IR 05000413/1998005
| ML20236H637 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 06/22/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236H635 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-98-05, 50-413-98-5, 50-414-98-05, 50-414-98-5, NUDOCS 9807070292 | |
| Download: ML20236H637 (27) | |
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l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos:
50-413. 50-414 License Nos:
Report Nos.:
50-413/98-05, 50-414/98-05
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Licensee:
Duke Energy Corporation i
Facility:
Catawba Nuclear Station. Units 1 and 2 l
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Location:
422 South Church Street Charlotte. NC 28242
Dates:
April 12 - May 23, 1998 Inspectors:
D. Roberts. Senior Resident Inspector R. Franovich, Resident Inspector
M. Giles. Resident Inspector (In Training)
l E. Lea. Project Engineer. RII (Section M3.2)
R. Moore. Reactor Inspector. RII (Sections 08 M8.3.
E8.1-E8.4)
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W. Stansberry. Safeguards Specialist (Sections S1.1-S7.1)
Approved by:
C. Ogle. Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects
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Enclosure 9807070292 980622
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PDR ADOCK 0500
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Catawba Nuclear Station. Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-413/98-05, 50-414/98-05 This integrated inspection included aspects of facility operations, maintenance engineering, and plant support.
The report covers a 6-week period of resident ins)ection: in addition. it includes the results of announced inspections ]y regional-based inspectors. [ Applicable template codes and the assessments for items inspected are provided.]
Operations An improper controller set point on condensate booster pump
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recirculation valve 1CM-27 caused the Unit 1 upper surge tank inventory to exceed the design temperature and temperature limits assumed in the licensee's accident analyses. An Augmented Inspection Team responded to the event.
Their inspection activities and findings are documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-413.414/98-06. (Section 01.1: [1A-Neg])
Maintenance
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Licensee efforts to monitor and trend nuclear service water system
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performance were indicative of a desire to identify and correct degradation before operability was impacted.
(Section M1.1: [2B - Pos])
Labeling problems encountered during nuclear service water system flow
testing were indicative of a persistent equipment labeling problem.
(Section M1.1: [1C - Neg])
A non-cited violation was identified for failure to have adequate
procedures for testing containment air return and hydrogen skimmer fans.
(Section M3.1: [4C - NCV])
The licensee's identification of inadequate test procedures for the
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containment air return and hydrogen skimmer fans was good.
(Section M3.1: [5A - Pos])
The licensee missed an opportunity in November 1996 to implement
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adequate corrective actions for the same pressurizer heater Technical Specification (TS) surveillance concern that was identified on May 14, 1998.
Once the TS surveillance concern was re-identified on May 14, 1998, the licensee delayed entry into TS 4.0.3 and 3.0.3 until May 21, 1998: thereby. preventing timely resolution of the TS noncompliance through formal NRC processes.
This TS surveillance issue was identified as an unresolved item.
(Section M3.2: [5C.2B - URI])
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Enaineerina An unresolved item was identified related to a potentially inadequate
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engineering technical evaluation concerning the operating time of the emergency diesel generator without cooling water.
This issue was not safety significant but exhibited poor engineering performance.
(Section E8.4: [4A,4B - URI])
Plant Sucoort-
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The licensee used good compensatory measures that ensured the
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reliability of security related equipment and devices.
(Section S1.1:
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[1C - Pos])
Intrusion detection systems, site illumination and essessment aids were
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found functional, well maintained, and effective.
(Section S2.3: [2A -
Pos])
Safeguards plan and procedure documentation complied with 10 CFR Part i
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50.
Changes to sections reviewed in the Physical Security Plan did not
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decrease the effectiveness of the Physical Security Plan.
(Section
$3.2: [1C - Pos])
Security personnel aossessed the knowledge to carry out their assigned
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duties and responsi)ilities, including the use of response procedures, deadly force, and armed response tactics.
(Section S4.1: [3B - Pos])
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Responses by the security organization to security threats.
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contingencies, and routine response situations, including drills, were
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consistent with the security procedures and the approved Physical Security Plan.
(Section S4.2: [3A - Pos])
The licensee was proficiently training the security force and conducting
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weapons requalification according to the Training and Qualification Plan and regulatory requirements.
(Section 55.1: [3B - Pos])
The total number of trained security officers and armed personnel
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immediately available to fulfill response requirements met plan requirements. (Section S6.3: [1C - Pos])
One full-time member of the security organization who had the authority
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to direct security activities did not have duties that conflicted with the assignment to direct all activities during an incident.
(Section S6.3: [1C - Pos])
Safeguards audits were thorough, complete, and effective in uncovering
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weaknesses in the Fitness for Duty Program, security program, plans, procedures, and practices.
(Section S7.1: [5A - Pos])
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Reoort Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 operated at or near 100 percent power until May 7. 1998, when a power
. reduction was initiated in response to demand swings associated with steam
- generator D feedwater. control valve ICF-55.
Power was reduced to approximately 30 percent for valve repair.
While at reduced power, the licensee determined that the cause of the demand swings was an air leak on I
valve ICF-55.
During maintenance, an inspection of the other three steam
. generator feedwater control valves revealed a similar air leak on steam i
generator A feedwater control valve ICF-28.
Both valves were repaired and i
power escalation to 100 percent commenced on May 8, 1998.
The reactor power increase was halted at 85 percent power when concerns about. auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system operability were raised as a result of a high temperature condition associated with the upper surge tank. An Augmented Inspection Team was dispatched to the site to inspect the AFW system operability issue (refer to NRC Inspection Report 50-413.114/98-06).
Following resolution of the AFW system operability concerns, power escalation commenced on May 15, 1998, and the unit reached 100 percent power on May 16, 1998. The unit operated at or near 100 percent. power for the remainder of the inspection period.
e Unit 2 operated at or near 100 percent power during the inspection period.
Review of Updated Final Safety Analysis Reoort (UFSAR) Commitments While performing inspections discussed in this report. the inspectors reviewed-the applicable portions of the UFSAR that were related to the areas inspected.
The inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the observed plant practices, procedures, and parameters.
I. Doerations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707. 93702)
The inspectors conducted frequent control room tours to verify proper
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staffing, operator attentiveness and communications, and adherence to procedures. The inspectors attended operations shift turnovers and site direction meetings to maintain awareness of overall plant status and operations.
Operator logs were reviewed to verify operational safety and compliance with Technical Specifications (TS).
Instrumentation, computer indications. and safety system lineups were periodically reviewed, along with equipment removal and restoration tagouts, to
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assess system availability. The TS Action Item Log (TSAIL) books for i
both units were reviewed daily for potential entries into limiting conditions for operation (LCO) action statements. The inspectors conducted plant tours to observe material condition and housekeeping.
