ML20246L672
| ML20246L672 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 03/03/1989 |
| From: | Potter J, Wright F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20246L645 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-89-02, 50-413-89-2, 50-414-89-02, 50-414-89-2, NUDOCS 8903240244 | |
| Download: ML20246L672 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000413/1989002
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -
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REGION il
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
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11AR 0 31989
Report Nos.: 50-413/89-02 and 50-414/89-02
Licensee: Duke Power Company
.422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
Dccket Nos.:
50-413 and 50-414
License Nos.:
-Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2
. Inspection Conducte : J nuar 30 - February 3, 1989
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Inspector:
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A F. N(Wright
pifeSigned
Approved by:
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J. M Potter, Chief
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D'at'e Signed
Facilities Radiation Protection Section
Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection
Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope
This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of pre-outage
planning, preparations, and management support for implementing the licensee's
radiation protection program.
The review included:
licensee organization and
management controls; maintaining occupational exposures as low as reasonably
achievable (ALARA); training and qualifications; outage preparations and
provisions; and licensee action on previously identified inspection findings.
Results
Two violations of NRC requirements were identified:
1.
Failure to take adequate timely corrective action on NRC identified
violations.
2.
Failure to provide licensee workers adequate training on the
. significance of yellow flashing lights, and failure to post the
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associated high radiation area.
This was similar to a violation
concerning training cited in a Notice of Violation issued
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September 16, 1988.
The input from section supervisors on methods to further reduce
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occupational radiation exposure was found to be minimal, although the
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person-rem totals per unit were low for a facility having two partial
refueling outages during the year.
The outage radiological controls were generally effective even
though there had been a reduction in radiation protection technician
support when compared to previous outages.
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REPORT DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
- V. _Barbour, . Quality Assurance, Director of Operations
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W. Bradley, Manager, Quality-Assurance Verification
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- W. Deal, Station Health Physicist
A. Duckworth, Director, Technical Services Training
- R. Glover, Compliance Engineer
'*V. King, Compliance Engineer
- P. LeRoy, Regulatory Compliance
T. Owens~ Station Manager
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R. Rivard, ALARA Planning Supervisor
Other' licensee employees contacted during this inspection included
technicians and office personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory-Commission
- M. Lesser, Resident Inspector
- W. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
2.
Organization'n and Management Controls
Through interviews with the licensee's staff, the inspector reviewed-the
licensee's health physics (HP) outage organization plans, staffing levels,
lines of_ authority and degree of interaction with other plant work groups,
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Health Physics Organization
The licensee had a HP staff which was' highly specialized, in that,
the staff was divided into small units having specific areas of
responsibility.
During refuelina outages the licensee's four
surveillance and control (SC) orups were deployed to provide
continuous HP outage support in the auxiliary and containment
buildings.
The licensee used contract HP supervisors for steam generator and
auxiliary building work.
The licensee contracted with approximately
ten supervisors and one hundred ANSI qualified HP technicians to
provide for outage surveillance and control activities.
In areas
where. the licensee did' not have utility employee supervisors, the
' licensee tries to place experienced ANSI qualified licensee HP
technicians to control work.
The licensee also used contract
technicians and clerical help in the HP support units.
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Through interviews with licensee representatives, the inspector
determined that the ' licensee had used approximately 180 contract HP
support personnel during previous outages. During the Unit 1 Cycle 3
outage, the licensee had reduced the number of contract support
personnel by 10 percent and was planning to have 15 fewer contract
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support personnel during the Unit 2 Cycle 2 refueling outage. These
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reductions were being made in the licensee's radiation protection
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staffing levels in an effort to reduce utility expenses.
Licensee
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representatives, in the HP section, reported that the reductions in
outage staffing levels had not adversely affected the licensee's
ability to implement the radiation protection program.
Except as
noted in Paragraph 2.c. and 4 of this report, the inspector found that
appropriate radiological controls were being implemented with this
reduced staffing-level.
