IR 05000413/1986036

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Insp Repts 50-413/86-36 & 50-414/86-39 on 860826-0925. Violation Identified:Failure to Follow Procedures to Troubleshoot & Repair Sci Inverters
ML20215K575
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/15/1986
From: Lesser M, Peebles T, Skinner P, Van Doorn P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215K542 List:
References
50-413-86-36, 50-414-86-39, NUDOCS 8610280217
Download: ML20215K575 (9)
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UNITED STATES

[P E thfq'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[" g REGION 11 g j 101 MARIETTA STREET, *' s ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos. 50-413/86-36 and 50-414/86-39 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street

' Charlotte, N.C. 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52 Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: Aug t 26 - September 25, 1986 Inspectors: , e h, e /6 /3 ~

k P. K. Van Door g /// Dafte Signed hj, , u4Gny/ lw /oFate

//oWJX P. E Skinf#r ~ Signed ~

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M. S. Lesse'r ~g

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/dArlhr D6tre Srfgried Approved by: (

T. A. Peebles, Section Chief

///N!M Date Signed Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY l

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted on site inspecting in the areas of review of plant operations; surveillance observation; maintenance l observation; review of licensee nonroutine event reports; refueling operations l (Unit 1 only); followup of previously identified items; followup of Confirmation l l

of Action Letter items (Unit 2 only) and observation of the Public Document Roo Results: Of the eight (8) areas inspected, one apparent violation was identified, (Failure to follow procedures to troubleshoot and repair SCI inverters, paragraph 7.b.).

8610280217 861020 PDR ADOCK 05000413 G PDR

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • J. W. Hampton, Station Manager E. M. Couch, Construction Maintenance Central Manager
  • H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent
  • W. H. Barron, Senior Instructor W. H. Bradley, 0A Surveillance
  • A. S. Bhatnager, Performance Engineer
  • M. E. Bolch, Station Emergency Planner S. Brown, Reactor Engineer B. F. Caldwell, Station Services Superintendent
  • J. W. Cox, Superintendent, Technical Services T. E. Crawford, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling 3. East, I&E Engineer
  • C. S. Gregory, I&E Support Engineer
  • C, L. Hartzell, Compliance Engineer J. Knuti, Operating. Engineer P. G. LeRoy, Licensi'ng Engineer
  • P. McAnulty, Training Supervisor W. W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor C. E. Muse, Operating Engineer
  • F. P. Schiffley, II, Licensing Engineer
  • D. Simpson, Compliance Specialist
  • G. T. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent J. Stackley, I & E Engineer
  • D. Tower, Operating Engineer J. W. Willis, Senior 0A Engineer, Operations
  • R. Wilson, Maintenance Planning Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne * Attended exit intervie . Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 26, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. No dissenting comments were received from the license The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio m . . ._ . .

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2 Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Units 1 & 2) (92702)

!. (Closed) Violation 413/85-05-02: Failure to Establish All Required

! Measures to Control Measuring and Test Equipment Program. The licensee

! responded to this violation in correspondence dated April 23, i ~ 0ctober 30,- and December 2, 198 The inspector has reviewed the actions identified by this correspondence and considers this item to be closed,

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i i (Closed) Unresolved Item 413/84-87-02: Review of Operability

{ Evaluation The licensee has implemented a new program via Station i Directive 2.8.1, Problem Investigation Process which adequately addresses reviews for operabilit No significant problems were identified as a result of the previously identified program weaknesse ; (0 pen) Unresolved Item 413/84-87-03: Review of Operations Corrective 4 Action Program. The licensees new program identified in paragraph 3.b.

addresses the weaknesses previously described. The inspector reviewed i the procedure, observed program training and reviewed Problem

Investigation Reports (PIR's) and determined that the new program

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appears to adequately address the NRC concern No significant problems were identified as a result of the previously described weaknesses in the licensees program This item remains open only to verify that the work request program, MMP 1.0 is updated to reflect the

new PIR program.

l (0 pen) Unresolved Item 413/85-14-01: Adequacy of Part 21 i

Implementatio The licensees new PIR program described in paragraph i 3.b. adequately addresses on-site review for Part 21 applicability. N ,

significant problems were identified as a result of previously identified program weaknesse This item remains open pending NRC review of the corporate process for assuring Part 21 applicability is

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identified on LER' No violations or deviations were identified.

