IR 05000414/1986014

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Insp Rept 50-414/86-14 on 860210-21.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Preoperational Test Results Review & Review of Previously Identified Items
ML20141N812
Person / Time
Site: Catawba Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/10/1986
From: Jape F, Matt Thomas
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20141N807 List:
References
50-414-86-14, NUDOCS 8603180157
Download: ML20141N812 (6)


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%,*....j Report No.:50-414/86-14 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket No.: 50-414 License No.: CPPR-117 Facility Name: Catawba 2 Inspection Conducted: February 10-21, 1986 Inspector: 6n.01_- tst6 3 /B 7/

M. Thomas Q / Dat( Signed Approved by:  %

F. Jape, Chief, Test Programs 65ection Date Signed Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine announced inspection involved 66 inspector-hours on site in the areas of preoperational test re:ults review and review of previously identi-fied item Results: No violations or deviations were identifie ,

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees i

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    1. J. W. Hampton, Station Manager
  • H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent
  • W. F. Beaver, Performance Engineer
    1. J. W. Cox, Technical Services Superintendent
    1. C. L. Hartzell, Compliance Enginear
    1. R. A.' Jones, Performance Test Engineer
  • P. G. LeRoy, Licensing Engineer
  • D. P. Robinson, Performance Reactor Engineer
    1. F. P. Schiffley II, Licensing Engineer
  1. G. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent Other lice,9see employees contacted included test coordinators, engineers, technicians, operators, security office members and office personne NRC Resident Inspectors

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  • P. H. Skinner, Senior Resident Inspector - Operations

"P. K. VanDoorn, Senior Resident Inspector - Construction

  • Attended exit interview February 13, 1986
  1. Attended exit interview February 21, 1986 Exit Interview ,

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 13 and 21, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings. No dissenting comments were received from the Itcensee. One new item identi-fled during this inspection is listed belo Inspector Followup Item 414/86-14-01, Guidance for Correcting In-process Procedure Documentation Errors, paragraph The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspectio ,

s Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during the inspectio ,

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5. Preoperational Test Results Review (70322, 70324, 70325, 70326, 70329, 70400)

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The inspector reviewed the completed test data packages for the following preoperational (preop) tests:

IP/2/A/3200/03, Reactor Protection / Safeguards Features Response Time Testing TP/2/A/1100/01, Controlling Procedure for Hot Functional Testing TP/2/A/1100/06, Diesel Generator 28 Post Inspection Run TP/2/A/1200/01, Component Cooling System Functional Test TP/2/A/1200/01A, Component Cooling System Operation During Hot Functional Testing TP/2/A/1200/028 Residual Heat Removal System (Hot) Functional Test TP/2/A/1200/03A, Engineered Safeguards Features Functional Test TP/2/A/1200/030, Safety Injection Accumulator Functional Test

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TP/2/A/1200/04, Containment Spray System Functional Test TP/2/A/1200/05, Chemical and Volume Control Functional Test TP/2/A/1250/04, Auxiliary Feedwater System Functional Test TP/2/A/1350/25A, Diesel Generator 2A Blackout and Load Rejection Preoperational Test TP/2/A/1350/250, Diesel Generator 2B, 01ackout and Load Rejection Preoperational Test TP/2/A/1400/01, Nuclear Service Water System Functional Test The test data packages were reviewed to verify that:

- Test changes were approved in accordance with administrative procedures, i

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Test changes did not change the basic objectives of the tes Actions required by test changes had been complete Test deftetencies had been resolved, including retetting where require Individual test steps and data sheets were completed properl Test data were within the acceptance criteria spectfted.

