IR 05000413/1986008

Insp Repts 50-413/86-08 & 50-414/86-10 on 860218-21.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Exercise Weaknesses Noted: Failure to Classify & Declare Site Area Emergency Based on Radiological Effluent Monitor Readings

ML20205M808
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	04/07/1986
From:	Cunningham A, Decekr T, Decker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205M795	List: IR 05000413/1986008 ML20205M793
References
50-413-86-08, 50-413-86-8, 50-414-86-10, NUDOCS 8604150384
Download: ML20205M808 (13)

Text

I m3 Kfro ,b UNITED STATES

, o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON

.? \ - / ,^ REGION li h ,( .h I 101 MARIETTA STREET, [ *'. i- t ATL ANTA. GEORGI A 30323 gw*****/

APR 0 71986 Report Nos.: 50-413/86-08 and 50-414/86-10 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Hos.: 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-48 Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: February 18-21, 1986 Inspector: b '

drie [" I'$

g'77A. L. Cunningham Date Signed Accompanying Personnel: B. C. Haagensen T. Lynch J. G. Stephan J. M. Will, J Approved by:

'/X8[Ad T. R. pecker, Chief h NAt4 4 -7 -h Date Signed Emergency Preparedness Section Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 195 inspector-hours onsite in the area of the annual radiological emergency preparedness exercis Results: No violations or deviations were identified; however, three exercise weaknesses were disclosed, namely; failure to classify and declare a site a'rea emergency based on radiological effluent monitor readings, predicting radiation level at the site boundary in excess of PAGs for adverse meteorological conditions (Paragraph 9); consistent failure of TSC field monitoring team coordinators to effectively direct field monitoring teams to locate and define the plume centerline (Paragraph 12.b); and failure to identify and factor into accident analysis and mitigation, critical scenario parameters contributing to the accident or major effects resulting therefrom (Paragraph 12.b).

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I REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted

• J. W. Hampton, Station Manager

• J. W. Cox, Technical Services Superintendent

• R. Harris, System Emergency

• E. Bolch, Station Emergency Planner

• P. Deal, Station Health Physicist

• B. F. Caldwell, Maintenance Superintendent

• f. McAnulty, Training and Safety Coordinator Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne Other Organization

• S. A. Schwartz, NRC/IE

• Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 21 1986, with

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those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas observed and discussed in detail the inspection findings. Major emphasis was directed toward the exercise weaknesses identified in Paragraphs 9 and 12.b. The licensee acknowledged the findings, and no i dissenting comments were received from the license !

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided 1 to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio ' Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters i

This subject was not addressed during the inspectio . Exercise Scenario (82301)

The scenario for the energency exercise was reviewed to assure that ;

provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion i of the basic elements defined in the licensee's emergency plan and i organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.N of NUREG-0654, Revision The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed in detail with licensee representatives on February 14 and 19,

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198 While no major scenario problems were identified, several inconsistencies became apparent during the exercis The inconsistencies,-

however, failed to detract from the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organizatio The scenario developed for this exercise was detailed, and fully exercised the onsite emergency organizations. The scenario provided sufficient information to the State and local government agencies consistent with the scope of their participation in the exercis The licensee made a large commitment to training and personnel through the I use of controllers, evaluators, and required personnel participating in the exercise. Note, however, that additional training of TSC field team coordinators and field team personnel is indicated in Paragraphs 10 and 12, !

below. The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the exercise; I however, some minor prompting was noted by the inspector I i

No violations or deviations were identifie . Drill Scenarios (82301) ,

The scenarios for the medical emergency and fire drills were reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test specific functions in the licensee's emergency plan pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.N of NUREG-065 Scenarios developed for the subject drills were explicit, and adequately exercised the participating licensee organization and offsite local

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I emergency agencies. The scenarios provided sufficient information to the local support agencies consistent with the scope of their participation in the drill The licensee and offsite support agencies made a significant commitment to 1 training and personnel by use of controllers, evaluators, and specialists participating in the medical emergency and fire drills. The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the drills. The scope and objectives of each drill were fully implemente No violations or deviations were identifie . Assignment of Responsibility (82301)

This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1) Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.A of NUREG-0654, Revision The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments were made for the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff was

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available to respond to the simulated emergency.- The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives; however, because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not require Discussions with licensee representatives indicated that sufficient technical staff was available to provide for continuous staffing of the augmented emergency organization if neede The inspectors also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the TSC and OS At each response center, the required staffing and assignment of responsibility were consistent with the licensee's approved procedures.

