ML20236J747

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Notice of Violation from Insp on 980222-0411.Violation Noted:Adminstrative & Surveillance Procedures Not Implemented as Evidenced by Listed Examples
ML20236J747
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/11/1998
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236J744 List:
References
50-413-98-03, 50-413-98-3, 50-414-98-03, 50-414-98-3, NUDOCS 9807080334
Download: ML20236J747 (46)


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d NOTICE OF VIOLATION Duke Energy Corporation Docket Nos.. 50 413, 50-414

'. . Catawba Nuclear Station License Nos. NPF 35, NPF-52 EA 98 208 l

During an NRC inspection conducted on February 22, 1998, through {

April 11, 1998, violations .of NRC requirements were identified. .1 accordance I with the ' General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the violations are listed below:

A. Technical Specification 3.7.7, Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust System, requires that two trains of the Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust (VA) system shall be 03erable during Modes 14. With one train u of the VA system inoperable, tie' inoperable train shall be restored to L operable status within 7 days or the reactor shall be placed in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in' cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.7.7.b.3 states that each train of the VA system shall be demonstrated operable by verifying a system flow rate of .30,000 cubic feet per minute (cfm) +/- 10% during system. operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510 1980.

' Contrary to the abov.t. on March 16, 1998, the Unit 2 A train VA system was inoperable in that the system flow rate was 26.129 cfm during surveillance testing in accordance with ANSI N5101980: however, the-licensee failed to implement the seven-day restoration actions of Technical . Specification 3.7.7 until March 25,1998. As a result.

Unit 2 remained in Mode 1 with the A-train VA system inoperable for nine days. (01013)

' B. 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix B, Criterion XVI, as implemented by Duke' Power Company Topical Quality Assurance Program (Duke 1-A), ' requires, in part, that measures be established to ensure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures and nonconformances, are promptly identified and corrected.

Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements 4.7.7.b.3, 4.7.7.e,  !

and 4.7 7.f address system testing requirements in accordance with i L American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard N510 1980. Testing  ;

of Nuclear Air Cleaning Systems'. j L ANSI N510-1980, Testing of Nuclear Air Cleaning Systems, states that - l testing of the air cleaning system is an integral part of the licensee's j Quality Assurance Program, and that surveillance tests are used to  ;

monitor the condition of associated systems. The ANSI standard also '

provides that an airflow capacity test acceptance criterion shall be within +/ 10% of system design flow.

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g Enclosure 1 l r-9807080334 900611 f PDR ADOCK 05000413 G- PM g%{

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Notice of Violation 2 Contrary to the above, on February 9, 1998, during surveillance testing of the Unit 2 B train VA system, the licensee identified a low airflow condition associated with the Unit 2 A-train VA system, but' failed to prom)tly correct the low flow condition. Consequently, on 1 Marc 1 16, 1998, the Unit 2 A train VA system failed to meet an airflow acceptance criterion of 30,000 cubic feet per minute (cfm) +/- 10%

during an 18 month surveillance test required by TS 4.7.7. (01023)

C. Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures be established, implemented ard maintained covering the activities recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33 Revision 2. As-referenced, this includes administrative and surveillance procedures.

Nuclear Systera Directive (NSD) 203, Operability, Revision 10. Appendix A. 203, Operability Policy for Previously Identified Items., defines the

-licensee's policy governing failed TS surveillance tests as follows:

U)on initial discovery of a failed surveillance, the affected system, suasystem. train, component or device shall be declared. inoperable and the. applicable TS action statement entered."

Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 203, Operability, Revision 10, l Section 203.9.1, General Requirements, states that notification to Operations (Operations Shift Manager) shall be accomplished by completion of Appendix E, Operability Notification Form, as described by this directive.

Surveillance procedure PT/0/A/4450/01C, Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust Filter Train Performance Test, approved May 5, 1986..

Step 12.2.1.4.2, applies to surveillance tests of the auxiliary building filtered exhaust (VA) system whereby acceptance criteria have not been met- and states, Notify the Shift Supervisor, Performance Engineer and the Licensing Engineer, and have the system (equipment) declared inoperable in accordance with its LCO in Tech. Specs."

