IR 05000413/1986050
| ML20207P312 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 01/07/1987 |
| From: | Lesser M, Peebles T, Skinner P, Vandoorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207P303 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.F.2, TASK-TM 50-413-86-50, 50-414-86-53, NUDOCS 8701150390 | |
| Download: ML20207P312 (9) | |
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eEug UNITED STATES o
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11 o
j 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.
50-413/86-50 and 50-414/86-53 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, N.C.
28242 Docket Nos.:
50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.:
NPF-35 and NPF-52 Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:
N ember 26 - December 25, 1986
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P. K. VanDoor g
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Y P. H. Skinner'
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Eate signed Approved by:
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/!7//7 T. A. Peebles,'Siici.fon Chief Datfe Signed Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted on site inspecting in the areas of review of plant operations; surveillance observation; maintenance observation; review of licensee nonroutine event reports; calibration; de:;ign, design changes and modifications; TMI Action items; and followup of previously identified items.
Results: Of the eight (8) areas inspected, no apparent violations or deviations were identified.
870115o390 e7ogo7 DR ADOCK 05000413 PDR
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J. W. Hampton, Station Manager E. M. Couch, Construction Maintenance Central Manager
- H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent W. H. Bradley, QA Surveillance A. S. Bhatnager, Performance Engineer T. B. Bright, Construction Engineer Manager S. Brown, Reactor Engineer B. F. Caldwell, Station Services Superintendent
- J. W. Cox, Superintendent, Technical Services T. E. Crawfora, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling C. S. Gregory, I. & E. Support Engineer C. L. Hartzell, Compliance Engineer J. Knuti, Operating Engineer W. W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
- F. N. Mack, Project Services Engineer C. E. Muse, Operating Engineer
- F.
P. Schiffley, II, Licensing Engineer G. T. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent
- J. Stackley, I. & E. Engineer J. W. Willis, Senior QA Engineer, Operations Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 23, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Unit 1) (92702)
a.
(CLOSED) Violation 413/85-55-04:
Failure to Follow Procedures Associated With Operation of Diesel Generator 18.
The licensee responded to this item in a letter to Region II dated May 15, 1986.
The inspector reviewed the corrective actions addressed in this response and has monitored this area to determine if corrective actions were adequate.
Based on thir action this item is close *
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b.
(CLOSED) Violation 413/86-15-02: Operation Dutside AFD Limits Without Taking Actions Prescribed by Technical Specifications. DPC responded to this violation in a letter to Region II dated July 2,1986.
The inspector has reviewed the corrective actions as described and considers this item closed.
4.
Unresolve,d Items *
Three new unresolved items are identified in paragraphs 9 and 10.
5.
Plant Operations Review (Units 1 & 2) (71707 and 71710)
a.
The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements. Technical Specifications (TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs, danger tag logs, Technical Specification Action Item Log, and the removal and restoration log were routinely reviewed.
Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures.
The inspectors verified by observation and interviews, the measures taken to assure physical protection of the facility met current requirements.
Areas inspected included the security organization, the establishment and maintenances of gates, doors, and isolation zones in the proper condition, that access control and badging were proper and procedures followed.
In addition to the areas discussed above, the areas toured were observed for fire prevention and protection activities. These included such things as combustible material control, fire protection systems and materials, and fire protection associated with maintenance activities, b.
A management meeting was held with licensee management, the NRC Region II Deputy Regional Administrator and the Senior Resident Inspector, on December 10, 1986.
Plant status, operating history and steam generator level control was discussed. In addition, a plant tour was conducted.
c.
The inspectors conducted a detailed Engineering Safety Features walkdown of the following systems:
Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System (A and B trains on Unit 2) and Diesel Generator Engine Starting Air System (A and B trains on Units 1 & 2).
- An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violatio "
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d.
TMI Actions Items (Unit 1)
II.F.2, Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation.
This -item is addressed in Safety Evaluation Report, Supplement No. 2 and Supplement No. 5 in paragraph 4.4.3.4 in which NRC concluded that Catawba conforms
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to the design requirements of Nureg 0737 item II.F.2 subject to modifications being completed prior to the startup following the first refueling outage. This was made part of the licensee conditions (see s
license condition 2.C.(15)) for Unit 1.
During the most recent refueling outage, the licensee upgraded the inadequate core cooling instrumentation system which includes the core exit thermocouples, subcooling margin monitor, and reactor vessel level inst mentation using the class IE Westinghouse microprocessor system. Tt. system has been tested ~ and is functional.
Based on this review this item is closed.
e.
