IR 05000413/1996015

Insp Repts 50-413/96-15 & 50-414/96-15 on 960901-1012.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Engineering & Plant Support

ML20134J735
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	11/07/1996
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20134J728	List: IR 05000413/1996015 ML20134J725
References
50-413-96-15, 50-414-96-15, NUDOCS 9611180019
Download: ML20134J735 (14)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos: 50-413, 50-414 License Nos: NPF-35, NPF-52 Report Nos.: 50-413/96-15. 50-414/96-15

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Licensee: Duke Power Company i Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Dates: September 1 - October 12. 1996 Inspectors: P. Balmain. Resident Inspector N. Economos Reactor Inspector Approved by: Leonard Wert. Acting Chief, Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects l

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ENCLOSURE

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Catawba Nuclear Station. Units 1 & 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-413/96-15, 50-414/96-15 This integrated inspection included aspects of Steam Generator Replacement Project activities in the area of engineering and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of announced inspection performed by resident and regional reactor inspector Enoineerina l

• Restoration of piping, piping supports, and instrumentation was j performed effectively (Section E1.3).

The licensee's control and implementation of the startup testing program was effective. Hot gap measurement and visual leak inspection efforts were well coordinated and executed (Sections E1.4 and E1.5).

l * Use of the Plant Simulator to familiarize and review load rejection test l procedures and expected plant response with control room shift crews prior to performing transient tests was good. Senior operators and reactor operators demonstrated a proactive attitude during this training i

(Section E1.4).

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• Unit 1 Lower Containment area housekeeping conditions declined during l this inspection period. The number of tools and miscellaneous equipment

! observed to be left in the lower containment areas increased, apparently l as the result of physical access to the containment areas being reduce The licensee increased attention to housekeeping and took appropriate l

actions following identification of the issues (Section E1.6).

Plant Succort

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• Radiation protecticii performance during the steam generator replacement outage was very good. The work was completed well under established radiation protection goals for steam generator replacement and outage activities. The licensee's efforts and implementation of a good shutdown crud burst, temporary shielding, and ALARA (As Low As

Reasonably Achievable) exposure planning resulted in excellent l performance (Section R1.1).

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Reoort Details Summary of Unit 1 Plant Status The Unit began the period defueled with steam generator replacement activities in progress. Refueling activities began on September 7.1996, and final Steam Generator Replacement Project (SGRP) secondary system welding activities were !

completed on September 8. Refueling was completed and preparations for unit !

heatup began on September 15. The unit entered reactor startup mode on i October 2 and was on-line October 4. The unit reached full power on October 10. The duration of the steam generator replacement was approximately 113 days, which exceeded the target duration of 100 days. The delay was due to steam generator secondary welding problems and plant equipment problems during startup.

Review of UFSAR Commitments I A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) description highlighted the need for a special focus review that compares plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters to the UFSAR descriptions. While performing inspections discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas ins)ected. The inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with tie observed plant practice procedures, and/or parameters. No deficiencies were identifie .

I. Enaineerina )

El Conduct of Engineering E General Comments-Steam Generator Reolacement Outaae Summary i i

Unit 1 steam generator replacement activities were completed during this j inspection period. In general, the licensee's management and execution i of steam generator replacement activities was good. The licensee's preparation and planning for the outage was evident in several areas !

where good results were achieved; including facility preparation '

removal and storage of old steam generators, fit-up of new steam generators, and startup testing. Overall radiation protection

]erformance during the outage was very good because of an effective crud Jurst and ALARA planning. One area of significant challenge concerned problems encountered with manual secondary system welding, which resulted in part from insufficient preparation and trainin ENCLOSURE

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E1.2 Steam Generator Reolacement a. Insoection Scoce (50001)

Weld process control records were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the documentation of fabrication. Additionally, an inspection of SGRP safety-related welds was conducte b. Observations and Findinos Weld process control records were selected at random for review. The records were reviewed for completeness, accuracy, compliance with site Welding Manual requirements and regulatory commitment The review focused on applicable weld fabrication requirements, inspection of '

Quality Control (OC) and Authorized Nuclear Inspector hold point documentation of weld repairs filler metal used identification of welders, and Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) requirements as  ;

applicable.

