IR 05000413/2023001
| ML23124A007 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 05/05/2023 |
| From: | Eric Stamm Division Reactor Projects II |
| To: | Flippin N Duke Energy Carolinas |
| References | |
| IR 2023001 | |
| Download: ML23124A007 (19) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000413/2023001 AND 05000414/2023001
Dear Nicole Flippin:
On March 31, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Catawba Nuclear Station. On May 3, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. These findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Catawba Nuclear Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Catawba Nuclear Station.
May 5, 2023 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Eric J. Stamm, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000413 and 05000414 License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000413 and 05000414
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000413/2023001 and 05000414/2023001
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2023-001-0022
Licensee:
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
Facility:
Catawba Nuclear Station
Location:
York, South Carolina
Inspection Dates:
January 1, 2023, to March 31, 2023
Inspectors:
A. Donley, Senior Resident Inspector, Acting
D. Rivard, Resident Inspector
C. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector, Acting
J. Austin, Senior Project Engineer
W. Truss, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Eric J. Stamm, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Catawba Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with the Fuel Water Storage Tank Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000413/2023001-01 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71152A A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," was identified when the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a degraded condition associated with the fuel water storage tank (FWST). Specifically, the FWST wide range level instrument (1FWLT-5000) sensing line insulation degradation was not identified, and corrective action was not initiated per licensee procedure IP/0/B/3560/009, "Operational Check for Winter Months and Extreme Cold Weather Surveillance of Freeze Protection Heat Trace and Instrument Box Heaters (EHT/EIB)
Systems," Revision 019. This failure contributed to the freezing of the sensing line and subsequent failure of a Unit 1 FWST level transmitter.
Failure to Maintain Procedure for Draining the Main Steam Header Results in Unit 2 Reactor Manual Trip During Startup Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000414/2023001-02 Open/Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71153 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a, Procedures, was identified when the licensee failed to maintain startup procedure OP/2/A/6100/001, Controlling Procedure for Unit Startup, Revision 175, as required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation),
Revision 2, Appendix A, Section 2, General Plant Operating Procedures. Specifically, licensee procedure OP/2/A/6100/001 did not contain procedural guidance to blow down the main steam equalization header to the feedwater pump turbines (CFPT) prior to restoration after an extended period of isolation. The failure to blow down the main steam equalization header allowed hot condensate to enter the CFPT condenser and degraded the vacuum to the point of requiring operators to manually trip the Unit 2 reactor.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000414/2022-003-00 LER 2022-003-00 for Catawba Nuclear Station,
Unit 2, Manual Reactor Trip and Auxiliary Feedwater System Actuation 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 operated at or near 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP). On March 8, 2023, the unit began a power reduction coast down in advance of refueling outage C1R27. Unit 1 was at 94 percent RTP at the end of the inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at or near 100 percent RTP for the entire inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Suction source alignment for auxiliary feedwater following standby shutdown facility maintenance on February 21, 2023 (2)2B auxiliary feedwater (CA) pump during 2A CA pump periodic maintenance on March 16, 2023
- (3) B train control area chill water (YC) chiller during periodic maintenance on the A train YC chiller on March 16, 2023
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire Area 4, 543' elevation of the auxiliary building common area on January 26, 2023
- (2) Fire Areas 39 and 40, turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps #1 and #2 pump pits on February 27, 2023
- (3) Fire Area 2, Unit 2 CA pump room and motor driven pump pits on March 8, 2023
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an announced fire drill on March 3, 2023.
