerning the discovery of a large amount of

resin in a pre-strainer of the subject floor drain system. as well as

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higher than usual dose levels on associated inlet piping.

Screened as

non-significant. PIP resolution remained with chemistry to clean out the

strainer.

PIP updates approximately one month later indicate that inlet

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pipe dose levels hadn't dropped significantly, but actions to remove the

resin internal to the drain system would be postponed until September

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after U1E0C9 was completed. Since the higher than usual inlet pipe dose

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levels were an indication of blockage (i.e. , a barrier where resin was

accumulating behind). the inspector considered the postponement of

internal resin removal to be indicative of a lack of operational focus

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on the impact of potential drainage increases to the floor drain system.

Recovery of Affected Eauioment

Some of the water which backed up the 560 foot floor drain system made

its way to a number of the pump rooms on the 543 foot level by seeping

through non-water tight hatch covers / floor plugs.

Equipment exposed to

water and wetted included a Unit 2 spent fuel cooling system panel,

three environmentally qualified Rotork valves (2NI-135B.136B. and

100B). and motors associated with the 1A and 1B charging pumps and the

2B and 1B safety injection pumps.

The inspector reviewed data from pump

motor / cable testing performed per IP/0/A/4974/13. Horizontal Split

Sleeve Bearing Motor Inspection and Maintenance, and PT/0/A/4950/01.

Power Cable Testing, as well as the work requests documenting the

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results of water intrusion inspections, to confirm that no equipment

problems resulted from the spill.

A review of FSAR Section 3.3.6.1.

Critical Auxiliary Building Areas, indicated that equipment submergence,

not wetting, is the concern from flooding in the Auxillary Building.

Since submergence of critical Auxiliary Building areas was not a concern

in this event, there was no significant risk of flood damage to safety

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equipment.

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ENCLOSURE

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A general tour by the inspector of the 560. 543. and 522 foot levels of

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the Auxiliary Building revealed no additional cencerns.

No personnel

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contaminations occurred as a result of the floor drain backup or the

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decontamination efforts to restore access to the affected areas.

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Leak Isolation /00erator Response

Unit 1 had entered Mode 6 at approximately 3:45 a.m., on September 7.

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According to the event time line developed by the licensee's FIP, the _

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Unit 1 night shift control room crew suspected reactor coolant system

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leakage early on. but VCT level trending was difficult (due to charging

flow indication problems and the necessity to balance charging and

letdown to maintain VCT level high to compensate for an inability to

provide gas overpressure).

The control room operators took the

following actions: monitored containment floor and equipment-sumps:

dispatched an operator to verify sperit fuel cooling system purification,

since it had been put in service earlier in the shift: dispatched an

operator (based on misleading information from Radwaste Chemistry

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personnel) to ensure VCT divert valve NV-172A wasn't leaking back to the

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recycle holdup tank since being placed in automatic earlier in the

shift: referred to AP/1/A/5500/26. Loss of Refueling Canal or Spent Fuel

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Pool Level, but didn't enter because specific symptoms were not met; and

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pursued the spent fuel cooling system demineralizer as a possible leak

source since it was placed in service during the shift and resin was

found in the floor drain strainer.

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The inspector reviewed the Unit 1 Supervisor and Control Room Operator

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logs for the time of interest.

Although information was limited

concerning the above activities, the Unit 1 supervisor log did contain

two entries around 5:00 a.m. concerning notification of the 560 foot

floor drain backup and suspected reactor coolant system leakage. The

Control Room Operator log revealed no indication of a problem, nor

mentioned the control room actions discussed above. Although placing

the IB NC filter in service around 2:30 a.m. had been prompted by the

control room due to a high differential pressure on the 1A NC filter,

there was no indication of such in either log until an end of the shift

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control room operator log entry at 6:19 a.m. documenting issuance of R&R

16-2099 to replace the 1A NC filter.