Problem Identification Process (PIP) reports were routinely reviewed to ensure that potential safety concerns and equipment problems were resolved.
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l An improper controller setpoint on condensate booster pump recirculation j
valve ICM-127 caused the Unit 1 upper surge tank (UST) inventory to i
exceed the design temperature and temperature limits assumed in the licensee's~ accident analyses.
An Augmented Inspection Team responded to the event: their inspe'ction activities and findings are documented in NRC Inspection-Report 50-413.414/98-06.
On May 14. 1998, the licensee reported a missed TS surveillance
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associated'with auxiliary building filter unit (ABFU) surveillance testing. The ABFU surveillance requirement included measuring the pressure drop across-the complete filter unit, including a moisture
separator. -to ensure that the acceptance criterion for differential
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pressure across the ABFU could be met.
The licensee discovered that the moisture separator was not located within the filter train, and the
. pressure drop across it had not been accounted for ln previous tests.
Both units immediately entered TS 4.0.3.
The 1A, 2A and-2B ABFUs were successfully tested..but the.1B ABFU surveillance test results indicated that the air flow acceptance criterion of 30.000 cfm +/- 10% could'not be met.
Filters associated with the B-train of the auxiliary building ventilation system were replaced, and the test was successfully i
completed.within the required LCO time.
The issue is being documented I
in a licensee event report (LER) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 l
reporting requirements.
Inspector followup of this issue will be documented in the closeout of LER 50-413/98-05.
Operational ' Status. of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 Reoortable Events (71707.- 71750)
Several notifications were made to the NRC regarding the failure of
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emergency warning equipment and fire protection program noncompliance.
I On April 16, 1998, the' licensee notified the NRC that all' 68 sirens.
failed to activate.during the conduct of a York County silent test of the warning siren system. The licensee determined that a computer
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. problem caused the sirens to fail the test and implemented compensatory
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- measures to ensure that siren activation could be 3rovided by an
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alternative means until York County's activation a)ility could be
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restored.
Foilowing computer repairs, the York County sirens were l
.. restored to service within three hours of the test failure.
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.During their triennial fire protection audit. the licensee identified-two problems associated with their Fire Protection Program.
Specifically. -they discovered that a requirement to inspect fire hose
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coupling gaskets every 18 months was omitted when procedure changes were made in 1994.
The licensee inspected the fire hose coupling gaskets and determined that they were'in good material condition.
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' verified that the valve gaskets listed in the licensee's design basis-documentation were also listed in Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.4.
Fire Hose Stations. Table 16.9-2. Fire Hose Stations, dated March 18, 1997;
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The licensee also identified several problems with penetration seals in committed fire barriers.
The problems rendered the fire barrier sealing devices inoperable. The insSector verified that compensatory measures (fire watches) were established to ensure that the Fire Protection Program requirements were satisfied.
Pendirig the licensee's completion of its triennial fire protection audit and further NRC inspection of the Fire Protection Program, this issue is characterized as Unresolved Item (URI) 50-413.414/98-05-01:
Fire Protection Program Noncompliance.
Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901. 92700)
08.1 (Closed) Violation (VIO) 50-414/96-05-01: Failure to Comply With Hydrogen Mitigation System Technical Specification (TS)
(Closed) LER 50-414/96-02: Technical Specification Violation for Redundant Hydrogen Igniters Inoperable in the Same Region These items addressed a condition in which the number of inoperable containment hydrogen ignitors exceeded the number specified in TS. This was due to ]oor communications between maintenance and operations
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regarding t1e status of ignitors being out-of-service for maintenance and surveillance testing.
An additional contributor was the lack of clarity in the surveillance procedure regarding the acceptance criteria.
The corrective actions specified in the licensee's response to the violation dated June 27. 1996, and September 1. 1996, included replacement of the out of service ignitor, and review and revision of maintenance procedures that implement the TS surveillance to clarify acceptance criteria.
The out-of-service ignitor was replaced on August 6. 1996, and documented on work order 96025349-01.
The procedure review was completed on February 27. 1997, and documented in Problem Investigation Process (PIP) report 0-C96-0708. There were 565 procedures reviewed and three 3rocedures revised to clarify acceptance criteria. A communication paccage to superintendents, managers and supervisors dated April 25. 1996, addressed the communications issue regarding informing 0)erations of TS surveillance results. The inspector concluded tais item was adequately resolved.
II. Maintenance i
M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Coolina Water Flow Quarterly Test a.
Insoection Scone (61726)
The inspectors observed the conduct of a quarterly test to identify the presence of clams and mussels in the nuclear service water (NSW) system cooling flow associated with the 1A containment spray heat exchanger.
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Observations and Findinas On April 20, 1998, the inspectors observed the conduct of PT/1/A/4400/009. Cooling Water Flow Monitoring for Asiatic Clams and Mussels. Enclosure 13.5. Containment Spray Heat Exchanger 1A Flow Verification. Revision 45. The inspectors noted that 1RNPX5790. to which test instrumentation is connected for pressure readings, did not have a tag.
The test technicians stopped work to obtain piping and
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instrumentation diagrams so that the correct component could be verified by an alternative means. Although the test was delayed for almost an hour, the inspectors considered this an appropriate action.
The inspector concluded that problems persisted with labeling of equipment.
A site-wide effort to identify missing labels and informal operator aids is ongoing.
The test also had been performed on April 14. 1998.
Although the results met acceptance criteria they indicated the resistance factor for NSW flow through the heat exchanger was significantly higher than it had been during previous tests. The test was repeated to determine if an adverse trend in NSW biofouling could be detected.
The results of
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the April 20. 1998, test were sat 1sfactory and more comparable to results from previous tests.
The April 14, 1998, test results were considered anomalous.
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that efforts to monitor and trend system performance were indicative of a desire to identify and correct degradation before operability was impacted.
However problems with labeling of equipment persisted.
M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation M3.1 Containment Air Return Fan and Hydroaen Skimmer Fan Tests a.
Inspection Scope (61726)
On May 6. 1998, licensee personnel determined that procedures used to test the performance of containment air return fans and hydrogen skimmer fans for )oth units did not include a correction for air density.
The air density correction was not required by the associated TS surveillance, but was referenced in the Bases for TS 3/4.6.5.6. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and observed the performance of the corrected test procedure.
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Observations and Findinas On May 6,1998, the licensee identified that the then-current revision of Procedure PT/1/A/4450/05B. Containment Air Return Fan IB and Hydrogen Skimmer Fan 1B Performance Test, along with similarly titled procedures for fans in the other train / unit, did not correct for air density associated with assumed conditions in containment following a loss of
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coolant accident.
