IR 05000413/1986043

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Insp Repts 50-413/86-43 & 50-414/86-46 on 860926-1025. Violation Noted:Failure to Maintain Adequate Procedure for Conducting RHR Pump 1B Performance Test
ML20213G266
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/06/1986
From: Peebles T, Skinner P, Van Doorn P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20213G255 List:
References
50-413-86-43, 50-414-86-46, IEIN-86-081, IEIN-86-81, IEIN-86-816, NUDOCS 8611170410
Download: ML20213G266 (8)


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Report Nos.: 50-413/86-43 and 50-414/86-46 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.:

50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52 Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:

September 26 - October 25, 1986 Inspectors:

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//- / - 6 P. K. Van D6orn

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Date Signed l

//- S U P. H. Skinner '

f Date Signed Accompanying Personnel:

M. S. Lesser Approved by:

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//-6-6 T. A. Peebles, Section Chief Date Signed Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:

This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted on site inspecting in the areas of review of plant operatiors; surveillance observation; maintenance observation; review of licensee nonroutine event reports and construction deficiency reports; followup of previously identified items; followup of licensee actions relative to IE Information Notices; review of calibration program; and maintenance program implementation.

Results:

Of the eight (8) areas inspected, one violation was identified (Failure to maintain an adequate procedure paragraph 4.b.).

861117o410 861107 DR ADOCK 05000413 PDR

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REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • J. W. Hampton, Station Manager E. M. Couch, Construction Maintenance Central Manager
  • H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent W. H. Bradley, QA Surveillance
  • A. S. Bhatnager, Performance Engineer T. B. Bright, Construction Engineer Manager S. Brown, Reactor Engineer B. F. Caldwell, Station Services Superintendent
  • J. W. Cox, Superintendent, Technical Services T. E. Crawford, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling B. East, I. & E. Engineer
  • C. S. Gregory, I. & E. Support Enginaer C. L. Hartzell, Compliance Engineer J. Knuti, Operating Engineer P. G. LeRoy, Licensing Engineer W. W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor C. E. Muse, Operating Engineer F. P. Schiffley, II, Licensing Engineer
  • D. P. Simpson, Licensing Specialist
  • G. T. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent J. Stackley, I. & E. Engineer D. Tower, Operating Engineer J. W. Willis, Senior QA Engineer, Operations Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
  • Attended exit interview.

2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 23, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.

No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

The following violation was discussed:

(413/86-43-01) Failure to maintain an adequate procedure (paragraph 4b).

The following inspector followup item was discussed: (413/86-43-02) Review of control board tagout method.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Units 1 & 2) (92701)

(92702)

a.

(CLOSED)

Unresolved Item 413/86-19-01: Review of licensee imple-mentation of procedures. The inspector conducted further review of the incident associated with this item, the licensee's corrective action and the licensee's procedure improvement program. Since the portion of the rod control system involved in the incident is not safety-related a violation is not being issued. The licensee has issued an appropriate procedure for conducting repairs to the rod control system.

The licensee has also begun an extensive procedure improvement program for instrument / electrical and maintenance procedures.

This program includes a new writer's guide based on INPO standards, training of

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procedure writers, upgrading of procedures, issuing of additional procedures for non safety-related requirements, incorporating ETQS, review of procedures for HED considerations and prioritization of procedure needs.

Licensee actions are satisfactory.

b.

(DELETED) Violation 414/86-16-02: Failure to provide written bases for NSM 2-0084.

The licensee responded to this violation on July 2,1986 denying the violation and provided additional information.

NRC accepted the denial in correspondence dated July 29, 1986 and therefore this item is deleted.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4.

Plant Operations Review (Units 1 & 2) (71707 and 71710)

a.

The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements.

Technical Specifications (TS), and administrative controls.

Control room logs, danger tag logs, Technical Specification Action Item Log, and the removal and restoration log were routinely reviewed.

Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures.

System tagouts were reviewed for the Nuclear Service Water, Auxiliary Feedwater and Chemical and Volume Control Systems.

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The inspectors verified by observation and interviews, the measures taken to assure physical protection of the facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the security organization, the establishment and maintenances of gates, doors, and isolation zones in the proper condition, that access control and badging were proper and procedures followed.

In addition to the areas discussed above, the areas toured were observed for fire prevention and protection activities. These included such things as combustible material control, fire protection systems

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and material s, and fire protection associated with maintenance activities.