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. Unresolved Items *

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A new unresolved item is identified in paragraph 8 . PlantOperationsReview(Units 1 & 2) (71707 and 71710)

The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting i' period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements. Technical

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Specifications (TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs, danger tag logs, Technical Specification Action Item Log, and the

removal and restoration log were routinely reviewed. Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with l approved procedures, i
  • An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to detennine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violatio .

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The inspectors verified by observation and interviews, the measures taken to assure physical protection of the facility met current requirement Areas inspected included the security organization, the establishment and maintenances of gates, doors, and isolation zones in the proper condition, that access control and badging were proper and procedures followe In addition to the areas discussed above, the areas toured were observed for fire prevention and protection activities. These included such things as combustible material control, fire protection systems and materials, and fire protection associated with maintenance activitie On September 1,1986, a high differential current relay tripped the Unit 2 Main Generator from 43% power as a result of a phase to phase short in the stato Four days later the rotor was pulled revealing extensive damage to the stator windings. It is suspected that the excessive heat from the short also caused a rupture of the stator cooling system, however, the root cause of the short has yet to be established. On September 11, it was decided to completely replace the stator with one from a cancelled plant supplied by General Electri , The inspector observed the local Public Document Room to determine if appropriate documents were being received and appropriately filed. The files were orderly, documents were retrievable and it appeared from a sample review that appropriate documents were availabl The inspector reviewed licensee actions taken to complete the requirements of item 3.b. of Confirmation of Action Letter (CAL) dated July 3,1986, which required certain actions to be taken as a result of the transient during the loss of control room test on June 27, 198 The inspector reviewed licensee documentation (work request packages 1938 NSM,11123 NSM,11124 NSM and 11125 NSM) and observed the field modifications associated with this work. This completes licensee

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actions relative to the CA No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance Observation (Units 1 & 2) (61726)

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During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations were in compliance with various TS requirements. Typical of these requirements were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, emergency power systems, safety injection, emergency safeguards systems, control room ventilation, and direct current electrical power source The inspector verified that surveillance testing was l

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performed in accordance with the approved written procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, appropriate removal and restoration of the affected equipment was

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accomplished, test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne Specifically the inspector observed surveillance testing on various safety related motor overcurrent relays. (PT/0/A/4971/01R). One overcurrent relay was noted by the technicians to be out of specification. The inspector observed appropriate corrective action taken to adjust the overcurrent setting and to properly retest in accordance with the procedures. The inspector also observed an isolation test on the Containment Purge Ventilation System (PT/1/A/4200/41C). The Inspector also observed welding in progress on the Chemical and Volume Control System for conformance to procedures and quality requirement No violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance Observations (Units 1& 2) (62703) Station maintenance activities of selected systens and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance

, with requirements. The inspector verified licensee conformance to the requirements in the following areas of inspection: the activities were accomplished using approved procedures, and functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control recordt were maintained; activities performed were accomplished by qualified personnel; and materials used were

properly certified. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may effect system performanc On August 4,1986, a problem was identified on EIB Vital Inverter. A Work Request (WR 33820 ops) was submitted to investigate and repair

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this problem. Planning personnel processed WR 33820 ops on August 7 l and specified that the procedure to be used to perform this work was IP/0/A/3890/01, Controlling Procedure for Troubleshooting and Corrective Maintenanc Step 1.2 of IP/0/A/3890/01 states "This procedure is NOT TO BE USED to perform normal OR preventive maintenance for which a specific permanent procedure is provided". A permanent i procedure IP/0/A/3540/01, SCI Inverters Corrective Maintenance, dated l 3-7-83, existed to provide instructions for a safe and correct method of maintenance and repair of Solidstate Cnntrols, Inc. (SCI) Inverters.

