IR 05000266/1989008
| ML20245A117 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1989 |
| From: | Foster J, Patterson J, Matthew Smith, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245A115 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.B.3, TASK-3.D.3.3, TASK-TM 50-266-89-08, 50-266-89-8, 50-301-89-08, 50-301-89-8, NUDOCS 8904250055 | |
| Download: ML20245A117 (30) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'
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REGION III
Reports No. 50-266/89008(DRSS); 50-301/89008(DRSS)
Docket Nos.-50-266; 50-301
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Licenses No. DPR-24; DPR-27 Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company 231. West Michigan
. Milwaukee, WI 53201
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Facility'Name:
Point: Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
i Inspection At:
Point 8each Site, Two Creeks,. Wisconsin-Inspection Conducted:
March 14-16, 1989
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c Inspectors:
oster
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am Leader Dyef
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. Patterson Date
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Date La_).tE M Approved By:
W. Snell, Chief 4/sh/2)
l Emergency Preparedness Dat~e,
l and Effluents Section Inspection Summary Inspection on March 14-16, 1989 (Reports No. 50-266/89008(DRSS);
50-301/89008(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection.of the Point Beach Power Station emergency preparedness exercise involving observations of' key functions and<
locations during the exercise (IP 82301), and followup on previously. identified items (IP 92701).
The inspection involved six NRC inspectors.
Results:
The licensee demonstrated an adequate response to multiple equipment ~
failures and a: simulated release of radioactive materials to the environment.
While corrective ection for a previous exercise weakness was adequate, management attention to emergency program criteria should be increased.
Although no items of noncompliance, deficiencies'or deviations were. identified,
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licensee performance in release path identification and release termination was marginal.
One exercise weakness which will require corrective action'is identified in this report and the Appendix to the report's transmittal letter.
Section 7 of this report provides an updated summary of-the status t
of emergency preparedness related TMI (SIMS) items.
8904250055 890413 O
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i DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
NRC Observers and Areas Observed J. Foster, Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (05C), Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)
D. Shultz, Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center l
M. Smith, Emergency Operations Facility l
J. Patterson, Field Monitoring Teams l
W. Swensen, Control Room l
L. Kokajko, Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
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Wisconsin Electric Power Company
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- G. J. Maxfield, General Superintendent, Operations
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- J. E. Knorr, Regulatory Engineering l
- D. R. Stevens, Emergency Planning Coordinator j
- F. A. Fledtje, Specialist, Regulatory Services
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- R. H. Chojnacki, Quality Specialist, Emergency Planning
- J. G. Schweitzer, Lead Mechanical Engineer
- Denotes those attending the NRC exit interview on March 16, 1989.
2.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (IP 92701)
i a.
(Closed) Open Item (No. 266/87900-01; 301/87900-01):
This Open
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Item was issued to track actions on Information Notice 87-58 which addressed the licensee's capability to provide continuous communications with the NRC following an emergency notification.
Licensee Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) 3.1. addresses l
this issue.
This capability was adequately demonstrated during this i
exercise.
This item is closed.
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(0 pen) Open Item (No. 266/88007-01):
Licensee procedures do not I
assure annual emergency plan training for all personnel assigned duties in the emergency plan.
This item was not reviewed, and will remain open, c.
(Closed) Open Item (No. 266/88021-01):
During the previous evaluated exercise, licensee personnel failed to declare a General Emergency when exercise scenario conditions required this classification.
This was an exercise weakness.
During the 1989 exercise, licensee personnel recognized conditions that warranted the General Emergency Classification, correctly classified the condition and properly notified offsite support groups.
This item is closed.
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d.
(Closed) Open Item (No. 50-266/88021-03):
During the previous exercise, message forms to the NRC lacked indications of management review and approval.
Form EPIP-14 "NRC Event Notification Worksheet" was revised to include a section for management review and approval.
This worksheet was properly implemented for notification of the NRC during this exercise.
This item is closed.
3.
General klen e f
An exercise of the Point Beach Powen Plant Emergency Plan was conducted at the Point Beach station on March 15, 1989.