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Licensee Audits
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Technical Specification (TS) 6.11 requires that procedures for
personnel radiation protection be prepared consistent with the
requirement of 10 CFR 20 and be approved, maintained, and adhered to
for all operations involving personnel radiation exposure.
Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS) Directive
3.8.3,
Contamination
Prevention,
Control
and
Decontamination
Responsibilities,
Revision 24, dated November 29, 1988, requires in Section 4.6.2.2
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that personnel perform a survey for contamination when leaving a
radiation control area (RCA).
If frisking just the hands and feet, a
minimum frisk of 40 seconds is required.
CNS Directive 3.8.6 (TS), Radiation Exposure Control, Revision 17,
dated November 21, 1988, requires in Section 2.7 that all individuals
complete a Daily Exposure Time Record Card (DETRC) for each entry
into the RCA/ radiation control zone (RCZ) and each change of
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radiation work permit (RWP).
The inspector reviewed licensee Quality Assurance (QA) Surveillance
Audit CN-88-34 which was conducted December 5-9,
1988.
The
surveillance reported the following radiological control findings on
January 27, 1989.
(1) Employees were exiting an RCA from areas that cre not normal
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exit points
(i.e.,
back door of Auxiliary Building,
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elevation 594' and Unit 1 Control Room location).
(2) Hand held items were not being frisked.
(3) Dose cards were not being completed for each entry / exit of RCA
(mostly at Unit 2 entry / exit point)
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(4) A HP Technician (Vendor) was reaching into the RCZ and
performing work without being dressed in accordance with the
RWP.
As a result of the findings, the licensee terminated the vendor HP
technician that had violated the RWP requirements.
The Station
Health Physicist also issued a letter to station management
concerning the audit.
The letter, Intrastation Letter to Group
Superintendents and Section H ea.ds , issued December 29, 1988,
addressed radiation protection practices relative to the QA
-Surveillance Audit CN-88-34.
The letter, in part, discussed the
following conditions:
Employees were observed exiting the RCA at points other than the
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Single Point Access (SPA).
The exit points observed did not
meet procedural requirements for emergency conditions or
escorting of material.
One observed exit at the Material
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Control Point did not include the required hand and foot frisk.
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Several exits were discovered to be into and out of the Control
Room using the Unit 1 side access, as well as the access door to
the ventilation equipment room.
Both doors were clearly marked
as not being an exit and, in addition, did not have any frisking
equipment.
A similar situation was discovered by HP when personnel were
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detected exiting at the 560' elevation below the SPA. This exit
also had no frisking equipment available. This door was clearly
marked as not being an RCA exit. These persons were challenged
and given preper instruction.
Frisks of hand held items were observed to be inadequate (not
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frisked at all or frisked too fast). Many of these observations
were made at the Unit 2 Control Room entrance / exit.
Dose cards were not completed for each entry / exit from the RCA.
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Most of these observations also occurred at the Unit 2 Control
Room extrance/ exit.
For these observations, the individual was
identified by the auditor, and dose card records were audited
the next day and no dose record was available.
A contract HP technician was observed reaching into an RCZ and
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performing work without meeting dress requirements.
HP action
was to terminate the individual immediately.
In addition, the licensee issued a CNS Radiological Protection
Practices Training Package as an attachment to the letter.
The
training package was prepared for section supervisors for use in crew
tailgate meetings.
The report findings of hand held items nei being
frisked and dose cards not being completed for each exit of 1he RCA
in accordance with the above requirements were recurring examples of
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the earlier violation issued in Inspection Report (IR) No. 50-413,
414/87-31'.
c.
Management Controls and Corrective Action
10 CFR 50; Appendix B, Criterion XVI states that measures shall be
established to assure that conditions adverse to_ quality, such as
deviations and nonconformances, are promptly identified and
corrected.
In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality',
the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is
determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition.
