IR 05000413/1986041

Insp Repts 50-413/86-41 & 50-414/86-44 on 861006-09.No Violations or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Seismic Analysis for as-built safety-related Piping sys,safety- Related Pipe Supports & Base Plate Designs

ML20214F716
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	11/10/1986
From:	Blake J, Vias S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214F700	List: IR 05000413/1986041 ML20214F698
References
50-413-86-41, 50-414-86-44, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-04, IEB-79-07, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-2, IEB-79-4, IEB-79-7, NUDOCS 8611250406
Download: ML20214F716 (9)

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• P Kf r UNITED STATES

/ uq'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1

[' n REGION li 101 MARIETTA STREET, g ,j

• * ATI.ANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-413/86-41 and 50-414/86-44 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52 Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: October 6-9, 1986 Inspector: - - # ll)I 8(ca S. a Date ig ed Approved by: g a // /0 dd J. lakg, SEction Chief Date S'igned Engi eer}6g Branch Div sion'of Reactor-Safety SUMMARY Scope': This routine, announced inspection on site and 'in the licensee's Engineering Offices in Charlotte, N.C.', was in the areas of seismic analysis for as built safety-related piping. systems (IEB 79-14), safety-related pipe supports, base plate designs using concrete expansion anchor bolts (IEB 79-02), IE Bulletin 79-04, IE Bulletin 79-07, inspector followup items and other previous enforcement

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matter Results: No violations or deviations 'were identifie %

PDR ADOCK 05000413 G PDR ,

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• C. L. Ray, Jr., Principal Engineer, Design Engineering

• F. P. Schiffley II, Licensing Engineer D. H. Stout, Design Engineering

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• L. N. Adams, Quality Assurance (QA), Operations J. Kinard, Construction Maintenance, Operations J. W. Willis, Senior QA Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included engineers and office personne NRC Resident Inspectors

• P. Skinner, Senior Resident Inspector - Operationc

• M. Lesser, Resident inspector

• Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 9,1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection below. The licensee acknowledged the inspection with no dissenting comment The licensee did identify as proprietary material, various documents for review by the inspector during this inspection, but no proprietary information is contained in this repor . Licensee Action on Previous Entorcement Matters (Clo' sed) Violation 413/86-03-01, Failure to Follow Procedures in Restoring to Service Failed Supports / Restraints. This matter concerns the inadequate repair and reinstallation of supports after a water hammer event. The inspector held discussions with appropriate licensee representatives and reviewed the following documentation to evaluate the violatio The licensee determined that Maintenance Procedure MP/0/A/7650/59, " Controlling Procedure for Support / Restraint Mainte-nance Activities" needed to be revised. Section 11.3.7.1 was revised to assure that all of the support is returned to the original design condition regardless of what the Work Request states in the repair instructions. Also, reviewed was a Duke Power memo, dated March 24, 1986, which referenced the revision in the above procedure and cautions the responsible personne'i on the importance of restoring a support back to its original design conditio _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ a

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The licensee also issued a new procedure, MP/0/A/7650/95, " Post Transient Piping and Hanger Inspection," approved June 10, 198 This procedure provides periodic inspection of piping and supports on systems that are subject to severe dynamic event This procedure should help identify any minor problems before they cause major damage

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to either piping or support This matter is considered close b. (Closed) Violation 413/86-03-02, Inadequate Engineering Evaluation of an Event that Damaged Support / Restraints. This violation pertains to the inadequate evaluation by Engineering, after a water hammer event that damaged piping and supports. This inspector held discussions with appropriate licensee representatives and reviewed Duke Power Company's (DPC) letter to the NRC, dated March 19, 1986, stating that the problem was attributed to a breakdown in communications and a misunderstanding

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of responsibilities between Design Engineering and Nuclear Power. The licensee has delineated who are the responsible persons for various type events and who was to take the lead positio The above

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requirements are stated in Design Engineering Department Manual,

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Voiume II, Revision April 30, 1986,Section II.4.6, Station Operability Determination - Exhibit 3, for Design Engineering Department, Catawba N.S., Operability Contacts. The above requirements were discussed with the responsible supervisors to assure that similar problems do not recur. This raatter is considered close c. (Closed) Unresolved Item 413/86-06-01 ' and 414/86-08-01, Control of Coatings on Pipe Support / Restraints. This item involved the painting over of pipe support ID numbers, NPT Data plates, spring load indication plates, and bushings / studs for struts and snubbers. Also, there was the concern of being able to identify supports in a timely manner. The inspector held discussions with appropriate licensee representatives and reviewed the following documentation:

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Work request 0277 LAP, dated September 18, 1985, instructing the

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craft to install stainless steel 10 tags on every tn1ra suppor NCIR CN-382, dated February 4, 1986, which revised CP-744, and required the licensee to conduct additional training for this are NCIR CN-380, dated February 3,1986, which called for the removal of paint from areas mention in the unresolved ite This matter is considered close (Closed) Violation 414/86-08-02, Failure to Follow Procedures During