Licensee Condition Review (Unit 1)
Facility Operating License NPF-35, item 2.C.(11) required the licensee to correct all human engineering deficiencies (HEDs) according to the schedule contained in the letter from Duke Power Company. dated February 20, 1984. This letter stated that all HEDs would be corrected by the completion of the first refueling. There were approximately 140 HED's identified. Approximately 105 HED corrections were reviewed by the inspector through review of the following Nuclear Station Modifications:
NSM CN - 10025 10544 10103 10545 10210 10546 10240 10547 10241 10548 10242 10549 10244 10553
10245 10554
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10248 10556 i
10249 10557 i
10251 10558
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10252 10559 l
10253 10561
10540 10562 i
10541 10563 10542 i
l Based on this review, minor deviations from the requirements of the NSM l
were provided to the licensee for corrections.
These deviations were not
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safety significant and primarily were administrative in nature.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Surveillance Observation (Units 1 & 2) (61726)
a.
During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations were in compliance with various TS requirements.
Typical of these requirements were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, emergency power systems, safety injection, emergency safeguards systems, control room ventila-tion, and direct current electrical power sources.
The inspector verified that surveillance testing was performed in accordance with the approved written procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, appropriate removal and restoratior. of the affected equipment was accomplishesi, test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel, b.
The inspector observed the performance of two surveillances which are described in more detail in paragraph 9. The inspector also observed performance of the monthly surveillance on Unit 2 train
"A" Solid State Protection System (SSPS).
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No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Maintenance Observations (Units 1& 2) (62703)
Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements. The inspector verified licensee conformance to the require-ments in the following areas of inspection:
the activities were accomplished using approved procedures, and functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities performed were accomplished by qualified personnel; and materials used were properly certified. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may effect system performance.
8.
Review of Licensee Nonroutine Event Reports (Units 1 & 2) (92700)
a.
The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC requirements.
The determination included: adequacy of description, verification of compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety significance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for those reports indicated by an (*).
The following LERs are closed:
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- 413/86-05, Rv. 1 Both Trains Control Room Ventilation Inoperable Due to Loss of Chilled Water Makeup
- 413/86-29, Rv. 1 Feedwater Isolation and Auxiliary Feedwater Failure Due to Equipment and Personnel Failures
- 413/86-35, Rv. 1 Feedwater Isolation on Hi-Hi Steam Generator Level Due to Procedural Deficiency
- 413/86-40, Rv. 1 Shorted Lamp Socket Causes Reactor Trip Due to Design Deficiency
- 413/86-41, Rv. 2 Missed Surveillance of Several Fire Detection Zones Inside Containment 413/86-55 Blackout of Train "A" Essential Switchgear Due to Unknown Cause 413/86-56 Containment Purge System Isolation Due to Defective Procedure
- 414/86-03, Rv. 2 Main Feedwater Isolations on Two Occasions Due to Design Deficiency and Defective Procedure
- 414/86-14, Rv. 1 Manual Reactor Trip After Turbine Trip on Hi-Hi Steam Generator Level Due to Design Deficiency
- 414/86-15, Rv. 1 Reactor Trip on Steam Generator Lo-Lo Level Due to Design Deficiency
- 414/86-16, Rv. 1 Main Feedwater Isolation Following Automatic Overfeeding of Steam Generator Due to Design Deficiency
- 414/86-18, Rv. 1 Main Feedwater Isolation on Hi-Hi Steam Generator Level Due to Design Deficiency 414/86-44 Gas Monitor Inoperable During Containment Purge Due to Equipment Malfunction b.
LER 414/86-45 describes a deficiency whereby the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump would not start from the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF).
Although local starting capability was available, starting the pump from the SSF appears to have been unavailable from April 23, 1986 through September 1,1986, without the licensee knowing of the deficiency. The cause was incorrect design of instrument tubing for a solenoid valve. Further, the licensee may have conducted work on
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this tubing without proper procedure control and documentation. The LER dated November 24, 1986, does not address corrective action for Design / Engineering and therefore remains open.
This is Licensee Identified Violation 414/86-53-03:
Design Deficiency Causing Failure of Component to Operate From Standby Shutdown Facility.
9.
Calibration (Unit 1) (56700)
a.
During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed certain portions of the licensee's calibration program to ascertain whether plant instrumentation calibration is in conformance with licensee requira-ments.
The inspector reviewed documentation and records to verify licensee conformance to calibration requirements for instrumentation in the Reactor Protection, Engineered Safety Features and selected systems required for safety. The following areas were verified: instrumenta-tion calibration and channel functional tests were accomplished in accordance with the specified frequency in Technical Specifications (TS); test documentation was complete; acceptance criteria was met; and approved test procedures were used.
b.