Contrary.to the above, administrative and surveillance procedures were not implemented as evidenced by the following examples:

1. On March 16, 1998, the Unit 2 A-train VA system was not declared inoperable following a surveillance test during which system performance failed to meet TS surveillance acceptance criteria: l and
2. On March 16, 1998, a formal, documented operability notification  :

.was not provided to the Operations Shift Manager following the l March 16, 1998, VA system surveillance test failure. -(01033)  !

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Notice of Violation 3 D. Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering the activities recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33 Revision 2. As referenced, this. includes general procedures for the control of modification work.

Catawba Nuclear Station Modification Manual Revision 15. Section 5.6.2, states, that prior to returning the Minor Modification (MM) Work-Orders to the Operational Control Group for Return To Service, the Implementation Accountable or MM Originator shall verify that all 4

-activities as described by the MM have been implemented in the field or '

a Variation Notice written to revise the MM's scope accordingly.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to verify that all activities ,

described by Minor Modification CNCE 7901 (Resolution of System-  !

VA Filtered Exhaust Low Air Flow Concerns) had been. implemented.in the field before closing the modification on December 23, 1996. As a-result <three flow straighteners in the Unit 2 A-train auxiliary building filtered exhaust (VA) system that should have been removed by CNCE-7901 were left installed until removed on March 25, 1998. (01043)

E. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI. Test Control, as implemented by Duke Power Company Topical Quality Assurance Program (Duke-1 A).

states that a test program shall be established to ensure that all

testing required to demonstrate that structures systems and components will perform satisfactorily in service. Test procedures shall include provisions for assuring, in part, that all prerequisites for the given test have been met.

i As referenced in Technical-Specification 4.7.7, American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard N510-1980, Section 4.2 Test Procedures, states that test procedures shall identify, among other things. .the arrangement or clearances that have to be made prior to the test and the prerequisites that have to be met.

Contrary to the above,. surveillance test procedure PT/0/A/4450/01C,

' Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust Filter Train Performance Test, approved May 5.1986, did not establish a prerequisite controlling system _ configuration (pertaining to the status or position of various ,

interfacing systems and components)~ fo: performance of the test. As a i result, a consistent, repeatable test methodology.had not been  !

' established to ensure that system performance trends were reliable

indicators of flow degradation. (01053) i These violations represent a Severity Level III problem (Supplement I).

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Notice of Violation 4 F. 10 CFR Part 50.71(e)' states that each person licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor shall periodically update the Final Safety

' Analysis Report (FSAR) to ensure that the information included in the FSAR contains the latest material developed. The updated FSAR shall be revised to include the effects of, in part, all changes made in the L far.ility as described in the FSAR.

l Contrary to the above, as of April 9,1998, the licensee failed to l ensure that changes made during 1996 modifications CNCE 61117 and CNCE 61118 to the auxiliary building filtered exhaust (VA) system to

, routinely operate the VA system in the filtered mode were reflected in L . revisions to the applicable sections (7.6.12.1 and 7.3.1.1.1) of the updated FSAR. (02014) l This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I). l l Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Duke Energy Corporation (Licensee) i is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S.

' Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.

20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the i NRC Resident Inspector at Catawba, within 30 days of the date of the letter  !

, transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly l marked as a " Reply to a Notice of. Violation" and should include for each '

' violation: (1) .the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for

. disputing the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that have

.been.taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be

'taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will i be achieved. Your response may reference or include previously docketed  !

correspondence. if the correspondence adequately addresses the required I l response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in '

l this Notice, an order _or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, sus) ended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not >e taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time. j If you contest this enforcement action, you'should also provide a copy of your response to the Director, Office of Enforcement. United States Nuclear j Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555 0001.

L Under.the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. '

r Because your res)onse will- be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possi yle, it should not include any personai privacy, proprietary.

or safeguards information so that it can be placed.in the PDR wit 1out redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request l withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of

.your response that you seek to have withleid and provide in detail the bases L _ - - . _ - - _ . _ _ _ __ __-- _ _ - J

1 Notice of Violation 5 l for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information  !

will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the  ;

information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.

