IR 05000266/1989015

Insp Repts 50-266/89-15 & 50-301/89-14 on 890401-0531. Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Previous Insp Findings,Operational Safety Verification,Radiological Controls,Maint & Surveillance & Emergency Preparedness

ML20245G789
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	06/21/1989
From:	Defayette R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20245G758	List: IR 05000266/1989015 ML20245G757 ML20245G776
References
50-266-89-15, 50-301-89-14, NUDOCS 8906290264
Download: ML20245G789 (15)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-266/89015(DRP);50-301/89014(DRP)

Docket No. 50-266; 50-301 License No. DPR-24; DPR-27 Licensee:- Wisconsin Electric Company 231' West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53201 Facility Name: . Point. Beach Unit 1 and 2-Inspection At: 'Two Creeks, Wisconsin

. Inspection Conducted: April 1 through May 31, 1989

' Inspectors: C. L. Vanderniet R . si . Leemon R. A. Paul M. C. Schumache E. R. Schweibinz Approved By: Robert W. DeFayette, Chief Reac r Projects Section 3 Dat . .

6, , h-Inspection Summary Ins)ection from April 1 through May 31, 1989, (Reports No. 50-266/89015 (DR)); No. 50-301/89014(DRP)

Areas Inspected: A routine, unannounced inspection by resident and regional inspectors of previous inspection findings; operational safety verification; '

radiological. controls; maintenance and_ surveillance; emergency preparedness; security; engineering and technical support; safety assessment / quality verification; and temporary instruction followu Results: During this inspection period unit I was in cold shutdown for a refueling outage and unit 2 continued at full power. A violation for failure to. follow approved procedures was issued based on two examples; improper use of the qualified red taggers list (Paragraph 3.a) and personnel error resulting in the actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system (Paragraph 5.b).

Several other issues are also addressed in this inspection report including the following: actions taken by the licensee to resolve the RHR switch-over from the RWST to the containment sump (Paragraph 3.a); an unplanned extremity exposure (Paragraph 4.a); torn grid strap on fuel assembly T14 (Paragraph 8.b); and the establishment. of an on-site Quality Assurance group (Paragraph 9). One unresolved item was identified regarding the modification of nitrogen backup lines to the power operated relief valves (Paracraph 5.a). ,

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DETAILS l

' Persons Contheted

• J. J. Zach, Placc Manager T. J. Koehler, General Superintendent - Maintenance G. J. Maxfield, General Superintendent - Operations J. C.' Reisenbuechler, Superintendent - Operations W. J. Herrman, Superintendent - Maintenance N. L. Hoefert, Superintendent - Instrument & Controls R. J. Bruno, Superintendent - Training T. L. Fredrichs, Superintendent - Chemistry D. F. Johnson, Superintendent - Health Physics R. C. Zyduck, Superintendent - Technical Services

• J. E. Knorr, Regulatory Engineer

• F. A. Flentje, Administrative Specialist

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The inspector also contacted other licensee employees including members of the technical and engineering staffs, and reactor and auxiliary operator .

• Denotes the licensee representatives attending the management exit Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) (Closed).UnresolvedItem(301/89002-03) Valve 2RC-583DiscoveredOut of the Normal Positio LThis item concerned the finding of 2RC-583 in the closed position during efforts to identify in-leakage to the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT). This valve had should have been in its normally open 4 position however, had been shut during a venting procedure and was j not reopened when the procedure was completed. The licensee 1 acknowledged that the procedure was inadequate and has conrnitted to revise the procedure prior to the next Unit 2 refueling outage in the fall of 1989. Based on the commitment to revise the venting j procedure the unresolved item will be close (Closed) Open Item (266/89005-01 and 301/89005-01) 50.59 Review had not been Completed for Modification of Feedwater Heater No 50.59 evaluation had been done for modification to the feedwater heaters. The licensee performed the evaluations and demonstrated that no unreviewed safety question existed. The inspectors were satisfied that the licensee improvements in the area of 50.59 evaluations would prevent further occurrences of this concern. As a j result of the licensee action on this matter this item is considered )

