IR 05000413/1988033

Insp Repts 50-413/88-33 & 50-414/88-33 on 880826-0925. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Review of Plant Operations,Surveillance Observation,Maint Observation & Review of Licensee Nonroutine Event Repts

ML20205K093
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	10/14/1988
From:	Lesser M, William Orders, Pebbles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205K079	List: IR 05000413/1988033 ML20205K073 ML20205K089
References
50-413-88-33, 50-414-88-33, NUDOCS 8810310549
Download: ML20205K093 (9)

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Report No /88-33 and 50-414/88-33 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52 Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted. August 26 - eptember 25, 1988 Inspectors;W. T. Orders

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Approved by: 4<ul WAb E{A.Peeflet,SectionChief Projects Branch 3 J Date Sig'ned Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine, resident inspection was conducted on site inspecting in the areas of review of plant operations; surveillance observation; maintenance observation; review of licensee nonroutine event reports; and rollowup of previously identified item Results: la the areas inspected, the licensee's programs were observed to be adequat One violation was identified with two examples involving failure to follow procedures for post maintenance testing. One licensee identified violation was identified involving an unlocked high radiation are GS10310549 881017 DR ADOCK0500g3

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent W. F. Beaver, Performance Engineer W. H. Bradley, QA Surveillance R. N. Casler, Vnit 1 Coordinator R. H. Charest, Station Chemistry Supervisor T. E. Crawford, Integrated Scheduling Superintendent W. P. Deal, Health Physics Supervisor

• R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer T. P. Harrall, Design Engineering

• V. D. King, Compliance F. N. Mack, Project Services Engineer W. W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor W. R. McCollum Station Services Superintendent C. E. Muse, Unit 2 Coordinator

• T. B. Owen, Station Manager

• G. T. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent

• J. M. Stackley I&E Engineer D. Tower, Shift Operating Engineer R. F. Wardell, Technical Services Superintendent R. White, CSRG Chairman J. W. Willis, Senior QA Engineer, Operations Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne'..

NRC Resident Inspectors

• T. Orders

• M. S. Lesser

• Attended exit interview, Unresolved Items An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to detennine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation. There was one unresolved item identified in this report (paragraph Se.) Plant Operations Review (71707 and 71710) The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements Technical Specifications (TS), and administrative coritrols. Control room logs, danger tag legs, Technical Specification Action Item Lcj, and

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the removal and restoration log were routinely reviewed. Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedure The inspectors verified by observation and interviews, that the measures taken to assure physical protection of the facility met current requirement Areas inspected included the security organization; the establishment and maintenance of gates, door:, and isolation zones in the proper conditions; and that access control and badging were proper and procedures followe in addition to the areas discussed above, the areas toured were observed for fire prevention and protection activitie These included such things as combustible material control, fire protection systems and materials, and fire protection associated with maintenance activities. The inspectors revitwed Problem Investigation Reports to determine if the licensee was appropriately documenting problems and implementing appropriate corrective action Unit 1 Summary The unit started the reporting period in a maintenance outage to repair a steam generator tube leak. The unit was started up on August 2 On September 3, the shaft driven lube oil pump on the 1B centrifugal charging pump failed and had to be replace On September 22, high differential pressure (dp) was observed after flow was initiated through the 1A Containment Spray (NS) Heat Exchanger during the performance of a test to detect Asiatic clam The licensee's design analysis allowed the heat exchanger to remain operable provided Nuclear Service Water temperature remained below 79.5 F. The licensee later successful'y cleaned the heat exchanger with heated trisodium phosphat The cause of the high (dp) wss mud from Lake Wylie collecting on the shell side. Later, flow through the NS heat exchanger had to be throttled to force sufficient flow to the 1A Component Cooling Heat Exchanger which is currently fouled. The unit ended the period at or about 100% powe Unit 2 Summary The unit operated at or about 95% the entire reporting period. Power has been reduced due to fouling of the 2C mainfeed line flow orifice and the inability to feed the steam generator at 100% power. The associated Hain Feed Bypass valve is fully open with the Main Feed Control Valve about 92% ope On August 2,1988, Health Physics personnel discovered an unlocked door to a high radiation crea. This vici sted the requirements of TS 6.12.2 which requires that high radiation areas be kept locked except during periods of access under Health Physics control. The room had

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been verified locked on August The licensee's investigation included a review of the security printout for personnel access, personnel interviews, and review of dose amounts for workers in the are The cause of the unlocked door could not be determined ,

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howeve The licensee verified that no excessive or unusual exposures occurred. As this incident meets the criteria of 10 CFR 2 Appendix C for a Licensee Identified Violation (LIV), no Notice of Violation will be issued and this is classified as LIV 413/88-33-02:

High Radiation Area Discovered unlocke No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance Observation (61726) During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant oterations t were in compliance with various TS requirements. Typical of these ;

requirements were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor i coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, emergency power systems, i safety injection, emergency safeguards systems, control room ventila- o tion, and direct current electrical power source The inspector verified that surveillance testing was performed in accordance with the approved written procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, appropriate removal and restoration of the affected equipment was accomplished, test results m( t requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspectors witnessed or reviewed the following surveillances:

PT/i/A/4200/49 RN to CA Suction Piping Flush IP/1(2)B/3172/02 Calibration of Containment Air Temperature Detectors .