Technical Specification 3.6.5.6 requires that two independent containment air return and hydrogen skimmer systems be operable with the plant in Modes 1 through 4.
The associated surveillance requirements in TS 4.6.5.6.lb and Ic are.to demonstrate operability by ver.ifying that, for the air return fans, the motor
- current;is measured to be less than or equal to 59 amperes (amps) when the fan speed _is 1187_ +/- 13 rotations per minute (rpm).
For the hydrogen skimmer fans, the motor current is required to be less than or
. equal to 69-amps when-the fan speed is 3580 +/- 20 rpm. The surveillance requirements are performed at least once per 92 days on a-staggered test b6 sis.
LThe )rocedure acceptance criteria for motor currents were conservatively:
.esta)lished for each fan motor at values less than the TS surveillance requirement acceptance criteria because of assumed instrument inaccuracies for clamp-on ammeters specified for use by the procedure.
For each air return and skimmer fan, the motor current requirements were established in the procedure at 4 amps less than the TS requirement.
such that the containment air return fan motors were required to be less than or equal'to 55 amps and the hydrogen skimmer fan motors were o
required to be less than or equal to 65 amps. The most recently completed procedures (performed prior to May 6,1998) for all. four trains (two trains per unit) indicated that the procedure acceptance criteria, and hence the.TS criteria, were satisfied with considerable margin. Average motor current readings were between 36 and 40 amps for
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all fans. The inspectors reviewed the above procedure results to verify that the fans. had previously passed their surveillance-tests.
However.
~these values had-been recorded without any compensation for density, as
- specified in the TS Bases for TS 3.6.5.6.
U)on discovery of the discrepancy, the licensee performed an evaluation, w1ich included an air' density correction for the most recently measured motor currents based on actual plant data (barometric conditions inside
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containment at the times the fans were last tested) and engineering judgement of what the accident density in containment would be. A psychrometric chart was used to obtain specific volume and density values.
The evaluation concluded that all but the two B-train containment air return fans (one in each unit) were within procedural acceptance criteria after density compensation. The B-train fans had calculated motor currents of 58~ and 57 amps for Unit 1 fan (ARF 1B) and l
Unit. 2 fan (ARF 28). respectively.
Both readings were above the 55-amp
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_ procedure requirement.
The licensee entered a 72-hour TS LC0 action
- statement as a result.
The A-train air return fans were calculated at
54 and 55 corrected amps, and the hydrogen skimmer fans were all between 55 and 57 corrected amps, still within their 65-amp requirement.
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~ The. licensee. determined that the procedure acceptance criteria were
. established below the TS values and questioned whether the procedure was unnecessarily conservative in including an adjustment for instrument error.
Licensee personnel pursued revising the procedure acceptance criteria-to remove the conservatism. The procedure was revised to L
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6 establish the acceptance criteria at the TS values, specify the most accurate of instruments be used, and to apply density compensation to the average of all three phase currents for each motor.
The inspectors reviewed the completed safety evaluation (done per 10 CFR 50.59) for the procedure change, which was approved by the PORC. The safety evaluation was reasonable and appropriately addressed each question regarding the potential for a TS clange or unreviewed safety question.
. On May 7,1998.-the -inspectors observed the performance of PT/1/A/4450/005B. Revision 40, which was corrected to include density compensation for the S-train containment air return fan, one of the two inoperable fans based on the previous day's evaluation.
Revised acceptance criteria for ARF-18. as well as those for ARF-2B (performed later that day) were both met during their respective tests-.
The two fans were declared operable and their LC0 action statements were exited.
The inspectors considered that the air return fans (with density
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compensation) were all operating relatively close to the TS motor current limit.
The licensee indicated that the fan motor current measurements had not increased significantly over previous tests and no
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immediate corrective actions were necessary.
The omission of density compensation from the fan motor test procedures had existed since both Catawba units began operating in the 1980s.
Technical Specification i 8.1.a and Regulatory Guide 1.33. Appendix A.
Revision 2. Section 8.b recuire that procedures be established, implemented, and maintainec covering surveillance tests listed in the TS.
The failure to have adequate procedures for the testing of the containment air return and hydrogen skimmer fans was considered a violation of this requirement.
This non-repetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is identified as a non-cited violation (NCV).
consistent with section VII B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, and is identified as NCV-50-413.414/98-05-02: Failure to Have Adequate Procedures for Testing Containment Air Return and Hydrogen Skimmer Fans.
c.- Conclusion i
A non-cited violation was identified for failure to have adequate procedures for testing containment air return and hydrogen skimmer fans.
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The licensee's identification of inadequate test procedures for the containment air return and hydrogen skimmer fans was good.
M3.2' Missed Pressurizer Heater TS Surveillance a.
Insoection Scooe (61726)
The inspectors followed up on a licensee-identified discrepancy regarding the performance of pressurizer heater surveillance testing as specified in Technical Specification (TS) 4.4.3.3.
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b.
Ob'servation and Findinas On May 19, 1998, the inspector observed.the licensee's discussion and reviewed PIP 0-C98-1812 (dated.May 14.1998)c which described a concern l'
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associated with the performance of TS surveillance.4.4.3.3 to
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demonstrate pressurizer heater operability in Units 1 and 2.
TS 4.4.3.3 i,
states that..~the emergency )ower supply for the pressurizer heaters shall be demonstrated OPERA3LE at least once per 18 months by manually transferring power from the normal-to the emergency power supply and-
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E energizing the heaters." Following review of the PIP, the inspectors discussed the issue with the licensee.
The inspectors were informed
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testing had been performed in accordance with TS.
During conversations with the licensee., the inspectors were also informed that the plant was L
designed =such that an automatic transfer from~ normal to emergency power would occur when required: therefore, based on the design of the plant.
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h the need to. test the manual transfer of power as indicated in TS 4.4.3.3-was not. required,
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f1, The inspectors were also informed through~ conversations with the licensee and by documentation supplied'by the licensee. that station
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management believed.that the intent of TS 4.4.3.3 had been met'.
PIP 0-
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C98-1812 specifically stated that "CNS feels that the intent of TS Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.3 is met by. successfully performing the
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overlapping procedures." The procedures to which the licensee's
documentation refer. d were ESF Test Procedure. PT/1(2)/A/4200/09.
Quarterly Surveillance Items Procedure. PT/1(2)/4600/003B, and the Surveillance Requirement for Unit Startup Procedure. PT/1(2)/A/4600/16.
The inspectors'later reviewed the procedures and determined that they
'did demonstrate an automatic transfer of power, but did not demonstrate-a manual transfer of power to energize the pressurizer heaters as c
required by-TS.
-On May 20, 1998, the licensee discussed PIP 0-C98-1812 again.