_ Installation, Inspection, and Review of QA Documents for Pipe 1 Supports / Restraints. This violation was identified during a review of pipe supports, and three concerns were identifie _- - . . -- ,

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Fi rst , a concrete anchor bolt was found with a 1/8" gap under the washe In discussions with the licensee and review of NCIR CN-381, dated February 3,1986, it was noted that this was similar to another violation previously identified and responded to in NCI 15,706 which was satisfactorily responded to and closed out on November 23, 198 The anchor bolt has been evaluated and reworked and this portion of the violation is considered close Secor.d, various QC documentation packages for pipe supports were missing appropriate signatures. The inspector held discussions with the licensee and reviewed NCIR CN-383, dated February 5,1986, which determined that the missing signatures were an oversight and that the packages had indeed been reviewed. This portion of the violation has been satisfactorily evaluated and is considered closed.

- Finally, there was a concern of non ASME, NF (non-NF) welds not being identified on support sketches or the CP-635A forms. In discussions with the licensee and information given in the licensee's violation response, dated April 9, 1986, it was decided that this would be addressed as a separate concern and was identified as UNR 86-08-03, which is discussed in paragraph 3e of this repor This entire matter is considered close (Closed) Unresolved Item 414/86-08-03, Identifying Non-NF Welds on-Hanger Sketches During Inspections. This item involved non-NF welds not being identified on support sketches and CP-635A forms. The inspector held discussions with appropriate licensee representatives and reviewed their respon;e in NCIR CN-383, which stated that the method for numbering of non-NF welds was per their Procedure CP-22 and that there was no discrepancies as' stated in the unresulved item. This matter is considered close . Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during the inspectio . (Closed) IE Bulletin 79-02, Pipe Support Baseplate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchors, Units 1 & 2, (25528) Document Review The inspector reviewed the following documents to determine whether the IE Bulletin 79-02 requirements had been adequately addressed and implemente The review of procedures, specifications, and field inspections have been documented in previous inspection report m m p

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The following letters from Duke Power Company to the NRC for responses to the Bulletin were reviewed:

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Dated July 5, 1979, Original Response to Revision 1 of the Bulleti Dated August 15, 1979, Forwarding Results of the Teledyne Engineering Services Stud Dated January 7, 1980, Revision 1 to the Final Response to Revision 2 of the Bulleti Dated December 15, 1983, Revision 2 to the Final Response to Revision 2 of the Bulleti Dated November 2, 1984, Revision 3 to the Final Response to Revision 2 of the Bulleti Dated February 3,1986, Revision 4 to the Final Response to the Bulletin. This letter gave the final status of Unit 2 and stated that all support using concrete expansion anchors had been designed with a Safety Factor = 4, for all condition Dated May 4, 1982, Revision 5 to the Final Response to Revision 2 of the Bulletin, for the McGuire NF The following Catawba procedures were reviewed and compared to the McGuire procedures:

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Catawba Procedure, " Support / Restraint Base Plant and Anchor Bolt Design Procedure," dated December 28, 197 .

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McGuire Procedure, " Procedure for Designing Baseplates with Expansion Anchors," dated July 16, 197 Also reviewed' was the Parameter Report it--140, 5tatus or closeout of IE Bulletin 79-02: " Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts," dated December 13, 198 The inspector also reviewed the Teledyne Engineering Services (TES)

report, issued for a group of 13 utilities, titled, "TR-3501-2 Support Report, Generic Response to USNRC I&E Bulletin number 79-02 Base -

Plate / Concrete Anchor Bolts," dated August 30, 1979. In Section 1.2, Initial NRC Meeting, it_ states:

"On April 26, 1979, the Utility /TES group met with the NRC in Bethesda, Maryland to discuss this generic program and applic-ability to Bulletin 79-0 Representatives from both I&E and NRR were in attendance and their general conclusion was that _ __ ______ ________________ ___ ___ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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the proposed program would address the concerns over the base plate / anchor bolt installation in a manner that was acceptable to the NR Bulletin Closure The inspector reviewed Duke Power Company's correspondence and determined that all the requested actions of the Bulletin have been adequately addressed. The inspector held discussions with licensee representatives regarding the implementation of the NRC requirements and the licensee commitments, reviewed the aforementioned supporting documentation and verified that the actions identified in the responses have been completed. This Bulletin is considered close . (Closed) IE Bulletin 79-04, Incorrect Weights for Swing Check Valves Manufactured by Velan Engineering Corporation, Units 1 & Document Review The inspector reviewed the following documents to determine whether the IE Bulletin 79-04 requirements have been adequately addressed and implemente Parameter Report IE-143, dated May 1985, stating that the IE Bulletin 79-04 is closed for Units 1 & 2

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NRC Memo from E L. Jordan, dated July 5,1985, "IE Bulletin 79-04 Closecut." Bulletin Closure The inspector reviewed the above documents and determined that the requested actions of the Bulletin have been adequately addressed. This Bulletin is considered closed for the purposes of the Regional

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Inspection Program The Parameter Report IE-143, pertains to the status and closure of the IE Bulletin /9-04 tor NRR evaluation the Parameter Report closed the Bulletin per Criterion 2, which states:

" Facility has submitted an acceptable response indicating that it has no affected valves installed or planned for installation."

