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Insp Repts 50-413/88-22 & 50-414/88-22 on 880526-0625. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Surveillance & Maint Observations,Review of Licensee Nonroutine Event Repts & Previously Identified Items
	ML20151E568
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	07/08/1988
From:	Lesser M, Peebles T, Van Doorn P; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20151E538	List: ML20151E536; ML20151E553; ML20151E568;
References
	50-413-88-22, 50-414-88-22, NUDOCS 8807260121
	Download: ML20151E568 (10)
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UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION 11

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101 MAPIETTA STRE ET, N.W.

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ATL ANTA. GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.

50-413/83-22 and 50-414/83 22

Licensee: Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, N.C.

28242

Docket Nos..

50-413 and 50-414

License Not.: NPF-35 and NPF-52

Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted May 26,1938 - June 25,1985

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Inspectors /

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P. K. VYn~0oorn~

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Approved by:

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T. A( Peebles, 'Section Chief

Date Signed

Projects Branch 3

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine, resident inspec' ion was conducted on site inspecting in

the areas of review of plant operations; surveillance observation;

maintenance observation; review of licensee nonroutine event reports;

and followup of previously identified items.

Results:

Licensee programs covered by this inspection were observed to be

adequate.

Within the areas inspected the following violation was

identified:

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Failure to follow requirements for overtime, paragraph 3d.

One

unresolved

item was

identified

involving potential

inadequate venting of ECCS systems, paragraph 4c.

8807260121 880708

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REPORT DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent

W. F. Beaver, Performance Engineer

W. H. Bradley, QA Surveillance

R. N. Casler, Unit 1 Coordinator

R. H. Charest, Station Chemistry Supervisor

T. E. Crawford, Integrated Scheduling Superintendent

W. P. Deal, Health Physics Supervisor

R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer

T. P. Harrall, Design Engineering

F. N. Mack, Project Services Engineer

W. W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor

W. R. McCollum, Station Services Superintendent

C. E. Muse, Unit 2 Coordinator

T. B. Owen, Station Manager

G. T. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent

J.

M. Stackley, I. & E. Engineer

D. Tower, Shift Operating Engineer

R. F. Wardell, Technical Services Superintendent

R. White, CSRG

J. W. Willis, Senior QA Engineer, Operations

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,

mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

Attended exit interview.

2.

Unresolved Items

One new unresolved item is identified in paragraph 4.c.

An Unresolved

Item is a matter about which more information is required to determine

whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation.

3.

Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2) (71707 and 71710)

a.

The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting

period to verify conformance with regulatory reouirements, Tt .

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Specifications (TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs,

danger tag logs. Technical Specification Action Item Log, and the

remo,al and restoration log were routinely reviewed. Shift turnovers

were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with

approved procedures.

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The . inspectors verified by observation and interviews, that the.

measures taken to l assure' physical protection of the facility met

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current requirements. Areas inspected included the security organi-

-zation; the establishment and . maintenance of gates, doors, and

is.olation zones in the proper conditions; and that access control and

badging were proper and procedures followed.

In addition to the areas discussed above, the areas toured were

observed for fire prevention and protection. activities.

These

inc%ded such things as combustible material control, fire- protection

systems and materials, and fire protection associated with mainte-

nance activities.

The inspectors reviewed Prom em Investigation

' Reports to determine if the licensee was appropriately documenting

problems and-implementing appropriate corrective actions.

b.

Unit 1 Summary

Unit-l operated at or near 100?4 power for the entire period.

Problems with C Feedwater Regulating Valve forced a small reduction

in power to.97*;, however, later the unit was able to achieve 100%.

The unit achieved 100 days of continuous operation on June 22. This

is the first time a Catawba unit has reached this milestone. -The

licensee is closely monitoring two small steam generator tube leaks

from S/G 1A and 10 on the order of 1-5 gallons per day.

Technical

Specifications allow up to 500 gallons per day leakage,

c.

Unit 2 Summary

Unit 2 experienced 5 reactor trips this reporting period.

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May 27; Automatic trip from 100?; power on steam generator low

low level when a circuit breaker supplying ' power to one main

feed pump speed control was erronec. sly opened.

