ML20244A899
| ML20244A899 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 03/29/1989 |
| From: | Lesser M, William Orders, Shymlock M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20244A894 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-89-05, 50-413-89-5, 50-414-89-05, 50-414-89-5, NUDOCS 8904180259 | |
| Download: ML20244A899 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000413/1989005
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA ST,, N.W.
- ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
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, Report Nos. 50-413/89-05 and 50-414/89-05'
Licensee: Duke Power Company
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422 South Church Street
Charlotte, N.C.
28242
Docket'Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414
License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52
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Facility Name:-Catawba 1 and 2
~ Inspection Conducted:' February.4, 1989 - February 25, 1989
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Inspector-
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W. T. Ord~ers
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Inspectorp ?S. Te'se~r, ~ /
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Approved by
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M B."Sh'fml'o~ck, Sectiogl Chief
ate 41gn'ed
Projects Branch 3
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Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, resident inspection was conducted on site inspecting in
the areas of review of plant operations; surveillance observation;
maintenance observation; review of licensee nonroutine event reports;
and followup of previously identified items and part 21 reports.
Results:
In the areas inspected one violation was identified involving an
' inadequate' test procedure to ensure that auxiliary feedwater piping
was vented after filling, paragraph 7.
One unresolved item was
- identified involving personnel errors associated with two safety
injections on Unit 2.
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8904180259 890329
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Emplo,Utes
- H. Barron, Operations Superi?tendent
W. Beaver Performance Enginee
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R. Charest, Station Chemistry Supervisor
T. Crawford, Integrated Scheduling Superintendent
W. Deal, Health Physics, Supervisor
- J. Forbes, Technical Services Superintendent
- R. Glover, Compliance Engineer
T. Harrall, Design Engineering
R. Jones, Maintenance Engineering Services Engineer
F. Mack, Project Services Engineer
W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer
W. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent
- T. Owen, Statior Manager
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J. Stackley, Instrumentation and Electrical Engineer
D. Tower, Shift Operating Engineer
R. Wardell, Station Services Superintendent
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- W. Orders
M. Lesser
- Attended exit interview.
2.
Unresolved Items
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An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to
determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation. There was
one unresolved item identified in this report.
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3.
Plant Operations Review (71707 and 71710)
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a.
The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting
period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, Technical
Specifications (TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs,
danger tag logs, Technical Specification Action Item Log, and the
removal and restoration log were routinely reviewed. Shift turnovers
were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with
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approved procedures.
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The inspectors : verified by. observation and interviews, that the
measures taken to assure physical protection- of. the-facility met.
current requirements.
Areas inspected included the security.
organization, the establishment'and maintenance'of. gates, doors, and
isolation zones in the proper conditions, and that access. control and
badging were proper and procedures followed.
In addition to the areas discussed above, the; areas toured were~
observed .for fire prevention and protection' activities.
These
included such things as combustible material control, fire protection
systems. and materials, and fire protection associated with mainte-
nance activities. . The inspectors reviewed Problem Investigation
Reports to determine if the licensee was appropriately documenting
problems and implementing corrective actions,
b.
Unit 1 SummaryL
Unit 1 began the . report period in Mode 2 performing zero power
physics testing (ZPT) associated with the completion of the end of
cycle (E00) 3 refueling outage.
By February 6, ZPT testing was
complete and the outage was essentially over.
The outage duration
was-74 days, and was originally targeted for'60 days. On February 7
when the turbine was rolled, it was found that the B low pressure.
turbine rotor was. slightly bowed which had given rise to a high
vibration indication.' The . turbine was manually tripped and efforts
began to "unbow" the turbine which had apparently bowed as the result
of uneven heating. .By the following day, the rotor had been repaired
and 'the unit was at 17% power.
On February 13, with testing
continuing, the unit reached 82% power and the following. day the unit
achieved 100% power where it remained throcghout the remainder of the
report period.
c.
Unit 2 Sunmary
Unit 2 began the report period at 94% power, limited to that power
level by the previously reported problems of main feedwater flow to
the C steam generator (S/G).
The unit operated at this power level
with no major problems until February 21, when at 1:15 a.m.
instrument technicians were attempting to determine why the 90% open
test light was not illuminating on main steam isolation valve (MSIV)
2SM-3 when performing surveillance procedure PT-2-A-4250-01A, " Main
Steam Isolation Va~1ve Movement Test."
The
MSIV closed when the
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technicians placed an improper electrical jumper which short
circuited the power supply to the MSIV control circuity.
When the
MSIV closed, the unit suffered a reactor trip on low low level in the
C S/G due to the resultant pressure increase, and void collapse.
