IR 05000266/1986006

Insp Repts 50-266/86-06 & 50-301/86-06 on 860401-0531.No Noncompliance or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Followup on Items of Noncompliance & Deviations & Operational Safety Verification & ESF Sys Walkdown

ML20199C798
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	06/11/1986
From:	Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20199C715	List: IR 05000266/1986006 ML20199C709
References
50-266-86-06, 50-266-86-6, 50-301-86-06, 50-301-86-6, NUDOCS 8606180254
Download: ML20199C798 (8)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COPWISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-266/86006(DRP); 50-301/86006(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. DPR-24; DPR-27 Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53203 Facility Name: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Two Creeks, WI Inspection Conducted: April 1 through May 31, 1986 Inspectors: R. L. Hague R. J. Leemon Approved By: . ack' , Chief '//d Re,ctor P ojects Section 28 Date Inspection Summary Inspection on A)ril 1 through May 31, 1986, (Reports No. 50-266/86006(DRP);

50-301/86006 (DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of followup on inspector identified problems; followup on items of noncompliance and deviations; operational safety verification and engineered safety features system walkdown; monthly surveillance observation; monthly maintenance j observation; refueling activities; surveillance - refueling; spent fuel pool

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activities; and licensee event report followu Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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8606180254 860611 l PDR ADOCK 05000266 G PUR

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DETAILS-

' Persons Contacted

• J. J. Zach, Manager, PBNP

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T. J. Koehler, General superintendent

, G..J. Maxfield, Superintendent - Operation

• J. C.' Reisenbuechler,. Superintendent - EQR W. J. Herrman,' Superintendent - Maintenance & Construction R. S. Bredvad, Health Physicist R. Krukowski,- Security Supervisor

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• F. A. Flentje, Staff. Services Supervisor I

• J. E. Knorr, Regulatory Engineer T. L. Fredrichs, Radiochemist W. B. Fromm, Modification Engineer

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R.' L. Harris,~ Superintendent - Reactor Engineering S. W. Pu11 ins,. Inservice Inspection Engineer

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The inspector also talked with and interviewed members of the' Operation, Maintenance, Health Physics, and Instrument _and Control Sections.

• Denotes' personnel attending exit interview . -Licensee Action on Previo'us Inspection' Findings (92701) (92702) .

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. Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/75 - The requirements of TI 2515/75 (Inspection of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring to Determine if Wiring is Environmentally Qualified) have been satisfied by the special-safety inspection conducted by Messrs. R. Smeenge and A. Gautam (266/86002 and 301/86002). At present 30 of 40 Limitorque Motor Valve Operators have been rewired. All of Unit l's and all but two of the valves outside the containment on Unit 2 have been rewired. :The valves in the containment on l Unit 2 have not been rewire Temporary Instruction (TI) 2500/16 " Potential Seismic Interaction Between -

. the Movable In-Core Flux Mapping System and Seal Table." 'An investigation of the flux mapping system was performed to determine the adequacy of the restraints to withstand a seismic event. This investigation concluded that restraints should be added to the 10 path rotary transfer device to provide assurance that the device would withstand a seismic event. Similar investigations for the 5 path device indicated that no modification was

. required. Modification requests (85-157 Unit 1 and 85-204 Unit 2) to add restraints to the 10 path transfer device were completed on June 15, 1985

(Unit 1) and on November 19, 1985 (Unit 2).

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3. Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71709 and 71710)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of April and May. During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the Unit 1 Containment, the Auxiliary, and Turbine Buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plant was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan. The inspector verified compensatory measures, repairs to security systems, and observed security drill The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the months of April and May, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Auxiliary Feedwater, Vital Electrical, Diesel Generating, Component Cooling, Safety Injection, and Containment Spray systems to verify operabilit These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedure Unit 1 was taken off-line at 4:17 a.m., April 12, 1986, to start refueling 13. At 8:05 a.m. on May 18, 1986, the unit was taken critical completing the refueling outage. Major evolutions accomplished during the outage included: replacement of both trains of the hos. 1, 2, 3, and 5 feedwater heaters; modification to the moisture separator reheater internals; replacement of the Unit 1 plant process control computer (P-250);

completion of environmental qualification of pressurizer safety valve position indication; condenser tube replacement; the replacement of power ( range detectors NE-42 and NE-43; the upgrade of the control circuits on 20 environmentally qualified valve motor operators; and eddy current testing in the steam generators was completed with no pluggable indications