TS 6.11 requires that procedures for personnel radiation protection
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be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 20 and be
approved, maintained and adhered to for all operations involving
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personnel radiation exposure.
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CNS Directive 3.8.3,
Contamination Prevention, Control
and
Decontamination Responsibilities, Revision 24, dated November 29,
1988, requires in Section 4.6.2.2 that personnel perform a survey for
contamination when leaving the RCA.
If frisking just the hands and
feet, a minimum frisk of 40 seconds is required.
CNS Directive 3.8.6 (TS), Radiation Exposure Control, Revision 17,
dated November 21, 1988, requires in Section 2.7 that all individuals
complete a DETRC for each entry into the RCA/RCZ and each change of
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the RWP.
IR No. 50-413, 414/87-31 documented the results of an inspection made
September 14-18, 1987.
A Severity Level IV violation (50-413,
414/87-31-02) was issued for failure to adhere to radiological
control procedures in that:
(1) From September 14 to September 17, 1987, ten of twelve
individuals observed frisking at the RCA access / exit point
located at the top of the spiral stairway on the 609' elevation,
frisked for only 20-25 seconds and;
(2) Two individuals who worked inside an RCA/RCZ on the removal,
repair, or replacement of a detector in the Unit 1 Reactor
Building on August 24, 1987, did not complete a daily dose card
as required.
On November 17, 1987, the licensee responded to the violation issued
in IR No. 50-413, 414/87-31 for violation 87-31-02. The NRC reviewed
the licensee's proposed corrective action and determined that the
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proposed corrective action was not sufficient to prevent recurrence,
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and a supplemental response was received dated December 11, 1987, and
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with clarification, it was accepted in an NRC letter dated
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January 15, 1988.
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On' December 10, 1987, the NRC issued IR No. 50-413, 414/87-40.
In
Paragraph 7 of the. report, the inspector reported numerous examples
of personnel failing to perform personnel monitoring in accordance
with licensee procedures.
The Notice of Violation described a
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failure to properly store contaminated tools and post a copy of a
previous' Notice of Violation.
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On April 7,1988, the NRC issued IR No. 50-413,414/88-12 for an
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inspection made on February 22-26, 1988.
In Paragraph 4.f of the
report, the inspector reported on discussions held with licensee
Single Point Access (SPA)g the uses and limitations of the personnel
representatives.concernin
Licensee representatives indicated that
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they were still evaluating the adequacy of the SPA in minimizing the
. potential of low level contamination leaving the RCA. The inspector
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noted that the HP technician nearest to the area was located one
level above and could only be reached by telephone.
The
tools / equipment frisking station was also located one elevation above
the exit.
Some individuals were confused about whether items frisked
at the tools / equipment frisking station must be frisked again at the -
SPA. . Licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments
and agreed:to evaluate equipment release practices.
The inspector noted that the signs regarding personnel monitoring in
the men's change room, next to friskers indicated that the frisker:
were there for " convenience". Licensee representatives had indicated
that personnel contamination surveys were " required" in the change
rooms when personnel had been working in contaminated areas.
Licensee representatives indicated that they would reevaluate the
adequacy of the signs.
On September 16, 1988, the NRC issued IR No. 50-413, 414/88-27,
documenting a violation involving the failure of operations personnel
to follow radiological control procedures on two occasions during
responses to stop leaks in radioactive systems. The report also
documented the licensee's failure to take full corrective action for
violation 50-413, 414/87-31-02.
The licensee's response to these violations indicated that an
immediate program of HP SPA routine observations would be implemented
to improve compliance with the frisking and dose card requirements
and they would be in full compliance on March 1,1988.
However, as
of July 19-22, 1988, the program of routine observations had not been
implemented. The inspector noted that this was the second time in as
many inspections that the licensee had failed to meet all aspects of
their commitments to the NRC by the date established by the licensee.