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May 28; Manual trip f rom 15?; power when a fe'dwater transient

occurreri, compounded by a faulty feedwater regulating valve.

Confusing indicatiens led the operator to an incorrect con-

clusion to reduce feed flow when feed flow should have been

increased.

June 4; Manual trip from 82*; power when steam supply was

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inadvertently isolated from one main feed pump and steam

generator levels dropped.

June 6; Automa,,c trip from 60*J power when a control red cropped

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due to a blown fuse on the stationary gripper coil.

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June 20; Manual trip from 80'e power when one main feed pump

tripped on low bearing oil pressure af ter its lube oil pump

tripped due to a faulty control switch.

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It is noted the four feedwater induced trips may be partially related

to recognized problems with Unit 2 D-5 steam generators.

The

operating water level band is relatively narrow and feedwater

transients are unforgiving (See IFI 414/87-30-04). Westinghouse has

proposed a modification to move the lower instrument tap below the

transition cone to dampen out indicated level swings. The licensee

hopes to implement the modification during its next refueling outage.

The modification will require a TS amenc: ment.

d.

During a routine review of overtime use by Performance Engineering

personnel

t' ' inspector noted numerous instances of overtime in

excess of Technical Specif::ation (TS) guidelines. Records of prior

approval as required by the TS could not be located and the licensee

indicated that prior approval had not been granted.

TS 6.2.2. f

(implemented by Catawba Nuclear Station Directive 3.0.8) requires in

part that:

"Administrative procedures shall be developed and implemented to

limit the working hours of unit staff whc perform safety-related

functions (e.g, licensed Senior Operators, licensed Operators,

health physicists, auxiliary operators, and key maintenance

personnel).

Adequate shift coverage shall be maintained without routine heavy use

of overtime. The objective shall be to have operating personnel work

a nominal 40-hour week while the unit is operating.

However, in

the event that unforeseen problems require substantial amounts of

overtime to be used, or during extended perinds of shutdown for

refJeling, major maintenance, or major plant modification, on a

temporary t, asis the following guidelines shall be followed:

(1) An ir.Jividual should not be permitted to work more than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months

straignt, excluding shift turnover time.

(2) An individual should not be permitted to work mcre than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months

in any 24-hour period, nor more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months in any 48-hour

period, nor more than 72 haurs in any 7-day period, all

excluding shift turnover time.

(3) A break of at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months should be allowed between work

periods, including shif t turnover time.

(4) Except during extended shutdown periods, the use of overtime

should be considered on an individual basis and not for the

ent .e staff on a shift.

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Any deviation from the above guidelines shall be authorized by the

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Station Manager or his designee, or higher levels of management, in

accordance with established procedures and with documentation of the

basis for granting the deviation."

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The following discrepancies were noted:

Individual

Dates

Hours Worked

A.

Jan. 15-21

76

Feb. 9 -15

79

Feb. 19-20

27

Feb. 18-24

80

B.

Jan. 4 - 5

26.5

Jan 11-16

74, plus 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months per

48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months requirement

exceeded Jan. 13-16.

Feb. 1-7

98.5, plus 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months per

48 nour requirement

exceeded Feb. 1-5.

Feb. 8-14

85, plus 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months pe. 48

hour requirement

exceeded Feb. 8-9,

12-14.

Feb. 13-19

87, plus 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months per 48

hour requirement

exceeded Feb. 14-15,

16-18.

C.

Jan. 13-14

30.5

Feb. 17-23

77

Feb. 20

18

Feb. 21

17

D.

Jan. 15-16

26

E.

Feb. 2-8

78.5

Feb. 5

18

F.

Jan 18-19

26

Jan. 25-26

25

G.

Jan. 7-8

36

Jan. 7

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This is violation 413, 414/88-22-01:

Failur e to follow Technical

Specification requirements for Control of Overtime.

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On June 9LNuclear Service Water (RN) Lube Injection strainers became

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clogged with algae af ter suction was shifted from Lake Wylie to the

Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP).

As thera is only one

strainer. per train, cleaning the strainers would render . its

respective train; inoperable as the pumps must be isolated.

Lube

injection cools the motoi and lubricates the pump bearings.