! identified. The unit was placed on line at 4:40 p.m. on May 20, 1986, and

! then was taken off-line at 1:30 a.m. , May 21 for turbine overspeed testing.

l After successful overspeed testing, the unit was again placed on line at

! 2:41 p.m. on May 21, 198 The unit reached 100% power at 8:00 p.m. on i May 28, 1986.

l l At 7:29 a.m., on April 29, 1986, Unit 2 was accidentally tripped by an I&C l

Technician while performing the " Reactor Protection System Logic Periodic Test." The technician did not go to the correct logic train test panel.

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Therefore, instead of pushing the test switches for A train logic, he tested the B train causing a reactor trip. All systems responded normally.

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Some condensate relief valves lifted when the main feedwater regulating

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valves closed. The reactor was taken critical at 11:14 a.m. on April 29, 1986, and it was placed on line at 9:09 p.m. The cause of the_ trip was

personnel error. A contributing factor was that the panels were across from each other. 'The procedure used to control this test has been revised to require the door of the bypass breaker cabinet to be closed during the test portion of the procedure. See LER 86-001-0 The standing alarm at greater than 90% power on Unit 1, "RCS Subcooling Low Alert Alarm" has been a standing alarm since the Auxiliary Safety Instrumentation Panel has become operational. The subcooling at 100%

power is 35"F and the alarm setpoint is 35 F. The licensee has not taken action to resolve this situation. This is an open item (266/86006-01).

On May 10, 1986, while Unit I was in solid plant operation, an I&C Technician opened a breaker to the pressurizer level sensor which gave a false. low level signal and isolated letdown. Since one charging pump

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was running, this caused pressure to increase and open the power operated relief valve The charging pump _was secured and the system returned to normal. No other anomalies occurred during P '.s event. During a

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subsequent evaluation of the actuation of the low temperature-overpressure

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mitigating system, the licensee has determined that system pressure did

not exceed 400 pounds. An enhanced computer trend indicates a maximum pressure of 397 pounds and a local pressure gauge with a maximum pressure pointer indicated 390 pounds. The Technical Specification pressure limit

for the temperature at the time was 500 pounds.-

l No violations or deviations were identified.

j Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance i

testing on the Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog Channels and

' Nuclear Instrumentation and verified that testing was performed in i accordance with adequate procedures, the test instrumentation was 4 -

calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal

and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly i

reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

I The-inspector also witnessed or reviewed portions of the following test

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activities:

TS-1 " Emergency Diesel Generator 3D" i TS-10A Appendix "B", " Containment Airlock Door Seal _ Testing, l Unit 1" l

ICP ' " Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog Unit 1" t

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ICP " Reactor' Protection Logic" ICP " Calibration Procedure for Pressurizer-Pressure Transmitters"

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ICP 10.2- " Removal of a Safeguards or Protection Sensor from Service"

~WMTP "End of Cycle Testing" WMTP " Rod Control Mechanism Timing, Rod Drop Testing and Rod Position Calibration" WMTP 9.19 " Rod Position Verification and Rod Position Indicator Alignment During Power Operation"

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

I Station maintenance activities on safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted

, in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; l activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected i as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior i to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were

, maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were

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implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente Work' requests were reviewed to determine status-of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

• RMP No. 2M, Minor " Reactor Coolant Pump Maintenance" for IP1A and 1P1B

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• Rewiring of limitorque motor operators t

• Completion of environmental qualification of Pressurizer Safety

, Valve Position Indication

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• Replacement of the Unit 1 Plant Process Control Computer.