Noting that the night shift placed

the 1B NC filter in service and finally having a quantified leak rate

(based on VCT level) of approximately 20 gpm the day shift

subsecuently: suspended core alterations: entered AP/1/A/5500/26: and

closec 1KF-122 (cavity to spent fuel pool cross connect) and secured

purification and charging / letdown.

Based on a review of the actions taken, the inspector determined that

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the operators acted approariately to the information readily at hand.

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It was also apparent to t1e inspector that the lack of sufficient

information regarding system / equipment problems and operational status

changes (e.g. , makeup volumes. NC filter realignment, etc. . .) precluded

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the use of the Unit 1 Supervisor and Control Room Operator logs as an

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effective diagnostic tool.

Such a tool may have led to isolating the

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leak earlier and reducing the area contaminated.

[a4 lure Investiaation Process (FIP) Review

A review of the licensee's FIP for this ' event found'it to be

appropriately thorough.

It addressed and provided proposed corrective

actions for such related issues as: the validity of using existing

prestrainers in the 560 foot floor drain system to collect particulate

materials that the downstream oil and grit removal tank is designed to

collect: Radwaste Chemistry needing to ensure all conse

considered when establishing the time frame for a plan'quences ares implementatio

I

communication deficiencies between Operations and Chemistry which

prevented the transfer of complete and accurate information: Operations

referral to (versus entry into) AP/1/5500/26 and whether additional

guidance is needed for smaller magnitude leaks: the encountered

workarounds which made trending VCT level difficult; and whether

existing criteria for log entries are reflecting Management's

expectations. As discussed earlier. the FIP also tasked Maintenance

with ensuring applicable test requirements are clearly stated in the

necessary procedures.

c.

Conclusions

The licensee's FIP and recovery actions for the NC filter leak and

subsequent Auxiliary Building floor drain backup were considered to be

appropriate.

Post-cartridge replacement leak testing was inadequate to

l

ensure the leak tightness of NC filter 18. Subsequent implementation of

a minimal hold period at test 3ressure should preclude recurrence. The

i

postponement of removing a pro]able floor drain clog prior to the leak

reflected a lack of operational focus within the Chemistry organization.

Minimal entries in operations logs precluded their use as a diagnostic

tool that may have led to an earlier 1 solation of the leak.

M1.2 Pressurizer Pressure Control Problems Durina Unit 1 Restart

a.

Insoection Scoce (62703)

During Unit I restart from the steam generator replacement outage.

control room operators were unable to maintain pressurizer pressure with

the normal C bank of pressurizer heaters. A leaking pressurizer spray

valve was suspected. and inspection and repair activities revealed that

both pressurizer spray valves (INC-27 and 1NC-29 from reactor coolant

system cold legs A and B. respectively) were leaking.

The inspector

discussed the issue with licensee personnel

reviewed the station

Problem Investigation Process (PIP) Report that documented the problem.

reviewed work orders, and evaluated the licensee's decision to continue

unit restart with one of the valves still leaking.

l

ENCLOSURE

.

.

10

b.

Observations and Findinas

On September 27. Unit 1 was in mode 3 at normal operating pressure and

temperature, preparing for mode 2 operation.

Control room operators

noticed that pressurizer pressure control could not be maintained

,

without the additional heat input from the backup pressurizer heater

banks. The suspected cause was leakage past a spray control valve.

'

Work order 96077934 was initiated to inspect and repair 1NC-27. The

licensee determined that the valve positioner was out of adjustment and

proceeded to calibrate the positioner and declare the valve operable.

When the unit was preparing to enter mode 2 on Seatember 30 the problem

with maintaining pressurizer pressure without baccup heaters was

encountered again. Troubleshooting revealed that leakage past INC-29

was the cause.

Work order 96078640 was initiated on October 1 to

ins)ect and repair INC-29. The valve positioner and actuator appeared

to 3e correctly adjusted, and seat leakage was determined to be a result

of some internal degradation.

