ML20244A899

Insp Repts 50-413/89-05 & 50-414/89-05 on 890204-25. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Review of Plant Operations,Surveillance Observation,Maint Observation & Review of Nonroutine Event Repts

ML20244A899
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	03/29/1989
From:	Lesser M, William Orders, Shymlock M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20244A894	List: ML20244A893 ML20244A897 ML20244A899
References
50-413-89-05, 50-413-89-5, 50-414-89-05, 50-414-89-5, NUDOCS 8904180259
Download: ML20244A899 (8)

See also: IR 05000413/1989005

Text

_ _ . _ _

'<i

.g

gaOCECu

'

s

3

@'

.

4'

UNITED STATES

j

, j-

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION 11

o

101 MARIETTA ST,, N.W.

- ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

4,,f,

L

, Report Nos. 50-413/89-05 and 50-414/89-05'

Licensee: Duke Power Company

i<

h

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, N.C.

28242

Docket'Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414

License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52

,

h,

Facility Name:-Catawba 1 and 2

~ Inspection Conducted:' February.4, 1989 - February 25, 1989

1

_

Inspector-

//d j

J[Ud9

/D'at( Signed

W. T. Ord~ers

/

t

A/2

J-

<@/DN9

Inspectorp ?S. Te'se~r, ~ /

Irate / Signed

M

7

Approved by

.

//fd/

/

J df/h

M B."Sh'fml'o~ck, Sectiogl Chief

ate 41gn'ed

Projects Branch 3

-

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine, resident inspection was conducted on site inspecting in

the areas of review of plant operations; surveillance observation;

maintenance observation; review of licensee nonroutine event reports;

and followup of previously identified items and part 21 reports.

Results:

In the areas inspected one violation was identified involving an

' inadequate' test procedure to ensure that auxiliary feedwater piping

was vented after filling, paragraph 7.

One unresolved item was

identified involving personnel errors associated with two safety

injections on Unit 2.

!

8904180259 890329

DR

ADOCK O

3

_ _ __.._ _ ____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

J

_ - - - _ _ -

.

.

REPORT DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

Licensee Emplo,Utes

• H. Barron, Operations Superi?tendent

W. Beaver Performance Enginee

.

R. Charest, Station Chemistry Supervisor

T. Crawford, Integrated Scheduling Superintendent

W. Deal, Health Physics, Supervisor

• J. Forbes, Technical Services Superintendent

• R. Glover, Compliance Engineer

T. Harrall, Design Engineering

R. Jones, Maintenance Engineering Services Engineer

F. Mack, Project Services Engineer

W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer

W. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent

• T. Owen, Statior Manager

.

J. Stackley, Instrumentation and Electrical Engineer

D. Tower, Shift Operating Engineer

R. Wardell, Station Services Superintendent

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,

mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

NRC Resident Inspectors

• W. Orders

M. Lesser

• Attended exit interview.

2.

Unresolved Items

,

An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to

determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation. There was

one unresolved item identified in this report.

]

3.

Plant Operations Review (71707 and 71710)

,

i

a.

The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting

period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, Technical

Specifications (TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs,

danger tag logs, Technical Specification Action Item Log, and the

removal and restoration log were routinely reviewed. Shift turnovers

were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with

j

approved procedures.

1

I'

f

_-

_

- - _ _

_

-

_ _ _ _ _ _ __

.

. _ _- - _ _ _ _

_ _ _ -

_ _ _

_ - _ _ - _ .

_ _ _ _ _

__

_

-

,

.

J%.

,

,

2

,

.

.

The inspectors : verified by. observation and interviews, that the

measures taken to assure physical protection- of. the-facility met.

current requirements.

Areas inspected included the security.

organization, the establishment'and maintenance'of. gates, doors, and

isolation zones in the proper conditions, and that access. control and

badging were proper and procedures followed.

In addition to the areas discussed above, the; areas toured were~

observed .for fire prevention and protection' activities.

These

included such things as combustible material control, fire protection

systems. and materials, and fire protection associated with mainte-

nance activities. . The inspectors reviewed Problem Investigation

Reports to determine if the licensee was appropriately documenting

problems and implementing corrective actions,

b.