The exercise tested the licensee's emergency support organizations' capabilities to respond to a simulated accident scenario resulting in a major release of radioactive effluent.
This was a " utility only" exercise, with State and counties providing communications personnel only.
NRC Region III personnel participated in this exercire, activating the NRC Regional Incident Response Center and providing a site team to respond to the incident.
The Region III office had 35 individuals assigned to participate in the Incident Response Center, and 32 individuals assigned to the site response team.
I!RC Headquarters provided three individuals to evaluate regional performance, two evaluators at the Point Beach site, and one evaluator in the Incident Response Center.
Attachment 1 describes the Scope and Objectives of the exercise and Attachment 2 describes the exercise scenario.
4.
General Observations a.
Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the Point Beach Power Station Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
b.
Coordination The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and timely.
If the events had been real, the Protective Action Recommendations made by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect public health and safety.
c.
Observers The licensee's observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with six NRC observers.
NRC Region III performance was observed and evaluated by personnel from NRC Headquarters.
d.
Exercise Critiques A critique was held with the licensee and NRC representatives on March 16, 1989, one day after the exercise.
The NRC discussed the observed strengths and weaknesses during the exit interview.
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5.
Specific Observations (IP 82301)
a.
Control Room Presentation of scenario data in.the (dril'1) Control Room and Technical Support Center was very well done.. Innovative.use of simulated strip charts of thermal,' hydraulic and radiological.
parameters, mini computers displaying real. time plant parameters-and alarm conditions, mimic displays of control board panels, and the-Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). running in a training module, made'for a realistic presentation of exercise data.
Operators in the Control Room were prompt in the recognition i
l of adverse plant conditions'and-implementation of appropriate i
procedures. ~ Operators quickly analyzed the symptoms of containment radiological conditions to identify fuel failure and a small Reactor-Coolant Sample leak.
This analysis was performed concurrently ~with implementing the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) and Abnormal Operating Procedures (A0P), and initiating response in accordance with Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs).
Added functions of performing. leak rate calculations, notifying affected personnel i
(e.g. Load Dispatcher), initiating evaluation activities, (ordering
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chemistry to perform sampling), and initiating personnel protective actions were also promptly and correctly accomplished.
Control Room personnel adequately demonstrated an awareness of procedures and responsibilities.
Communication between the Control i-Room and the Technical Support Center were good, and the.. turnover of communication, notification, and Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) was well done.
The Primary Auxiliery Building evacuation public address announcement i
did not specify the conditions requiring the evacuation.
This was done following plant announcement procedures.
Procedure's (EPIP 6.1)
should be changed to allow this information to be included.in the l
announcement to avoid any confusion by personnel affected by the
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announcement.
Site accountability was accomplished within the required time frame.
One accountability reader in the Control Room experienced problems and personnel were required to key-in a second time.
Despite this difficulty, accountability was properly-i accomplished.
I At approximately 07:50, the turbine / reactor trip with associated Reactor Coolant System leakage and possible fuel f-ilures was i
evaluated by control room personnel as an event requiring NRC notification per.the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72.
Preparation
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plant conditions deteriorated to the extent that at approximately
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08:15 an Alert was declared.
An Alert message notification to
off-site authorities was promptly prepared, resulting in the NRC j
communicator, with a.50.72 report in hand, and the off-site
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authority communicator with an Alert niessage'in hand, commencing'
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J notifications to their respective listeners concurrently.
Durir.g f
the conversation with the NRC Duty Officer, the NRC communicator reported that he was making a 50.72 report, but that the plant might shortly be declaring an Unusual Event.
Following this report, the communicator was advised by a Control Room Operator that the plant had declared an Alert, which he j
immediately communicated to the NRC Duty Officer (without authority
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of the Emergency Coordinator).
As a consequence, the potential existed that the NRC Duty Officer would be confused as to what was occurring at the plant.
EPIP 1.1 requires the Acting Emergency Support Manager to initial on the " Plant Operations Manager Initial Response" checklist and to attach EPIP 13 or 14 " Status Update Forms." The use of these forms is to ensure coordination of information from the licensee to offsite agencies.
