IR 05000266/1999009

Insp Repts 50-266/99-09 & 50-301/99-09 on 990528-0713. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations, Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20210H054
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	07/28/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20210H026	List: IR 05000266/1999009 ML20210H021
References
50-266-99-09, 50-301-99-09, NUDOCS 9908030266
Download: ML20210H054 (12)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lli Docket Nos: 50-266; 50-301 License Nos: DPR-24; DPR-27 Report No: 50-266/99009(DRP); 50-301/99009(DRP)

Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 Location: 6610 Nuclear Road Two Rivers, WI 54241 Dates: May 28 through July 13,1999 Inspectors: F. Brown, Senior Resident inspector P. Louden, Resident inspector C. Brown, Reactor Engineer D. Chyu, Reactor Engineer M. Kunowski, Project Engineer Approved by: R. Lanksbury, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects a

9900030266 990728 PDR ADOCK 05000266 G PDR

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', l EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-266/99009(DRP); 50-301/99009(DRP)

This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week inspection period by the resident inspector Ooerations

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Operations department personnel were actively and effectively using the on-line Safety I Monitor, a computer-based system that provided advanced and real-time risk insights for proposed and current plant equipment configurations. (Section 04.1)

Maintenance

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Through effective work control and interdepartmental coordination, the licensee completed repairs to the "E" service water pump motor in a timely manner; thereby, limiting the amount of time in a limiting condition for operation. (Section M1.1)

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With a single nonsafety-significant exception, selected functional failures were documented in the 1998 annual maintenance rule report, were accurately classified and couated, and were appropriately dispositioned. (Section M2.1)

Enaineerina

The design, installation, and testing guidance for replacement components of the facade freeze protection system was consistent with industry recommendations and vendor documents. Section E2.1)

Plant Suooort There were no significant plant support issues this report perio i l

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Report Details '

Unit 2 power was reduced to approximately 60 percent on June 24,1999, in response to the loss of an offsite 345-kilovolt line. Power was retumed to 100 percent later that day. Both units remained at full power for the rest of the period with minor short-term exceptions for tests and i system load contro ~

1. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 Control Room and in-olant Observations of Activities (71707)

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Operations were conducted well during this reporting period. The inspectors did not observe any cases of inappropriate or inadequate performance. The inspectors did not i observe any examplea of exceptionally good performance during this perio Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Safety System Walkdowns (71707)

The inspectors performed a safety system walkdown of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Containment Spray systems following licensee surveillance testing. No discrepancies were observed. The inspectors performed a safety system walkdown of the "B" train emergency diesel generators. No significant discrepancies were noted. One inconsistency in the application of " red" locks was noted and is included in the licensee's corrective acti?n program as Condition Report 99-173 l 04 Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Use of the On-line Safety Monitor > Inspection Scoce (71707. 62707)

The inspectors monitored the operations department's use of the Safety Monitor syste This computer-based system provided advanced and real-time risk insights for proposed and current plant equipment configurations, Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed the shift technical advisors regularly using the Safety Monito Insights gained from the monitor were provided to the duty shift superintenden Significant increases in risk, or the need to sequence planned work so as to avoid significant increases in risk, were discussed at shift tumover meeting Conclusions Operations department personnel were actively and effectively utilizing the on-line Safety Monito ..

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05 Operator Training and Qualifications 0 Simulator Trainina (71707)

The inspectors observed a licensee-administered simulator evaluation. This evaluation was part of the licensed operator continuing training program. The inspectors considered the scenario to be an effective leaming and evaluatory tool. The training and operations department personnel present provided critical and objective feedback to the operators. Based on the observed performance, it was apparent that some operators were not yet comfortable with the licensee's new use and adherence policy for emergency operating procedures. Specifically, there was some confusion over the difference between using the procedures as written or changed via an approved process (as required by regulation) and " verbatim compilance" (a poor practice). The licensee recognized the need to address this discomfort and confusio Operations Organization and Administration O6.1 Reduction in Control Room Staffina (7170D The inspectors observed a decrease in the minimum number of licensed operators present in the control room. During shift tumovers, during meal hours, and on other occasions, there were as few as two licensed reactor operators and one senior reactor operator in the control room. This staffing level satisfied the plant's Technical Specification (T/S) minimum manning requirements, but was one fewer licensed individual than had previously been required by plant administrative procedure. The licensee had adopted the previous manning standard following performance problems for which violations were documented in inspection Report 50-266/96018(DRS);