The

ability of the SNSWP to supply cooling. water for 30 days was of

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concern.

The licensee was able to show through actual data that

although flow to the pump was low with the strainer clogged, enough

flow existed to. keep the pump from being damaged. Routine testing of

~the 1A Containment Spray Heat Exchanger showed no degradation

affirming the licensee's conclusion that the algae was not clogging

other parts of the RN_ system but being passed through. The algae was

apparently the result of decaying grass associated with a herbicide

that was sprayed around the SNSWP.

The licensee has indicated it

will pursue a program to prevent algae buildup in the SNSWP and will

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document resolution on PIR 0-C88-0212.

This is identified as

Inspection Followup Item 413,414/88-22-02:

Algae Buildup in the

SNSWP, pending implementation of measures to curb growth and a

possible modification to lube injection filters.

f.

PIR 1-C88 - 0207 identified 4 of 61 Namco Limit Switches inspected

by the licensee to have . loose or missing cover plate screws.

Based

upon this discovery the licensee expanded its inspection to include

all outside containment and accessible inside containment limit

switries.

This included an ac'ditional 215 switches of which the

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follo,e.ng problems were discovered and corrected:

12 loose cover

screws, 3 missing _ cover screws, 2 folded cover gaskets and 1

partially missing gasket. The licensee is evaluating the historical

operabili'y of ' the switet.a.

Switches inside containment are being

inspected on a priority basis during shutdown.

These items will be

discussed in an enforcement conference in RII on July 1.(See' report

413,414/88-07).

One violation was identified as described in paragraph 3d.

4.

Surveillance Observation (Units 1 and 2) (61726)

a.

During the inspection period, toe inspector verified plant operations

were in compliance with various TS requirements.

Typical of these

requirements were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor

coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, emergency power systems,

safety injection, emergency safeguards systems, control room ventila-

tion, and direct current electrical power sources. The inspector

verified that surveillance testing was performed in accordance with

the approved written procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated,

limiting conditions for operation were met, appropriate removal and

restoration of the affected equipment was accomplished, test results

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met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the

individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies idenc.fied

during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropciate

management personnel,

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The. inspectors witnessed or reviewed.the following surveillances:

- PT/1/A/4200/10A-

1A ND Pump Performance Test

PT/1/A/4200/26

NS Valves-Inservice Test

IP/0/A/3240/04C

Power Range Nuclear _ Instrument.

18 month calibration

-PT/1(2)/A/4200/06B

ECCS Vaive Lineup and Verification

PT/2/A/4150/010

Reactor Coolant Ltakage calculation

c.

The inspectors-reviewed PT/1(2)/A/4200/068, which is used-for venting

ECCS systems per TS surveillance ' 4.5.2.6.1 and determined that

venting procedures may be inadequate.

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The Residual Heat Removal (ND) Heat Exchanger water boxes and

bypass lines are not vented although these are system high

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points.

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ND pump discharge to Safety Injection (NI) and Centrifugal

Charging (NV) pump lines are not vented.

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Cold leg injection piping from Centrifugal Charging pumps is not

vented.

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Venting in some piping may be required because although points

are not system high po.nts, loop seals exist that would allow

non condensible gases to collect.

This is identified as Unresolved Item 413 414/88-22-03:

Potential

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Inadequate venting of ECC.S systems, pendle; farther licensee review

of procedures and the ba:.is for. venting.

No violations or deviations were identif'ed.

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Maintenance Observations (Units 1 and 2) (: ?s3)

a.

Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components

were, observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in

accordance with the requirements.

The inspector verified licensee

conformance to the r0quirements in the following areas of inspection:

the activities were accomplished using approved procedures, and

functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to

returning components or systems to service; quality control records

were maintained; activities performed were accomplished by qualified

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personnel;.and materials used were properly certified. Work requests

were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure

that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance

which may effect system performance.

On June 15 the iicensee discovered excessive frost accumulation in

the. ice basket flow passages in the Unit 1 ice. condenser. A 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months

action statement per TS 3.6.5.1 was entered and the licensee took

measures to correct the problem.

The licensee requested Discre-

tionary Enforcement- from NRC:RII on June 17 to extend the 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months an

additional 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months due to unforeseen problems in clearing the frost.