During this discussion, the licensee stated that existing-test procedures provided sufficient testing to demonstrate that those requirements identified in TS 4.4.3.3 were met.
The licensee's conclusion was reached based on existing plant design and PIP 0-C96-2985, initiated on
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November;-11, 1996. which had reached the same conclusion.
The basis
- indicated in the 1996 PIP for this conclusion was as follows:
"The Specification as written was adopted into CNS TS from generic Westinghouse specifications.
It is actually written for plants that have to manually align the emergency power source for the pressurizer.
heaters in an accident situation.
At.CNS power for the heaters will be L
aligned automatically, with no intervention required by the operators.
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ThereLare no special interlocks that have to be manipulated to allow the heaters to function from either the normal or emergency source. Since
.no manual actuation is required, our method of overlapping the tests to meet the specification is adequate."
' On May 21. the licensee notified the inspectors that the testing as identified in TS had not been performed.
Based on this finding, the
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licensee made the determination that both units were outside the surveillance requirements specified in the TS and requested enforcement discretion The NRC reviewed and granted the request for enforcement discretion on May 22, 1998.
Following a review of associated documentation and interviews of licensee personnel, the inspectors determined that had the licensee implemented adequate corrective actions for the PIP initiated in 1996, the concern-associated with -TS 4.4.3.3 would have been appropriately resolved.
During the ins)ection of the licensee's response to the concerns identified in PI) 0-C98-1812. the inspectors determined that the licensee was conducting a review of their TSs and existing testing procedures to ensure that all surveillance were being performed as required by TS.
The licensee also stated that other documents, such as the UFSAR. would be reviewed and the necessary changes would be made.
Pending further evaluation, this issue will be identified as Unresolved Item (URI) 50-413.414/98-05-03: TS Discrepancy Involving Pressurizer Heater Power Supply Manual Transfer Capability.
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c.
Conclusion The inspectors concluded that the licensee missed an opportunity in November 1996 to implement adequate corrective actions for the same pressurizer heater TS surveillance concern that was identified on May 14, 1998.
fhe inspectors also concluded that once the TS surveillance concern was re-identified on May 14, 1998, the licensee delayed entry into TS 4.0.3 and 3.0.3 until May 21. 1998; thereby. preventing timely resolution of the TS noncompliance through formal NRC processes. This
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TS surveillance issue was identified as an Unresolved Item.
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M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (IP 92902)
M8.1 (Closed) URI 50-414/97-11-03: Failure of 2B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Turbocharger Mounting Bolt This item addressed a repetitive failure of one of the 2B EDG turbocharger mounting bolts that fractured on August 19. 1997, because of high-cycle fatigue cracking.
The first failure occurred on September 19. 1995.
The metallurgical analysis report for the second failure.
approved September 9. 1997, indicated that the failure mechanism
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(fatigue cracking) was common in both failures and was usually caused by
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loss of
. failure) pre-load. The inspectors reviewed PIP 2-C95-1495 (first i
. PIP 2-C97-2713 (second failure), and the Failure Investigation
Process (FIP) results to assess the licensee's root cause evaluation and l
3roposed corrective actions and determine if the second failure could
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lave been prevented.
In both cases, the EDG was determined to be operable Corrective actions implemented following the first failure were to:
(1) install lock washers: (2) increase bolt torque from 60 to 75 foot -
pounds: (3) install a horseshoe style shim at each mounting bolt: (4)
install metal washer plates between the mounting bolt and mounting
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bracket: and (5) originate a work order to aerform a semiannual torque pass on the mounting bolts to ensure that t1e pre-load was being-maintained.
The licensee considered these corrective actions adequate to. prevent future mounting bolt failures.
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While performing the root cause evaluation for the second failure, the licensee found a loose turbocharger mounting bolt shim on the IB EDG.
Further investigation performed by the licensee revealed that the use of a single shim could not ensure that desired pre-load would be-maintained at all bolting locations because.the turbocharger and mounting bracket mating surfaces are not perfectly flat. The licensee concluded that the use of a single shim reduced the contact surface area and resulted in loss of pre-load.
Southwest Research Institute was tasked with evaluating the Catawba FIP team's conclusions and agreed that the second failure was caused by improper shimming.
Corrective actions im)lemented following the second failure were to:
(1) modify the turbocharger removal / installation procedure.
MP/0/A/7400/042. to add steps to perform step shimming if required; (2) add provisions for shim inspection as part of the mounting bolt i
semiannual torque pass: and (3) generate work order number 98017609 to check the flatness of the turbocharger and mounting bracket. The licensee indicated that, in addition to these corrective actions, strain measurements would be taken on some of the turbocharger mounting bolts
before and during EDG runs to determine the vibrational effects on the mounting bolts.
The inspectors concluded that the FIP team's root cause evaluation and implemented corrective actions were adequate following the first failure.
Additionally, the inspectors concluded that the second failure mechanism, improper shimming, could not reasonably have been detected.
This URI is closed.
M8.2 (Closed) LER 50-414/97-002-00: Failure to Perform Conditional Surveillance on Incore Detector Prior to Installation
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This LER was submitted on February 11, 1997, after the licensee determined that sealed source leak check surveillance testing had not been performed per TS 4.7.9.2.c on an incore fission detector installed in Unit 2 on January 7. 1997.
The licensee later determined that the amount of radioactivity present in the source detector (0.31
.microCuries) was less than the minimum amount (100 microCuries of beta
.and/or gamma emitting material or 5 microcuries of alpha emitting material) to which the TS applied. Accordingly, the licensee determined that the missed surveillance was not reportable and rescinded the LER by letter dated April 21, 1997.
M8.3 (Closed) VIO 50-413/96-12-01: Failure to Follow Procedure, Two Examples This item identified two examples of failure to follow procedure during welding activities for the steam generator replacement project (SGRP).
The first example was related to weld process control packages not being i
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kept at-the weld fabrication site as required by applicable site weld procedures and specifications.
The second example was related to improper weld pre-heat. The licensee's violation response, dated October 29, 1996, indicated the following corrective actions to resolve this item:
reinforcement of the requirement to have field weld data sheets and applicable procedures available at the work site: revision of procedures and training related to weld preheat processes: and additional in-process inspections to assess the effectiveness of these corrective actions.
Corrective actions were documented in PIP 0-C96-2066, dated August 6.
1996.
The revisions to the weld procedures related to preheat processes were incorporated in revision 22 of Process Specifications L-900.
Preheat. Interpass, and Post Weld Heat Treatment, and revision 23 of L-100. Welding Program. The inspector reviewed documentation of increased inspections to verify preheat requirements were met on Weld Process Control Sheets for welds 1-SM-39-34. 1-SM-24-35. 1-SM-24-36, 1-SM-29-36.