Unit 1 SummaryL

Unit 1 began the . report period in Mode 2 performing zero power

physics testing (ZPT) associated with the completion of the end of

cycle (E00) 3 refueling outage.

By February 6, ZPT testing was

complete and the outage was essentially over.

The outage duration

was-74 days, and was originally targeted for'60 days. On February 7

when the turbine was rolled, it was found that the B low pressure.

turbine rotor was. slightly bowed which had given rise to a high

vibration indication.' The . turbine was manually tripped and efforts

began to "unbow" the turbine which had apparently bowed as the result

of uneven heating. .By the following day, the rotor had been repaired

and 'the unit was at 17% power.

On February 13, with testing

continuing, the unit reached 82% power and the following. day the unit

achieved 100% power where it remained throcghout the remainder of the

report period.

c.

Unit 2 Sunmary

Unit 2 began the report period at 94% power, limited to that power

level by the previously reported problems of main feedwater flow to

the C steam generator (S/G).

The unit operated at this power level

with no major problems until February 21, when at 1:15 a.m.

instrument technicians were attempting to determine why the 90% open

test light was not illuminating on main steam isolation valve (MSIV)

2SM-3 when performing surveillance procedure PT-2-A-4250-01A, " Main

Steam Isolation Va~1ve Movement Test."

The

MSIV closed when the

-

technicians placed an improper electrical jumper which short

circuited the power supply to the MSIV control circuity.

When the

MSIV closed, the unit suffered a reactor trip on low low level in the

C S/G due to the resultant pressure increase, and void collapse.

Three steam line code safeties and one S/G power operated relief

valve (PORV) opened due to the pressure transient which in turn lead

,

L

. . .

.

_-

_ _ _ _ _ -

_ __

_ .__-_ _ _ _ _

,

.s

,

.

3

to a safety injection on steam line negative pressure rate,'

Preliminary inspection findings indicate that the transient-

was the result of inappropriate trouble . shooting / maintenance

techniques' associated with placing the above referenced jumper.

Inspection efforts were inccmplete at the end of the report period.

The inspector's have requested completed work request 42768 OPS to

determine actual work performed and procedures in use at the time.

This item will be carried as unresolved pending completion of review.

At 1:26 p.m. on February 21, unit 2 was in mode 3 recovering from the

above referenced safety injection and reactor trip, when a second

safety injection occurred on low steam line pressure.

The unit was

at approximately 530 degrees F and 800 psig steam pressure.

A

cooldown had been initiated earlier in the day when the unit entered

Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 based on information in post trip

data which indicated both diesel generator sequencers were degraded.

Preliminary indications are that the operating crew was in the

process of terminating the cooldown, thought that steam generator

pressures / temperatures had stabilized and diverted their attention to

other duties when pressure in the A steam generator began decreasing.

The rate of decrease was sufficient to cause a icw steam line

pressure safety injection.

Inspection efforts relative to this event are incomplete.

A review

of the data generated during the trip, procedures being employed

during the cooldown and discussions with the operators will be

completed and documented in report 89-07.

Until that review is

complete, this issue will be carried as Unresolved Item 414/89-05-01:

Personnel Errors Causing Two Safety Injections

No violations or deviations were identified.

4.

Surveillance Observation (61726)

a.

During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations

were in compliance with various TS requirements.

Typical of these

requirements were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor

coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, emergency power systems,

safety injection, emergency safeguards systems, control room ventila-

tion, and direct current electrical power sources.

The inspector

verified that surveillance testing was performed in accordance with

the approved written procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated,

limiting conditions for operation were met, appropriate removal and

restoration of the affected equipment was accomplished, test results

met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the

individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified

during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate

management personnel.

!

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ = - - _ - _ _ _ - _

s

.

.

4

b.

The inspectors witnessed or reviewed the following surveillance:

PT/2/A/4350/02B

Diesel Generator 2B Operability Test

PT/0/A/4200/02

Standby Shutdown Facility Diesel Test

No violations or deviations were identified.

5.

Maintenance Observations (62703)

a.

Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components

were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they- were conducted in

accordance with the requirements.