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• - . Installation and testing of the oxygen analyzer

* Replacement of Power ilange Neutron Detector (N42 and N43) '

• Repair of RHR to containment spray 2-871B

• Repair of core deluge injection valve 1-8788

• Repair and retesting of component cooling water supply check valve 1-755A

• Investigation of leakage back through the discharge check valve AF-109 for the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.(P38A)

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The Anchor Darling rep'resentative was onsite to witness the repair of check valve AF-10 Initial inspection found.the seal to be ill fitted

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on the existing plu After removing the rubber seal the plug was blued to the valve seat and showed good contact. A new plug was blued in and it showed good contact. The new plug, with a new rubber seal was installed.

f The valve, upon testing, still showed signs of back leakag The valve was -

reopene No sign of problems could be foun The lower seat was not scarred or pitted. Blueing showed good contac The valve was reassembled

'and returned to servic The oxygen analyzer was not operational by the commitment date (April 1, 1986) made in the recently issued Radiological Effluent Technical

Specifications (RETS) which states " effective upon' completion of .

installation and checkout but in no case later than April 1, 1986." '

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0xygen samples were performed as required by RETS requirements with

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the oxygen analyzer not in of service. Mechanical and instrumentation problems encountered during the system startup delayed placing the oxygen l analyzer in service. The analyzer was operational on April-14, 1986, j before the 14-day limiting condition for operation (LCO) expired.

" No violations or deviations were identified.

[ Refueling Activities (60710)

L The inspector verified that prior to the handling of fuel in the core,

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all surveillance testing required by the Technical Specifications and licensee's procedures had been completed; verified that during the outage L the periodic testing of refueling related equipment was performed as

! required by technical specifications; observed five shifts of the fuel

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handling operations (removal, inspection and insertion) and verified the l activities were performed *n accordance with the technical specifications and approved procedures; verified that containment integrity was maintained as required by technical specifications; verified that good housekeeping was maintained in the refueling area; and verified that staffing during

. refueling was in accordance with technical specifications and approved

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procedures.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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. Surveillance - Refueling (61701)

The inspector observed refueling outage related surveillance testing on Unit 1 to verify that the tests were covered by properly approved procedures; that the procedures used were consistent with regulatory requirements, licensee commitments, and administrative controls; that minimum crew requirements were met, test prerequisites were completed, special test equipment was calibrated and in service, and required data was recorded for final review and analysis; that the qualifications of personnel conducting the test were adequate; and that the test results were adequate. The inspector witnessed all or portions of the following tests:

• ORT No. 1 " Flow Test of Safety Injection Pumps"

• ORT No. 2 " Flow Test of RHR Pumps"

• WMPT " Power Level Increase to Full Power" No violations or deviations were identifie . Spent Fuel Pool Activities (86700)

Evidence of baffle jetting was discovered on one fuel assembly which was removed during the Unit 1 fuel shuffle. The assembly had been in core location D12. The fuel assembly which was in that location the previous cycle also had failed fuel rod Wear and cladding failure is a gradual process which can be effectively monitored through coolant sampling. The licensee decided not to attempt ,

any fixes this outage. A purchase order for equipment to modify the flow direction outside the core baffle plate has been issued. The modification will modify the vessel internals such that the flow outside the core baffle plate will be in the same direction as the flow through the cor This modification should eliminate the cross baffle plate pressure differential l thereby eliminating the cladding failure caused by baffle jetting. The up I flow modification will be done during the Spring refueling in 1987 for i Unit 1, and the Fall of 1986 for Unit This is discussed in LER 85-002-01, Failed Fuel Rod in Assembly H14 and LER 85-004, Unit 2 Failure of Fuel Assembly L56 and L59 Cladding (Positions M-6 and F-1).

l These are open items (266/86006-02; 301/86006-01).

l l No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700)

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and-review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine l that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective

action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had j been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.

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266/85002-01 Failed Fuel Rod in Assembly H14 l

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266/86002 Containment Isolation Valve Leakage in Excess of Technical Specifications

'301/85004 Failure of Fuel Assembly L56 and L59 Cladding (Positions M-6 and F-1)

301/86001 Reactor Trip During Trip Lopic Test No violations or deviations were identifie . Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 3 and . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection period to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection activitie The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' comments. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. .The licensee did not identify any such decuments/ processes as proprietar