The cover letter for the September 16, 1988 NRC report discussed the
licensee's failure to take full corrective actions on the violation
50-413, 414/87-31-02, and for another violation 50-413, 414/87-40-03,
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The cover letter stated that the NRC views failure to take full
corrective action on these radiological safety as a serious matter.
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On October 28, 1988, the licensee issued their response to the
Severity Level IV violation issued in IR No. 50-413, 414/88-27 which
included, management audit of several new records at Catawba such as:
HP Problem Reports
Dose Card Error Reports
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Single Point Access Logbook
Radiological Incident Investigations
The licensee also discussed continuing management involvement in
ALARA training and pre-outage meetings and that hand and foot
monitors had been purchased and placed in service throughout the
plant.
The licensee reported that whole body friskers had been
purchased and would be delivered in late 1988.
The licensee addressed the corrective action associated with the hot
tool room prncedure violation discussed in IR No. 50-413,414/87-40.
-The licensee listed these corrective actions for the root .cause of.
the problems:
Organizational changes were made which allowed the technical and
work execution aspects of the maintenance group to be separated.
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A new position was created that would separate the technical and
executional aspects of a job.
The licensee stated that "with
better job planning packages available, the execution crews can
now devote full attention to procedures, training, and improving
performance."
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The inspector attempted to verify completion of corrective action for
violation 50-413, 414/87-31-02.
However, during the inspection, as
detailed in Paragraph 2.b, the inspector noted a QA Surveillance made
in December 1988, which documented additional examples of failure to
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perform contamination frisks in accordance with licensee procedures
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and failure to complete daily dose cards in accordance with licensee
procedures.
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These findings by the licensee are additional examples of failure to
follow procedures and indicate a failure to take adequate and timely
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corrective action sufficient to preclude recurrence of a similar
violation cited on September 16, 1988.
Failure to take adequate and
timely corrective action is therefore, a violation of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B, Criterion XVI (50-413/89-02-01).
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One violation was identified.
3.
Outage Planning and ALARA Activities
10 CFR 20.1.c states that persons engaged in activities under licenses
issued by the NRC should make every reasonable effort to maintain
radiation exposures ALARA.
The recommended elements of an ALARA program
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radiation exposures ALARA.
The recommended elements of an ALARA program
are contained in Regulatory Guide 8.8, Information Relevant to Ensuring
That Occupational Radiation Exposure at Nuclear Power Stations will be
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ALARA, and Regulatory Guide 8.10, Operating Philosophy for Maintaining
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Occupation Radiation Exposures ALARA.
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for maintaining
occupational exposures ALARA, including the station's ALARA goals and
objectives, the effectiveness in setting and meeting ALARA goals,
participation by different station groups in the ALARA program, and
the functions of the onsite ALARA group.
The licensee's ALARA goal for 1988 was 552 person-rem.
The goal was
based on the licensee's task schedule for the year and the licensee's
person-rem exposure history for .the planned work.
The integration
scheduling staff provided the ALARA group with a list of planned
tasks.
The ALARA group reviewed the job history files and
established an ALARA package for jobs which are expected to exceed
one person-rem exposure.
The ALARA packages included detailed job
dose reduction recommendations, copies of RWPs, surveys, and other
information obtained in previous work experience for the job.
The
inspector reviewed selected ALARA planning packages and determined
that dose exposure reductions were being made through in depth
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planning and application of basic ALARA techniques.
Through interviews with licensee representatives, the inspector
determined that the ALARA group had solicited comments and dose
reduction recommendations from section supervisors on the 1988
exposure estimates and that only one supervisor had commented on his
section's estimated exposure for the year. The remaining supervisors
reported that the person-rem estimate determined by the ALARA group
appeared appropriate.
In general, the ALARA group set the annual
goal based on their estimates and there was very little input from
the plant staff supervisors to further reduce exposures.