The demonstration of this capability to coordinate the flow of information from the Control Room to offsite agencies and the proper use of EPIP 1.1 will be observed in the next exercise and will be tracked as Open Item No. 266/89008-01.
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With the exception of the above Open Item, this portion of the l
l licensee's program was acceptable.
However, the following area i
should be considered for improvement:
Procedures should be revised to require that the reason for any
evacuation be included during the evacuation public address announcement, to reduce the potential for confusing affected i
personnel.
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Technical Support Center (TSC)
It was observed that additional guidance for TSC personnel (TSC Guidebook, Revision 0) has recently been developed.
This guidance provides for assignment of a single individual to monitor emergency action levels.
l The ISC was activated approximately 45 minutes following the Alert
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Classification.
In most instances, briefings of TSC staff were complete and frequent.
The Site Area Emergency was declared as appropriate.
Status boards in the TSC occasionally contained inaccurate and/or out-dated information.
As a consequence, some decisions made by
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TSC staff may not have been made with "best information " At i
approximately 08:15, an Alert was declared based on " massive fuel damage," and shortly thereafter, a leak rate computation showed Reactor Coolant System leakage at 6.5 gpm.
Notwithstanding the above, as late as 09:00, when the TSC was declared operational, the status board reflected the integrity of fission ar9 duct barriers as i
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" Fuel clad - Unknown," "RCS breached," " Containment intact." The
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" containment intact" status remained at least until after 11:00, although a release path from containment occurred at approximately 09:40.
Emergency classification postings lagged by more than 15 minutes on at least one occasion.
The General Emergency declaration was not heard by some TSC members including the NRC staff (if the Gaitronics unit in the TSC is used, the announcement is not heard in the TSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility activation was not logged on any status board.
As noted above, at 09:40, a containment vent valve was postulated to fail, causing containment fission products to be released to l
the auxiliary building, and then out of the auxiliary building ventilation stack.
It was not clear that the TSC was fully aware of the radioactive release for some time, and not evident that it was aggressively pursued when they became aware.
Some events / comments related to inplant teams affected the overall outcome of the scenario relative to release termination time.
Based on a TSC staff briefing conducted at 11:00, some staff members had concluded that the source of high radiation in the area of charging pumps was from damaged charging pump seals, and thus not correctable.
However, a health physics supervisor in attendance at the staff meeting disputed this conclusion based on the fact that field dose rates could not possibly be as high as measured from such a seal leak.
A new priority was established to determine the leak j
path by inspection and evaluation.
The staff briefing ended at j
approximately 11:16.
Inspection activities were not initiated (for l
l reasons unknown) until a reentry team was constituted, beginning at j
approximately 12:30.
This team was properly directed to the area of
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concern, immediately found the " faulted" valve, and isolated the release path at 12:54.
The TSC staff did not recognize and identify as a priority action item the existence of the (faulted) containment release path for one hour and 20 minutes.
An additional hour and 30 minutes elapsed before a re entry team was dispatched to actively identify and correct if possible the faulted condition.
As a consequence, a large radiological release to the environment existed for more than three hours that was correctable by the local closure of a single valve.
This failure to determine the leak source in a timely manner and then proceed with release termination is an Exercise Weakness and will be tracked as Open Item No. 266/89008-02.
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With the exception of the above Exercise Weakness, this portion of the licensee's program was adequate.
However, the following items should be considered for improvement:
More attention should be devoted to maintaining status boards
accurate and current.
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Staff briefings should contain information ' elated to emergency
responsibilities assumed by other facilities along with plant status.
c.
Operational Support Center (OSC)
The OSC was directed to be staffed upon declaration of a Site Area Emergency, in accordance with the provisions of EPIP 4.2, "05C Activation and Operation." Due to the rapidly moving scenario, the OSC was not functional until some time after declaration of the General Emergency.
As a consequence, early accident response l
activities, if desired, were limited by the nonavailability of I
manpower.