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in work order (WO) 20379357, conduit manhole (CMH-8B) inspection and dewatering on January 26, 2023.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during the scheduled Unit 2 rod cluster control assembly bank repositioning on February 10, 2023.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance, Crew A, in the simulator during crew performance evaluation, CPE-23-01, on March 9, 2023.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Nuclear condition report (NCR) 02459945, maintenance rule screening of containment air return and hydrogen skimmer fan inlet isolation valve, 2VX-1A, which failed to meet the time open requirement during testing
- (2) NCR 02452547, standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel generator governor erratic on startup then failed causing overspeed
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Emergent work for failed open control room area chiller B auto control valve, 1RN-304B, work request (WR) 20240725
- (2) Units 1 and 2 elevated green risk during planned maintenance outage of SSF and associated switchgear, on February 28, 2023
- (3) Unit 2 elevated green risk due to 2B auxiliary feedwater pump motor breaker (2ETB13) replacement, WO 20502638
- (4) Single train vulnerability during YC A train periodic maintenance, WO 20558636
- (5) Unit 2 elevated green risk due to 2B emergency diesel generator battery bank planned maintenance, WO 20548635
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) NCR 02454309, 2B residual heat removal heat exchanger component cooling flow control valve, 2KC-82B, throttled for incorrect value
- (2) NCR 02455883, Unit 1 FWST terminal box channel 1 inaccuracy
- (3) WR 20244699, letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature control, 1KC-132, not controlling properly
- (4) NCR 02464387, primary to secondary leakrate 15-minute running average alarming on operator aid computer
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) PT/2/A/4200/007, "Standby Makeup Pump #2 Performance Test," on February 24, 2023
- (2) PT/2/A/4250/003 B, "Auxiliary Feedwater Motor Driven Pump 2B Performance Test,"
on March 2, 2023
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
- (1) PT/1/A/4350/02A, "Diesel Generator 1A Operability Test," on February 7, 2023
- (2) PT/2/A/4350/02B, "Diesel Generator 2B Operability Test," on February 22, 2023
- (3) PT/1/A/4250/003C, "Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump #1 Performance Test,"
on March 9, 2023
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) PT/0/A/4400/22A, "Nuclear Service Water Pump Train A Performance Test"
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03)===
- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022)
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022)
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
- (1) NCRs 02453976, 02454012, fuel water storage tank level transmitter, FWLT-5000, inoperability due to severe cold weather
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LER):
- (1) LER 05000414/2022-003-00, "Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip and Auxiliary Feedwater System Actuation," (ADAMS Accession No. ML22357A036). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with the Fuel Water Storage Tank Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000413/2023001-01 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71152A A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," was identified when the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a degraded condition associated with the fuel water storage tank (FWST). Specifically, the FWST wide range level instrument (1FWLT-5000) sensing line insulation degradation was not identified, and corrective action was not initiated per licensee procedure IP/0/B/3560/009, "Operational Check for Winter Months and Extreme Cold Weather Surveillance of Freeze Protection Heat Trace and Instrument Box Heaters (EHT/EIB) Systems," Revision 019. This failure contributed to the freezing of the sensing line and subsequent failure of a Unit 1 FWST level transmitter.
Description:
On December 24, 2022, level indication for the Unit 1 FWST via level transmitter, 1FWLT-5000, was lost. The Unit 1 FWST has four wide range level transmitters. Technical Specification 3.3.2 requires all channels to be operable in modes 1 - 4, and only one channel may be bypassed if it is inoperable.
The licensee performed an annual inspection of the various outside instrumentation for seasonal readiness. The heat trace and instrument box heaters for 1FWLT-5000 are inspected in accordance with licensee procedure IP/0/B/3560/009. The procedure was last completed in September 2022 under WO 2054429. Licensee procedure IP/0/B/3560/009, Section 5.1, states in part, to initiate a WO to have any insulation problem found during the performance of the preventive maintenance (PM) corrected. The inspectors determined the degraded insulation existed as early as September 2022, as indicated by pictorial evidence and interviews with licensee personnel. The licensee did not document the degraded insulation conditions, nor did they initiate corrective actions to protect equipment from severe cold weather risks during the September 2022 PM. As a result, during cold weather on December 24, 2022, the sensing line for the Unit 1 FWST level transmitter 1FWLT-5000 froze, and the transmitter/channel was rendered inoperable.
Corrective Actions: The licensee declared the level detection channel inoperable, placed the channel in bypass, and performed troubleshooting. The licensee applied additional insulation and sealing tape to the sensing line, and temperatures returned to normal. Level transmitter 1FWLT-5000 was returned to operable status on December 25, 2022.
Corrective Action References: WR 20239896, WR 20239959
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee did not document equipment problems and initiate a corrective action to protect equipment from severe cold weather risks per procedure IP/0/B/3560/009 Section 5.1, which contributed to freezing of the sensing line for U1 FWST level transmitter 1FWLT-5000.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the degraded insulation impacted the availability of the U1 FWST safety-related level transmitter, 1FWLT-5000, such that during severe cold weather, the sensing lines froze, and Operations declared the instrument inoperable and entered an unplanned TS action statement.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions," inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because all screening questions were answered "no."