PT/2/A/4150/01D NC System Leakage Calculation No violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance Observations (62703) Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in '

accordance with the requirement The inspector verified licensee conformance to the requirements in the following areas of inspection:

the activities were accomplished using approved procedures, and functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities performed were accomplished by qualified personnel; and materials used were properly certified. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may effect system performanc ,__

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4 The inspectors witnessed or reviewed the following maintenance activities:

41247 OPS 2VQ-2 Actuator Replacement On August 8,1988 the 24 volt battery cells for the Safe Shutdown Facility (SSF) diesel were replaced without performing a post maintenance equalizer charge or verifying that cell voltages and specific gravities were acceptable. Work requests 9397 IAE and 9398 IAE specified the cells be installed and tested per IP/0/A/3710/02, Battery Removal and Replacement. As the cells were unpacked, the ,

cell voltages and specific gravities were measured however they were l not measured after electrical connection. Step 10.2.24 of the above procedure specified the battery to be placed on equalizer charge if necessary, which was interpreted by the maintenance technician to be not applicable. The manufacturer states that it is essential that any newly installed battery be given a high rate of charge by placing the charger in a high rate charge mode so that maximum current is delivered. The battery was placed on float charge and declared F operabl On August 20, 1988 engineers determined an equalize charge and a quarterly inspection should have been performed prior to declaring the battery operable. The quarterly inspection was IP/0/8/3710/09, Alcad Battery Periodic Inspection and requires the electrolyte level, cell voltage and specific gravity be checked for all cell The l engineers discovered that the quarterly inspec61on had recently been '

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performed on August 28. A review of the results, revealed that 3 cell voltages and 1 cell specific gravity were below the stated acceptance criteria. Supervisor personnel had not been notified of this condition. The engineers informed the unit coordinator of the battery inoperability in accordance with Station Directive 3.1.1 t The unit coordinator failed to ensure the battery was declared ;

inoperable in a timely manner such that security compensatory measures could be implemented. Later on August 30 the battery was properly charged and inspecte '

A review of the significance of the unacceptable voltages and specific gravity by Duke Design Engineering showed that the battery would have performed its intended function of starting the diesel engine. This evaluation is documented in a September 27, 1988 letter from T. P. Harrall to T. B. Owe The following weaknesses / discrepancies were identified:

- Station Directive 3.2.2, Development and Conduct of the Periodic Testing Program, requires a retest to be specified on the work request af ter battery cell replacement. This was not done by ;

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- IP/0/A/3710/02, Battery Removal and Replacement, was inadequate to ensure an equalize charge was performed after cell replace-ment although the manufacturer's vendor manual specified s Technical Specification 4.7.13.2 requires in part that specific gravity be measured once each 92 days to verify the battery operable, although specific gravity is not a meaningful *

parameter of the state of charge for nickel cadmium batterie A TS amendment should be submitted by the license Technicians failed to inform supervisory personnel when quarterly test results were below acceptable level Personnel failed to ensure security compensatory measures were implemented when the battery was determined inoperabl Analysis later showed the battery would perform its function l hence the measures fortuitously were not require l This is identified as one example of Violation 413.414/88-33-01:

Failure to Follow Procedures For Post Maintenance Testing, On July 19, 1988, the air regulator for 1CF-89, Feedwater Containment isolation Bypass Valve, was found to be undersized while performing a maintenance work request generated to repair the regulato A modification was initiated to replace the regulator, however, the  !

regulator was replaced under the initial work request prior to '

authorization of the modification. Since the original work re.yest did not require a retest (stroke time), the test was not perfoimed and the valve was declared operable on July 21. A TS violation occurred because the valve should have been stroke time tested after the regulator replacement. The valve was successfully timed on August 4, 1988 per a monthly test. Undersized regulators were found ,

on all similar functioning valves and determined to be a Design i Engineering error. The regulator functions to open the valve and was undersized in that the valves might not fully open under certain condi tions. This does not make the valves inoperable as they are i designed to fail shut, however, the licensee plans to replace all regulator This is identified as a second example of Violation 413, 414/88-33-01: Failure to Follow Procedures for Post Maintenance i Testin During urit restart :ctivities after a trip on June 29, 1988. Valve 2CA-152, steam generator 0 Main Feed Bypass to Aux Feed Nozzle, was determined to be leaking by its seat approxinately 100 9pm. The {

valve oporetes by a 4 inch Borg-Warner air actuator. The valve  !