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The inspectors also reviewed Nonconforming Item Reports and Problem Investigation Reports to determine if adequate evaluations were being conducted relative to operability, corrective action and NRC reportability including 10CFR21.

An ESF System walkdown was conducted for the Residual Heat Removal Systems in both units.

b.

On October 6, 1986, a spill of approximately 12,000 gallons of contaminated, borated water occurred on Unit 1.

The unit was in mode 6 with the reactor vessel head in place, but not tensioned and the Upped Head Injection (UHI) piping was not installed.

Operators were preparing to conduct the performance surveillance (PT/1/A/4200/10B) on the 1B Residual Heat Removal (ND) pump.

The 1A ND pump was in operation for decay heat removal, taking suction from a loop hot leg.

The IB ND pump was not operating, however, its hot leg suction isolation valves, ND-36 and ND-37, were open with power removed. The test procedure required the Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) to be aligned to provide the suction head for the IB ND pump. When the FWST supply valve, FW-55, was opened, water from the FWST gravity drained through ND-36 and ND-37 into the Reactor Vessel.

Vessel water level rose rapidly due to the large diameter supply line and spilled through the vessel flange area. The upper head of the vessel continued to fill until water sprayed out the UHI open ports, wetting down Control Rod Dr{ve Mechanism coil stacks, Rod Position Indication coils, and other cabling and components in the area. The flow lasted approximately five (5) minutes until personnel inside the Reactor Building informed control room operators.

Operators immediately isolated the FWST from the Reactor Coolant System. No personnel were contaminated, nor was any airborne activity detectea.

The root cause of the incident was an inadequate procedure.

The procedure did not require ND-36 and ND-37 to be shut prior to opening FW-55 with the plant in mode 6.

This would have isolated the IB ND pump from the Reactor Coolant System.

These valve manipulations were identified in the procedure but the required sequence of operation was not specified.

This item violates Technical Specification 6.8.1 which requires adequate procedures to be maintained.

This is violation 413/86-43-01: Failure to maintain an adequate procedure.

c.

Further review of the spill described above identified valves ND-36 and ND-37 to have been tagged open with power removed from their operators.

This was in accordance with their procedure " Draining the Reactor Coolant System" (OP/1/A/6150/06) and intended to prevent the inadvertent closure of the valves and subsequent loss of residual heat removal. The removing of power eliminates electrical valve position indication at the control board. A sticker was placed on the control board switch which indicated the power supply breaker position but not the actual valve position.

Therefore there was no electrical or

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administrative indication of the valve positions on the control board for the operator.

It is the licensee's opinion that the lack of indication probably did not contribute to the spill.

Valve position

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indication on control board switches, either electrical or by method of tags is however an important tool for operators.

Therefore, the

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licensee has been asked to review its tagout methods for improvement in this area. This is Inspector Followup Item 413/86-43-02:

Review of control board valve tagout methods.

One violation was identified as described in paragraph 4.b. above.

5.

Surveillance Observation (Units 1 & 2) (61726)

a.

During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations were in compliance with various TS requirements.

Typical of these requirements were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, emergency power systems, i

safety injection, emergency safeguards systems, control room venti-lation, and direct current electrical power sources.

The inspector

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verified that surveillance testing was performed in accordance with the approved written procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, appropriate removal and restoration of the affected equipment was accomplished, test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

The inspectors witnessed ESF blackout testing during this report period.

b.

The August 14, 1986 memo from R. D. Walker, Region II Division Director of Reactor Projects, provided guidance on Technical Specification interpretation of ESFAS slave relay testing.

Catawba's ESFAS slave l.

relay testing methods were discussed with licensee personnel to verify that requirements are being met.

The performance group tests all ESF

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final actuation circuitry (slave relays) on a quarterly basis. In each

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case the slave relay is made to cycle by inserting a test signal.

Either the actual ESF component (pump, valve, breaker etc.) is observed

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to operate or continuity checks are performed.

This method is consistent with the FSAR and with Technical Specifications.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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6.

Maintenance Observations (Units 1& 2) (62703)

Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements.

The inspector verified licensee conformance to the requirements in the following areas of inspection:

the activities were accomplished using approved procedures, and functional testing and/or

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calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities performed were accomplished by qualified personnel; and materials used were properly certified. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may effect system performance.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7.

Review of Licensee Nonroutine Event Reports (Units 1 & 2) (92700)

The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC requirements. The determination included:

adequacy of description, verification of compliance with Technical Specifi-cations and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety significance of each event.