OSC procedures should be modified to require activation of the OSC concurrently with the TSC, to provide augmented manpower to carry out any TSC directed initiatives.
This will be tracked as Open Item No. 266/89008-03.
Repair team efforts on a Residual Heat Removal pump electrical breaker were thoughtful, thorough, and in accordance with applicable procedures.
Proper dressout procedures and exposure tracking of re entry teams was well performed at all times.
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Emergency supplies (outer rubber gloves for anti-contamination clothing) were inadequate in the " Emergency Plan Emergency Kits" in the OSC area.
After only two re-entry teams had been dispatched, a special team had to be dispatched to the warehouse (outside the power block) to pick up additional supplies.
This team of three per:;ons could have been unnecessarily exposed to adverse radiological conditions (an environmental release was in progress).
Additionally, manpower availability was impacted because of the necessity of assigning a health physics technician to the supply team.
Emergency Plan Emergency Kit inventories should be revised to ensure adequate supplies are available to support multiple inplant teams.
This will be tracked as Open Item No. 266/89008-04.
Communications critical to the mitigation of the accident (i.e.,
termination of the release) from the re entry teams were not promptly recognized, characterized, and made available to the TSC staff.
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Communication logs maintained by re-entry team communicators were
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l not periodically reviewed by knowledgeable personnel able to correlate I
the reports with plant status.
As a consequence, re-entry team " Ops
2" reported a "possible leak in Pipe Way 2" (the location of the i
scenario release point), which was recorded, unrecognized, in the communicator's log for more than an hour.
" Ops Team 3" was aispatched at approximately 12:40 and discovered the release point at approximately 12:55.
With the exception of the above Open Item, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
However, the following item
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l should be considered for improvement:
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Communication and coordination between OSC management
and operations personnel in the TSC should be improved.
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d.
Inplant Teams Two operations re entry teams were dispatched during the period 10:30-11:00 to perform primary tasks of (1) RHR system valve alignments and (2) installation of portable shielding.
These tasks were necessary to support recirculation and cooldown.
Neither of the teams were made aware of the overall plant status, nor alerted to the necessity for discovery of the reasons for the adverse radiological conditions, namely, the loss of containment integrity causing an environmental release.
As a consequence, the radiological l
release path was observed, but not recognized and identified for what it represented, by at least one of the re-entry teams.
Debriefings of the teams were not oriented towards developing information regarding plant status, and failed to uncover the importance of the teams' observations.
Scenario radio'ogical conditions in the auxiliary building necessitated the use of Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA).
In accordance with pre-exercise agreements, one member of each inplant team would actually utilize a SCBA (to minimize depletion of actual air reserves).
One team member, normally the individual actually using the SCBA, was chosen to be the team communicator.
It was noted that communications with the teams were barely readable on frequent occasions, and some important radio traffic was missed or misunderstood.
It was found that positioning of the communication unit microphone in the ear was very important to assure transmission fidelity.
Employees who will use SCBAs should be instructed in the proper positioning of this microphone when donning SCBAs.
Repair efforts conducted by the repair team dispatched to correct the faulted RHR pump breaker were thorough and in accordance with applicable procedures.
An electrical maintenance technician promptly identified the postulated electrical breaker fault by inspection, and recognized that the fault was not readily correctable.
The engineering decision to exchange breakers required re-setting of various trip settings.
The technician quickly obtained the proper setpoint documentation and tools to perform the activity.
On discovering that a calibration seal on the breaker trip test device was broken, an innovative, quick functional test was performed to verify correct operation of the test device.
Throughout the repair activity, due respect was shown for applicable safety precautions.
A repair re entry team was dispatched to perform repairs of the faulted RHR pump breaker.
This repair team traversed areas of potential contamination (although no contamination of these areas was postulated), and with no survey precautions, entered the Control Room.
The purpose of entering the Control Room was to obtain a Maintenance Work Request (MWR) from the Shift superintendent.
As a consequence, the Control Room could have been significantly contaminated since the repair team had passed through the '
cident control point".
Other arrangements could have been made to bring the MWR from the Control Room to the OSC.