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)

The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), !

Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria promulgated !

in Section II.B of NUREG-0654, Revision 1: (1) responsibilities .for l emergency response were unambiguously defined; (2) adequate staffing was !

provided to assure initial facility accident response in key functional

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areas at all times; (3) onsite and offsite support organizational ,

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interactions were specifie The inspectors observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined, and that staff was available to fill key functional

] positions within the emergency organization. Augmentation of the initial

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emergency response organization was accomplished through mobilization of off-shift personne The on-duty Shift Supervisor assumed the duties of Emergency Coordinator promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency, j and directed the response until formally relieved by the Station Manager, j i

Required interactions between the licensee's emergency response organization '

and State and local support agencies appeared to be adequate and consistent with the scope of the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)

This area was observed to assure that the following arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources were made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3); Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and Section II.C of NUREG 0654, Revision 1, .namely: (1) accommodation of selected State and local emergency response representatives at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility; (2) organizations l capable of augmenting the planned response were identifie . -- . - .- -- , - ._ .

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Representatives of the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, and York and Gasden Counties were accommodated at the licensee's Emergency News Center (ENC). Licensee contact with offsite organizations was prompt, effective, and consistent with the scope of the exercis Assistance resources from State and local agencies were available to the licensee consistent with the scope of their paricipation in the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Classification System (82301)

This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria promulgated in Section I.D of NUREG-0654, Revision An emergency action level matrix was used to promptly identify and properly classify the emergency and escalate to more severe emergency classifications as the simulated emergency progressed. Licensee actions in this area were timely and effectiv Observations confirmed that the emergency classification system was consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedure The system appeared to be adequate for classification of the simulated accident sequences. The emergency procedures provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions during the simulated emergency. It was noted, however, that the licensee failed to classify and declare a site area emergency based on radiological effluent monitor data predicting radiation levels at the site boundary in excess of PAGs for adverse meteorological conditions. The unit vent iodine monitor readings at 1615 exceeded the EAL symptoms listed in Procedure RP/0/A/5000/01 (Classification of Emergency)

under the Emergency Classification Guide Flowchart, Event 4.1.4, as shown on data sheets for the 1545 to 1615 exercise time line. A site team emergency was declared within the 1715-1730 time line. The latter was based on primary coolant leakage which exceeded the makeup pump capacit Exercise Weakness 50-413/86-08-01, 50-414/86-10-01: Failure to classify a site area emergency consistent with Emergency Classification Guide Flowchart Event 4.14 of Procedure RP/0/A/5000/01 based on radiological effluent monitor readings predictive of radiation levels at site boundary in excess of PAGs for adverse meteorological conditions. This finding was fully discussed with licensee representatives prior to and during the exercise critiqu The licensee acknowledged the subject findin This finding is also indicative of additional required training of TSC personnel regarding identification and classification of emergencie No violations or deviations were identifie l

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10. Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)

This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations were established. This area was further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.E of NUREG-0654, Revision An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were established and available for use in providing information regarding the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization Notification of the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, and local offsite organizations was completed within 15 minutes following declaration of each emergency classificatio Telephone notification of State and local response organizations was promptly followed by transmission of hard copies of the notification to these organization Such copies included prevailing meteorological information, average release rate (source terms in uCi/sec), site boundary integrated dose projections, and recommended protective actions whc necessar The prompt notification system (PNS) for alerting the public within the plume exposure pathway was in place and operational. The system was actuated during the exercise to simulate warning the public of significant events occurring at the plant sit No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Comunications (82301)

This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specifD criteria promulgated in Section II.F of NUREG-0654, Revision The inspector observed communications within and between the licensee's emergency response facilities (Control Room, TSC and OSC), between the licensee and offsite agencies, and between the offsite environmental monitoring teams and the TSC. The inspectors also observed information flow among the various groups within the licensee's emergency orgvnizatio Notwithstanding malfunction of the control room intercom, communication with the remaining facilities was effectiv No violations or deviations were identifie <.