Additional inplant reviews and discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for those reports indicated by an (*).

The following LERs are closed:

  • 413/86-26 High Flux Rate Power Range Reactor Trip Due to a Defective Procedure.
  • 414/86-33 Phase A Containment Isolation Due to an Unknown Cause.

414/86-33, Rev. 1 Phase A Containment Isolation Due to an Unknown Cause.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8.

Previously Identified Inspector Findings (92701)

(CLOSED) Inspector Followup Item 413/85-55-01, 414/85-68-01: Evaluation of long term lubrication requirements for Hydrogen Skimmer Fans. The licensee has reviewed lubrication requirements with the bearing manufacturer and has established a lubrication cycle of each refueling.

The inspector verified these licensee actions.

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No violations or devictions were identified.

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9.

Followup of IE Notices (92701)

The-inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee upon receipt of an IE Notice (IEN) sent for information purposes only.

The Compliance

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Engineer, at present, controls receipt and distribution of these documents l

to assure appropriate personnel review the contents and determine actions i

that may be required as a result.

The following notices were reviewed to I

assure receipt, review by appropriate personnel, and any resulting action identified, documented and followed to completion:

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IE Notices 86-81 Broken Inner-External Closure Springs on Atwood &

Morrill Main Steam Isolation Valves.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10.

Followup of Construction Deficiency Reports 55.55(e) (92700)

a.

(CLOSED) CDR 414/85-11: Unconsidered effects of radiation streaming on electrical equipment. The licensee submitted reports for this item on October 24, 1985, and November 5, 1985. The inspector verified the licensee had completed corrective actions identified in the reports and considers these actions to be satisfactory.

b.

(CLOSED) CDR 414/86-01: Diesel Generator main bearing shell failure.

The licensee submitted reports for this item on January 16, 1986 and February 19, 1986. The inspector verified the licensee had completed corrective actions identified in the reports and considers these actions to be satisfactory.

No violations or deviations were identified.

11. Maintenance Program Implementation (Units 1 & 2) (62700)

The inspector reviewed the implementation of the maintenance program to determine if it is meeting regulatory requirements, to determine the effectiveness of the program on important plant equipment, and review the maintenance staff's activities in this area.

This review consisted, in part, of a review of equipment operating history for specific component failures leading to a plant shutdown and recurring safety related equipment tailure. Attributes covered in this review included evaluation of the cause of the failure and corrective action taken to reduce the probability of recurrence, that procedures were adequate to perform the maintenance and that these procedures met manufacturer's recommendations, and that vendor maintenance recommendations were adequately incorporated into maintenance procedures.

Specific work requests (WR) reviewed were associated with the repair of a weld on valve 1NV849, Variable Letdown Orifice, which failed causing a forced shutdown on June 13, 1986, (See Licensee Event Report 413/86-31) and WR associated with various failures of Diesel Generator 2A which resulted in safety related equipment being placed in an inoperable status until these failures were corrected.

The specific WR reviewed indicated that the required administrative approvals were obtained, limiting conditions for operation with the equipment out of service were met, inspections were made as required by the appropriate procedures, measuring and test equipment used was identified and in calibration, parts and materials were specified and used, and special processes were controlled and documented.

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The machinery history records for maintenance activities identified above are maintained on a computer program.

This program lists individual components, a synopsis of the work performed, the date of the work request and the work request number. The program, in general, is several months

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behind the actual work completion due to the completion review cycle of the work requests.

No violations or deviations were identified.

12.

Calibration (Unit 1) (56700)

a.

During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed certain portions of the licensee's calibration program to ascertain whether plant

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l instrumentation calibration is in conformance with licensee require-ments.

The inspector reviewed documentation and records to verify

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licensee conformance to calibration requirements for instrumentation in

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the Reactor Protection, Engineered Safety Features and selected safety related systems.

The following areas were verified:

instru-mentation calibration and channel functional tests were accomplished in accordance with the specified frequency in Technical Specifications l

(TS); test documentation was complete; acceptance criteria was met;

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and approved test procedures were used.

b.

The following procedures were reviewed for Technical Content:

f (1) Analog Channel Operational Test, Channel III-7300 (IP/1/A/3222/00C).

(2) Calibration Procedure for Barton Model 763, 764, and 386A Pressure i

Transmitters (IP/0/A/3817/12).

(3) AC Current Transducer Calibration (IP/1/A/3951/01).

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No violations or deviations were identified,

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