149CF041-10, 1491CF041-14. 1491CF040-14 and 1491CF003-4. performed in August 1996.
Maintenance Training Summaries TTN-087. NGD Welding Orientation, dated February 19. 1998, and CNMB-30. Welding Orientation.
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revision 0, addressed the changes to the welding specifications.
The inspector verified training documentation on these summaries was performed between January 1. 1997 and May 6. 1998.
The inspectors concluded this item was adequately resolved.
M8.4 (00en) LER 50-414/96-01: Loss of Offsite Power Due to Electrical Failures.
This LER documents a loss of offsite power (LOOP) that resulted from ground faults on the resistor bushings for 2A Main Transformer X-phase potential transformer and 28 Main Transformer Z-phase potential transformer.
The inspectors reviewed NRC Inspection Reports 50-413, 414/96-03 and 96-01 work orders 96011404. 96011405, 96011406.' 96011362.
96011363. 96011774, and 96011775: the licensee's Loss of Offsite Power
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Forced Outage Report (March 22, 1996): the licensee's Significant Event Investigation Team (SEIT) Report.SA-96-32(CN)(SE): and PIPS 2-C96-0273.
2-C96-0455, and 2-C96-0864.
The inspectors verified that the majority of immediate and subsequent corrective actions discussed in the LER had been confirmed by NRC inspection (as documented in previous NRC inspection reports) and/or official records documented by the licensee (listed in the preceding i
paragraph). The inspectors verified that other subsequent corrective actions were completed by reviewing work orders and procedure changes.
l The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions associated with the o
planned corrective action to enhance the current (as of March 1996)
_ preventative maintenance programs for the Isolated Phase Bus (IPB)
system and transformer yard equipment to ensure continued ecuipment reliability. The LER indicated that the enhancements shoulc include measures to protect against the effects of moisture and condensation.
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1 The licensee's cor~ctive actions involved:
(1) establishment of a preventive main'.. nance program for the IPB to minimize the possibility
'of moisture intrusion: and (2) establishment: of a-program to verify j proper-operation' of the )otential transformer cubicle space heaters.
The licensee indicated tlat procedure changes had bee 7 made to implement these programs. but was unable to furnish specific documentation.for the.
inspectors' review to verify that the-actions had been.taken.
Pending the licensee's compilation of documentation associated with the-completion-of-these actions.- this item will remain open.
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III. Enaineerina
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E8
' Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (37551, 92903)
E8.1 (C1' sed) LER 50-413/96-04: Standby Shutdown Facility Found Outside of o
Design Basis This item addressed a misinterpretation by the licensee of design
' documentation'which resulted in an incorrect conclusion regarding the volume of water available,for the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) from
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the imbedded condenser circulating pi Je.
During a security event the available volume would be less than tlat required to maintain the unit at hot standby for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> which is inconsistent with the. licensee's design basis.
Additional actions would be recuired to provide the additional water and these actions were not acdressed by existing procedures.
The corrective actions stated in the LER included.
establ_ishing a mechanism for assuring the additional water volume and developing a procedure to provide guidance-for this activity.
The inspectors verified that a mechanism was provided to ensure that the required water volume would be available for~ the security event in which the SSF water source is vulnerable.
Nuclear Station Modification (NSM)
50474. SSF Portable Submersible. Pump for RC Pipe Break Recovery.- dated-June 19; 1996 implemented the. storage of the required equipment in the SSF. ' Procedure Ai/0/B/5100/008. Installation of RC Recovery Submersible Pump (s).. Revision 1. provided guidance for installation of the pump in the applicable security event. The licensee performed a line up of the piping and equi) ment on April 9. 1998. documented in. PIP 0-C98-1240.
verifying that )oth~ units could.be aligned before the available water source was. exhausted. The licensee had videotaped-the alignment using
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the procedure after the modification implementation. The inspectors
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concluded that-this issue.was adequately resolved and no violations of
regulatory requirements were identified.
E8.2.(Closed) IF1 50-413.414/96-02-08: Temperature Qualification of Control
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Room Intake Air-Radiation Monitors-
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-There was no qualification data available on detectors EMF 43A and
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EMF 438. which sample outside air from the-Control Room air' intake and
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could experience ambient temperatures less than 40'F.
Similar detectors in the plant were qualified to 40*F.
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The resolution of this item was documented in licensee PIP report 0-C96-0520.
The licensee evaluated the operability of the detectors at temperatures less than 40*F and determined that the detectors were not temperature dependent in the ranges experienced at Catawba.
The evaluation. included review of similar detector performance at other nuclear stations with more severe outdoor temperature conditions. These stations experienced no adverse performance due to variations in temperature. The inspectors concluded that this item was adequately resolved.
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E8.3 (Closed) VIO 50-413.414/96-02-07: Inconsistent Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Information - Two Examples The licensee denied example one of the violation related to the Spent Fuel Pool and the denial was accepted.
The second example remained valid concerning the use of charcoal. cartridges rather than silver zeolite for gaseous iodine monitoring. The licensee's response indicated that the zeolite filters were never used at Catawba. The-UFSAR had always been incorrect on this issue. The corrective actions stated in the violation response dated May 21, 1996, included an
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evaluatior of the acceptance of using charcoal vice silver zeolite cartridges, a study of cartridge applications at Catawba, and a revision to the UFSAR to provide correct references to the charcoal cartridges being used.
The licensee evaluated use of charcoal versus silver zeolite cartridges in a field study at McGuire Nuclear Station on March 8,1996, documented in a Station Support Division memorandum dated April 1.1996, to D.V.
Baysinger. et. al.
The evaluation concluded that charcoal was
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acceptable and no significant difference existed between the two cartridge types.
The UFSAR. dated May 2. 1997, included appropriate references to the charcoal cartridges used for air radiation monitors.
The inspector concluded that this item was adequately resolved.
E8.4 (Closed) IFI 50-413.414/96-300-01: FSAR vs Alarm Response Procedure (ARP) on Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Loss of Cooling Time to Failure This item addressed a concern regarding a discrepancy between the FSAR and the ARP regarding the time the EDG could operate with a loss of cooling water.
The UFSAR stated that the EDG could operate two minutes without cooling water as supported by actual vender testing. The ARP indicated that the EDG could operate for 10 minutes. The ten minute period indicated more time for operator response than that indicated by the UFSAR. This item was addressed in PIP 0-C96-1160, which was opened on June 11. 1996, and closed on May 28, 1997.
The inspectors reviewed the PIP to assess the licensee's corrective actions to resolve this issue.