The licensee exceeded its 1988 person-rem goal by approximately four
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person-rem. The licensee's 1988 ALARA goal of 552 person-rem was the
1988 person-rem estimate. While the licensee demonstrated an ability
to accurately project work and implement ALARA techniques to maintain
personnel exposures ALARA, the input from section supervisors on
methods to further reduce exposures was minimal. However, the 278
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person-rem totals per unit were low for a facility having portions of
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two refueling outages during the year.
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The inspector attended an outage planning meeting which included key
licensee staff personnel, representatives from Turkey Point, and
corporate staff personnel.
The meeting agenda included an open
discussion on lessons learned during the Unit 1 refueling outage and
plans for the upcoming refueling outage.
Discussion topics included
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improving worker efficiency, use of mockup . training equipment,
preparation of equipment, improved communications, shielding,
limitations on overtime, training, and exposure-reduction activities.
The inspector observed a free exchange of information in a spirit of'
cooperation to improve work objectives.
The inspector reviewed the following licensee procedures.
ALARA Manual, Revision 3
Maintenance Management Procedure 1.9, CNS ALARA Planning, dited
July 21, 1988
CNS Directive 3.8.1 (TS) ALARA Program, dated August 21, 1988
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Provisions
Through interviews with licensee representatives the . inspector
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determined that the licensee had established resources to support the
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outage.
such as protective clothing, respirators, radiation warning
signs, etc. and had the ability to borrow supplies or equipment from
the utility's other nuclear facilities.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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c.
Training and Qualifications of Vendor Health Physics Technicians
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TS 6.3 requires that each member of the facility staff meet or exceed
the minimum qualifications of ANSI N18.1-1977 for comparable
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positions, except for the Radiation Protection Manager, who shall
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meet or exceed the qualifications in Regulatory Guide 1.8,
September 1975.
TS 6.4.1 states that a retraining and replacement training program
for the facility staff shall be in accordance with ANSI N18.1-1971.
Paragraph 5.5 of ANSI N18.1 states that a training program shall be
established which maintains the proficiency of the operating
organization through periodic training exercises, instruction
periods, and reviews.
The inspector reviewed plant procedure HP/0/B/1000/19, Vendor Health
Physics Technician Training / Qualification, Revision 0.
The inspector
determined that the procedure provides specific guidance for
evaluating the previous work experience of vendor HP technicians in
order to comply with the ANSI N18.1-1971 requirements. The procedure
also specifies the training requirements necessary to meet the
requirements of TS 6.4.1.
No' violations or deviations were identified.
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4.
High Radiation Area Control Event-
10 CFR 19.12 requires a licensee to provide certain specified information
and instructions to individuals who work in or frequent any portion of a
restricted area.
10 CFR 20.203(c)(1) requires a licensee to post each high radiation area
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with a conspicuous sign or signs bearing the radiation caution symbol and '
the words: CAUTION HIGH . RADI ATION AREA.
A "high radiation area" is
defined in 10 CFR 20.202(b)(3), as any area, accessible to personnel, in
which there exists radiation, originating in whole or in part within
licensed material, at such levels that a major portion of the body could
receive in any one hour a dose in excess of 100 millirems.
TS 6.12 requires that, for individual high radiation areas accessible to
personnel:with radiation levels of greater than 100 mR/hr that are located
within large areas, such as pressurized water reactor (PWR) containment,
where no enclosure exists for purposes of locking, and where no enclosure
can be reasonably constructed around the individual areas, that individual
area. shall be barricaded, conspicuously posted, and a flashing light shall
be activated as a warning device.
NRC Information Notice (IN) No. 88-79: Misuse of Flashing Lights for High
Radiation Area Controls, was issued on October 7,1988.
The Notice was
issued to all holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors.
The purpose of the Notice was to alert addressees to problems involving
misuse of flashing lights .for high radiation controls.
The Notice
discussed five events involving improper access control of high radiation
areas.