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tc be close (Closed) Open Item (266/89006-01 and 301/89006-01) Improper use of Qualified Red Taggers Lis l

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A copy of a list from Operations Group Standing Order 4.12.2,

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Qualified Red Taggers, was attached to the front of the active red tag log and contained pen and ink changes. These changes constituted improper changes to the Standing Order as they were not reflected in the actual standing order. Upon reinspection, the  ;

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inspector.noted that the standing order had been revised on April 1, 1989 however, the practice of using a copy of the list with pen and ink changes was still in effect. Because the licensee had revised the standing order this open item will be closed. However, because the revision did not effectively resolve the practice the final correction of the issue will be tracked as part of Violation 266/89015-01 and 301/89014-0 , Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71707) (71710) (64704) Control Room Observation I The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period. During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained that the. operators were alert, cognizant of current plant conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions and took prompt action when appropriate. The inspectors noted that a high degree of professionalism attended all facets of control room operation and that the unit 2 control boards were generally in a " black board" condition (no non-testing annunciators ,

in alarm condition). Several shift turnovers were also observed and }

in all cases the turnovers appeared to be handled in a thorough  ;

manne The inspector performed walkdowns of the control boards to verified j

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the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affecte component Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Switch-over During this inspection period problems were identified with the i written guidance and training for operators regarding the switch over of RHR system from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to reactor containment sump recirculatio On December 19, 1988, LER 88-009-00 was issued which discussed the potential that Emergency Operating Procedure (E0P) 1.3 could not provide for a transfer from the RWST to the containment sump recirculation in a timely manner. In this LER the licensee assumed that approximately 13 minutes were available, following a large break Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA), to perform the transfer i before core damage occurred. The LER also stated that the transfer should take 7.5 minutes to complete. The licensee issued a night order discussing this possibility and cautioning the operator to be prudent in their actions if these circumstances occurre h

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On April 21, 1989 the NRC informed the licensee of a Westinghouse-notification stating that if there is a ce:sation of cooling water .

flow to the core for a period of.1.5 to 3 minutes following a large {

break LOCA, core damage could result. To prevent this from i occurring the licensee reissued a night order informing operators to ensure cooling water flow was maintained if a LOCA was experience The inspector reviewed this night order and expressed concern that it did not provide adequate guidance or training to the operator After discussions between the licensee and the NRC, the licensee committed to perform training for all operators and to revise E0P-1.3 which covers the large break LOCA event. Training was conducted for all shifts of operations personnel between May 26 and June 6, 1989. The training included a discussion of E0P-1.3 and walk-throughs from the control room and in the plant. The licensee also committed to revising E0P-1.3 by the end of July 1989. In light of the above training and the commitment to revise E0P-1.3 no further actions appear to be necessary however, an open item will be issued to track the completion of the revision to the procedure 4 (0 pen Item 266/89015-02 and 301/89014-02).

Qualified Red Taggers During the previous inspection period, Operations Group Standing Order 4.12.2, Qualified Red Taggers, was reviewed. During the review the-inspector determined that a copy of this list was attached to the front of the active red tag log and was referred to when issuing red tags. The copy however, was different from the list in the Standing Order in that pen and ink changes had been made ,

to it. These changes constituted changes to the Standing Order list l since its last issue and therefore, should have been included in the Standing Order This discrepancy was discussed with the licensee l and the licensee stated that corrections to the Standing Order would ;

be made. The inspector opened open items'266/89006-01 and l 301/89006-01 to track the correctio Upon reinspection, in an effort to close open items 266/89006-01 and 301/89006-01, the inspector noted that the standing order had been revised, however, the practice of using a copy of the order with pen ,

and ink changes was still in effect. Because the actions taken by the licensee have not been effective in correcting this problem the !

open item will be closed and a violation issued. lhe inspector considers this to be an example of a failure to follow approved !