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.8 - Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. Specifically, the licensee did not document equipment problems and initiate a corrective action to protect equipment from severe weather risks.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, that conditions adverse to quality, such as defective material and equipment, be promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, the degraded insulation condition associated with U1 FWST sensing line was not promptly identified and corrected in September 2022.
Specifically, while performing IP/0/B/3560/009, the licensee failed to identify the degraded insulation condition and initiate corrective actions which contributed to the freezing of the sensing lines to the U1 FWST level transmitter 1FWLT-5000 on December 24, 2022.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Maintain Procedure for Draining the Main Steam Header Results in Unit 2 Reactor Manual Trip During Startup Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000414/2023001-02 Open/Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71153 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, was identified when the licensee failed to maintain startup procedure OP/2/A/6100/001, Controlling Procedure for Unit Startup, Revision 175, as required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation),
Revision 2, Appendix A, Section 2, General Plant Operating Procedures. Specifically, licensee procedure OP/2/A/6100/001 did not contain procedural guidance to blow down the main steam equalization header to the feedwater pump turbines (CFPT) prior to restoration after an extended period of isolation. The failure to blow down the main steam equalization header allowed hot condensate to enter the CFPT condenser and degraded the vacuum to the point of requiring operators to manually trip the Unit 2 reactor.
Description:
On October 20, 2022, Unit 2 entered mode 4 following the C2R25 refueling outage and on October 21, 2022, at 0810, the 2B CFPT was started. Almost 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> later, Unit 2 entered mode 1 on October 24, 2022, at 0749, and Operations proceeded with restoration from secondary heatup with the licensee's unit startup procedure OP/2/A/6100/001, which has Operations open the valves on Enclosure 4.12 (Secondary Heatup Checklist). When Unit 2 was at approximately 9 percent reactor power on October 24, 2022, at 0857, the 2B CFPT tripped on loss of vacuum. The 2B CFPT vacuum degraded to its trip setpoint of 12.4 inches mercury (in Hg) Absolute. This caused a loss of all feedwater to the steam generators and operators manually tripped the reactor. The trip was not complicated, and all systems responded normally post-trip. The auxiliary feedwater system started automatically as expected. The licensee documented the manual trip in NCR 02446796 and submitted licensee event report (LER) 414/2022-003-00.
The licensees flexible causal evaluation identified a deficiency in the unit startup procedure, OP/2/A/6100 /001, Controlling Procedure for Unit Startup, Revision 175. Specifically, the operation of valve 2SP-34 (main steam to 2A and 2B CFPT) drained hot condensate/steam into the 2B CFPT condenser through the 2-inch automatic drain valve 2SP-33. This increased the 2B CFPT condenser temperature and raised condenser pressure higher than the 2B CFPT vacuum trip setpoint. The unit startup procedure did not ensure the main steam equalization header piping was adequately drained prior to alignment to the 2B CFPT and prior to restoration of secondary steam on entry into mode 1.
As described above, the licensee had a period of extended isolation of the main steam equalization header due to the time between mode 4 and mode 1. Valve 2SP-34 is closed prior to the unit entering mode 4 and opened while the unit is in mode 1. Valve 2SP-34 provides the motive force to drain the main steam equalization header, therefore when drain lines are opened prior to the start of the CFPT, when valve 2SP-34 is closed, the equalization header is not drained. The increased isolation period and cold seasonal temperature likely led to the increase in steam condensation in the header. Additionally, operating condenser recirculation water at higher-than-normal temperatures led to degraded CFPT condenser vacuum conditions which exacerbated the conditions.
Corrective Actions: On October 25, 2022, the licensee completed PT/0/A/4150/002 A "Transient Investigation." The licensee documented the manual trip in NCR 02446796 and submitted LER 414/2022-003-00. The licensee initiated multiple procedure revisions to include steps to drain the main steam equalization header to the main condensers and not to the CFPT condensers during restoration of secondary side, and to ensure valve 2SP-34 is open while draining the header prior to CFPT start. The licensee also completed an extent of condition to ensure Unit 1 procedures were revised prior to the C1R27 refueling outage.