The corrective actions documented in the PIP were to delete the specified time limit from the UFSAR and provide a technical justification for the time limit stated in the ARP. The
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inspectors identified that the engineering evaluation documented in the PIP did not provide adequate technical justification for the time limit
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stated in the ARP. The evaluation referenced an e-mail to operations from engineering in 1993 that stated a previous EDG event had occurred
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which demonstrated that the EDG could run greater than the ARP referenced time without cooling water. The inspector requested and received the special report of that event which was documented in PIP 2-C91-0338. The description of the event was for a reduction in cooling
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l water due to a jacket water leak into the crankcase housing and
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subsequent crankcase explosion. ~This event did not envelope the proposed complete loss of cooling water event addressed by the ARP and
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did not demonstrate that the EDG could run for any length of time I
without cooling water.
The technical evaluation conclusion that the ARP I
response time was adequate based on this event was not valid.
The PIP also referenced a safeguards calculation. CNC-1223.10-00-0003.
Catawba Units 1&2. RER Significant Finding Resolution, dated May 19.
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1989 which addressed loss of cooling to the EDGs. The inspectors reviewed this calculation and noted that an inappropriate assumption was used which impacted the conclusion of the calculation.
Specifically, i
the calculation assumed that boiling heat transfer of the jacket water was an adequate short-term cooling mechanism for the pistons on a loss
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of cooling water.. Discussions with the vendor (Cooper Energy Services)
during the inspection and correspondence provided to the licensee on April 29. 1996, indicated that boiling was not an effective heat removal mechanism for the pistons and seizure would occur in less time than stated in the calculation, The inspectors noted that the electrical loading of the EDG assumed for this event was not the worst case loading, which limited the application of this event beyond the narrowly defined parameters of the described security event.
In particular. this calculation could not be appropriately applied to resolve the ARP response time inconsistency with the FSAR.
The calculation was to determine a time line for security response to a specific location.
The i
current licensee practice is to man that location continuously:
therefore, the calculation errors did not impact the presently approved I
security plan.
The engineer that performed the technical evaluation was not available on site during this inspection and the licensee indicated that other
information was used in the evaluation. This item was identified as Unresolved Item (URI) 50-413.414/98-05-04: Potentially Inadequate Corrective Action to Justify ARP Response Time for Loss of EDG Cooling.
l The item remains unresolved pending further review and discussion between the responsible engineer and the NRC regarding additional
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information to support the PIP documented technical evaluation.
E8.5 (Ocen) VIO 50-414/96-03-02: Failure to Follow Procedure for Event Recorder Alarms This issue involved event recorder alarms that indicated intermittent failures of the 22 kV isolated phase bus system.
The alarms, which were received on February 5, 1996 were precursors to a loss of offsite power (LOOP) event that occurred February 6, 1996.
The licensee failed to respond to the alarms and take prompt corrective action to prevent the
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LOOP event.
In addition, alarm response procedures did not provide-guidance to control room operators.
The licensee attributed the violation to two root causes: (1) no audible alarm accompanied the event recorder alarms: and (2) alarm response guidance was inadequate. To
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. address these roct'causes the licensee committed to performing the followingi (1) modify the events recorder to provide an audible alarm
.. tone : (2) develop an Electrical Events Recorder Points Response document to 3rovide specific alarm response guidance for alarm points associated wit 1 generator and 22.kV Bus-undervoltage signals: and (3) issue an
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operator update.to inform control. room operators of the existence and location'of:the_ response document.
The inspectors verified that these actions were taken.
A modification
.to upgrade-the Operator Aid Computer (OAC) during 1996 and 1997 refueling outages (for Unit 1 and_ Unit 2, respectively) included-integration of the events recorder into the OAC. Additionally. an alarm bell replacement was included in the' modification to resolve human
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factors problems with previous bells.
The inspectors verified that a response procedure. the Electrical Events Recorder Points Response. was
available in the control room.
However, the inspectors determined that
.the OAC event recorder alarm screen did not reference the response
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sheet. The~ inspectors were concerned that operators would not' follow the response procedure because a reference to the procedure was~ not provided.
The inspectors discussed this concern with compliance and-operations personnel, who indicated that this issue would be resolved.
In addition. a minor discrepancy was identified in the Unit 2 alarm response procedure: the licensee was informed and planned to correct the discrepancy.
Pending resolution of the concern regarding reference to-the response procedure, this item will' remain open.
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IV. Plant Support S1 Conduct of Security.and Safeguards Activities S1.1 Compensatory Measures a.
Insoection Scooe (81700)
The inspectors evaluated the compensatory measures of the security transition mode during the installation of the new security system.
This was to ensure that the im)lemented compensatory measures were equivalent-to or better than t1e commitments of the Physical Security
' Plan (PSP) and appropriate procedures.
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Observations and Findinas-l At-the time of the inspection, six compensatory posts were manned by eight security officers Five of these posts were due to the transition
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mode. Three )osts were' observing the perimeter, one was at the exit portal, and tie other was in the central alarm station.
Each perimeter-security-officer interviewed had a diagram that showed the perimeter zones.the officers were responsible for, due to the out-of-service
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detection and assessment aids. The exit portal officer was compensating for the new protected area detection aids being installed at the exit porta _1.
The officer in the central alarm station was compensating for the-inactive automated alarm annunciation and assessment switching equipment.
The last' compensatory post was at the gate of an internal
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vital ~ area that was out of service; Interviews with the officers indicated that they were aware of their duties and responsibilities.
Security management indicated that they would continue these compensatory-measures for at least a week and probably not more than two weeks.
Appropriate security measures compensated for the inoperable equipment-and consisted of-the application of specific procedures to assure that they did not reduce tie effectiveness of the security system.
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c; Conclusions The licensee used good compensatory measures that ensured the
' reliability of-security-related equipment and devices.
S2 IStatus of Security Facilities and Equipment l<
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Insoection Scooe (81700)
-The inspectors evaluated the-licensee's intrusion detection systems and j
assessment aids to verify-that they were functionally effective and met licensee commitments.
This evaluation ensured that no vulnerabilities could be exploited.to avoid detection.
b.
Observations and Findinas The licensee had installed intrusion detection systems and posted compensatory measures that could detect attempted penetrations.through the isolation-zones, and attempts to gain unauthorized access to the protected area. The licensee segmented the intrusion detection systems into enough alarm zones to provide adequate coverage of the protected area perimeter barrier and isolation zones. The inspectors observed successful testing of the Unit 2 intrusion detection system zones. 28 through 54.
The system consisted of microwave systems to discover
. unauthorized activities and conditions. These systems sent alarm
- conditions to response force personnel though the alarm stations.
-allowing for_ response force personnel to assess and correct the conditions.
