IR 05000413/1998002
| ML20203C469 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 02/17/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203C461 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-98-02, 50-413-98-2, 50-414-98-02, 50-414-98-2, NUDOCS 9802250196 | |
| Download: ML20203C469 (2) | |
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U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos:
NPF-35 and NPF-52 Report No 98-02 Licensee Duke Energy Corpor'ation Facility:
Catawba Nuclear Station Location:
422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Dates:
January 12-13, 1998 Inspector:
D. Thompson, Safeguards Inspector Accompanying George A.
Belisle, Chief Personnel Special Inspection Branch Division of Reactor Safety Barry Manili, Licensing Reviewer Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Approved by:
George A. Belisle, Chief Special Inspections Branch Division of Reactor Safety Documernevnemanetwowe estains senolove unciam the:I l O f #. C " "cu C E au -
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Catawba Nuclear Power Station
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NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-413/98-02 and 50-414/98-02 This routine announced inspection was conducted in the area of plant support by a regional safeguards specialist.
The specific area evaluated was the Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants.
The inspector concluded that the vehicle barrier system,
using a combination of gates, jersey barriers, bollards, buildings, and terrain, was an acceptable barrier capable of stopping a design basis vehicle traveling at the established speed prior to the vehicle penetrating the protected area
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perimeter and causing damage to vital equipment.
The inspector concluded that the engineering staff had perforr.ed a good analysis of the vehicle threat and had installed an appropriate vehicle barrier to counter the threat. (S2.5.1)
The inspector determined that the licensee had installed the vehicle barrier at a distance that would preclude an explosion from a bomb-laden vehicle from causing damage to vital targots required for the safe shutdown of the reactor.
(S2.5.2)
Based on thr* inspector's review of the vehicle barrier system procedures and in discussion with the licensee, the inspector concluded that the plans and procedures were acceptable for implementing the vehicle barrier system.
(S2.5.3)
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