This Bulletin is considered close . (Closed) IE Bulletin 79-07, Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety-Related Piping, Units 1 & 2 Document Review The inspector reviewed the following documents to determine whether the IE Bulletin 79-07 requirements have been adequately addressed and implemente _ _ _ . .

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Parameter Report IE-141, dated January 1986, stating that the IE Bulletin 79-07 is closed for Units 1 & NRC Memo from E. L. Jordan, dated February 6,1986, "IE Bulletin 79-07 Closecut." Bulletin Closure The inspector reviewed the above documents and determined that the requested actions of the Bulletin have been adequately addressed. This Bulletin is considered closed for the purposes of the Regional

Inspection Program The Parameter Report IE-141, pertains to the status and closure of the Bulletin 79-07 for NRR evaluations. The Parameter Report closed the Bulletin per Criterion 2A which states: *

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" Utility has submitted an acceptable response indicating that computer programs with faulty algebraic summation of loads have not been used in seismic stress analysis of safety-related piping."

This Bulletin is considered close . (Closed) IE Bulletin 79-14, Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems, Unit 2,(25529) Document Review The inspector reviewed the following documents to determine whether the IE Bulletin 79-14 requirements have been adequately addressed and implemente The review of procedures, specifications, and field inspections have been documented in previous inspection report The following letters from Duke Power Company to the NRC for responses to the Bulletin were reviewed:

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Dated October 30, 1979, Original Respons Dated February 20, 1984, Final Response to Revision 1, Supple-ment Dated November 2, 1984, Revision 1 to the Final Response to Revision 1, Supplement Dated February 13, 1985, Revision 2 to the Final Response to Revision 1, Supplement The letter, dated February 13, 1986, indicates the final status of Unit 2 and that the As-Built Verification Program for all piping systems have been closed out. This was noted by a memo to the licensees' files, dated February 12, 1986.

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Also reviewed was the Parameter Report IE-142, " Status of Closecut of IE Bulletin 79-14: Seismic Analyses for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems, dated December 13, 1985, closing this bulletin for Unit 2 based on previous response It was noted during this review, that the Verification Program at Catawba NPS, was the same program that was used at and approved for, the McGuire NP Bulletin Closure The inspector has reviewed Duke Power Companys' correspondence and determined that all the requested actions of the Bulletin have been adequately addresse The inspector held discussions with licensee representatives regarding the implementation of the NRC requirements and the licensee commitments, reviewed the aforementioned supporting documentation and verified that the actions identified in the responses have been completed. This Bulletin is considered close . Inspector Followup Item (IFI)

(Closed) IFI 413/85-37-01 and IFI 414/85-33-01, Load Rating for Mechanical Snubbers under Faulted Condition. This matter concerns loads on the Load Capacity Data sheets (LCDs) for PSA snubbers, for Service Level D conditions, were noticed to be approximately 50% greater than those published in manufacturer's technical catalo The inspector held discussions with appropriate responsible licensee representatives and reviewed the following documents:

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ITT letter, dated August 9,1985, transmitting PSA reports, DR-1431, R/0, October 14, 1977, and DR-1496, R/4, November 5, 1979, stating that ITT loads for " Level D" condition are based on DR-143 PSA letter, dated July 29, 1983, stating that DR-1431 loads were calcu'ated per the ASME 1974 code. Also stated was their philosophy that safety-related devices should not be loaded to their very limit during " Faulted" condition, therefore it was decided to use " Emergency" condition loads for both " Emergency" and " Faulted" conditions which are the " Level C & D" loads. The change in the design allowables have in no way af fected the actual design of the snubber itsel Catawba Desigr. Information, ITT Grinnell - Load Capacity Data Sheets -

306N & 307N, Revision 17, page 4 of 8, dated October 10, 1984, showing the same loads as transmitted by the ITT letter mentioned abov _ _ _ _ - - - - - -

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The following snubber calculations were checked to verify that indeed the correct allowables were being utilized:

Hanger Size- Design Allowable Number Stroke Load Load 2-R-SM-1500 #1-4" U-828# U-1500#

F-1552# F-2300#

2-R-SM-1551 #35-6" U-31000# U-50000#

(double) F-50000# F-91000#

-2-R-NI-0108 #1/2 - U-115# U-350#

1/2" F-210# F-590#

2-R-ND-0334 #3-5" U-1729# U-6000#

F-3243# F-11520#

All snubbers were within their allowable load rang This matter is considered closed.

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