procedure as required by Technical Specification 15.6.8.1, Plant Operating Procedures. Final correction of this issue will be !

tracked as part of Violation 266/89015-01 and 301/89014-0 b. Facility Tours Tours of the Auxiliary, Turbine, Service Water Buildings, and Unit 1 Containment were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions, status of fire protection equipment, fluid leaks and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc i

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During the facility tours inspectors noticed very few signs of 2

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l leakage and that all equipment appears to be in good operating l

condition. Overall the plant cleanliness was goo Employees' Family Site Tour During this inspection period tours of the facility were given to the families of plant employees. Approximately 1200 people toured the administration building, turbine building, auxiliary building and. containment. This was a well organized undertaking which resulted in no abnormal operational or radiological event Hydrogen Tank Storage Also during this inspection period the inspector was requested by the region to evaluate the storage of hydrogen at the facilit ,

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This evaluation included information on the distance from the storage facility to safety related structure or air intake. A visual inspection was performed by the resident inspector and the installation appeared to be of adequate design, Safety System Walkdowns During this inspection period, the inspectors walked down accessible portions of the Auxiliary Feedwater, Vital and DC Electrical, Diesel Generating, Component Cooling, Safety Injection, and Containment Spray systems to verify operabilit Extensive walkdowns of the station batteries were conducted during this inspection period. Due to the number of concerns and the detail of the evaluations conducted on this subject a special inspection report, 266/89016 and 301/89015, has been issued. For a i complete description of these inspection activities and the results please refer to the above repor Unit 1 Operational Status Unit I started this inspection period in coastdown operations and was taken-off-line on April 2, 1989. The unit was placed in cold shutdown to begin refueling outage #16, a scheduled 43 day maintenance and refueling outage. The unit was returned to service on May 17, 1989. Major activities performed during this outage included eddy current inspections of the steam generators and other miscellaneous heat exchangers; inspection of the IB reactor coolant pump motor; inservice inspection of the primary system; station battery DOS replacement; and overhaul of the high pressure turbin The unit has remained at full power since returning to power on May 17th except for load reductions requested from systems contro Unit 2 Operational Status Unit 2 started this inspection period in a shutdown condition the result of a generator lockout / turbine trip / reactor trip event on

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March 29, 1989. The unit returned to full power operation on April 2. 1989 and continued at full power throughout this inspection period except for load reductions requested by systems control. The '

licensee also reduced power for a period of approximately 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> on April 22 and 23 to facilitate main condenser waterbox cleanin These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications,10 CFR, and administrative procedure . Radiological Controls (71709)

The inspecters routinely observe the licensee's radiological controls and practic% during normal plant tours and the inspection of work activities. Inspection in this area includes direct observation of the use of Radiation Work Permits (RWPs); normal work practices inside contaminated barriers; maintenance of radiological barriers and signs; and Health Physics (HP) activities regarding monitoring, sampling, and surveying. The inspector also observed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste processin ,

From a radiological standpoint the plant is in good condition which allows access to most portions of the facility. During tours of the facility the inspectors noted that barriers and signs were in good condition. When minor discrepancies were identified the HP staff quickly responded correcting any problem I Unplanned Extremity Exposure Two ragion based radiation specialists reviewed the circumstances surrounding unplanned extremity exposures to three station employees who handled a radioactive object on April 14, 1989, during a closeout inspection of the Unit 1B steam generator. The licensee informed Region III of a possible hand overexposure on the afternoon of the same day and formed a formal investigation committee to review the incident. During the review, which was performed onsite on April 15, the inspectors interviewed licensee managers and health physics personnel and the individuals involved in the incident. The inspectors observed several reenactments of the event using a full scale mockup of a steam generator and reviewed the licensee's dosimetric reconstruction of the inciden No overexposure appears to have resulted from the even An RWP was issued on April 14, 1989, for two engineers to perform an inspection in the hot and cold legs of the Unit 18 steam ganerator beforo closing it after outage work was completed. A Radiation Control Operator (RCO) was assigned to provide health physics coverag Portable instruments and TLD tree surveys for the RWP were done on April 13, from which RWP requirements and stay times were determined. Full protective clothing including cotton liner gloves and two pairs of rubber gloves were prescribed for both the first engineer who was to make the jump (entry) and tha second engineer who would provide assistance including rescue if necessar Dosimetry for each included 15 self reading dosimeters (SRDs) in