Corrective Action References: NCR 02446796, PRR 02446847
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined the licensees failure to have procedure guidance to blow down the main steam equalization header as part of restoration, after an extended period of isolation, in procedure, OP/2/A/6100/001 Controlling Procedure for Unit Startup, Revision 175, was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the lack of instructions to blow down the main steam equalization header as part of restoration after an extended period of isolation resulted in significant quantities of hot condensate/steam draining into the 2B CFPT condenser, causing the 2B CFPT to trip, a loss of all feedwater, and operators to manually trip the Unit 2 reactor.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, the inspectors determined that although this finding caused a reactor scram, it did not cause a loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable condition. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.5 - Work Management: The organization implements a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. Specifically, the licensee did not identify the risk associated with an extended period of steam equalization header isolation and the impact of not properly draining the header prior to restoration on CFPT condenser vacuum. The licensee also accepted the risk associated with operating the condensate circulating water at higher temperatures which further degraded CFPT condenser vacuum margin.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements, Revision 2, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 2.b, requires procedures for Hot Standby to Minimum Load (nuclear startup). The licensee established procedure OP/2/A/6100/001, Controlling Procedure for Unit Startup, Revision 175, to meet Regulatory Guide 1.33 requirements.
Contrary to the above, on October 24, 2022, the licensee failed to maintain procedures used to perform startup of the Unit 2 reactor following refueling outage C2R25. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain the procedure to account for plant conditions when the main steam equalization header had accumulated condensation of significant quantities, due to inadequate draining instructions in OP/2/A/6100/001. When the licensee restored the main steam equalization header, condensation drained directly into the 2B CFPT condenser degrading vacuum to the trip set point. This resulted in a trip of the 2B CFPT, and the unit being manually tripped.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On May 3, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Nicole Flippin and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CN-1574-02.01
Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN)
CN-1574-02.05
Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN)
CN-1578-02.02
Flow Diagram of Control Area Chilled Water System (YC)
CN-1592-01.00
Flow Diagram of Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA)
CN-1592-01.02
Flow Diagram of Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA)
Drawings
CN-1604-01.02
Flow Diagram of condenser Circulating Water System (RC)
Procedures
OP/0/A/6450/011
Control Room Ventilation/Chilled Water System
148
Work Orders
20558636
Corrective Action
Documents
2460126
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
2462620
CSD-CNS-PFP-
AB-0543-001
Unit 2 Auxiliary Building Elev. 543 CA Pump Rm, Pits and
Panels
000
Fire Plans
CSD-CNS-PFP-
TB2-001
Unit 2 Turbine Building Elevation 594 Pre-Fire Plan
000
23-02 Unit 2 Main Turbine Oil Tank Fire Drill Scenario
and Critique
Team/Crew Learning Communications from failed fire drill
on 2/9/2023
Training Attendance Sheet for Fire Drill on 3/3/2023
CN-1209-10.11
Fire Protection Equipment Auxiliary Building Elevation
543+0
016
Miscellaneous
CNM 1376.00-
0137.001
Fire Detection System EFA Detector Locations U2 Aux.