! In addition, Maintenance Management Procedure (MMP) 1.0, Revision 20,

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Work Request Preparation in paragraph 4.1.5 requires that Section II of the WR be updated by the supervisor as required and section 4. identifies that the I & E Technician, when using IP/0/A/3890/01, must contact Quality Control (QC) before exceeding the limits imposed by IP/0/A/3890/01. The WR was not updated to identify the correct procedure nor was QC contacted for this particular work evolutio Since the improper procedure was used to attempt to correct this inverter problem, this resulted in the tripping of the EIB inverter causing a reactor trip signal and main feedwater isolation to occu Since the plant was in Mode 3 at this time, there was no safety significance for this specific occurrenc This incident is also discussed in Licensee Event Report 414/86-36. This is identified as a Violation 414/86-39-02: Failure to follow Procedures to troubleshoot and repair Solidstate Controls, Inc. Inverter One violation was identified as described in paragraph 7.b. abov . Review of Licensee Nonroutine Event Reports (Units 1 & 2) (92700) The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC requirements. The determination included: adequacy of description, verification of compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety significance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for those reports indicated by an (*). The following LERs are closed:

  • LER 413/86-15 Diesel Inoperable Due to Incorrect Specifications on Support / Restraint Sketch LER 413/86-28 Unit Shutdown Due to Unidentified Peactor Coolant Leakage LER 413/86-29 Re Engineered Safety Features Actuation of Diesel Sequencer by Unknown Cause LER 413/86-32 Steam Generator PORV Surveillance Interval Exceeded Due to Personnel Error -

LER 413/86-34 Auto Start of Auxiliary Feedwater Due to Equipment Malfunction

  • LER 413/86-36 Inoperable Containment Isolation Valve Due to Defective Procedure L

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LER 413/86-37 Ice Condenser Inlet Doors Inoperable Due to Personnel Error

  • LF.R 413/86-38 Unit Vent Radiation Monitor Inoperable Due to Personnel Error
  • LER 414/86-07 Feedwater Isolation Due to a Personnel Error
  • LER 414/86-21 False ESF Signal Causes Main Feedwater Isolation
  • LER 414/86-22 Feedwater Isolation Due to a Training ~

Deficiency

  • LER 414/86-23 Main Feedwater Isolation.During Testing Due to Personnel Error
  • LER 414/86-24 Incomplete Containment Integrity Surveillance Due to Defective Procedure (violation issued)
  • LER 414/86-25 Missed Valve Retest Due to a Personnel Error (violationissued)
  • LER 414/86-28 Safety Injection During Loss of Control Room Test Due to Design Deficiency (violation issued)
  • LER 414/86-34 Manual Reactor Trip Due to Unexpected Closure of Feedwater Containment Isolation Valves The following LER's have been reviewed but can not be closed at this time. The licensee has been requested to revise these LER's to clarify questions raised by the inspectors:

LER 413/86-08 Auxiliary Feedwater Start Due to Malfunction of Main Feedwater Control Valve