On October 2. the licensee decided to

continue with the unit restart and initiate work orders to perform more

extensive work on both pressurizer spray valves in the next refueling

outage.

The inspector reviewed PIP 1-C96-2673.

The licensee determined that

numerous leakage and setup problems had been experienced on all

pressurizer spray valves. At the end of the inspection period, the need

j

for predefined work orders on each valve was being evaluated by the

Engineering organization.

No other concerns were identified.

c.

Conclusions

I

The inspector concluded that the licensee appropriately delayed Unit 1

startup to evaluate the cause of the pressurizer pressure control

problem and its impact on safe operation of the facility. The decision

to continue the Unit 1 restart with leakage past 1NC-29 was adequately

justified.

M3

Maintenance Procedures and Documentation

M3.1 Nonconservative Reactor Coolant System Controlled Leakaae Test

a.

Insoection Scooe (617_251

On September 26. the licensee discovered that the surveillance test for

determining controlled Reactor Coolant (NC) System leakage rate was not

conservative. The ins)ector discussed the finding with plant personnel

and reviewed the TS, t7e corrected procedure, and the associated station

Problem Investigation Process (PIP) report.

ENCLOSURE

l

11

l

b.

Observations and Findinos

During a review of the proposed Im3 roved Technical Specification (ITS)

'

3.5.5.1, the licensee discovered t1at the PT/1(2)/A/4150/01, NC System

'

Controlled Leakage Verification, was not being performed to simulate the

system flowpath as it is described in the current TS basis.

Specifically, the basis states that the controlled leakage limitation

restricts operation when the total flow supplied to the reactor coolant

pump seals exceeds 40 gpm with the modulating valve in the supply line

(NV-294) fully open at a nominal NC System pressure of 2235 psig. This

limitation ensures that in the event of a loss of coolant accident

'

(LOCA), the safety injection flow will not be less than assumed in the

safety analyses.

The surveillance test had been performed with NV-294 in the normal

modulating position to control charging flow. This was not conservative

because the accident analysis assumes a station blackout concurrent with

the LOCA. and the valve fails to the open position on a loss of power to

ensure that adequate seal injection is provided.

)

Once the discrepancy was identified the licensee determined that the

surveillance for Unit 2 had been missed as a result of the discrepancy.

Licensee Event Report (LER) 413/96-09 is currently being drafted to

document the procedural inadequacy, and the licensee's past operability

evaluation will be included in the report.

The licensee initiated an

,

immediate procedure change to ensure that the surveillance could be

performed correctly within the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period allowed by TS 4.0.3.

Unit

1 was in Mode 3 with NC System pressure at 1900 psig; the surveillance

was not required for that unit until it reached normal operating

pressure (2235 psig).

The surveillance was performed in both units on September 27.

The

controlled leakage for Unit 1 was 35'.5 gpm; the controlled leakage for

Unit 2 was 33 gpm.

,

c.

Conclusions

The inspector concluded that the licensee was proactive in identifying

the discreaancy in the test procedure and correcting it in a timely

manner.

T1e impact of the procedural error was minimal, and the

subsequent test results indicated that controlled leakage with the

modulating valve fully open remained less than the 40 gpm limit imposed

by TS.

Pending a review of the licensee's past operability evaluation

and long-term corrective actions, this issue will be identified as

Unresolved Item (URI) 50-413.414/96-16-02:

Nonconservative RCS

Controlled Leakage Test.

ENCLOSURE

. - -

- -

- - -

- . - -

--

---

-

.

.

.

.

-.

-.

-_

12

M8

Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92902)

M8.1 (Closed) Insoector Followuo Item (IFI) 50-413/96-08-03: Review of

End-Of-Cycle (EOC) Control Rod Drop Timing Data.

NRC Bulletin 96-01.

Control Rod Insertion Problems, reported that control rods had failed to

fully insert in fuel assemblies with greater than 30.000 Megawatt

Days / Metric Tonne Uranium (MWD /MTU) exposure and requested measurement

and evaluation of drag forces for all fuel bundles with control rod

assemblies.