The inspector verified licensee

conformance to the requirements in the following areas of inspection:

the activities were accomplished using approved procedures, and

functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to

returning components or systems to service; quality control records

were maintained; activities performed were accomplished by qualified

personnel; and materials used were properly certified. Work requests

were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure

that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance

which may effect system performance.

4

b.

The inspectors witnessed or reviewed the following maintenance

activities:

44660 OPS

Inspect Why ISV-19 Failed to

Indicate Open

44716 OPS

Inspect Why 1SV-13 Will Not Open

5545 MNT

Repa.k Valve ISV-13

44717 OPS

Inspect Why ISV-1 Will Not Open

No violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Review of Licensee Non Routine Event Reports (92700)

a.

The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to

determine if the information provided met NRC requirements.

The

l

determination included: adequacy of description, verification of

'

compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements,

i

corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems,

reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety

'

significance of each event.

Additional inplant reviews and

discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for

j

i

those reports indicated by an (*).

The following LERs are closed:

]

1

1

• 413/88-26

Engineered Safeguards Features

j

Actuation Caused by Momentary Inverter

1

Low Voltage

1

1

E____

_- _ _ _

-

<

1

5

.

. .I

• 414/88-26

Technical Specification Required

!

Shutdown due to an Inoperable Chemical

.i

and Volume Control Centrifugal Charging

pump

No violations or deviations were identified.

l

7.

Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings (92701 and 92702)

a.

(OPEN) Unresolved Item 413/88-38-01: Gravity Drain of FWST to

Refueling Cavity.

On January 7, at approximately 4:00 p.m. it was

i

determined that the deep end of the refueling canal had been

i

overfilled allowing water to flow around the vertical missile shields

to the reactor vessel.

Water was approximately one inch deep at

vessel flange and flowed through the temporary nozzle covers and

cavity seal to . lower containment.

Water level was subsequently

lowered in the deep end of the canal and the vessel flange area was

flushed with demineralized water.

The cavity was cleaned /deconta-

minated and a visual inspection of the vessel flange area showed

areas of rust and slight traces of boron on five studs. These areas

were recleaned.

Discussions with operations personnel indicated that the incident may

have been caused by inadequate procedural guidance.

Procedure

OP/1/A/6200/13 which controls the filling, draining and purification

of the refueling cavity does not appear to adequately tcke into

'

consideration the possibility of having the Refueling Water Storage

Tank (FWST) in the purification mode. This in turn led the operators

to overlook the fact that valve FW-23 was open.

This valve is a

bypass around the refueling water recirculation pump and provided a

gravity drain flowpath from the FWST to the refueling cavity.

The review of this event is incomplete. An analysis of the interface

between all applicable procedures in force at the time of the event,

and an evaluation of the safety significance of the equipment which

was wet by the event and discussions with the operating staff has

begun, but is not complete. The licensee's review of the event which

is being carried as Problem Investigation Report (PIR) 1-C89-0067 is

also incomplete.

Efforts will continue in this area and results will

be documented in report 89-07.

b.

(OPEN) Unresolved Item (413/88-38-03):

Turbine drive CA Pump

Pressure Seal Failure.

On January 27, 1989, the licensee attempted

to start the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (CAPT) on unit 1

for the first time since the refueling outage. The unit had entered

mode 3 at 2:41 a.m. on January 26 and was in a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action

statement per TS 3.7.1.2 until the CAPT could be tested.

Operators

stopped the pump when the turbine reached 2000 rpm with no corre-

sponding indicated fl7w. A second start resulted in pump seizure.

The inspectors reviewed activities which had recently been performed

on the pump. On January 18 the licensee drained portions of the pump

_ _ -

-_-

- _ _ - _ _ _ - _

_-

h

wra

-

, . -

.

<

o

g

p

.

6

.

L. ,

! suction piping per _ PT/1/A/4200/55, "CA- Check Valve _ Leak Rate ' Test,"

N

to perform a leak rate test on ICA-8.