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Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
However, the following items should be considered
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for improvement:
Team briefings should contain plant status information and
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directions on observing inplant equipment / conditions, in
order to assist the TSC engineering staff to identify and correct plant problems.
Team briefings should include instructions on the proper
use of microphones when wearing SCBAs, Procedures should be revised to provide for issuance of
Maintenance Work Requests in the OSC or TSC.
e.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The EOF was not prestaged for the exercise, and was set up in an efficient and effective manner by a team which checked out and i
l installed equipment, put out supplies and forms, filled out status l
boards and arranged work stations.
Checklists were used extensively during the EOF setup.
Qualified EOF Communicators established and maintained adequate communications with plant emergency response facilities, the State of Wisconsin and Manitowac and Kewaunee Counties, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Offsite notifications and updates were performed per procedures.
The Emergency Support Manager (ESM)
approved all status update forms prior to notifying offsite support groups.
Administrative staff in the EOF adequately distributed relevant information, received fax information and responded to staff requests in a timely manner.
l Overall management of the E0F was adequate.
Briefings were j
informative and conducted at frequent intervals or whenever plant or offsite conditions changed.
EOF habitability was maintained throughout the exercise by Health Physics (HP) personnel.
Self reading dosimeters were issued to all i
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EOF staff members.
HP staff members instructed E0F staff members to read their dosimeters several times throughout the exercise.
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EOF emergency ventilation system was activated and run successfully i
throughout the exercise.
E0F personnel integrated well with the NRC Region III site team.
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Interaction was evident between protective measures staffs and j
the Director of Site Operations and the Emergency Support Manager.
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Access control was established and well maintained by plant security I
personnel.
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The ESM would turn over command and control to the Radiological Chemistry Waste Manager whenever he had to leave the area.
Although this was not formally accomplished, all EOF staff members were well aware of the change.
Procedures should specify that the ESM be briefed upon his return to the position in order to be completely cognizant of all changes in plant status and offsite activities occurring during his absence.
This was not always done, and consequently the ESM was unaware of the containment isolation leak discovery for approximately 1/2 hour.
Conversion of field team data to dose rates / dose projections was confusing at one tirae during the exercise.
This lead to incorrect dose projection data being placed on the protective measures status board.
Plant personnel were unable to comprehend the reason for the discrepancy, and appeared to be unfamiliar with computer conversion methodology.
Press releases were faxed to the E0F from the JPIC for ESM approval prior to release.
However, when corrections were made, approval was not part of the procedure.
As a result, release No. 2 contained incorrect information and later had a correction issued.
The initial incorrect information was available tc the media for approximately 30 minutes.
The plant status board was maintained accurately, but the times on the board did not always reflect the actual time the updates were made.
As a parameter varied, that particular parameter's posting would be changed, but the time on the board would remain the same from the last complete update, making recent information appear to be over an hour old.
Based on the above findings this portion of the licensee's program was adequate.
However, the following items should be considered for improvement:
E0F status boards should reflect the time that each update
of a parameter is made, to ensure that E0F staff is aware the information on the board is current.
The ESM should approve corrected press releases (even if
verbally by telephone).
Procedures related to conversion of field team data shou",d
be improved or personnel provided additional training in the correct conversion procedures.
f.
Field Monitoring Teams The offsite monitoring teams were notified to report to the HP room at the Alert level per procedure.
The Health Physics Director (HPD)
conducted a thorough briefing of the offsite monitoring teams.
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Both observed-teams followed their guidance in plume tracking, including instances where radiation levels exceeded 10 mR/ hour.
At that level, they donned their respirators and independent air supply cylinders or self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
These SCBAs and full face respirators were worn until scenario radiation levels decreased or the controller gave the technicians permission to remove both pieces of-equipment.
Fogging of the respirators occurred in several instances due to cold weather and the length of time the HP technician was outside.
Overall, both teams demonstrated good use of the respirators and SCBAs.
Also, the earplug speaker / microphone unit, designed to allow vocal-communications through the respirator to the team dispatcher, performed well.