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Field Welds selected for review were as follows:

Weld Sjzg System Comments CF038-1 16"x0.844 Main Feedwater No random i Nozzle "A" Loop inspections l documente CF039-1 16"x0.844 Main Feedwater No random Nozzle "B" Loop inspections documente !

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CF040-1 16"x0.844 Main Feedwater Four repairs Nozzle "C" Loop before accepted by Radiographic

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Testing (RT). OC

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hold deleted by  ;

Technical Suppor I CF041-1 16"x0.844 Main Feedwater No random OC Nozzle "D" Loop inspections documente BB127-05 3"x0.438 SG Blowdown OC hold pt. for purge deleted by Technical Suppor Four repairs before accepted by R ENCLOSURE

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I 3 1BB134-04 3"x0.438 SG Blowdown Six repairs before accepted by R BW018-35 3"x0.438 SG Wet Layup One repair Recirculation before accepted by i R CF002-13 18"x0.938 Main Feedwater Two repairs Loop "A" before accepted by R CF003-4 18"x0.938 Main Feedwater Four repairs Loop "A" before accepted by R ISM 24-26 32"x1.478 Main Steam One repair Loop "C" before accepted by R ISM 29-36 32"x1.478 Main Steam Six repairs Loop "B" before accepted by R CF002-4 18"x0.938 Main Feedwater Five repairs ,

Loop "A" before accepted by !

R The inspector noted the following:

Records of welds fabricated prior to August 8.1996, showed that for the most part random QC inspections of weld process attributes (i.e.. pre-heat. interpass, temperature, welder identification, and filler metal verification) were not being documented. However, after the'above dat random OC checks of the attributes were being documented on the forms provide In reference to main feedwater weld CF040-1 identified above, the review l disclosed that the weld was fabricated on August 7.1996, and

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subsequently rejected by visual for a root condition which was subsequently confirmed and rejected by radiography on August 9.199 No further repairs were performed on this joint until August 31. 199 At that time, the we V repair was radiographed and again rejected on September 1. 1996. for a root condition. This weld was repaired again and rejected two more times by RT before being accepted on September . During this review, the inspector noted that 1nitially, the

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licensee attempted to repair the root condition by grinding. Due to the extensive grinding required to remove the defect, the joint was weld

. repaired. During the conduct of these weld repairs all QC hold points

. were inspected as required. In addition to documenting this corrective 4 action. the Quality Assurance (0A) manager deleted the non-applicable OC i

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hold points, on August 27. 199 The deleted hold points ap)1ied to welding (i.e.. fitup and preheat). Although deletion of OC lold points was permitted by the procew re controlling inspection of 0A welds, the inspector noted that it was not an often used practice. In conclusio the ins)ector determined that in this case. deleting these QC hold !

points lad no adverse effect on weld quality or plant safet !

1 Conclusions  :

The weld process control records review disclosed that the licensee was !

maintaining a good record of weld fabrication and inspections of safety-related welds. Documentation of random QC inspections improved i following the work stoppage for process control problems identified on ~

August 8-9. 1996. The details of the process control problems and work stoppage was discussed in Inspection Report 50-413.414/96-1 !

El.3 Interference Removal and Restoration i Insoection Scooe (50001)

The inspector performed walkdowns and reviewed maintenance work order and modification documentation associated with SGRP Interference Removal and Restoratio Observations and Findinas i

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Restoration of Pioina. Restraints. Snubbers and Sucoorts I The inspector performed walkdowns of the A SG cavity following -

completion of SG installation activities. The inspector verified that selected piping supports and snubbers associated with the SG blowdown, wet layup and main steam systems were installed properly. The inspector also performed a review of the supporting Work Order (WO) documentation ,

listed below and found no discrepancies. The inspector reviewed '

corrective action documentation of discrepancies identified during the licensee's walkdowns of system restoration and found that the licensee took appropriate actions to properly identify and correct snubber and l support installation problems (PIPS 1-C96-2466.2492). l

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WO 95024972 Remove / Install New Feedwater (CF) Piping SG 1A