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LER 413/86-31 Forced Shutdown Caused by Excessive Leakage Due to Weld Failure LER 413/86-35 Feedwater Isolation on Hi-Hi Steam Generator Level Due to Design Deficiency LER 414/86-03 Rev. 1 Main Feedwater Isolation Due to Spurious Hi-Hi Steam Generator Level Signals LER 414/86-26 Rev. 1 Feedwater Isolation on Hi-Hi Steam Generator Level Due to Design Deficiency LER 414/86-29 Feedwater Isolation and Auxiliary Feedwater Failure Due to Equipment and Personnel Failures LER 414/86-33 Phase A Containment Isolation Due to An Unknown Cause LER 414/86-36 Reactor Trip Signal and ESF Actuator Due to Personnel Error b. During the review of LER 413/86-39, the inspector identified that administrative controls did not exist to adequately describe the method of placing a performance test in a hold status or to "back-out" of a test that for some reason could not be completed and the system or portion thereof returned to a normal status. This inadequacy lead to the problem identified in this repor The inspector discussed this with licensee personnel and the licensee has stated he will revise Station Directive 3.2.2, Development and Conduct of The Periodic Testing Program, to clarify methods to be used for test interruption This item is identified as Inspector Followup Item 413/86-36-01, 414/86-39-01; Revision of SD 3.2.2 to clarify administrative controls for test interruptio c. Licensee Event Report 413/86-18 was reported on April 24, 198 This described a violation of TS 3.7.1.2 associated with the Auxiliary Feedwater System, where both motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps were inoperable at the same time without taking the action steps required by TS. This is identified as a Licensee Identified Violation (LIV) as described by Regional Office Notice No. 0903, Documenting Violations for Which No Notice of Violation is Issued. Identification of this item is LIV 413/86-36-2, Violation of TS 3.7.1.2 Auxiliary Feedwater Inoperable Due to Personnel Error - LER 413/86-18. This item is closed based on actions taken in the LE d. LER 414/86-17 describes a situation whereby fouling of valves caused inadequate ficw from the Auxiliary Feedwater System, to the Steam Generators (SG's). The preoperational test had not been conducted to verify design flow to the SG's due to practical considerations such as cooldown effects on the plant during Hot Functional Testing. The

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reactor trip reviews did not recognize inadequate flow since only two SG's data were being reviewed. The trip review program has been upgraded to correct this problem. Another aspect of this event was the fact that the periodic test to perform the surveillance required by Technical Specification (TS) 4.7.1.2.2 did not verify design flow to the SG's. This TS requires verification of a flow path to each SG "by verifying normal flow to each steam generator". The licensee indicated that they believe the intent of this TS is to verify flow path only, not design flow. This is based on their historical knowledge of the TS and the fact that no parameters are defined in the TS. The licensee was requested to provide documentation of the intent of this TS if available. Further review of this incident is necessary to determine if the licensee was in violation of TS 4.7.1.2.2. This is Unresolved Item 413/86-36-03, 414/86-39-03: Review for Compliance with TS 4.7.1.2.2, Auxiliary Feedwater Syste No violations or deviations were identifie . RefuelingActivities(Unit 1) (60705 and 60710)

Unit 1 entered Mode 6 to commence its first refueling outage during this reporting perio The inspectors observed adequate coordination and planning of refueling activities. Areas inspected included verification that Technical Specifications were met, including completion of required fuel handling equipment testing. Proper radiological controls, housekeeping and foreign materials exclusion practices were observed. The inspectors additionally witnessed fuel handling activities and implementation of proper fuel accountability procedures and reviewed applicable operating and casualty procedure After lifting the reactor vessel head an unidentified object was discovered by the licensee laying on the upper support plate. It was subsequently identified as the nozzle from one of four (4) Upper Head Injection (VHI)

lines. The nozzle, which is threaded and pinned to the pipe apparently fell off at some point in time. Investigation is in progress by the licensee and vendor for this even No violation or deviations were identifie . Previously Identified Inspector Findings (Units 1 & 2) (92701)

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 413/84-93-06, 414/84-42-06: Need to Upgrade Maintenance Trainin The inspector reviewed the upgraded mechanical maintenance training. This training has now been defined and is being conducted according to the requirements contained in the Employee Training and Qualification System (ETQS). Qualification task, task training and requalification training have been included in ETQS. Based on this review, this item is close No violation or deviations were identifie _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ . _ _ .__ _ _ - _ . ___

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