In accordance with Bulletin 96-01, the licensee had conducted control

rod assembly drag tests of fuel bundles with control rod assemblies at

EOC 9.

The inspector reviewed fuel bundle drag testing traces and

identified ten fuel bundles that indicated increased drag during control

rod insertion.

Of these ten fuel bundles. the licensee had identified

four fuel bundles as having longer control rod drop times at EOC

compared to Beginning-of-Cycle.

The inspector reviewed the list of fuel

bundles discharged at EOC 9 and determined that only one of the ten fuel

I

bundles was reloaded for Cycle 10 and that fuel bundle did not have a

control rod assembly.

Based on the ins)ectors review, the licensee had

conducted E0C drag testing as required )y Bulletin 96-01 and identified

those fuel bundles that may be susceptible to excessive friction.

No

further licensee action for Bulletin 96-01 was required.

Nine fuel bundles, discharged at E0C 8, were reinserted for Cycle 10

with five of these fuel bundles having control rod assemblies. The

inspector noted that Bulletin 96-01 did not address the reinsertion of

fuel bundles other than those off-loaded at E0C and questioned if these

reinserted Cycle 8 fuel bundles had been drag tested.

The licensee said

only the fuel bundles from EOC 9 had been drag tested.

The licensee

said they could take data during drag testing conducted after the upper

internals package was set.

However, this drag testing was conducted

!

only to assure the control rod drive and the control rod assembly were

connected and would not yield the same detailed traces obtained during

EOC 9 drag testing. The EOC 10 exposure for the reinserted Cycle 8 fuel

bundles was predicted to be greater than the maximum exposure for fuel

bundles drag tested during E0C 9.

The inspector questioned if the

i

j

licensee had considered this factor since the E0C 9 drag testing would

!

not be bounding. The licensee stated that this was not considered a

aroblem because Bulletin 96-01 addressed problems observed only with

destinghouse Vantage-5 fuel and not Framatome Mark-BW fuel used in both

Catawba Units 1 and 2.

The inspector noted that Bulletin 96-01 did not

distinguish between different fuel manufacturers' fuel bundles.

However, the inspector concluded that the drag testing conducted af' c

setting the upper internals package was adequate to meet the

requirements of Bulletin 96-01.

.

!

ENCLOSURE

!

13

III. Encineerina

E8

Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)

E8.1

(Ocen) Violation (VIO) 50-413.414/94-17-02:

Failure to Properly

Translate Regulatory Requirements into Specifications. Drawings, and

Procedures.

The licensee had revised calculation CNC-1150.01-00-001.

Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond - Thermal Analysis During One Unit

LOCA and One Unit Shutdown, revision 6. to irclude groundwater recharge

and seepage from the Standby Nuclear Service water Pond (SNSWP) dam.

The licensee calculated the total inventory loss for the 30-day duration

to be 7.36 ac-ft due to groundwater recharge and 0.007 ac-ft due to

seepage from the SNSWP dam.

However, the license only used inventory

losses for the first six days as the input to the thermal analysis

model. The licensee had calculated the peak service water intake

temperature occurred on the 5th day after event initiation.

One

additional day of heat input was added for conservatism to obtain the

maximum service water intake tem3erature. Calculation CNC-1150.01-00-001

did not reference any analysis t1at validated using only 6-day inventory

losses verses 30-day inventory losses.

The licensee provided a

sensitivity analysis that used the 30-day inventory losses as an input

to the model.

This sensitivity analysis indicated that the additional

inventory losses did not affect service water intake temperature beyond

the 6-day inventory losses used in the thermal analysis model.

The licensee had also revised CNC-1150.01-00-001 to include pump work as

a heat in)ut to the model.

However, this input was substantially less

than the leat input from various other auxiliary heat inputs, such as

motor and oiler coolers, already included in the thermal analysis model.