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WO 95024654 Reroute SG Blowdown Recycle (BB)/ Wet Lay-Up (BW)

Piping and Supports J

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WO 95096811 Remove / Replace Auxiliary Feedwater (CA) Piping l in SG 1A Cavity I

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5 Restoration of Instrumentation The licensee performed modifications to instrumentation affected by the j SG replacemen These changes were controlled by modification NSM CN- l 19815. Replacement SG Instrumentation and Control. The inspector reviewed the final scope document and performed a walkdown of the A SG wide range and narrow range SG level instrumentation. During the walkdown the inspector verified that instrument tubing was installed and insulated as required by modification documentatio Conclusions Restoration of piping, piping supports, and instrumentation was performed effectivel E1.4 Steam Generator Post-Installation Verification and Testina

! Insoection Scoce (50001)

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The inspector conducted post-installation verification inspections in '

the areas of startup testing preparations, hot gap measurements, visual leak inspections of primary and secondary systems, instrumentation calibration. and operator trainin Observations and Findinas Startuo Testina Preoarations The inspector reviewed the licensee's startup testing preparations and observed that the performance of tests conducted up to Mode 2 was controlled through the outage schedule. Included were hot gap verifications at various temperature plateaus and visual leak inspections at operating temperature / pressure. Control of startup testing from Mode 2 through full power was integrated and controlled t through procedure PT/0/A/4150/01. Controlling Procedure for Startup l Physics Testing, and included SG level control system verification, load rejection tests. Reactor Vessel Level Indicating System (RVLIS)

verification, reactor core performance, and steam generator thermal performance. The licensee's test plan also included a moisture carryover test after approximately one month of full power operation and a natural circulation verification test during a scheduled controlled shutdow Hot Gao Measurements and Visual Leak Insoections t At several temperature plateaus during primary system heatup the licensee performed hot gap measurements at support locations on the reactor coolant pump supports. steam generator lower lateral supports, and upper lateral supports. The licensee performed some shim adjustments during tie heatup in order to meet the predicted gap

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requirements for full temperature conditions. Contingencies to cool the unit down for shim adjustments were not needed. The inspector reviewed gap measurement data and verified that as left final gap measurements i met acceptance criteri )

In lieu of hydrostatic pressure testing for welded repairs and !

installation of replacement welding the licensee utilized ASME Code Case N-416-1. Alternative Pressure Test Requirements for Welded Repairs or Installation of Replacement Items by Welding. Class 1. 2. and 3 Section XI. Division This code case was approved for use at Catawba !

by the NRC on March 6.1995, based in part on industry experience that has demonstrated that leaks are not being discovered as a result of i hydrostatic test pressures propagating a pre-existing flaw through wal The inspector verified that the licensee implemented the requirements of Code Case N-416-1 (procedure MP/0/A/7650/088). The licensee identified approximately 10 small active leaks from pipe caps, seat leakage, and valve packing A. ring the walkdown. These leaks were subsequently corrected. ?o leaks were detected associated with SG weld installatio From discnsions with personnel who performed the walkdowns the inspector discerned that the number of active leaks identified was less than the number identified following previous outages. The inspector concluded that both the hot gap measurement and visual leak inspection efforts were well coordinated and execute Instrumentation Calibration Unit 1 License Amendment Number 151, issued on August 29. 1996, addressed instrumentation setpoints for the reactor trip system and the engineered safety features system. The inspector reviewed calculations used to establish the new narrow range level instrumentation setpoin DPC-1210 04-00-0004. Instrument Loop Uncertainty for Steam Generator Narrow Range Level and DPC-1201.37-00-0001. Replacement Steam Generator Level Control System Set)oints for MNS Units 1 and 2. and CNS Unit The inspector verified tlat narrow range level trip setpoints established through the licensee's calculations were translated properly into calibration procedures and reflected Technical Specification (TS)

values. The inspector reviewed instrumentation calibration procedure IP/1/A/3222/ 014A. Steam Generator Narrow Range Level Channel 1 and completed calibration data sheets (WO 96019199-02) and verified that the revised protection setpoints for Hi-Hi and Lo-Lo levels were properly implemented in the plan Doerator Trainina The inspector reviewed operator training lesson plans and training packages provided for operators and verified that training was provided which addressed changes involved with the new Babcock & Wilcox International (BWI) replacement steam generators. Training was performed for SG internal geometry changes, secondary piping reroutes, revised setpoints normal operating procedures, and procedures for transients and accidents. An operations training instructor made a trip ENCLOSURE