As discussed in the Notice, inappropriate use of such access
controls could lead to potentially significant, inadvertent, radiation
exposures.
Additionally, the Notice stated that it was apparent that
plant workers and supervisors did not fully understand the TS requirements
for high radiation access control.
During the inspection the inspector determined that on December 16, 1988,
two employees apparently entered a high radiation area unknowingly.
One
of the two employees was assigned to the Catawba mechanical maintenance
staff and the other was a construction maintenance department (CMD)
employee based at the Oconee facility on site to support the Unit 1
outage.
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The inspector reviewed the HP Investigation Data sheet which described the
event and the written statement of the event prepared by the Catawba
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worker.
According to the worker, the employees entered lower containment
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after reviewing RWP No.88-919 and after discussing their work with a HP
representative.
The two employees were going to perform preventive
maintenance (PM) on several limitorque operators.
According to the worker's statement, he asked the HP technician if a
respirator would be required for entry and was told that respirators would
not be required for the planned work.
The workers checked in with the HP
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rover for permission to enter lower containment and were told to proceed.
The- employees climbed down a ladder into lower containment to work on
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their first valve.
After completing- work on the first valve the workers
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crossed over an airduct and up some scaffolding to the second limitorque
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operator.
As the men began their paperwork, they were interrupted by HP
personnel monitoring the B and C steam generator platform and told that
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they were in a respirator required area and a high radiation area. The HP
technician told the men to exit the platform area which had a flashing
yellow light. The workers exited containment, were surveyed, and found to
be' free of external contamination. One worker received only 10 mrem whole
body exposure while the second worker received 30 mrem whole body exposure
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for the entry.
An air sample taken on the platform did not indicate any
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airborne radioactive material .on the steam generator platform.
The Catawba worker reported in his write-up of the event that they had not
crossed any identified rope or signs in getting to the platform from
above.
The worker also stated that he was unaware of the significance of
a flashing yellow light.
The HP Investigation Data sheet also documented
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that the licensee workers had entered the platform area from above and
that the workers did not know the significance of the flashing yellow
light.
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The.immediate steps taken to prevent recurrence of this type of event was
to post the access taken by the workers as a high radiation area.
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long-term steps taken to prevent recurrence was to proceduralize the
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posting of the area.
The inspector determined that the dose rate on the
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platform was 500 mrem per hour (mr/hr) beta and 500 mr/hr gamma at the
cold leg side of the generator. The dose rate was approximately 35 mr/hr
four feet from the manway.
The gamma dose rate twelve inches from the
manway was 300 mr/hr gamma.
Through interviews with the General Employee Training (GET) supervisor,
the inspector determined that the Catawba worker had taken bypass training
for the last four years and that the use and meaning of yellow flashing
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warning lights was not included in the bypass training.
The inspector
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contacted the resident inspector at Oconee and determined that, for the
CMD employee based at Oconee, the bypass training there also did not
include training on the use and significance of flashing yellow lights.
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Failure of the licensee to provide adequate training for employees
concerning the significance of flashing yellow lights and failure of the
licensee to post accessible areas of a high radiation area in accordance
with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.203(c)(1) are examples of a violation
of NRC requirements of 10 CFR 19.12 requiring the licensee to provide
information and instructions to workers (50-413, 414/89-02-02).
This
violation is similar to a violation concerning training cited in a Notice
of Violation issued September 16, 1988, and could reasonably be expected
to have been prevented by previous corrective action.
0ne violation was identified.
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5.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
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(0 pen) Violation 87-31-02:
Failure to. adhere to radiological control
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procedures for personnel contamination monitoring and completion of daily
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dose. cards.
The item will remain open since previous implementation of
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licensee corrective actions had not been adequate. . This was exemplified
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by a licensee' audit conducted in December 1988, which reported findings
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concerning -persons exiting the RCA from areas that were not normal exit
points, - hand held -items not properly surveyed, dose cards not being
completed for each entry and exit portal, and a contract HP technician
reaching in a RCZ and performing work without being dressed in accordance
with the RWP.