Based on a review of the calculation and supporting documentation, the

inspector concluded the licensee had adequately addressed SNSWP

inventory losses due to seepage and increased heat input due to pump

,

work.

However, this violation will remain open pending completion of

I

additional NRC review of the SNSWP modeling.

EB.2 (Closed) VIO 50-413.414/94-17-05:

Failure to Perform Quality Related

Activities per Prescribed Procedures or Drawings.

The inspector toured

the Service Water (RN) pumphouse and found that the licensee had

corrected the instrument lines having a ]roblem as identified in

Inspection Report (IR) 413.414/96-10.

T1e licensee had identified that

one of the instrumentation lines needed a supporting tray installed and

l

had written a deficiency.

The licensee had also placed warning signs

against climbing on the instrument lines.

The inspector concluded the

licensee's actions were adequate.

As identified in IR 413.414/96-10. procedure SI/0/A/5090/001. Tube

Fitting and Tubing Installation. revision 0. was not clear as to which

section in Enclosure 4.1 was referred to in Enclosure 4.6.

The licensee

had considered this a generic problem with the format of the Standard

ENCLOSURE

l

l

14

Procedures being developed and issued PIP 96-2449 to initiate a review

of the format for these procedures.

The inspector concluded this review

would address the concern.

E8.3 (Ocen) IFI 50-413.414/94-17-10:

Flush Program Improvements.

The

inspector had previously requested to review the radiographs of the RN

i

supply to Auxiliary Feedwater (CA) line, but the licensee was unable to

produce these radiographs during the earlier inspection. The licensee

i

attempted to locate these radiographs, but was unable to locate the

'

radiographs for the A train RN supply to CA line.

Furthermore, there

was no documentation of the as-found condition for the A train RN supply

to CA line on the work order.

The licensee had issued a PIP to initiate

documentation of the as-found conditions and to radiograph the RN su) ply

to CA line.

This item will be reviewed after the radiographs are tacen.

The licensee had scheduled this activity for late 1996.

E8.4 (Closed) IFI 50-413.414/94-17-12:

Unnecessary Post-Maintenance Tests

(PMTs) on Predefined Work Orders.

The licensee had previously conducted

a review of the 3 redefined work orders and identified the unnecessary

PMTs listed in tie predefined work orders.

However, the licensee had

not updated the predefined work orders to reflect only the required

PMTs.

The inspector reviewed a sample of the predefined work orders for

the RN system and found they had been updated.

IV. Plant Sucoort

F4

Fire Protection Staff Training and Qualification

F4.1

Inattentive Fire Watch

a.

Insoection Scoce (71750. 40500)

On September 4. during a facility tour, the inspector identified that an

individual performing fire watch duties was not attentive to those

duties. The licensee was informed of the inspector's observation. The

inspector reviewed PIP C96-2955 and the licensee's followup actions.

b.

Observations and Findinas

A floor plug which was part of a fire barrier had been removed for

equipment access during the Unit 1 outage.

As a compensatory action, a

fire watch was posted at the opening.

The inspector observed the

individual performing fire watch duties reclined, with his shoes and

socks removed. When the inspector left the area, the individual was on

his feet and attentive. The inspector informed the licensee of his

observation.

The same day, an individual assessment was performed by

the licensee's safety review group.

The assessment included a visit to

all areas with fire watches )osted (7 total) .

The same individual was

found inattentive again by t1e licensee.

ENCLOSURE

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.

. - -

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. - . _

_..- - .

. - .

-. . _ - - .. - - - . .

_

.

i

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I

15

F

l

The licensee took disciplinary action with the individual and

j

implemented refresher training to reinforce fire watch responsibilities

and expectations based on lessons learned.

c.

Conclusions

.

Based on the results of the licensee's assessment and other facility

tours performed by the ins)ector. the inspector considered the

inattentive fire watch to 3e an isolated instance.

The licensee took

appropriate corrective action.