The following calibration work requests were reviewed for completion and results:
003586 SWR 003683 SWR C03737 "
003554 "
003648 "
003560 "
003539 "
003571 "
003635 "
003681 "
004202 "
003663 "
003533 "
004012 "
003581 "
003870 006505 "
004049 "
003687 "
003715 "
003561 "
003574 "
006507 "
003936 "
The inspector determined all work requests to be adequate.
l c.
The inspector witnessed the performance of the following calibration surveillances:
IP/1/A/3241/01A Baron Dilution Mitigation System Analog Channel Operational Test IP/1/B/3112/04 Calibration of Non Safety Related RN Intake Structure Instrumentation During the performance of IP/1/A/3241/01A, the acceptance criteria for a particular step required output voltage to read 9.9 to 10.1 Volts upon insertion of test signal.
However the permanently installed voltmeter used to determine this had a maximum scale of 10 volt *
As this step was performed the voltmeter read slightly high (greater than 10, but not on the peg).
This was determined acceptable by the technician. When the inspector questioned the responsible IAE engineer about this apparent inconsistency, the engineer acknowledged the discrepancy. A work request was written to measure the output voltage for the step in question with a digital multimeter.
The results were satisfactory and documented under Work Requests 7303IAE and 7304IAE.
A procedural revision has been initiated to require all readings be performed with a digital multimeter.
While observing the performance of IP/1/B/3112/04 the inspector noted that a Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) high temperature alarm was not routinely checked during calibration of the temperature loop ORNP8130.
Section 9.2.1.5.4 of the FSAR states " Outlet temperature of the SNSWP is monitored and alarmed on high temperature".
Review of instrument drawings revealed the lack of a current switch and/or bistable and an annunciator for a high temperature situation.
The licensee stated there is a computer point which alarms on SNSWP high temperature.
Discussions with licensee IAE personnel indicated that generally computer points are not used to take credit for instrument functions as described in the FSAR. This is because there are no controls to maintain the setpoint of the alarm nor is the setpoint ever verified by a surveillance.
This is identified as Unresolved Item 413/86-50-02, 414/86-53-02; Determination by the Licensee as to Whether the Computer Point High Temperature Alarm for the SNSWP Temperature Meets the Intent of the FSAR.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Design, Design Changes and Modifications (Units 1 & 2) (37700)
The inspector reviewed the process established by the licensee to assure that design changes and modifications (NSM's) are being developed, processed and controlled in accordance with the requirements of the Technical Speci-fications (TS), Duke Power Company Topical Report Quality Assurance Program (QCP) and 10 CFR 50.59.
Specific attributes reviewed were: (1) review and approval was performed in accordance with established procedures; (2) post modification testing was performed where specified; (3) associated procedure changes were made, as required; (4) as built drawings were changed to reflect the NSM's; (5) training on the modifications was being provided l
to operations personnel in a reasonable timeframe depending on the NSM; and, (6) changes are planned to be on or were listed on the required 10CFR50.59 annual report to the NRC.
j In addition, the licensee's program for temporary modifications, lifted l
leads and jumpers, as described in Station Directive 4.4.4, was reviewed to
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that review and approval are in accordance with TS and l
10 CFR 50.59; that detailed procedures are used for control of these system changes; that a formal record is maintained and periodically reviewed; and that testing is conducted upon removal, when required.
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The specific NSM's reviewed were as follows:
CN - 10620 Diesel Engine Control Panel Annunciator Modification CN - 10210 Upgrade of Outside Containment Portion of Incore Thermocouples (Also see list of NSM's associated with human engineering deficiencies discussed in paragraph 5.e. above.)
Based on this review two unresolved items were identified.
QCP section 17.2.3 states final approval of each station modification is the responsibility of the Station Manager.
However TS section 6.5.1.3 states
" proposed modifications" shall be approved by the Station Manager prior to implementation.
In practice, the Station Manager is in the approval stage for the concept and not in the final approval process of the change.
This conflict between the requirements of the TS and the requirements of the QCP is being identified as an Unresolved Item 50-413/86-50-01, 50-414/86-53-01; Station Manager's Approval of Nuclear Station Modifications, pending review of this area by the licensee and by NRC management to determine which controlling document is correct or if both are correct.
The second unresolved item identified in this area involved NSM 10025.
While performing a surveillance on the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) Temperature Instrument, the technician discovered the gauge to be out of calibration. Upon further troubleshooting it was determined that a new gauge had been installed under NSM 10025 during the recent Unit I refueling outage. The input signal to the gauge was 4 to 20 milliamps with the gauge face indicating from 30 to 130 F.
The old gauge apparently read from 32 to 122 F and the calibration procedure IP/1/B/3112/04 still reflected the previous gauge's values.
This is being identified as Unresolved Item 50-413/86-50-03:
Improper calibration procedure for SNSWP Temperature Instrument, pending review by the licensee of the NSM require-ments concerning calibration and procedure changes.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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