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addition to a TLD on the chest and a finger TLD on each hand. The i RC0 also wore full protective clothing and a TLD and three SRDs on j his chest; no finger or wrist dosimetry was wor i The measured dose rates in the hot leg, determined on April 13, ranged up to 24 R/hr with the highest rates at the approximate location of a workers upper body dur ig a jump. Based on this survey, the engineers were each authurized for 1500 millirem exposure for the day and the maximum stay time was set at 3 minutes ;

and 15 seconds. The actual entry duration timed by the RC0 was 23 seconds. The radioactive object was not identified during the survey, presumably because of the generally high radiation field and the location of the object which was in a difficult position to make a close surve One engineer made the jump. As he was turning his body in preparation for exit, he noted an object partially covered by water lying against a divider plate in the low point of the channel head, I'

picked it up and pas:;ed it outside to the second engineer in what was essentially one continuous motion while completing his exi (He later stated that he thought the object might be a weld plug or bolt from the upper part of the channel head). The second engineer stated he glanced at the object but cast it aside and continued with his assigned task of assisting the first engineer complete his exi The attending RC0 stated that he picked the object up and without hesitation tossed it under the steam generator bowl out of the wa He then measured the object with an R02A ionization chamber and obtained an offscale reading of 50 R/hr at near contact and 2.5 R/Hr at about 18 inches. (A later measurement made by the RC0 using extended probe instrument gave 200 R/hr at near contact).

The RCO then left to help the first engineer to remove his protective clothing. He also informed his supervisor of finding the object and was instructed to have it bagged for removal from the area. However, before this could be accomplished, the first engineer told the RC0 that he wished to see the object agai (During the reenactment, the engineer said his concern us that the object may have been a weld plug or bolt which would have precluded closing up the steam generator.) The RCO then reverified his reading of 2.5 R/hr at 18 inches. (During the reenactment the engineer indicated that he mentally evaluated the survey result in the context of his entry into a general 20 R/hr field inside the steam genarator without recognizing the potential significance of a contact exposure.) The engineer then knelt near the object and picked it up and held it in his right hand for about five seconds before putting it down. (The RC0 stated during the reenactment that he was not expecting the engineer to touch the object and that he was shielded by the engineer's body and did not see him actually pickitup.) The second engineer then placed the object in a plastic bag using a 12 inch strip of duct tape to avoid direct contact. The object was identified as a portion of a split pin that had been missing since a previous modification of the upper reactor internals in 198 _ _. _ _____

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[' The licensee calculated extremity exposures for each of the involved j individuals using a modified "QAD" computer code. They were based L

on source strength from measured. dose rates measured at various

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distances,. isotope identification by gamma spectroscopy, measured thickness of hand coverirg. source configuration, and times determined from event reconstruction. The maximum dose thus determined was in the range of 4 to 6 rem to the hand of the first

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engineer assuming he held the object for about 10 seconds. Beta contribution was negligible by comparison. The assumptions used in these determinations were consistent with the reenactments witnessed by the inspectors, . The more significant measured doses to this engineer were 370 millirem, whole body and 450 millirem, right wris The inspectors were generally impressed with the overall knowledge of the three principals involved in this event. However, it was apparent that they lacked a proper appreciation of the very high contact doses possible from physically small sources. This reflects a training weakness and a weakness in th'e RWP that it did not caution the workers against direct handling of objects found inside the steam generator. Communication between the RC0 and the engineer was also weak on this matter as evidenced by the actions of the engineer when he returned to the steam generator area and picked up -