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's program.for provision and maintenance of assessment aids The licensee provided means for monitoring and observing by human eye or' Closed Circuit Television
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(CCTV). )ersons-and activities in the isolation zone and exterior areas-
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within tie protected area.
These means provided for assessing intrusion
alarms-for possible threats occurring in the isolation zone and exterior areas within the protected area.
The alarm stations could
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simultaneously monitor scenes viewed by CCTV cameras.
The transmission and control lines in the CCTV intrusion alarm assessment system had line i
supervision and tamper indications.
i The inspectors evaluated programs for provision and maintenance of facility lighting.
The licensee illuminated the isolation zones and exterior areas within the protected area to at least 0.2 foot candles measured horizontally at ground level. The illumination of the
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isolation zone and exterior areas within the protected area was appropriate.
It was sufficient to monitor. and observe persons and activities within these areas b/ the unaided human eye or CCTV.
The licensee appropriately illuminated the protected area access portal for the identification ana search of packages, personnel, and vehicles.
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Conclusions l
Intrusion detection systems, site illumination and assessment aids were functional, well maintained, and effective.
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S3 Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation
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S3.2 Security Procedures
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a.
Insoection Scoce (81700)
The inspectors reviewed sections of the PSP and related supporting security procedures to determined their adequacy and compliance with 10 CFR Part 50.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors randomly reviewed the latest changes to eight sections of the PSP, eight security procedures, and related supporting records and reports. The inspectors also interviewed security force personnel to decide their familiarity with the documents reviewed.
The PSP sections and procedures reviewed pertained to Armed Response. Contingency
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Conditions. Compensatory Officers, Alarm Systems. Training and Qualification, Staffing Levels, and Audits.
The reviewed documents met 10 CFR 50.54(p)(1-3) requirements.
c.
Conclusions Safeguards plan and procedure documentation complied with 10 CFR Part 50.
Changes te PSP sections reviewed did not decrease the effectiveness of the PSP.
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S4 Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance S4.1 Security Force Reauisite Knowledae a.
Insoection Scope (81700)
The inspectors interviewed and observed security personnel to determine if they possessed adequate knowledge to carry out their assigned duties
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.and responsibilities, including the use of response procedures, deadly force, and armed response tactics.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors interviewed 6 alarm station operators. 9 security officers posted as compensatory measures, 3 access control officers. I shift supervisor, and witnessed approximately 20 others in the performance of their duties during normal conditions. Members of the security force were knowledgeable in their duties and responsibilities, response commitments and procedures, and armed response tactics.
The inspectors found that the licensee had instructed armed response
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personnel in the use of deadly force as required by 10 CFR Part 73.
c.
Conclusions Security personnel possessed the knowledge to carry out their assigned duties and responsibilities, including the use of response procedures, deadly force. and armed response tactics.
S4.2 Resoonse Capabilities a.
Inspection Scope (81700)
The inspectors evaluated the security organization's capability to respond to security threats and routine situations (including drills) to ensure consistency with the security procedures and the approved PSP.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed the response commitments of the Security Contingency Plan in the following areas: deadly force, central and secondary alarm station operations, communication.s. and security system degradations.
The licensee required response personnel to be competent in these skills before doing response duties.
As stated in Section 4.1 above, response personnel interviewed were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and M ies.
The licensee has conducted 12 table top drills since January 30, 1998, 9 team drills with 6 being unannounced.
and 4 armed response refresher training classes during 1997.
The inspectors reviewed the critiques of these drills.
The critiques stated the number of adversaries and their objectives involved in each drill.
The critiques indicated the performance of each response member and any strengths or weaknesse _ - _
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. Responses by the security organization to security threats, contingencies. and routine response situations, including drills, were L
consistent with the security procedures and the approved PSP.
S5 Security Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification u-55.1 -Security Trainina a,nd Qualification a.
InsDection Scooe (81700)
The' inspectors observed.and reviewed security personr.el. firearms training and qualification to ensure that the' training met the criteria in the Security' Personnel Training and Qualification Plan (T&OP).
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Observations and Findinas The inspectors found that interviewed armed response personnel had been i
instructed in the 'use of deadlycforce as required by 10 CFR Part 73.
Members:of the security organization were requalified at least every 12 months in the performance of their assigned tasks. both normal and contingency.
This included the conduct of physical exercise requirements and the completion of the firearms' course. Through the o
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- observation of firearms training and requalification of security personnel _with hand guns shotguns and rifles at the site firing range and interviews with security force personnel, the inspectors found that'
the training complied with 10 CFR 73. ' Appendix B. Section 1.F. firearms proficiency requirements.
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Conclusions The licensee was proficiently training the security force and conducting weapons requalification according to the T&OP and regulatory requirements.
'S6 Security Organization and Administration-
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S6.3 Staffina Level a.
Inspection Scope'(81700)
The; inspect' ors evaluated the total number of trained security officers
~and armed personnel intnediately available at the facility to fulfill
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response requirements:specified in the PSP. The inspectors also determined,if one full-time member of the security organization, who had L
the authority to direct security activities, did not have duties that conflicted with the assignment to direct all activities during an Lincident.
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b. : Observations and Findinas.
The~ inspectors veri.fied'that the licensee has an onsite physical protection system and security organization. Their objective was to 1.
provide assurance against an unreasonable. risk to public health and
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safety. The security organization and abysical protection system were
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designed to protect'against the design Jasis threat of radiological sabotage as' stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a).
The inspectors verified that at l,
least one full-time manager of the security organization was always
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onsite.1 This ' individual had no duties that conflicted with the assignment to direct all activities during an incident. This individual had the authority to direct the physical protection activities:of the organization. The inspectors reviewed four-shift rosters and interviewed ~ security force personnel on two s'ifts. The licensee had the number of trained security officers-and armed personnel immediately l-available. to fulfill response requirements and commitments of the PSP.
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Contlusion The' total number' of trained security officers. and armed personnel
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immediately available to fulfill response requirements met PSP
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requirements. One full-time member of the security organization who had L
the authority to direct security activities did not have duties that conflicted with the assignment to direct all activities during an
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S7-Quality Assurance in Security and Safeguards Activities l
S7.1 Audits /Self-Assessment Prooram a,
Insoection Scooe (81700)
. Based on commitments in Sections 11 and 16 of the PSP and NSD No. 208.
the inspectors evaluated the audit program. This review also ensured compliance with the requirement for an-annual audit of the security and contingency programs.
Also, evaluated was the qualifications and independence of the audit program auditors.
b.
0 observations and Findinas The audit program commitments included. auditing the Fitness for Duty
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l Program. security program. and the Security and Contingency Plan at least every twelve months.
Persons conducting the audit were
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independent of both onsite security management aad security supervision.