Dated at Atlanta, Georgia this lith day of June 1998 l

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l' LIST OF CONFERENCE ATTENDEES o

l' LNuclear Reaulatory Commission L -L EReyes, Regional Administrator,-Region II (RII) ,j L -J. Johnson,. Deputy Regional Administrator, RII-LL. Plisco, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII-B. Mallett; Deputy Director, Division.of Reactor Safety (DRS). RII

~ A. Boland, Director, Enforcement and Investigations Coordination Staff. RII l R. Franovich, Resident-InspectorL- Catawba, Branch'1, DRP, RII L; R.' Carroll : Project Engineer Branch 1, DRP, RII

'C. Evans, Regional Counsel, RII l

( .R, Bernhard, Senior Reactor Analyst,' DRS, RII l JM. Giles, Resident Inspector (in training) - Catawba, Branch 1, DRP.' RII .!

L Watson, Enforcement. Specialist. EICS..RII:

Duke Eneroy Corporation (DEC)

M. Tuckman, Executive.Vice. President, DEC. .

G. Peterson..Vice President, Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS). l R.: Jones, Station Manager, CNS

-P. Herran Engineering Manager, CNS lt M. Kitlan, Regulatory Compliance Manager, CNS

! R. Cummings, Community Relations Manager, CNS.. i L J. Kammer, Senior Engineer, CNS I

! P. Newton, Chief- Council Nuclear, DEC h

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Enclosure 2 l

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PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE AGENDA CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION MAY 14,1998,10:30 A.M.

NRC REGION 11 OFFICE, ATLANTA, GEORGIA l

1. OPENING REMARKS AND INTRODUCTIONS L. REYES, Regional . Administrator ll .- NRC ENFORCEMENT POLICY A. Boland, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff Ill.

SUMMARY

OF THE ISSUES L. Reyes, Regional Administrator IV. STATEMENTS OF CONCERNS / APPARENT VIOLATIONS L. Plisco, Director, Division of Reactor Projects  !

l V. LICENSEE PRESENTATION VI. BREAK / NRC CAUCUS Vll. NRC FOLLOW UP QUESTIONS Vill. CLOSING REMARKS L. Reyes, Regional Administrator Enclosure 3 L . . . __ _ __ -. __ _ .- . - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

A. (eel 98-03-04) i Technical Specification 3.7.7, Auxiliary Building Filtered '

Exhaust System, requires that 'two trains of the ,

Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust system shall be '

operable During Modes 1-4. With one train of the Au~xiliary- Building Filtered Exhaust System inoperable...,

restore the inoperable train to operable status within 7

' days or be in at least hot standby.within the next 6

. hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 ,

hours.  !

Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.7.7.b.3 states that each train of the Auxiliary Building 3 Filtered Exhaust System shall be demonstrated operable  ;

by verifying a system flow rate of 30,000 cubic feet j

.per minute (cfm) + /- 10% during system operation i when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980. j On March 16,1998, the Unit 2 A-train Auxiliary _

Building Filtered Exhaust System (VA) was inoperable .

in that the system flow rate was 26,129 cfm during  !

surveillance testing in accordance with ANSI N510-  !

1980. The licensee failed to implement the seven-day a restoration actions of Technical Specification 3.7.7. As a result, Unit 2 remained operating (Mode 1) with the  !

n A-train VA system inoperable for nine days. <

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, NOTE: The apparent violations discussed in this enforcement conference are I

subject to further review and are subject to change prior to any resulting enforcement action.

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B. (eel 98-03-06) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, as implemented by Duke Power. Company Topical Quality Assurance Program (Duke-1-A), . requires, in part, that measures be' established to ensure that conditions  ;

adverse to quality, such as failures and nonconformances, are promptly identified and corrected. '

Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements 4.7.7.b.3, 4.7.7.e, and 4.7.7.f involve system testing in accordance with American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard N510-1980, Testing of Nuclear Air Cleaning Systems ANSI N510-1980, Testing of Nuclear' Air Cleaning Systems, states that testing of the air' cleaning system is a~n integral part of the licensee's Quality Assurance-Program, and that surveillance tests are used to monitor the condition of associated systems. The ANSI standard also states'that an airflow capacity test acceptance criterion shall be airflow within +/- 10% of system design flow.