Three steam line code safeties and one S/G power operated relief
valve (PORV) opened due to the pressure transient which in turn lead
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to a safety injection on steam line negative pressure rate,'
Preliminary inspection findings indicate that the transient-
was the result of inappropriate trouble . shooting / maintenance
techniques' associated with placing the above referenced jumper.
Inspection efforts were inccmplete at the end of the report period.
The inspector's have requested completed work request 42768 OPS to
determine actual work performed and procedures in use at the time.
This item will be carried as unresolved pending completion of review.
At 1:26 p.m. on February 21, unit 2 was in mode 3 recovering from the
above referenced safety injection and reactor trip, when a second
safety injection occurred on low steam line pressure.
The unit was
at approximately 530 degrees F and 800 psig steam pressure.
A
cooldown had been initiated earlier in the day when the unit entered
Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 based on information in post trip
data which indicated both diesel generator sequencers were degraded.
Preliminary indications are that the operating crew was in the
process of terminating the cooldown, thought that steam generator
pressures / temperatures had stabilized and diverted their attention to
other duties when pressure in the A steam generator began decreasing.
The rate of decrease was sufficient to cause a icw steam line
pressure safety injection.
Inspection efforts relative to this event are incomplete.
A review
of the data generated during the trip, procedures being employed
during the cooldown and discussions with the operators will be
completed and documented in report 89-07.
Until that review is
complete, this issue will be carried as Unresolved Item 414/89-05-01:
Personnel Errors Causing Two Safety Injections
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
a.
During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations
were in compliance with various TS requirements.
Typical of these
requirements were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor
coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, emergency power systems,
safety injection, emergency safeguards systems, control room ventila-
tion, and direct current electrical power sources.
The inspector
verified that surveillance testing was performed in accordance with
the approved written procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated,
limiting conditions for operation were met, appropriate removal and
restoration of the affected equipment was accomplished, test results
met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the
individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified
during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate
management personnel.
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b.
The inspectors witnessed or reviewed the following surveillance:
PT/2/A/4350/02B
Diesel Generator 2B Operability Test
PT/0/A/4200/02
Standby Shutdown Facility Diesel Test
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Maintenance Observations (62703)
a.
Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components
were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they- were conducted in
accordance with the requirements.
The inspector verified licensee
conformance to the requirements in the following areas of inspection:
the activities were accomplished using approved procedures, and
functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to
returning components or systems to service; quality control records
were maintained; activities performed were accomplished by qualified
personnel; and materials used were properly certified. Work requests
were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure
that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance
which may effect system performance.
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b.
The inspectors witnessed or reviewed the following maintenance
activities:
44660 OPS
Inspect Why ISV-19 Failed to
Indicate Open
44716 OPS
Inspect Why 1SV-13 Will Not Open
5545 MNT
Repa.k Valve ISV-13
44717 OPS
Inspect Why ISV-1 Will Not Open
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Review of Licensee Non Routine Event Reports (92700)
a.
The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to
determine if the information provided met NRC requirements.
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determination included: adequacy of description, verification of
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compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements,
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corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems,
reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety
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significance of each event.
Additional inplant reviews and
discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for
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those reports indicated by an (*).
The following LERs are closed:
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- 413/88-26
Engineered Safeguards Features
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Actuation Caused by Momentary Inverter
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Low Voltage
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- 414/88-26
Technical Specification Required
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Shutdown due to an Inoperable Chemical
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and Volume Control Centrifugal Charging
pump
No violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings (92701 and 92702)
a.
(OPEN) Unresolved Item 413/88-38-01: Gravity Drain of FWST to
Refueling Cavity.
On January 7, at approximately 4:00 p.m. it was
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determined that the deep end of the refueling canal had been
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overfilled allowing water to flow around the vertical missile shields
to the reactor vessel.
Water was approximately one inch deep at
vessel flange and flowed through the temporary nozzle covers and
cavity seal to . lower containment.
Water level was subsequently
lowered in the deep end of the canal and the vessel flange area was
flushed with demineralized water.
The cavity was cleaned /deconta-
minated and a visual inspection of the vessel flange area showed
areas of rust and slight traces of boron on five studs. These areas
were recleaned.
Discussions with operations personnel indicated that the incident may
have been caused by inadequate procedural guidance.
Procedure
OP/1/A/6200/13 which controls the filling, draining and purification
of the refueling cavity does not appear to adequately tcke into
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consideration the possibility of having the Refueling Water Storage
Tank (FWST) in the purification mode. This in turn led the operators
to overlook the fact that valve FW-23 was open.
This valve is a
bypass around the refueling water recirculation pump and provided a
gravity drain flowpath from the FWST to the refueling cavity.
The review of this event is incomplete. An analysis of the interface
between all applicable procedures in force at the time of the event,
and an evaluation of the safety significance of the equipment which
was wet by the event and discussions with the operating staff has
begun, but is not complete. The licensee's review of the event which
is being carried as Problem Investigation Report (PIR) 1-C89-0067 is
also incomplete.