50-301/96018(DRS). The licensee relaxed the minimum control room staffing requirement because the previous perfomtance problems had been corrected, a shortage of licensed operators, and because of labor-management issues. The inspectors verified that the administrative procedure revision that relaxed the minimum staffing required had the necessary reviews and approval Miscellaneous Operations issues (92700)

08.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-266/99005-00: Steam Leak From Low Pressure Feedwater Heater. The issues associated with this event were discussed in inspection Report 50-266/99008(DRP); 50-301/99008(DRP). The LER was complete

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and accurat .2 (Closed) LER 50-301/99003-00. Missed T/S Surveillance Test of Emergency DC [ direct current] Lighting. The inspectors performed an independent review of the missed test I and concluded that there was minimal safety significance associated with this issu Specifically, new battery-powered lighting systems had been installed that were redundant to the direct current lighting system in all the areas of coverage. Additionally, other tests of the system performed within the required frequency had verified operation of the lighting circuit with the exception of a single contact. The licensee had been in the process of removing the missed surveillance test from the T/S because of the lack of safety significance associated with a failure to perform the test. The violation for failure to perform the test specified in T/S 15.4.6.A.3 was therefore of minor safety significance and, consistent with Section IV of the Enforcement Policy, is not being cite ,

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i 11. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Service Water (SW) Pumo Motor Reoairs Inspection Scope (62707)

l The inspectors reviewed the conduct of maintenance activities associated with the I

repairs to the "E" SW pump motor which failed on June 24,1999. The SW system was the second highest ranking safety significant system in the licensee's probabilistic safety analysi Observations and Findinas On June 24,1999, in response to a control room alarm indicating a potential ground fault on the Unit 2 Train "A" safety-related 480-volt bus, operators attempted to start the

"E'SW pump in accordance with alarm response procedures. The pump fai:ed to start, was declared out-of-service, and a 7-day limiting condition for operation was entered.

, Troubleshooting identified that the "E" SW pump motor had a phase "A" ground faul Actions were immediately initiated to remove the damaged motor and obtain a spare, which was being rebuilt at an offsite vendor. Maintenance personnel installed the spare motor and the pump was retumed to service following surveillance testing on June 27,

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The inspectors observed that coordination activities between the maintenance, nuclear supply services, and operations staff, and other involved work groups were both effective and efficiently performed. The spare motor was received on the weekend, during off-hours, and was released for installation in a timely manner. Likewise, maintenance personnel installed the motor efficiently and in accordance with routine maintenance procedures. These efforts resulted in limiting the out-of-service time for the "E" SW pump to 3% days of the 7-day limi Conclusions Through effective work control and interdepartmental coordination, the licensee completed repairs to the "E" SW pump motor in a timely manner; thereby, limiting the amount of time in a limiting condition for operatio i M2- Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment

- M2.1 Review of the Annual Maintenance Rule Report i Inspection Scoos (62707)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's 1998 annual maintenance rule report to ensure that the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65," Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance," I were satisfied. The inspectors focused the review on ensuring that functional failures (FF) and maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFF) were identified, accurately classified and counted, and appropriately dispositione i