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NOTE: The apparent violations discussed in this enforcement conference are subject to further review and are subject to change prior to any resulting enforcement action.

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(eel 98-03-06 cont'd)

On February 9,1998, during surveillance testing of the Unit -2 B-train Auxiliary Building Ventilation (VA)

L System, the ' licensee identified a low airflow condition associated-with the Unit 2. A-train VA system, but

' failed to take immediate corrective action to correct the

low flow condition. Consequently, on March 16,

-1998, the Unit 2 A-train VA system failed to meet an

. airflow acceptance criterion of 30,000 cubic feet per minute (cfm) + /- 10% during an 18-month surveillance test required by TS 4.7.7. Again, the licensee failed to take immediate corrective action to identify the cause and. correct:the degraded airflow condition.

NOTE: The apparent violations discussed in this enforcement conference are subject to further review and are subject to change prior to any resulting enforcement action.

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C. -(eel 98-03-01) l Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering the activities recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2. As referenced, this includes specific procedures for surveillance tests.

L Surveillance procedure PT/0/A/4450/01C, Auxiliary Building Fi!tered Exhaust Filter Train Performance Test, Approved May 5,1986, Step 12.2.1.4.2, applies to surveillance t'ests whereby acceptance criteria have not been met and states, " Notify the Shift Supervisor, Performance Engineer and-the Licensing Engineer,:and have the system (equipment) declared inoperable in l accordence with its.LCO in Tech. Specs."

On March 16,1998, when airflow capacity test accept'ance criteria were not met during surveillance

testing of the Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust Filter Train 2A, the test technician notified the Work Control

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Center Senior Reactor Operator, instead of the Shift L Supervisor (Operations Shift Manager), of the system's inoperablility due to test acceptance criteria not being met and did not have the system declared inoperable in L accordance with the surveillance procedure. Although not formally notified of the test failure and low flow

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condition, the Operations Shift Manager was cognizant '

L of the issue.

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-NOTE: The apparent violations discussed in this enforcement conference are subject to further review and are subject to change prior to any resulting enforcement action.

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D. (eel 98-03-02)  !

l Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures .be-established, implemented and maintained covering the activities recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33,. Revision 2. As referenced, this l

includes administrative procedures.  ;

Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 203. Operability, Revision 10, Appendix A. 203, Operability Policy for Previously identified Ite.ms, defines the licensee's policy governing failed TS surveillance tests 'as follows: "Upon initial discovery of a failed surveillance, the affected system, subsystem, train, component or device shall be declared inoperable and the applicable TS action statement entered."

Nt clear System Directive (NSD) 203, Operability, Rnvision 10,_ Section 203.9.1, General Requirements, states that notification to Operations (Operations Shift Manager) shall be accomplished by completion of Appendix E, "203. Operability Notification Form," as described by this directive."

' Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 203, Operability, Revision 10, Appendix H. 203, Generic Letter 91-18 NRC: Inspection Manual - Part 9900: Technical Guidance, Section H.2.6.5, Surveillance and Operability Testing.in Safety Configuration, states.that repetitive testing to achieve acceptable test results without identifying.the root cause or correction of any problem in a previous test is not acceptable as a.means to establish or verify operability.

NOTE: The apparent violations discussed in this enforcement conference are subject to further review and are subject to change prior to any resulting enforcement action.

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(eel 98-03-02 cont'd)

Administrative procedures governing operability were i not implemented as evidenced by the following examples:

1. -On March 16,-1998, the Unit 2 A-train VA system was not declared inoperable following a surveillance test during which system performance failed to meet TS surveillance acceptance criteria.
2. On March 16,1998, a formal, documented operability notification was not provided to the Operations Shift Manager following the March 16, 1998, surveillance test failure.
3. On March 16 and 24-25,1998, four unsuccessful attempts to meet surveillance test acceptance criteria specified in Technical Specification 4.7.7.b.3 were made before the Unit 2 A-train auxiliary building ventilation system was declared  !

inoperable.

i NOTE: The apparent violations discussed in this enforcement conference are subject to further review and are subject-to change prior to any resulting enforcement action.