Efforts will continue in this area and results will
be documented in report 89-07.
b.
(OPEN) Unresolved Item (413/88-38-03):
Turbine drive CA Pump
Pressure Seal Failure.
On January 27, 1989, the licensee attempted
to start the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (CAPT) on unit 1
for the first time since the refueling outage. The unit had entered
mode 3 at 2:41 a.m. on January 26 and was in a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action
statement per TS 3.7.1.2 until the CAPT could be tested.
Operators
stopped the pump when the turbine reached 2000 rpm with no corre-
sponding indicated fl7w. A second start resulted in pump seizure.
The inspectors reviewed activities which had recently been performed
on the pump. On January 18 the licensee drained portions of the pump
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! suction piping per _ PT/1/A/4200/55, "CA- Check Valve _ Leak Rate ' Test,"
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to perform a leak rate test on ICA-8.
The inspectors reviewed this
procedure'and determined that the system restoration, performed later
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that day, failed'to vent the piping after. filling it._ Specifically .
high point vents 1CA-141 and ICA-195 were closed in steps 12.20.2 and
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- 12.20.9 prior to the'11ne being filled in step 12.20.10
A review of the system isometric elevation drawings' and a walkdown of-
the piping revealed the potential for air to be trapped after filling.
.the system.
.It cannot as' yet be concluded whether or not this
contributed to the pump seizure, however, the fact that the procedure =
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was inadequate 'to ensure the piping was vented is identified as -
violation 413/89-05-02:
Inadequate Test Procedure to Ensure
- Auxiliary Feedwater Piping is Vented After Filling. Portions of the
unresolved item remain open until. the failure mechanism of the pump
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is determined by the licensee.
c;
(OPEN) Unresolved Item 413/88-38-04: Valve stroke program
inadequacies.
The licensee's valve stroke test program was reviewed
in order to assess their current practice of testing motor operated
valve stroke times from limit switch to limit switch.
The licensee requested and was granted relief from measuring full
stroke time of these valves. When a valve is timed from limit switch
to limit switch " full" stroke'+ime is not. measured as is required by
10CFR50.55 a(g)
Realistically, only 90' to 95% of valve stroke is
measured.
Further, this method does not account for the time between
initiation of the actuating signal and the start of valve motion.
Finally, the licensee has in place, per procedure IP-0-A-3820-04 a
mechanism through which the OPEN limit switch can be adjusted to'95%-
of full stroke on motor operated gate and butterfly valves which do'
not meet response time requirements.
In essence, this shortens the
-stroke time .
Identified on enclosure 11.5 of that procedure are 20
valves which have required the OPEN limit switch setting to be
adjusted in order to meet response time requirements.
During this
report period, this matter was forwarded to NRR for review, and
will remain Unresolved pending completion of that review.
One violation was identified in paragraph 7b above.
8.
Part 21 Inspections (36100)
(OPEN) P2188-08 Defective Intercooler Inlet Adapter Provided as Part of
IMO Declared Standby Diesel Engine Generator.
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The 10CFR21 involved a report on the air diffuser plate in a Delaval
diesel engine's intercooler inlet adapter which had broken loose due to
failure of the weld heat affected zone on September 15, 1988.
The broken
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piece ruptured intercooler tubes.
Catawba Nuclear Station had observed
broken welds on its diffusers (air distribution vane) as early as 1984.
The licensee initially suspected the problem to be localized to the right
bank intercooler due to previously discovered vibration problems.
The
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-licensee-modified the welds'on the right bank intercoolers to correct the
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problem. On August 18, 1986 a failure of the air distribution vane to the
left bank -intercooler occurred on the IB Diesel which resulted in a
rupture of a cooling tube.
Non-Conforming Item (NCI) CN-457 documented-
the event and corrective action which included repairs made similar to
those on the right bank. .This failure was the same as that experienced in
the 10CFR21 report.
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In 1986, the licensee determined their failures to be not reportable under-
The inspectors requested the licensee to provide the basis for
the evaluation, considering the repetitive weld ' failures experienced at
Catawba from-1984-1986.
This item remains open pending NRC review of the licensee's evaluation.
-9.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February. 27, 1989
1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector
described - the areas inspected and discussed .in detail the inspection
findings listed below.
No dissenting comments were received from the
licensee.
The licensee did ~not identify as proprietary any of the
materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this
inspection.
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Item Number-
Description and Reference
Unresolved Item 414/89-05-01
Personnel Errors causing Two Safety
Injections
Violation 413/89-05-02
Inadequate Test Procedure to Ensure
Auxiliary Feedwater Piping is Vented After
Filling.
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