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l to another facility which recently completed a steam generator replacement and incorporated startup testing results from the other plant into the Catawba training program. The inspector observed that prior to the SGRP outage the licensee performed a training and procedure l

' self-assessment audit which was effective (OPS-01-96). During startup testing the licensee conducted "just in time" training for all the control room operating crews that would be on shift during load rejection testin This training utilized the plant simulator to review the tests and to perform abnormal procedures that would be used. The inspector witnessed the "just in time" simulator training and observed that the control room crew effectively used the simulator to re)erform the load rejections in several secondary plant configurations tlat were possible during power escalation activitie ' Conclusions The licensee's control and implementation of the startup testing program was effective. Hot gap measurement and visual leak inspection efforts were well coordinated and executed. Use of Plant Simulator to familiarize and review load rejection test procedures and expected plant response with control room shift crews prior to performing transient '

tests was good. Senior reactor operators and reactor operators demonstrated a proactive attitude during this training.

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E1.5 Startuo and Power Escalation Testina Observations .

The inspectors periodically observed startup testing and power escalation activities in the Unit 1 control room from October 2 through October 10. These activities were performed with clear communication and good coordination between test personnel and control room shift crews. One exception to this performance involved coordination for the resolution of main steam flow indication discrepancies which resulted in unexpected level deviations in the A and B steam generators (PIP 1-C96-2723). The inspector reviewed and discussed the results of load rejection transient tests and SG level control system tests with responsible test engineers. Level stability was improved from the previous SGs and no tuning or modifications to the SG level control system were required as a result of the SG replacement. In additio transient test data revealed that plant equipment responded properl Overall, the licensee rformed startup testing and power escalation testing activities wel E1.6 Lower Containment Cleanliness and HousekeeDinQ Controls Insoection Scone (50001)

l The inspectors reviewed Unit 1 lower containment housekeeping and l

material conditio i l

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8 Observations and Findinas During the inspection period housekeeping conditions in the Unit 1 lower containment were observed to have declined. The inspector informed licensee management of these observations and the licensee subsequently formed an assessment team to perform a detailed walkdown of all areas in lower containment. The licensee documented results of the walkdown in PIP 1-C-96-2424. Numerous unattended articles, including tool bags, hard hats and used grinding disks were found throughout the lower containment areas during the walkdown. Some areas contained staged equipment that was not secured. Several main travel paths and ladder paths were observed to be cluttered with unnecessary equipment. The ,

licensee also identified and corrected several workers using im) roper i fall protection practices and several areas where grinding sparcs were improperly controlled. From discessions with licensee management, the inspector discerned that the decline in lower containment housekeeping was apparently attributable to the installation of divider barriers between upper and lower containment which reduced access to the are The inspectors subsequently performed independent walkdowns of the Unit I lower containment areas and verified that the licensee had corrected the housekeeping problem I Conclusions Unit 1 Lower Containment area housekeeping levels declined during this inspection period. The number of tools and miscellaneous ecuipment observed to be left in the lower containment areas increasec. apparently as a result of physical access to the containment areas being reduce The licensee increased attention to housekeeping and took appropriate actions following identification of the issue El.7 Review of Overtime Records Insoection Scoce (50001)

The inspector reviewed overtime records to determine if TS administrative guidelines for control of working hours for SGRP personnel performing safety-related functions were me Observations and Findinas TS 6.2.2.f. Administrative Controls-Unit Staff. requires that administrative controls be developed and implemented to limit the working hours of station staff who perform safety-related function ,

The inspector reviewed a sample of overtime records for SGRP personnel including engineering technical support Jersonnel, welders, and welding QC inspectors. The inspector verified tlat overtime worked by personnel in this sample did not exceed TS guidelines. The inspector verified that Nuclear Site Directive 200 rev 3. Overtime Control, contained ENCLOSURE l