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12. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)

This area was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.H of NUREG-0654, Revision The inspectors observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency response facilities and evaluated the equipment provided for emergency use during the exercis Control Room - The inspector observed that following review and analysis of the sequence of accident events, Control Room operations 3 personnel acted promptly to initiate required responses to the simulated emergenc Emergency procedures were readily available, E routinely followed, and factored into accident assessment and mitigation exercise Control Room personnel involvement was essentially limited to those personnel assigned routine and special operational duties. Effective management of personnel gaining access to the Control Room precluded overcrowding, and maintained an ambient noise level required for the orderly conduct of operations under emergency condition The Shift Supervisor and the Control Room operators were cognizant of their ddies, responsibilities, and authoritie These personnel demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system and the proficient use of specific procedures to determine and declare the prsper emergency classificatio It was observed that the data and information provided as the scenario's initial sequence of accident events and conditions placed no demands upon the Emergency Director and the Control Room Staff in commencing the exercise in a timely manner. The Control Room staff demonstrated the capability to effectively assess the initial conditions and implement required mitigating action It was noted however, that control room operators failed to maintain a log of facility activities throughout the exercise. This finding was discussed with licensee representatives prior to and during the exercise critique as a suggested improvement since the Control Room log would constitute a legal record in the event of an actual emergenc Effective training should therefore routinely require use and maintenance of bound facility logs to chronicle simulated accident sequences and corresponding miti and protective action responses. gating actions, including notification Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-413/86-08-02, 50-414/86-10-02: Maintain a Control Room log during facility's participation in emergency exercises and drills. This item was discussed with licensee representatives and will be reviewed during subsequent exercise ___ . . . .

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b. Technical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC was activated and promptly staffed following notification by the Emergency Director of the simulated emergency conditions leading to the Alert classificatio The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of their emergency duties, authorities, and responsibilities. Required operations at the facility proceeded in an orderly manner. This facility was provided with adequate equipment for support of the assigned staff. TSC security was promptly established; however, it was observed that security did not

- maintain a log or otherwise account for personnel entering and exiting the facilit It was further observed that no radiological control boundaries were established at the TSC door even under conditions where a release was in progress and plant radiological conditions were unknown because of loss of power to area radiation monitors. The subject observations were discussed during the exercise critiqu >

Licensee representatives stated that the subject items were not within the scope of the scenario objective; however, accountability of personnel entering and existing the facility, and maintenance of the radiological control barriers associated with the facility would be routinely implemented during emergency condition The independent ventilation system was operational during the exercis Radiological habitability was frequently monitored throughout the exercise. Dedicated communicators were assigned to the TSC and all required notifications were promptly implemente It was observed that the TSC staff did not trend radiological j parameters; accordingly, dose assessment and decision-making personnel were not provided with key paraneter information that would have i allowed identification of the effluent release path and magnitude of sam It was also observed that the dose assessment group projected offsite dose rates that .were significantly lower than reported field monitoring measurement Apparently, the subject group was not aware that the above situation could imply the existence of additional unmonitored release paths. An additional related observation disclosed that TSC field monitoring team coordinators failed to properly define the plume. Plume centerline values were never measured; although field teams traversed the plume several times. The maximum measured offsite dose rates were reported as less than 1.0 mrem /hr., despite the finding that centerline dose rates reached 50 mrem /hr at the site boundar l Consistent with the above findings, it was observed that the field l monitoring teams' activity was essentially confined to the plume i perifery, as directe Based upon the summary of the above findings, I the exercise weakness defined below was identifie Exercise weakness 50-413/86-08-03,50-414/86-)0-03: Consistent failure of TSC Field Monitoring Team Coordinators t? offectively direct field monitoring teams to locate and define the plume centerline. This finding was fully discussed with licensee representatives prior to and during the exercise critiqu This finding is further indicative of inadequate training. The licensee acknowledged the subject findin . . ._-- . . _ . - - . . ,

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l The scenario postulated an undetected breach of containment.- The