the source a second time. The licensee also recognized these weaknesses and are considering taking a number of corrective actions to preclude recurrence. These actions includt (1) enhancement of procedural requirements for steam generator closeout and pre-surveyor inspections with emphasis on proper handling and retrieval of. foreign objects; (2) provide training for radiation technologists and contractor technicians on job coverage for primary system closeout inspections and primary system foreign object removal and training for all personnel concerning the hazards associated with handling radioactive materials; (3) augmented channel head pre-entry visual inspection program which may include use of video cameras. The implementation and effectiveness of these corrective actions will be reviewed at a future inspection (0 pen Item 266/89015-03and301/89014-03).

No violations or deviations were identified in this area during this inspection perio . Maintenance / Surveillance Observation (62703) (61726) Maintenance Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in confomance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were remew from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the wr; activities were accomplished using approved

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procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems.to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and i materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to d.etermine status of outstanding jobs and to assure-that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

- Replacement of the "A" Station Battery (DOS)

The inspectors spent.a great deal of time during this inspection period observing the replacement of the "A" Station Battery (D05). Many concerns were identified through the

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course of their observations and assistance from regional and headquarters personnel was requested. Due to the number of-concerns and the detail of the evaluations conducted on this subject a special inspection' report, . 266/89016 and 301/89015, has been issued. For a complete description of these inspection activities and the results please refar to the above repor Unit 1 PORV Nitrogen Supply modification Testing of t'he unit 1 PORVs actuation using the backup nitrogen supply demonstrated that the valves could not open in the ,

required amount of time, approximately 2 seconds. It was determined that the pressure from the nitrogen regulator to the valves, 100 psig, was insufficient to overcome flow restrictions due to the length of~the line from the regulators to the valves. This resulted in opening times of approximately 9 seconds, 7 seconds longer than required. To correct this problem the licensee modified the supply of nitrogen to the valves by moving the pressure regulators closer to the valve This resulted in reducing the length of the lines from the regulators to the valves thereby reducing the flow restrictions to the valves. When the modification was completed the unit 1 PORVs were again tested. PCV-430 was able to open within the required amount of time however, PCV-431C still required slightly greater than 2 seconds to open. The licensee is still in the process of evaluating the operation of PCV-431C and plans further adjustments to the valve to correct its opening time. The licensee stated that these modification will be made as soon as possible. The inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee's corrective actions for IPCV-4310, evaluate original nitrogen backup post-modification testing, and inspect status and corrective actions associated with the Unit 2 PORV, This followup work will be tracked by unresolved items 266/89015-04 and 301/89014-0 _ - . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _

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- Disassembly and Inspection of unit _1 B Reactor Coolant Pump Moto The RCP motor was disassembled, inspected and reassembled by vendor personnel and monitored by the licensee. The work was completed in a thorough and professional manner and no discrepancies were identifie Surveillance The inspector observed surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; that test instrumentation was calibrated; that limiting conditions for operation were met; that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished; that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspector witnessed and reviewed the following test activities:

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ICP-4.32'(Revision 10) Auxiliary Feedwater System During this test the Instrumentation and Control (I&C)

technicians were to be testing the low suction pressure trip on auxiliary feedwater pump P38B. However, due to a discrepancy in the drawing being used the I&C technician inadvertently tripped the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump 2P29 low suction pressure trip. This resulted in 2P29 being in a tripped condition for approximately three minutes while P38B was administratively out of servic The error resulted from the technician's use of drawing C02-14, referenced _in the procedure, to determine which instrument was to be tested. The drawing was labeled incorrectly which resulted in the technician accessing the wrong instrument rac The rack itself was correctly labeled however the technician failed to recognize this and proceeded to test the 2P29 low suction pressure trip-instrumen When the test equipment was connected to the instrument the bistable tripped as designed and a turbine-driven auxiliary )

feedwater pump trip signal was received. This signal prevents ;

the automatic opening of motor operated valves 2019 and 2020, 2P29 turbine steam admission valves. The signal does not prevent the operator from manual operation of those valves and therefore, if needed, 2P29 could have been used. The ;

motor-driven pump P38B though administratively out of service had not been physically removed from service and remained operable during the entire perio _______