The licensee provided information from a Westinghouse analysis of the

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Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ice condenser as a technical basis for the

. extension. The analysis allows.up to 15% flow blockage for the ice

condenser to be able-to function as designed. Discretionary enforce-

ment was granted verbally. A followup letter dated June 20, 1988 was

sent from Hal B. Tucker to NRC.

The frosting of the flow passages

was unexpected as TS surveillances require inspection every 9 months.

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Unit I had been in operation from its second refueling outage for

only 6 months. The cause of the frosting is not clearly understood

by the licensee however is believed to be a ventilation flow path

problem. The Unit 2 ice condenser was inspected and did not exhibit

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the problem.

This is identified as Inspector Followup Item 413/88-

22-05:

Excess Frosting .of Ice Condenser Flow Passages, pending

resolution by the licensee as documented on PIR 1-C88-0215.

c.

As a result of questions at McGuire Nuclear Station concerning

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operability of active air control valves manl -tured by Fisher

Controls.

Duke Design Engineering requested Fisher Controls to

supply them with sizing calculation documentation for affected valves

in a June 9,1988 letter from T. F. Wyke to George Chang.

Fisher

Controls apparently did not include packing loads in their calcula-

tions for actuator spring sizes prior to 1977. Therefore valves with

pre 1977 documentation may not be able to operate against maximum

differential pressure. Most Catawba valves appear to be post'1977

valves and conservatively designed. Duke Design Engineering intends

to obtain the information and verify operability of the valves in

question. This is identified as Inspector Followup Item 413,414/

'88-22-04:

Fisher Control Air Actuator Sizing.

Verification, pending completion of the review and action taken for

inoperable valves.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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6.

Review of Licensee Non-Routine Event Reports (Units 1 and 2) (92700)

a.

The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to

determine if the information provided met NRC requirements.

The

determination included: adequacy of description, verification of

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compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements,

corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems,

reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety signifi-

cance of each event. Additior,al inplant reviews and discussion with

plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for those reports

indicated by an (*).

The following LERs are closed:

414/88-16

Both trains of Auxiliary Building Ventilation System

being rendered inoperable due to personnel error.

414/88-17

Feedwater Isolation due to inadequate interpretation

of plant response.

414/88-18

Feedwater Isolation while cycling steam generator

power operated relief valve.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7.

Action On Previous Inspection Findings (Units 1 and 2) (92701 and 92702)

a.

(CLOSED) Violation 414/86-18-01:

Failure to Follow Procedures for

Locking of Valves.

The licensee responded to this item in letters

dated July 11, 1986 and March 31, 1987. An additional violation

was issued in this area (see Report 413,414/87-30).

Followup of

corrective actions will be conducted against the later violation,

therefore, this item is closed.

b.

(OPEN)

Inspector Followup Item 413,414/88-15-04:

Evaluation of

Corrective Action for Diesel Generator Failures.

A management

meeting was held in RII offices on June 9 with the licensee relative

to the recent diesel generator failures.

The licensee discussed

their May 25, 1988 special report concerning excessive failures,

current engine reliability and initiative to improve reliability.

Problems resulting in failures of the pneumatic control system appear

to have been corrected with improvement in the control air quality

and with identification of the design flaw in the P3 pressure switch.

This item remains open pending evaluation of the Owners Group

Clearing House charter to disseminate relevant information

8.

Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 24, 1988, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1.

The inspector described the areas

inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below.

No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did

not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed

by the inspectors during this inspection.

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Item Number

Description and Reference

413,414/88-22-01

Violation - Failure to follow 15

requirements for Overtime, paragraph 4d.

413,414/88-22-02

Inspector Followup Item - Algae Buildup in

SNSWP, paragraph 4e.

413,414/88-22-03

Unresolved Iten - Potential inadequat-

Venting of ECCS Systems, paragraph Sc.

413,414/88/22-04

Inspector Followup Item - Fisher Control

Air Actuator Sizing Verification, paragraph,

Sc.

413/88/22-05

Inspector Followup Item - Excess Frosting

of Ice Condenser Flow Passages, paragraph

5b.

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ML20151E568

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