! breach was traceable to a-flaw in containment penetration resulting in

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an opening equivalent to a 4.0 inch diameter hole exiting to the annulu This condition provided an' effluent transport path, and -

allowed small amounts of activity to be released from containment via i the flawed penetration. Inspectors observed,-however, that the staff assumed that containment _ integrity was maintained throughout the l exercise, and that design leakage was the basis - for the source term i flow. Accordingly, an estimate of the~ flow rate for the source term .

through the containment boundary was- not developed. It was.also noted that no attempt was made to quantify transport flow rates using

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estimated source . term concentration within containment. 'The. subject approach would conceivably have shown that the flow rate from.

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containment was significantly greater than design leakage.' This j finding was fully discussed during the licensee's controller / observer a

critiqu The subject finding was also discussed with NRC inspectors

prior to the~ exercise critiqu Licensee representatives concurred

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that the TSC staff overlooked the containment breach, and added that a more detailed analysis of exercise scenario event sequences and i parameters is required. In view of the significance of the above, the 1 subject finding will be considered an exercise weakness, as defined i- below.

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l Exercise Weakness 50-413/86-08-04, 50-414/86-10-04: Failure to I identify and factor into accident assessment and mitigation critical i parameters contributing to the accident and major effects resulting

therefrom.

l 1 Operations Support Center (OSC) =- The OSC was promptly staffed

following activation of the emergency plan by the Emergency Directo It was observed that teams were promptly assembled, briefed, and j prepared for deployment. The~'0SC Supervisor appeared to be cognizant i of his duties and responsibilities. During operation of this facility,

radiological habitability was ' routinely monitored and documented.

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It was observed by the licensee and NRC inspectors that the OSC-supervisor needed assistance in. handling communications and management.

] of the status board. It was also observed however that the OSC j supervisor demonstrated the required ability to discern and select i those conditions which warranted priority, and promptly provided the

! required investigative and repair team I

! The PASS drill (liquid and air) was successfully managed and

! implemente No violations or deviations were identified.

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13. Accident Assessment (82301)

This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria in Section II I of NUREG-0654, Revision The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of plant status, and an assessment of radiological hazards to onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident. During the exercise, the engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively except as discussed in the preceeding Sections, in analyzing plant status to provide recommendations to the Site Emergency Manager concerning mitigating actions required to reduce damage to plant systems and equipment, control of releases of radioactive materials, and termination of the emergency conditio Radiological assessment activities involved several groups. An inplant group was effective in estimating the radiological impact within the plant based upon inplant monitoring and onsite measurements. Offsite radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the plume. Radiological effluent data was received in the TSC. The problems regarding offsite radiological l surveillance data are discussed in Paragraph 12.b, abov Routine inventory and verification of the contents of monitoring kits issued to offsite radiation monitoring teams' personnel was conducted. It was noted that required contents of each kit were provided and were consistent with assigned inventories. No instrument or radio failures occurred during offsite surveys and monitoring. It was noted, however, that teams were neither informed nor periodically updated regarding plant status, emergency classification, and related condition It was also noted that field teams had difficulty reading and interpreting field sample location map Observed teams were occasionally lost. Navigation during night time appeared to distract team personnel from routine instrument surveillance.

I IFI 50-413/86-08-05, 50-414/86-10-05: Provide updated and effectively illustrated offsite maps of radiological sampling and surveillance stations to field monitoring teams, and additional training in use of same during day and night operations.

l No violations or deviations were identifie . ProtectiveResponse(82301)

This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions, consistent with federal guidance, were developed and in place, and

! protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of I non-essential personnel, were implemented promptly pursuant to l 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and specific criteria promulgated in NUREG-0654,

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The prompt notification system in the 10-mile EPZ was actuated. The sirens were operational. Protective actions regarding sheltering and evacuation of

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area occupants, where indicated," was promptly implemented as require Prompt notification of the,public was successfully implemented.