E. (eel 98-03-03)

Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering the activities recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2. As referenced, this includes administrative procedures.

Nuclear System Directive 408. Testing, Revision 5, Section 408.7.2.2, Invalid Test, states that failure to meet acceptance criteria is by itself not a valid reason to consider the test invalid and re-perform a procedure section.

From March 16 25,1998, three consecutive tests of the Unit 2 A-train VA system (governed by surveillance

. procedure PT/0/A/4450/01C, Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust Filter Train Performance Test, Approved May 5,1986) were considered invalid when acceptance criteria were not met despite unsuccessful system adjustments between reperformances. The system was eventually declared inoperable following

. subsequent test 'reperformance on March 25,1998.

l' NOTE: .The apparent violations discussed in this enforcement conference are subject to further review and are subject to change prior to any resulting enforcement action.

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F. (eel 98-03-05)

Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures be established, imple'mented and maintained covering the activities recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2. As referenced, this includes general procedures for the control of modification work. ,

Catawba Nuclear Station Modification Manual, Revision 15, Section 5.6.2, states, Prior to returning the Minor Modification (MM) Work Orders to the Operational Control Group for Return-To-Service, the

. implementation Accountable or MM Originator shall verify that all activities as described by the MM have -

been implemented in the field or a Variation Notice written to revise the MM's scope accordingly.

The licensee failed to verify that all activities described by. Minor Modification CNCE-7901 (Resolution of System-VA Filtered Exhaust Low Air Flow Concerns) had been implemented in the field before closing the modification on December 23,1996. As a result, three flow straightness in the Unit 2 A-train VA system that should have been removed by CNCE-7901 were left installed. .

NOTE: The apparent violations d.scussed in this enforcement conference are subject to further review and are subject to_ change prior to any resulting enforcement action.

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G. (eel 98-03-07) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, as implemented by Duke ' Power Company Topical Quality Assurance Program (Duke-1-A), states that a test program shall be established to ensure that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems and coiTiponents will perform satisfactorily in service. Test procedures shall include provisions for ensuring, in part, that all prerequisites for the given test L have been met and.that the test is performed under suitable environmental conditions. Test results will be documented and evaluated to ensure that the test requirements have been satisfied.

Referenced in Technical Specification 4.7.7, American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard N510-1980, Section 4.2,. Test Procedures, states that. test procedures shall identify, among other things, the arrangement or clearances that have to be made prior to the test and the prerequisites that have to be met.

Surveillance test procedure PT/0/A/4450/01 C, Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust Filter Train Performance Test, Approved May 5,1986, did not establish a prerequisite controlling system configuration or suitable environment (pertaining to the status or position of various interfacing systems and components) for performance of the test. As a result, a consistent, repeatable test methodology had not been established to ensure that system performance trends were reliable indicators of flow degradation.

NOTE: The apparent violations discussed in this enforcement conference are subject to further review and are subject to change prior to any resulting enforcement action.

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H. (eel-98-03-O'8) l

Title _10 of CFR part 50.71(e) states that each person  !

licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor shall periodically update the Final Safety Analysis Report u

(FSAR).to ensure that the information included in the 1 l FSAR contains the latest material developed. The l updated FSAR shall be revised to include the effects of, I in part, all changes made in the facility as described in the FSAR.

As of April 9,1998, the licensee failed to ensure that l changes incurred by 1996 modifications CNCE-61117 l and CNCE-61118 to the auxiliary building ventilation j

system were reflected in revisions to the applicable l sections (7.6.12.1 and 7.3.1.1.1) of the updated '

o FSAR.

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( NOTE: The apparent violations discussed in this enforcement conference are  !

subject to further review and are subject to change prior to any resulting  !

enforcement action.

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