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The licensee' issued a nonconformance. report on the event'and is planning to correct the drawing discrepancy. This appears to adequately address this issue and no further evaluation by the inspectors-is necessar ICP-11.422(Revision 0) Initial Checkout and Test of AMSAC, MR 85-213, Unit 1 During the performance of the ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) test on May 5, 1989 the auxiliary feedwater system was inadvertently actuated. The actuation was the result of a. failure to place simulated steam generator level into the instrumentation for the 1A stem generator as required by procedure step 7.4.7. The simulated level signal was not used in the.1A steam generator because of confusion in communication between the operator and the technician performing the. test. The technician did not understand that both unft I steam generators were in the process of being drained to facilitate maintenance and, therefore, did not use the simulated signal for the 1A steam generator. When the unit I steam generators were drained the auxiliary feedwater system, a system shared between the units, actuated on the 1A steam generator low-low level. The actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system lasted approximately 30 seconds and resulted in the injection of approximately 75 gallons of feedwater. to the unit-2 steam generators. No feedwater was injected into unit 1 because auxiliary feedwater to those steam generators had been isolate The failure to follow the guidance in the procedure is a viewed as a failure to follow approved licensee procedures as required by technical specification 15.6.8.1 and is an example of violation 266/89015-01 and 301/89014-0 ORT-3 (Revision 19) Safety Injection Actuation with Loss -

of Engineered Safeguards AC, Unit 1

This is an extensive test requiring a great deal of planning .l and cooperation on the part of all participating licensee 1 J

personnel. Approximately 20 individuals were involved in the performance of this test and all exhibited excellent communication and a high degree of professionalism. The test I was completed successfully with the exception of one rela ]

The relay failed to operate properly initially, however, J because of self cleaning contacts, operated properly'later !

during the test. The licensee issued a Maintenance Work Request j (MWR 891852) to facilitate further evaluation and testing of ]

this relay. The MWR was completed, and the licensee determined I that the relay was operable. No other problems were identified I during this tes PT.R-5 (Revision 4) No.1StationBattery(DOS) Service j

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The inspectors spent a great deal of time during this inspection period observing the testing of the "A"(DOS),

"B"(006), and Temporary Station Battery. Concerns were identified through the course of their observations and assistance from regional and headquarters personnel was requested. Due to the number of concerns and the detail of the evaluations conducted on this subject a special inspection re- ' . 266/89016 and 301/89015, has been issued. For a cumplete description of these inspection activities and the results please refer to the above repor . Emergency Preparedness (82031)

An inspection of emergency preparedness activities was performed to assess the licensee's implementation of the site emergency plans and implementing procedures. The inspection included monthly review and tour of emergency facilities and equipment, discussions with licensee staff, and a review of selected procedure No violations of deviations were identified in this area during this inspection perio . Security (71881)

The inspectors, by direct observation and interview verified that portions of the physical security plan were being implemented in accordance with the station security pla During this inspection period several compensatory measures were enacted to compensate for licensee identified problems. These actions were revicwed by Region III security personnel and were turned over to the regional security personnel for further evaluatio No violations or deviations were identified in this crea during this inspection perio . Engineering and Technical Support (37701)

The inspector evaluated licensee engineering and technical support activities to determine their involvement and support of facility operations. This was accomplished during the course of routine evaluation of facility events and concerns tN eogh direct observation of activities and discussions with engineering personnel, Evaluation of "A" Station Batteries (DOS) Replacement During this inspection period resident, regional, and headquarters personnel identified several concerns associated with the "A" station batteries. Due to the number of concerns and the detail of the evaluations conducted on this subject a special inspection report, 266/89016 and 301/89015, has been issue For a complete description of these inspection activities and the results please refer to the above repor _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _

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. Torn Grid Strap on Fuel Assembly T14 During fuel movement for the refueling of the unit I core, fuel  ;

assembly T14 was damaged when it was being lowered into the spen l fuel racks. The damage resulted in a tear to grid strap number 2 on the corner between faces 1 and 2, causing a slight protrusion of the- )

grid on face 2. The licensee contacted the vendor and filed a field

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anomaly report describing the. damage. . After analysis, the vendor informed the licensee that the fuel assembly could be reloaded'into-the core if a special vendor reloading procedure was followed.- The licensee decided to reload-the fuel assembly following the vendors recommendations. The reloading of the fuel assembly was monitored  ;

by the resident inspectors and no problems were noted during the  ;

reloading of this assembl '

No violations or deviations were' identified in this area during this inspection perio . Safety Assessment / Quality Verification (35701) (35502)

An inspection of the licensee's quality programs was performed to assess the implementation and effectiveness of programs associated with management control, verification, and oversite activities. The inspectors consider areas' indicative of overall management involvement in quality matters, self improvement programs, response to regulatory and industry initiatives, the frequency of management plant tours and control room observations, and management personnel's attendance at technical and planning / scheduling meeting During this inspection Quality Assurance (QA) period the licensee has established an on-siteThe prese sectio been evident during this outage and is seen as an improvement in this area. The staff consists of five inspectors with QA and engineering backgrounds and was established on 4/1/198 No violations or deviations were identified in this area during this inspection perio . . Temporary Instructions (TI) (255100) (255101) (Closed) TI 2515/100 Proper Receipt, Storage, and Handling of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Fuel Oil The licensee was given the questionnaire and responded in writing to the inspectors. The licensee used approximately 24 manhours in researching the questions and preparing the response. A copy of the response will be sent to NRR for inclusion in their surve (Closed) TI 2515/101 Loss of Decay Heat Removal (Generic Letter No. 88-17)

The inspector verified that the licensee has met the requirements of.

j~ this Temporary Instruction:

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- The necessary lesson plans dealing with tnis TI have been generated, and they have been taught tc the required personne L L .

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- A new containment closure checklist (CL-IE) has been generated to ensure that containment closure can be achieved betore uncovering the cor Two independent incore thermocouple will remain operational when the head is located on top of the reactor vessel during reduced inventory operation. Parameter values will be set to l provide a computer alarm in the control roo Level Instrumentation:

1) Currently one reduced inventory level transmitter is installed on each unit, LT-447. This level transmitter J provides level indication in the control room when at a '

reduced inventory condition. The electrical current loop for LT-447 also includes a bistable which provides a high' i level alarm in the control room. This indication can also >

be displayed on the plant process computer.and on a digital display in the control room. A modification request has been initiated to replace the existing bistable with a dual setpoint bistable that will supply the existing annunciator window with both high level and low level signal ) A second channel of level indication will be installed'in each unit using another transmitter similar to LT-44 This channel will also have input to the plant process computer system (PPCS) and will provide low level alarm indication in the control roo ) A modification request has been initiated to install a permanent sight glass to replace the tygon level tub The licensee has prepared procedures and established administrative controls to avcid perturbations while in a reduced inventory conditio The licensee has two additional means of adding water to the RCS if RHR is los Plant Procedure SMP-907 addresses the installation and removal of the SG nozzle dams. This procedure required that the cold leg nozzle dams be installed prior to the hot leg nozzle dams, and not removed until after the hot leg nozzle dams are remove The licensee does not have stop valves in the primary syste . Open Items f Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraph 3 ,

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12. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of

' noncompliance, or deviations. An Unresolved Item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph . Exit Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Section 1 after the conclusion of the inspection on June 7, 1989. The inspectors discussed the purpose of the inspection and the finding '

The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any documents / processes as proprietar I

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