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The protective measures decision making process was observed by the

! inspectors. Recommendations implemented by the TSC staff were timely, effective, and consistent with the above criteri Protective measure recommendations were provided by the licensee to the States of South l Carolina, North Carolina, and designated counties and local offsite l organization No violations or deviations were identifie . Radiological Exposure Control (82301)

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This area was observed to determined that methods for controlling radiological exposures in an emergency were established and implemented for emergency workers, and that these methods included exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11), and specific criteria defined in Section II.K of NUREG-0654, Rev.1.

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! An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout

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the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency workers and by l conducting periodic radiological surveys in the emergency response l facilitie Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of l emergency actions, and adequate protective clothing and respiratory protection was available and used as appropriate.

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Health Physics control of radiation exposure, contamination control, and radiation area access appeared adequat Health Physics Supervisors were observed to thoroughly brief survey teams prior to their deploymen Dosimetry was available and appropriately used. High range dosimeters were also available in case they were neede No violations or deviations were identifie . Public Education and Information (82301)

This area was observed to assure that information concerning the simulated 1 emergency was made available for dissemination to the public pursuant to !

10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific !

l criteria promulgated in Section II.G of NUREG-0654, Re The licensee activated and fully staffed the Emergency News Center (ENC).

The facility was used by the licensee for preparation, coordination and dissemination of emergency news information. Written press releases were prepared and issued from the ENC. Releases issued were timely, and adequately reflected plant emergency conditions. A corporate spokesman was designated to conduct periodic press briefing The briefings were l technically accurate and presented in a manner readily understood by layme l l l

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o Visual aids were provided and effectively use Question and answer sessions were held after each briefin Interaction and direct cooperation of the licensee with the States and counties was effective. Representatives of State, counties and Federal agencies were accomodated at the ENC. The cited representatives fully participated in the composition of all news release Similarly, State, Federal and county representatives assigned to the ENC, fully participated in planning and presentation of periodic press briefings held during the exercis Operation and management of the ENC was effectively implemented, and was consistent with the emergency plan requirements and approved procedure No violations or deviations were identifie . Recovery Planning (82301)

This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13),

10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.H, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The licensee conducted a detailed recovery planning session prior to termination of the exercise. Licensee planners discussed the need for administrative and logistical support, manpower needs, engineering service needs, radiological surveillance, and implementation of the recovery organization consistent with the scope of the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie . Exercise Critique (82301)

The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that shortcomings identified as part of the exercise, were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10CFR50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E, 10 CFR 50, and the specific criteria promulgated in NUREG-0654,Section I A formal critique was held on February 21, 1986, with exercise controller's and observers, licensee management, and NRC representative Weaknesses identified during the exercise and plans for corrective action were discussed. Licensee action on identified weaknesses will be reviewed during subsequent inspections. The licensee's critique was detailed, and addressed both substantive deficiencies'and indicated improvement items. The conduct and content of the critique were consistent with regulatory requirements and I guidance cited above.

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i 19. Inspector Followup Items (92701) (Closed) 50-413/84-12-02, 50-414/84-12-02: 15-minute notification of State and local organization Observations and review of records

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confirmed that State and local organizations were notified within the 15-minute time regime attending declaration of emergency classifications.

I (Closed) 50-413/84-12-03, 50-414/84-12-03: Evaluate feedback of information from the TSC to Control Room and OSC. Observations confirmed that, notwithstanding malfunction of the Control Room i intercom, communications between the Control Room and Emergency j Response facilities were adequate and effectiv (Closed) 50-413/85-03-01, 50-414/85-03-01: Posting of required security at designated medical facility emergency entrance and treatment facility, as part of medical emergency drill preparatio The inspector observed that adequate security was provided and maintained at the receiving hospital throughout the medical emergency drill . (Closed) 50-413/85-03-02,50-414/85-03-02: Provision of containers for disposal of contaminated items associated with reception and treatment of contaminated injured person admitted into medical facility emergency I and treatment areas. The above containers were provided during the medical emergency drill conducted as discussed here (Closed) 50-413/84-98-01,50-414/84-44-01: Provide backup power supply for the Control Room meteorological equipment. Inspection confirmed that subject power was provided.

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' (Closed) 50-413/84-98-02, 50-414/84-44-02: Specific relabeling of meters in Control Room for steamline radiation monitor Inspection

confirmed that the above relabeling has been completed.

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