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. Observations and Findinas The inspectors developed a list of 15 equipment failures or malfunctions of risk significant equipment that had occurred in 1998, and appeared to be FFs or MPFFs under the licensee's program. The inspectors then reviewed the licensee's 1998 annual maintenance rule report to determine whether the failures or malfunctions had been counted against system performance criteria. The inspectors found that all 15 items had been appropriately included in the annual monitoring report except in cases where the system engineering staff could provide reasonable explanations why the failure or malfunction did not satisfy the definition of an FF or MPF The inspectors reviewed the annual report to ensure that documented FFs and MPFFs for risk significant systems were accurately classified and counted. With two exceptions, all items reviewed appeared to be accurately classified and counted. The only inappropriate classification of documented failures involved repetitive Vari-drive failures for the charging pumps. Licensee staff had not recognized that repetitive functional failures satisfied the program definition of an MPFF. Licensee staff informed the inspectors that the involved failure mode had been recognized as a repetitive MPFF in early 1999. In addition to this failure to correctly classify an MPFF, the inspectors also identified that repetitive malfunctions of the instrument air compressors were classified as FFs but not as MPFFs. The licensee demonstrated to the inspectors that the FF classification had been a conservative error (the malfunctions should not nave been classified as functional failures), and that an MPFF had not occurred. These two issues were considered to be of minimal safety significanc The inspectors verified that all identified FFs and MPFFs for risk significant systems had been appropriately dispositioned, with the exception of the charging system repetitive MPFF discussed above. The charging system had been moved to (a)(1)in early 1999 after one additional Vari-drive failure, and the inspectors considered this to be a minor issue. The inspectors noted several cases where systems had conservatively been moved from (a)(2) status to (a)(1) status prior to performance criteria being exceede One example was the condensate and feed system for both unit Conclusions With a single nonsafety-significant exception, selected functional failures were documented in the 1998 annual maintenance rule report, were accurately classified and counted, and were appropriately dispositione Ill. Engineering E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E Facade Freeze Protection Heat Tracina Installation Inspection (37551)

The inspectors observed maintenance personnel installing some of the replacement heat tracing elements on piping for the Unit i refueling water storage tank located in the Unit i facade. The specific piping inspected was the same length of pipe that was discovered to be frozen in January 1999, and was the subject of a recent escalated enforcement action (see inspection Report 50-266/99004).

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The inspectors also reviewed design and installation documentation associated with the !

heat tracing elements and power supplies. The design, installation, and testing :

guidance was consistent with recommendations in Electric Power Research Institute, l Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and vendor document ;

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The inspectors noted that the administrative controls being used for the installation of the heat tracing elements and electrical circuitry were the spare parts equivalency )

evaluation documentation (SPEED) and the plant modification processes. The l inspectors had no concems with this approach for the facade freeze protection improvement project. However, the inspectors noted that goveming procedures for SPEEDS and plant modifications did not contain definitive criteria for ensuring that SPEEDS would not be used in place of plant modification E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92700,92903)

E (Closed) LER 50-301/98003-00: Missed ASME [American Society of Mechanical Engineers] Section XI Pressure Test Program Surveillance. An increased-frequency surveillance test was not performed because scheduling personnel missed the notification of the surveillance test frequency change. The valve passed subsequent testing. The failure to perform the increased-frequency test was a violation of T/S 15.4.2.B.3. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation j (NCV) consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-301/99009- 1 01(DRS)).

E8.2 {Qlosed) Insoection Followuo item 50-266/96018-19(DRS): 50-301/96018-19(DflS):

The Chemical and Volume Control System May Not be a Closed System. The inservice testing program was revised (Revision 6) on September 30,1998. This revision included new component classification and test requirements to ensure that the chemical and volume control system satisfied applicable code requirements for a closed syste E8.3 (Closed) LER 50-266/98003-00: Containmert Accident Fan Motor Cooler Exchanger Flow Rates Found to be Outside the Design Basis of the Plant. The licensee identified that the design basis cooling flow to the fan motor coolers had not been appropriately translated into the procedures for establishing the flow rates. The problem was caused by inappropriate translation of system pressure drops into indicated flow rates on

- installed gauges. The failure to appropriately translate design basis requirements into required procedures was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion lil,

" Design Control." This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent i with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-266/99009-02(DRS); I 50-301/99009-02(DRS)).

l E8.4 (Closed) LER 50-266/93003-01: Containment Accident Ran Motor Cooler Exchanger Flow Rates Found to be Outside the Design Basis of the Plant. This supplement appropriately revised the licensee's corrective actions for the LER discussed in Section E E8.5 - (Closed) Unresolved item 50 266/99005-01(DRS): 50-301/99005-01(DRS): Operability of Emergency Diesel Generator Room Fire Dampers. The licensee removed the components necessary for the manual trip function of the emergency diesel generator ventilation and fire dampers to prevent unintended closure of fire dampers. During

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subsequent review, the licensee identified that the fire dampers could not automatically close due to the differential pressure created by the ventilation system. The licensee had since included instructions in Fire Emergency Plan (FEP) 4.13, " Emergency Diesel l Generator (G-01/G-02) and Compressor Rooms," Revision 7, to shut down the ventilation system so the fire dampers could automatically dose upon melting of the fusible links. The inspcetors considered this operator action to secure the ventilation system to be acceptable and in accordance with information Notice 89-52, " Potential j Fire Damper Operational Problems."