6.
Exit' Interview
a.
Inspector Comments
The inspection included a review of selected QA Surveillance, Outage
Planning and the ALARA program for control of radiation exposures.
Through review of representative records and discussions with
licensee representatives the inspector reviewed the licensee's
planning, preparations, and management support for implementing the
radiation protection program during outages.
The inspector discussed staffing levels for the outage and
determined that due to budget restraints the licensee had
completed the Unit 1 outage with fewer HP vendor technicians
than previously utilized.
Licensee representatives reported
that adequate radiation protection controls were maintained even
with the reduced staff during the outage.
The inspector reviewed licensee's utilization of special
training including use of mockup training.
The inspector discussed the licensee's methods for ensuring
adequate supplies were available to support outage activities.
The inspector reviewed selected ALARA work packages and
determined that the licensee was taking steps to reduce
exposures by clearly defining job sequences and taking measures
to improve worker efficiency and lowering personnel exposures.
The inspector reviewed selected documented which demonstrated
that numerous ALARA pre-job planning and post job meetings were
taking place to ensure that persons were adequately prepared for
upcoming work and methods for improving the tasks were being
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evaluated.
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The inspector discussed management support for the radiation
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protection program including the purchase of additional
personnel monitors (hand and foot) which were installed and in
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use.
Whole Body Friskers had been purchased and the licensee
had initiated the installation of whole body friskers during the
inspection which
should enhance
personnel monitoring
capabilities.
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The inspector. reviewed the licensee's GET program and determined
that the instructors were adequately qualified and that lesson
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plans were well documented.
The inspector determined that the
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l.icensee could provide the general employee training during the
peak periods prior to outage start dates.
The inspector determined that the licensee had an adequate training
program for vendor HP technicians.
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b.
Inspection Findings
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The inspector discussed violation 50-413, 414/87-31-02 issued
October 19, 1987, for failure to adhere to radiological control
procedures for personnel contamination monitoring and completion of
daily dose cards.
The item will remain open since previous
implementation of licensee corrective actions had not been
sufficient.
The inspector stated that procedure violations in personnel
monitoring had been documented in the recent radiation protection
inspections.
The previously identified violations and those
documented in the licensee's audit report will be reviewed by
Region 11 management for the need to consider additional enforcement
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actions. The item was left as an unresolved item (URI)*.
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Upon review by Region II staff, the licensee's failure to take timely
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corrective actions of radiological protection violations to preclude
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recurrence was identified as a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
Criterion XVI 50-413, 414/89-02-01 (Paragraph 2.c).
During the inspection, the inspector determined that on December 16,
1988, two licensee employees had unknowingly entered a respirator and
high radiation area established for steam generator work.
The area
was monitored by a video system and HP personnel took action to
remove the employees from the area.
The inspector reviewed the
radiological investigation sheet and the written account of the
event.
According to one of the employees they had not crossed any
high radiation or respirator required boundaries until approached by
HP personnel.
The employees had noticed a flashing yellow light but
claimed that they did not know the significance of the light.
The
inspector determined that the employees did not receive any internal
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contamination, external contamination, or significant external
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exposure. The inspector stated that there appeared to be a violation
- Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
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determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.
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for inadequate GET since neither employee claimed to know the
. significance of flashing yellow lights and/or failure of the licensee
to adequately post a high radiation area. The inspector stated that
the event would be discussed with Region 11 staff following the
inspection.
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The NRC has determined that there were two ' violations; one for
failure to adequately post a high radiation area in accordance with
the requirements of 10 CFR 2.203(c)(1) and one for failure to provide
adequate training for individuals who work in or frequent a
restricted area. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of
the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this
inspection.
The inspector expressed his appreciation for the staff
cooperation during the conduct of the inspection.
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