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administrative controls that implemented the guidelines of TS 6.2. t i Conclusions l Required controls to limit working hours were implemented properl j II Plant Sucoort R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 SG Reolacement and Refuelino Outaae Radiation Protection Performance  ; Insoection Scooe (50001)

The inspector reviewed the results of licensee's steam generator and refueling outage radiation protection performance based on ALARA goals and results for total radiation exposure, number of radiological events, i and solid radwaste generatio I Observations and Findinas ,

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Total outage exposure received was 268 rem which was.approximately 65%  ;

l of the licensee's target goal of 434 rem. Exposure was categorized to  ;

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account for dose received during SG replacement activities and routine refueling outage activities. SG replacement activities accounted for

168 rem (60% of the 300 rem target goal). Refueling outage activities

! accounted for 100 rem (89% of the 113 rem target). Similar results were achieved in-the Solid Radwaste generation area with a total of 8320 l cubic ft of waste generated (44% of target goal). 4326 cubic ft. were generated by SG replacement activities and 3994 cubic ft. were

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L generated by refueling outage activities (34% and 66% of target goal res)ectively). A total of 7 radiological events occurred which resulted

, in 31Ps. This was 19% of the target goal of 48' events. 2 radiological I

events occurred during SG replacement activities and 5 events occurred during refueling outage activities (8% and 28% of target goal respectively).

l Conclusions

, Radiation protection performance during the steam generator replacement

! outage was very good. The work was completed well under established-radiation protection goals for steam generator replacement and outage activities. The licensee's efforts and implementation of a good shutdown crud burst, temporary shielding, and ALARA planning greatly contributed to the good performanc :

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III. Manaaement Meetinas X1 . Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors resented the inspection results to members of licensee

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management at tie conclusion of the inspection on October 17. 1996. The l licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was i identified.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED ,

Licensee-Anderson. J. 0A. Welding Benoit. R., SGRP Engineer Cabe. D., Level III Examiner Radiography l Connell. K., SGRP Licensing Procurement Manager  :

Edwards. J., Welding Job Supervisor Forbes. J. , Engineering Manager Freeman. C. Welding Technical Specialist  !

Hallman, G.. SGRP Project Manager Harbin. G., System Engineer  !

Kent. G., SGRP Licensing <

Kitlan. M., Regulatory Compliance Manager '

McCollum W. Catawba Site Vice-President  ;

McCurry. T.. SGRP Engineer '

Nicholson, K., Compliance Specialist l Patrick M.. Safety Assurance Manager  !

Peterson. G. Station Manager  !

Pitser. K., SGRP Engineer t Queenan R.. System Engineer Schlise. L.. SGRP_ Radiation Protection Sharpe. R., SGRP Licensing Sills. S., SGRP Site Manager Stout. D.. Engineering Supervisor Tower, D. , Compliance Engineer Vandeven. T., Maintenance Engineer Wiley, SGRP Engineer ENCLOSURE

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 50001- Steam Generator Replacement Inspection LIST OF ACRONYMS USED l ALARA - As Low As Reasonably Achievable ASME - American Society of Mechanical Engineers BB -

Blowdown Recycle BW -

Wet Lay-Up BWI -

Babcock & Wilcox International CA -

Auxiliary Feedwater  !

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Feedwater i CFR -

Code of Federal Regulations  !

CNS -

Catawba Nuclear Station  !

FSAR - Final Safety Analysis Report '

FTI -

Framatome Technologies In ;

IAE -

Instrument and Electrical  !

l IR -

Inspection Report  :

MNS -

McGuire Nuclear Station NDE -

Non-Destructive Examination  !

NRR -

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  !

PIP -

Problem Investigation Process  ;

! OA -

Quality Assurance

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QC -

Quality Contro ;

R Radiation Protection l RT -

Radiographic Testing  ;

RVLIS - Reactor Vessel Level Indicating System SG -

Steam Generator l SGRP - Steam Generator Replacement Project i i TS -

Technical Specification l

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Unresolved Item  :

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Work Order  !

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