Upon detection of a fire or heat source in the emergency diesel generator room, the

= ventilation system would automatically start due to a rise in temperature. If the ventilation system was capable of removing heat and maintaining the room temperature below 160 degrees Fahrenheit, no equipment in the immediate area would be affected i by temperature. If operators had secured the ventilation system per FEP 4.13, the i fusible links would melt and the fire dampers would close automatically. The inspectors I considered the use of fusible links with a rating of 160 degrees Fahrenheit to be acceptable. The licensee was planning to install higher temperature rated fusible links to address a high-energy line break analysis. The inspectors did not review the associated safety evaluation and therefore could not reach a conclusion conceming the higher rated fusible link The licensee had conduded that the manual trip function was not needed to meet the requirement of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. The NRC had previously concluded that the loss of the cables associated with the manual trip function of the ventilation system would have no effect on safe shutdown capability following the fire. Therefore, it was insignificant when this function was eliminate :

E8.6 Review of Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness (Closed) Temoorarv insoection (TI) 2515/141: Review of Y2K Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plant l The inspectors conducted an abbreviated review of Y2K activities and documentation using Tl 2515/141. The review addressed aspects of Y2K management planning, documentation, implementation planning, initial assessment, detailed assessment, remediation activities, Y2K testing and validation, notification activities, and contingency !

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planning. The inspectors used NEl/NUSMG [ Nuclear Energy institute / Nuclear Utilities

, Software Management Group) 97-07, " Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness," and l- NEl/NUSMG 98-07, " Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness Contingency Planning," as the primary references for this review. The results of this review will be combined with the results of other reviews in a summary report to be issued by July 31,199 IV. Plant Support R1- Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls

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No significant discrepancies were observed during routine tours of the radiologically controlled are .

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l V. Manaaement Meetinas  !

I X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the i conclusion of the inspection on July 13,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings .

presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie l J

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee J. R. Anderson, Operations Manger A. J. Cayla, Regulatory Services and Licensing Manager R. P. Farrell, Radiation Protection Manger V. M. Kaminskas, Malntenance Manager R. G. Mende, Plant Manager C. R. Peterson, Director of Engineering M. E. Reddemann, Site Vice President J. G. Schweitzer, System Engineering Manager INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onslie Engineering IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations 1 IP 92700: Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor )

Facilities j IP 92903: Follow up - Engineering {

i Tl 2515/141: Review of Y2K Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants I

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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-301/99009-01(DRS) NCV Technical Specification violation - LER 50-301/98003-00 50-266/99009-02(DRS) NCV Design basis violation - LER 50-266/98003-00 50-301/99009-02(DRS)

Closed 50-266/99005-00 LER Steam leak from low pressure feedwater heater 50-301/99003-00 LER Missed T/S surveillance test of direct current lighting i

50-301/98003-00 LER Missed ASME Section XI pressure test 50-301/99009-01(DRS) NCV Technical Specification violation - LER 50-301/98003-00 i 50-266/96018-19(DRS) IFl The chemical and volume control system may not be a 50-301/96018-19(DRS) closed system 50-266/98003-00 LER Containment accident fan motor cooler exchanger flow rates found to be outside the design basis of the plant 50-266/99009-02(DRS) NCV Design basis violation - LER 50-266/98003-00 50-301/99009-02(DRS)

50-266/98003-01 LER Containment accident fan motor cooler exchanger flow rates found to be outside the design basis of the plant 50-266/99005-01(DRS) URI Operability of emergency diesel generator room fire 50-301/99005-01(DRS) dampers Tl2515/141 Review of Y2K Readiness of Computer Systems at 1'

Nuclear Power Plants

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

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FEP Fire Emergency Plan FF Functional Failures LER- Licensee Event Report '

MPFF Maintenance Preventable Functional Failures NCV Non-Cited Violation SPEED Spare Parts Equivalency Evaluation Documentation

' SW . . Service Water Tl .. Temporary Instruction T/S Technical Specification URI Unresolved item Y2K Year 2000

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