Building El. 5430
000
AD-FP-ALL-1520
Transient Combustible Control
000
AD-OP-ALL-207
Fire Brigade Administrative Controls
005
Procedures
RP/0/B/5000/029
Fire Brigade Response
036
Work Orders
244024, 20244025, 20244026, 20243796
Corrective Action
2458114, 02429628, 02368536, 01409488
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Documents
CN-1938-06.01
Computer Cable Routing Outdoor Area Sections & Details
009
CNM-1354.00-
0002-001
Cable Environmental Qualification
CNM-13554.01-
0076
Certificate of Conformance
Miscellaneous
CNS-1354.01-00-
001
DPS-1354.01-00-
0001
Cable Procurement Specifications
AD-EG-ALL-1615
Cable Aging Management Program Implementation
004
Procedures
PD-EG-ALL-1615
Cable Aging Management Program
2
Miscellaneous
OP-CN-CPE-21-
23 Segment 3 CPE, Licensed Operator Requalification
AP/1/A/5500/003
Load Rejection
050
AP/1/A/5500/016
Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation System
031
AP/2/A/5500/014
Control Rod Misalignment
016
AP/2/A/5500/015
Rod Control Malfunction
016
EP/1/A/5000/ES-
0.1
Reactor Trip Response
050
EP/1/A/5000/FR-
H.1
Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink
049
OP/1/B/6100/010C
Annunciate Response for Panel 1AD-2
071
OP/2/A/6150/008
Rod Control
008
PT/0/A/4150/030
RCCA Bank Repositioning
041
Procedures
PT/2/A/4350/02B
Diesel Generator 2B Operability Test
134
Work Orders
20442043, 20379357, 20241784
Corrective Action
Documents
2455172
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
2462082
Drawings
CN-2592-01.00
Flow Diagram of Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA)
2
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
PRT-2-23-2B CA OOS-0053 (clearance tag)
PRT-0-23-A
VC/YC OOS-0060
(clearance tag)
Miscellaneous
PRT-2-23-2B-D/G
OOS-0065(1)
(clearance tag)
AD-OP-ALL-0201
Protected Equipment
009
AD-OP-ALL-0210
Operational Risk Management
2
AD-OP-ALL-0400
Operations, Work Management - Online
001
AD-WC-ALL-0240
On-line Risk Management Process
003
CSD-WC-CNS-
240-00
2
Procedures
OP/0/B/6350/012
250/125 VDC-120 VAC Standby Shutdown Facility
Auxiliary Power System
037
CN-2499-KC.22-
Instrument Detail Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger
Outlet Flow Control
Drawings
CNSF-1574-
RN.01
Summary Flow Diagram Nuclear Service Water System
(RN)
CSD-CP-CNS-
20
Catawba Primary-to-Secondary Leak Rate Monitoring
Program
003
Procedures
PT/1/B/4600/028
Steam Generator Tube Leak Rate - Unit 1
030
Work Orders
20582904, 20542630, 20579206
Corrective Action
Documents
2459730, 02455757, 02462250, 02462041
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
2461095, 02461097, 02461098, 02461099, 02461171,
2465853
PT/1/A/4250/003
C
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump #1 Performance
Test
109
Procedures
PT/2/A/4250/003
B
Auxiliary Feedwater Motor Driven Pump 2B Performance
Test
048
Work Orders
20554586, 20575943, 2490118, 20536346, 20381289,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
20540453, 20586136, 20573884
Operator Logs Unit 2, April 2022 and October 2022
URI/UAI Derivation Reports for Component Cooling Water
System for Unit 1 and Unit 2 Jan-Dec 2022
Operator Logs Unit 1 and 2, Jan-Dec 2022 for Component
Cooling Water system availability/unavailability
Component Cooling Water (KC) System MSPI
Unavailability Records Jan-Dec 2022
71151
Miscellaneous
Monthly performance indicator validation data packages
Jan-Dec 2022
CN -1785-01.12-
Connection and Outline Diagram Process Control System
(EIA) Miscellaneous Terminal Boxes
Drawings
CN -1864-31
Connection Diagram Heat Trace System (EHT) for
1EHTTC0200 AND 1EHTTC0201
2
IP/0/B/3560/008
Preventative Maintenance and Operational Check of
Freeze Protection Heat Trace and Instrument Box Heaters
(EHT/EIB) Systems (Fall PM)
Procedures
IP/0/B/3560/009
Operational Check for Winter Months and Extreme Cold
Weather Surveillance of Freeze Protection Heat Trace and
Instrument Box Heaters (EHT/EIB) Systems
Work Orders
20520264, 20524429
Corrective Action
Documents
2446847, 02446796
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
2466609
Drawings
CN-2593-01.04
Flow Diagram of Steam Supply to FWP Turbine System
(SP)
009
External Department Guidance for OSIP 22-008, Guidance
for obtaining minim exhaust hood temperatures for end of
outage Turbine Overspeed Test
Miscellaneous
OSIP 22-008
RC Temp Control to support C2R25 Turb. Overspeed test
Procedures
AD-OP-ALL-0111
Operations Communications
005
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
OP/2/A/6100/001
Controlling Procedure for Unit Startup
135,175,176
OP/2/A/6250/001
Condensate and Feedwater System
158, 159