The audit included a' review of routine and contingency security procedures and practices also. The Regulatory Audit Group did a multi-site audit. SA-98-32(ALL)(RA) of-the fitness for duty and station
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security activities'at the Catawba. McGuire, and Oconee Nuclear Sites.
and in the General Office during January 19 through February 6.1998.
The Fitness for Duty Program and Station Security 1998 Multi-Site Audit identified 6 strengths. 20 findings, and 16 recommendations.
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The audit report concluded that the Fitness for Duty Program remains effectively implemented and all three sites also effectively implemented security programs.
The audit report further concluded that the conduct of routine security duties. training and qualification of personnel, and security hardware were common areas of strong performance, c.
Conclusion Safeguards audits were thorough, complete. and effective in uncovering weaknesses in the Fitness for Duty Program, security program, plans.
procedures. and practices.
S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards Issues S8.1 (Closed) VIO 50-413.414/97-12-02: Failure to Deny Protected Area Access to Terminated Employees The inspectors reviewed Duke Energy Corporation's response to this violation, dated December 10. 1997.
The licensee documented corrective actions, changes to corporate policy and site procedures that eere put
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in place or superseded to indicate the new security computer system enhancements.
Corrective actions were completed or are being tracked in the Problem Investigation Process for completion.
S8.2 (Closed) VIO 50-413.414/97-12-03:
Failure to Control Protected Area Access Badges, in that the Badges Were Taken Outside the Protected Area Unescorted by Security Personnel The inspectors reviewed Duke Energy Corporation's response to this violation, dated December 10. 1997.
The use of the Biometrics access control system eliminated this problem.
This was completed on February 23, 1998.
S8.3 (Closed) VIO 50-413.414/97-12-04:
Failure to Comply with the Regulatory Requirements of Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 73 The inspectors reviewed Duke Energy Corporation's response to this violation, dated December 10. 1997.
The licensee revised Nuclear Security Manual Directive. " Reporting and Trending of Safeguards and Security Events" in Revision 12. dated January 1.1998. This revision requires logging of favorable terminations within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
V. Management Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 27, 1998.
The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
No proprietary information was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee M. Birch. Safety Assurance Manager M. Boyle. Radiation Protection Manager T. Byers. Security Manager B. Emmons. Organizational Effectiveness Manager R. Glover. Operations Superintendent P. Herron. Engineering Manager R. Jones. Station Manager
~T. Mauldin, Maintenance Welding Program Supervisor J. Minnicks. Security Supervisor K. Nicholson, Compliance Specialist M. Kitlan. Regulatory Compliance Manager G. Peterson, Catawba-Site Vice-President R. Propst. Chemistry Manager C. Wray Radiation Specialist i
NRC P. Tam. Project Manager. NRR i
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering IP 61726:
Surveillance IP 71707:
Plant Operations IP 71750:
Plant Support Activities-IP 81700:
Physical Security Program for Power Reactors IP 90712:
In Office Review of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities IP 92700:
Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities IP 92901:
Followup - Operations IP 92902:
Followup - Maintenance IP 92903:
Followup - Engineering IP 92904:
Followup - Plant Support ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
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OPENED 50-413.414/98-05-01 URI Fire Protection Program Noncompliance (Section 02.1)
50-413.414/98-05-02 NCV Failure to Have Adequate Procedures for Testing Containment Air Return and Hydrogen Skimmer Fans (Section M3.1)
50-413.414/98-05-03 URI TS Discrepancy Involving Pressurizer Heater Power Supply Manual Transfer Capability (Section M3.2)
50-413.414/98-05-04 URI Potentially Inadequate Corrective Action to Justify ARP Response Time for loss of EDG Cooling (Section E8.4)
CLOSED 50-414/97-11-03 URI Failure of 2B EDG Turbocharger Mounting Bolt-(Section M8.1)
50-413.414/97-12-02 VIO Failure to Deny Protected Area Access to-Terminated Employees (Section S8.1)
50-413.414/97-12-03 VIO Failure to Control Protected Area Access Badges, in that the Badges Were Taken Outside the Protected Area Unescorted by Security Personnel (Section S8.2)
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-50-413.414/97-12-04 VIO Failure to Comply with the Regulatory Requirements of Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 73 (Section 58.3)
50-413/96-04 LER Standby Shutdown Facility Found Outside of Design Basis (Section E8.1)
50-413.414/96-02-08 IFI Temperature Qualification of Control Room Intake Air Radiation Monitors (Section E8.2)
50-413.414/96-02-07 VIO Inconsistent FSAR Information - Two Examples (Section E8.3)
50-413.414/96-300-01 IFI FSAR vs ARP on EDG Loss of Cooling time to
'
~
Faildre (Section E8.4)
50-414/97-002-00 LER Failure to Perform Conditional Surveillance on i
Incore Detector Prior to Installation (Section
'
M8.2)
,
50-413/96-12-01 VIO Failure to Follow Procedure. Two Examples (Section M8.3)
50-414/96-05-01 VIO Failure to Comply With Hydrogen Mitigation System Technical Specification (Section 08.1)
50-414/96-02 LER Technical Specification Violation for Redundant Hydrogen Igniters Inoperable in the Same Region l
(Section 08.1)
DISCUSS'
50 414/96-01 LER Loss of Offsite Power Due to Electrical Failures (Section M8.4)
'
50-414/96-03-02 VIO Failure to Follow Procedure for Event Recorder Alarms (Section E8.5)
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ABFU '
Auxiliary Building Filter Unit
-
l AFW
-
'
ARF
-
Alarm Response Procedure
.
CFR
-
Code of Federal Regulations
>
!
-
Emergency Diesel Generator FIP
-
Failure Investigation Process FSAR Final-Safety Analysis Report
-
IFI
-
Inspector Follow-up Item
!
LCO
-
Limiting Condition Operations
'
LER
-
Licensee Event Report NCV Non-Cited Violation
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,
-. _ -.
_ _. _ - _ _ - -... -
_ _ _. _ _ _ _ _. -. _. _.
- - _ _ - -. _ _ - - _ - _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
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___-____-__________ _ ___-___.-_-_- _
. _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ -
.
NGD
-
Nuclear Generation Department NSM
-
Nuclear Station Modification
,
'
NSW Nuclear Service Water
-
PIP Problem. Investigation Process
-
PORC -
Plant Operations Review Committee-PSP.
Physical Security Plan
-
SGRP-2 Steam Generator Replacement Program SSF
-
Standby Shutdown Facility.
TSAIL
.
Tech. Spec. Action Item Log UFSAR -
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report URI
- Unresolved Item
-
VIO Violation
-
-
Work. Order l
t l
..
f
..
i t
I
- _ - _ _ _. _. _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _
-. _ _.. _ _