actuator linkage was adjusted and the leakage stopped. A similar r valve problem was discovered in August 1987 on valve 2CA-150 and t reported in LER 414/87-23, 2CA-150 was determined to have been coupled improperly between the actuator and valve stem resulting in a 300 gpm teak with the valve fully closed. A defective procedur l l

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MP/0/A/7600/28A, Borg-Warner Pressure Seal Air Operated Gate Valve Corrective Maintenance, contributed to the 2CA-150 incident and we corrected. Corrective action also included visual inspection os valve stem and thread engagement for similar valves. This correctivs action appears to have been inadequate to prevent or detect problems with 2CA-15 The licensee has discovered that an additional procedure, IP/0/A/3820/22, Maintenance Instructions for Miller Air and Hydraulic Cylinders may have also been used to set up the actuators and was not revised after the 1987 incident. The inspectors were concerned that the potential exists for other Borg-Warner air actuators to be set up incorrectly. The following action was requested of the licensee:

- review work request history to determine the potential for improper setup of Borg- Warner air actuator review ability of previously run tests to detect possible problems in this area

- clarify responsibility for maintenance of the actuator to Valve stem coupling on the Borg-Warner actuator This is identified as Unresolved Item 414/88-33-02: Improper Coupling Set Up of Borg-Warner Air Actuated Valves, pending resolution by licensee and NRC review of corrective action One violation was identified as described in paragraphs Sc and 5 . Review of Licensee Non Routine Event Reports (92700) The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC requirements. The determination included: adequacy of description, verification of compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety signifi-cance of each even Additional inplant reviews and discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for those reports indicated by an (*). The following LERs are closed:

413/88-17 Actuation of Reactor Trip Breaker Due to Personnel Erro /88-18 Alignment of Nuclear Service Water System to Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond due to Personnel Erro *414/87-29 Reactor Trip due to Spurious Steam Generator level Signa .

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• 414/87-31 Diesel Generators Rendered Inoperable Due to Missed Retest *414/88-20 Reactor Trip due to Loss of Feedwater Control to Steam Generato *414/88-23 Reactor Trip due to Imminent low Low Steam Generator Level due to a Failed Switc *414/88-25 Reactor Trip on Steam Generator low Low Level due to Operator Erro No violations or deviations were identifie . Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings (92701 and 92702) (Closed) Unresolved Item 413/86-36-03, 414/86-39-03: Review for Compliance with TS 4.7.1.2.2. , Auxiliary Feedwater System. The intent of the TS surveillance was verified by review of the licensee's response to TMI Concerns, Item II.E.1.1 where the licensee stated the normal flow path would be verifie The inspectors reviewed change 4 to PT/1(2)/A/4250/068, CA System Flow Verification, which is used to perform the Furveillanc The procedure also accomplishes Inservice Testing Requirements for full stroking Auxiliary Feedwater System check valve The combined acceptance criteria requires each check valve to pass accident flow rate, which is dependent upon steam generator pressure. Therefore the intent of the TS surveillance requirement of verifying a flow path is met by verifying a flow rate. Based upon this, the item is close (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 413/86-47-03,: Review of Licensee Long Term Corrective Action Regarding Valve Position and Lockin Two violations have been issued due to inadequate locking of valve (414/86-18-01 and 413, 414/87-30-03). Responses to the violations are contained in correspondence dated July 11, 1986, March 31, 1987 and November 13, 1987 and May 4, 1988. Concerns associated with this open item are being adequately addressed by ongoing corrective action associated with the violations and will be followed up as suc This item is, therefore, closed, (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 413,414/87-30-07: Upgrade of CMD Personnel Maintenance Training. Construction Maintenance personnel have been incorporated into the Employee Training and Qualification System used by Nuclear Production and most individuals scheduled for training have completed their training and qualification. The program appears to be excellent and it is appropriate for all main-tenance personnel to be in the sane progran and, therefore, this item is close (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 413,414/87-30-09: Review of Repetitive Failures of Borg-Warner Air Actuators. The licensee has reviewed failure documentation for the subject actuators and has not

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found a significant failure patter The specific failure (valve CA-88) appears to have involved an undersized air regulator, in addition a task force has been established to monitor and control i work activities on all air operated valves in order to ensure .

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Licensee actions appear acceptabl (Closed) Violation 413,414/88-18-01: Inadequate Measures to Assure l Stopwatches used in TS Surveillances are Controlled and Calibrate The licensee responded to the violation in correspondence dated  ;

July 15, 1988. The inspectors verified corrective actions stated in the response and determined them acceptable. Therefore, this item is close No violations or deviations were identifie , Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 29, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed belo No dissenting comments were received from the license The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio Item Number Description and Reference 413,414/88-33-01 Violation - Failure to follow Procedures for Post Maintenance Testing (Para. Sc j and 5d)

413/88-33-02 Licensee Identified Violation - High l Radiation Area Discovered Unlocked (Para.3d) ,

414/88 33-02 Unresolved Item - Improper Coupling Set l up c; Borg-Warner Air Actuated Valves '

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