The inspectors reviewed this

procedure'and determined that the system restoration, performed later

ie

that day, failed'to vent the piping after. filling it._ Specifically .

high point vents 1CA-141 and ICA-195 were closed in steps 12.20.2 and

zy

- 12.20.9 prior to the'11ne being filled in step 12.20.10

A review of the system isometric elevation drawings' and a walkdown of-

the piping revealed the potential for air to be trapped after filling.

.the system.

.It cannot as' yet be concluded whether or not this

contributed to the pump seizure, however, the fact that the procedure =

'

was inadequate 'to ensure the piping was vented is identified as -

violation 413/89-05-02:

Inadequate Test Procedure to Ensure

- Auxiliary Feedwater Piping is Vented After Filling. Portions of the

unresolved item remain open until. the failure mechanism of the pump

b

is determined by the licensee.

c;

(OPEN) Unresolved Item 413/88-38-04: Valve stroke program

inadequacies.

The licensee's valve stroke test program was reviewed

in order to assess their current practice of testing motor operated

valve stroke times from limit switch to limit switch.

The licensee requested and was granted relief from measuring full

stroke time of these valves. When a valve is timed from limit switch

to limit switch " full" stroke'+ime is not. measured as is required by

10CFR50.55 a(g)

Realistically, only 90' to 95% of valve stroke is

measured.

Further, this method does not account for the time between

initiation of the actuating signal and the start of valve motion.

Finally, the licensee has in place, per procedure IP-0-A-3820-04 a

mechanism through which the OPEN limit switch can be adjusted to'95%-

of full stroke on motor operated gate and butterfly valves which do'

not meet response time requirements.

In essence, this shortens the

-stroke time .

Identified on enclosure 11.5 of that procedure are 20

valves which have required the OPEN limit switch setting to be

adjusted in order to meet response time requirements.

During this

report period, this matter was forwarded to NRR for review, and

will remain Unresolved pending completion of that review.

One violation was identified in paragraph 7b above.

8.

Part 21 Inspections (36100)

(OPEN) P2188-08 Defective Intercooler Inlet Adapter Provided as Part of

IMO Declared Standby Diesel Engine Generator.

<

The 10CFR21 involved a report on the air diffuser plate in a Delaval

diesel engine's intercooler inlet adapter which had broken loose due to

failure of the weld heat affected zone on September 15, 1988.

The broken

1

piece ruptured intercooler tubes.

Catawba Nuclear Station had observed

broken welds on its diffusers (air distribution vane) as early as 1984.

The licensee initially suspected the problem to be localized to the right

bank intercooler due to previously discovered vibration problems.

The

-_-____w-

um_

_._______________.______mm-_--.____.m_____.m___.-.____

_ _ _

____m._-___

- . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - -

_

-___m

_-_m.

_____

m._

__2__

. _ . _ _ _ _ - - _

_ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._

_ . _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _

__ _

_ _ _ _ _

_

_ _ _ - _ . -

_ __

--

- . ,

s'

,.

19

f,

.

• -

.

.

.'-

[

7

l

.

l

1,

)

.

-licensee-modified the welds'on the right bank intercoolers to correct the

-

problem. On August 18, 1986 a failure of the air distribution vane to the

left bank -intercooler occurred on the IB Diesel which resulted in a

rupture of a cooling tube.

Non-Conforming Item (NCI) CN-457 documented-

the event and corrective action which included repairs made similar to

those on the right bank. .This failure was the same as that experienced in

the 10CFR21 report.

i

.

.

I

In 1986, the licensee determined their failures to be not reportable under-

10CFR21.

The inspectors requested the licensee to provide the basis for

the evaluation, considering the repetitive weld ' failures experienced at

Catawba from-1984-1986.

This item remains open pending NRC review of the licensee's evaluation.

-9.

Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February. 27, 1989

1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.

The inspector

described - the areas inspected and discussed .in detail the inspection

findings listed below.

No dissenting comments were received from the

licensee.

The licensee did ~not identify as proprietary any of the

materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this

inspection.

'

Item Number-

Description and Reference

Unresolved Item 414/89-05-01

Personnel Errors causing Two Safety

Injections

Violation 413/89-05-02

Inadequate Test Procedure to Ensure

Auxiliary Feedwater Piping is Vented After

Filling.

1

__

- _ - - - _