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- Evaluation and approval of the test results had been completed by appropriate engineering and management personne While reviewing the data package for Preop Test IP/2/A/3200/03, a concern was identified which pertained to several instances where, " white out" correction fluid was used to correct data entries and other documentation errors. The inspector discussed this concern with responsible licensee personnel and questioned whether this was an acceptable practice. The licensee agreed that " white out" should not be used when making correction The normal practice used to make corrections is to draw a line through the mistake, initial and date it. However, guidance on how to correct in-process procedure documentation errors does not appear to be addressed in any of the administrative procedures reviewed by the inspecto Use of

" white out" in this procedure appears to be an isolated case since no similar prchlems were found during the inspector's revia < of other preop test data packages and completed procedures. The lices. ee stated that appropriate administrative procedures will be revised to address correction of in process procedure documentation errors. The inspector informed the licensee that this item will be identified for followup during subsequent inspections as inspector followup item 414/86-14-01, Guidance For Correcting In process Procedure Documentation Error While reviewing the data packages for Preop Tests TP/2/A/1100/06, TP/2/A/1200/03A, and TP/2/A/1350/258, the inspector discussed with respon-sible licensee personnel several diesel generator (DG) 2B trips which occurred both during and subsequent to the preop test Questions were raised concerning DG 28 reliability and whether the test frequency should be increased for periodic tests performed during plant operation (Based on the guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.108 and Table 4.8-1 of the combined Technical Specifications (TS) proposed for Catawba Units 1 and 2). Licensee personnel stated during discussions that per TS Table 4.8-1, they have determined that in the "last 100 valid tests" DG 2B has had two valid test failures since completion of the preop test requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.10 Therefore, the periodic test frequency will be increased for both DG 2A and DG 2 This item is also discussed in the resident inspectors' report (414/86-15).

The licensee identified in its " Status for Fuel Loading" letters dated, January 24, 1986 and February 10, 1986, all of the preop tests that were not expected to be completed by fuel load. The inspector and resident inspec-tors vertfled that all other preop tests required for fuel load have been completed and the completed data packages have been reviewed and approved by appropriate engineering and management personnel. The inspector will review the status of those tests which have not been completed during subsequent inspection No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspecte _ __ .- . - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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6. Followup on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92701)

The inspector reviewed the unresolved item and inspector followup items (IFI) discussed belo (Closed) Unresolved Item 414/85-67-01, concerning verifying the proper position of solid state protection system (SSPS) circuits. This item was discussed with responsible licensee personnel who stated that when systems are transferred from the construction department to the nuclear production department, all sliding links are supposed to be close There have been instances, such as those identified during ESF testing, where sliding links were found inadvertently left ope These were identified during preop testing also. The number of sliding links found open relative to the number installed in *he plant was very small. Problems like this are expected to occur and the preop test program is designed to identify these problem All sliding links installed in safety-related systems were tested during preop. The open sliding links identified during ESF testing were in portions of the system that were being tested for the first time since being trans-ferred from the construction department. Thus, satisfactory completion of the ESF test demonstrated that all the sliding links installed in portions of the systems tested during ESF testing were in their proper positio The inspector reviewed the licensee's administrative controls estab-lished to control activities performed by nuclear production or construction personnel on a system that has been transferred to the nuclear production departmen These controls were determined to be adequat (Closed) IFI 414/85-42-01, concerning the loss of oil from DG 2A governor. The licensee stated that the governor continued to leak oil after the internal seal was replaced, so the entire hydraulic actuator was replaced. Prior to replacing the hydraulic actuator, licensee personnel stated that oil would have to be added to the governor after approximately three to four hours of operations. After the actuator was replaced, the DG was operated for over nine consecutive hours on February 16-17, 1986. The governor oil level was checked hourly (per periodic test procedure PT/2/A/4350/10) and the oil level appeared to remain constant (at or above the line in the sight glass). No oil was added during operation, (Closed) IFI 414/86-06-01, concerning improper setting of the Train B sequencer timer. An investigation was performed to determine the cause of the timer being rese Af ter reviewing work performed in the sequencer cabinet the licensee stated that they could not find an apparent reason for the timer being rese It is believed that the timer was inadvertently and unknowingly reset. The licensee issued a nomorandum to file, dated February 14, 1986, advising maintenance

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, supervisors to instruct technicians not to perform work ctrroutpment which has not been identified to be worked on. If work is inadver-tently performed on equipment which has not been identified to be worked on, appropriate personnel should be notified so that an evaluation can be performed to analyze the consequences of the inadvertent action No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspecte e e

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