'

V. Manaaement Meetinas

X1

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors ) resented the inspection results to members of licensee

management at t1e conclusion of the inspection on October 29. 1996. The

licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

No proprietary information was

identi fied.

l

,

ENCLOSURE

j

16

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

Bhatnager. A.. Operations Superintendent

Coy. S., Radiation Protection Manager

Forbes, J., Engineering Manager

Harrall . T.

IAE Maintenance Superintendent

Kelly. C., Maintenance Manager

Kimball . D. , Safety Review Group Manager

Kitlan, M., Regulatory Compliance Manager

Lowery, J.. Compliance Specialist

McCollum, W.. Catawba Site Vice-President

Nicholson, K., Compliance Specialist

Patrick, M., Safety Assurance Manager

Peterson. G., Station Manager

Propst, R., Chemistry Manager

Rogers

D. , Mechanical Maintenance Manager

Tower

D., Compliance Engineer

~

l

ENCLOSURE

l

_ _ - . _ . . . _ . . _ _ _ _

_

17

,

i

'

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 37551:

Onsite Engineering

i

IP 40500:

Effectiveness of Problem Identification and Prevention

IP 61726:

Surveillance Observation

IP 62703:

Maintenance Observation

IP 71707:

Plant Operations

IP 71750:

Plant Support Activities

IP 92902:

Followup - Maintenance

IP 92903:

Followup - Engineering

ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Ooened

50-413/96-16-01

NCV

Inadequate Reactor Coolant Filter Leak Test

(Section M1.1).59-413.414/96-16-02

URI

Nonconservative RCS Controlled Leakage Test

(Section M3.1)

Closed

50-413/96-08-03

IFI

Review of E0C Control Rod Drop Timing Data

(Section M8.1).

l

50-413.414/94-17-05

VIO

Failure to Perform Quality Related Activities

Jer Prescribed Procedures or Drawings (Section

E8.2).

!

50-413,414/94-17-12

IFI

Unnecessary PMTs on Predefined Work Orders

.(Section E8.4).

J

Discussed

50-413.414/94-17-02

VIO

Failure to Properly Translate Regulatory

'

Requirements into Specifications. Drawings, and

Procedures (Section E8.1).

50-413.414/94-17-10

IFI

Flush Program Improvements (Section E8.3).

50-413/96-09

LER

Inadequate NC System Controlled Leakage

Verification (Section M3.1).

ENCLOSURE

1

18-

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ASME -

American Society of Mechanical Engineers

CA

-

Auxiliary Feedwater

BOC

-

Beginning-of-Cycle

,

CFR

-

Code of Federal. Regulations

COLR -

Core Operation Limits Report

DEV

-

Deviation

DPC

-

Duke Power Company

E0C

End-of-Cycle

-

FIP

-

Failure Investigation Process

FSAR -

Final Safety Analysis Report

FWST

Fueling Water Storage Tank

-

IAE

-

Instrument and Electrical

i

IEEE -

Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers

IFI

-

Inspector Followup Item

IR

-

Inspection Report

ITS

-

Improved Technical Specification

KF'

-

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System

LER

-

Licensee Event Reporr.

,

LOCA -

Loss of Coolant Accident

MCC

-

Motor Control Centers

MWD /

-

Megawatt Days / Metric Tonne Uranium

MTU

NC

-

Reactor Coolant

i

NCV

-

Non Cited Violation

i

1

OSC

-

Operations Support Center

PIP

-

' Problem Investigation Process

PMTs -

Post-Maintenance Tests

Parts per million

PPM

-

RHT

-

Recycle Holdup Tank

-RN

Nuclear Service Water System

-

Rated Thermal Power

RTP

-

SNSWP -

Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond

TS~

-

Technical Specifications

'

TSC

-

Technical Support Center

UFSAR -

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

URI

-

Unresolved Item

Vac

-

Volts alternating-current

VCT

-

Volume Control Tank

'

Vdc

-

Volts direct-current

VIO

-

Violation

WO

-

Work Order

ENCLOSURE

._-