Plume traversing and monitoring skills were well demonstrated including use of Emergency Planning Zone maps with local road intercepts.
Each team communicated well with the team dispatcher and information exchanges were handled properly.
Teams were directed to obtain environmental samples for analysis.
These samples included air samples, gaseous sampling obtained by displacing water in a two liter bottle with outside air, soil deposition samples and snow samples.
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Sample handling techniques were poorly demonstrated by both field i
teams.
Bare hands were observed being used to handle the air l
sampler itself while the vehicle rear hatch door was open to the atmosphere.
Gloves were later used to remove the air cartridge and the exposed filter paper.
When the sample was put in a small plastic pouch, the gloves were discarded on the rear floor of the vehicle.
An outwardly clean, large vinyl pouch should have been l
used for discarded contaminated gloves or anything else subject l
to atmospheric contamination from the release.
The shovel used for obtaining the soil deposition samples and snow samples was roughly cleaned off with a gloved' hand, then placed on l
the rear floor of the vehicle.
This would spread any contamination on the shovel to the floor of the vehicle.
This shovel should have been encased in a vinyl sheet after each use.
One team member placed the soil deposition samples (in outwardly contaminated plastic bags)
on the dashboard of the vehicle.
A separate large plastic bag or container designated for Dry Active Waste (DAW) should have been utilized to collect waste material, gloves, and paraphernalia.
Improved training in sampling techniques should be developed and conducted for~taking, handling and storage of air, soil, water or other media where radioactive contamination is potentially present.
Performance in this area will be observed during the next annual exercise.
This will be tracked as Open Item No. 266/89008-05.
Field teams received practically no plant status updates, except for one brief mention of a General Emerger.cy being declared.
This message was inserted along with other instructions for the team,
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5 The teams were never informed when the release was terminated, although the HPD did have this information.
It was alsc, noted that none of the team members requested information on plant I
conditions.
With the exception of the Open Item, this portion of the licensee's
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program was acceptable.
However, the following items should be j
considered for improvement:
j Offsite teams should be informed of major plant status changes
as well as other related information that could effect their personal health and safety.
g.
Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
The JPIC functioned well during the exercise.
Among the positive i
I aspects observed were access control, setup, briefing arrangements,
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l and information dissemination (notices and briefings).
Staffing was sufficient in number, and JPIC personnel were cognizant of their responsibilities and appeared well trained.
Excellent media material and packages were available.
Briefings were adequate and responses to questions were good.
Controllers were well prepared.
Although some early communication and coordination problems were encountered, they were adequately adcressed.
Some briefing information was incorrect, however, it was quickly corrected.
A good JPIC critique we conducted following the exercise, JPIC activities we"e videotaped for subsequent use in a training program for JPIC personnel, which was considered very worthwhile.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
6.
Non facility-Related Items During the exercise, two items were observed which were not related to any specific facility.
I It was noted that the licensee was unable to obtain and analyze a j
containment air sample when containment air pressure exceeded 5 psig.
Licensee personnel indicated that the system could not accommodate pressures above this limit.
Subsequent review indicated that the relevant procedure (EPIP) does indicate that 5 psig is the limit for utilization of the containment air sampling system due to the design of the sampling pump seals.
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NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," included
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guidance for Post Accident Sampling Systems (PASS) in Item II.B.3.
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By letter dated September 30, 1982, the licensee provided information to the NRC regarding their PASS system.
The NRC reviewed this information, m i by letter of December 22, 1982, advised the licensee that the system met eight of the eleven evaluation criteria.
Additional information was later provided on some aspects of the system and relevant procedures.
The NRC concluded that the licensee had the capability to promptly obtain reactor containment atmosphere samples and complete an analysis of the sample within three hours of the decision to obtain a sample.
It was (
intended that the licensee's system be capable of obtaining a containment atmosphere sample at pressures up to and beyond containment design pressure.
Discussion with licensee personnel and with representatives of the NRC office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation could not identify any documentation that the operating pressure of the system had been considered in the previous reviews of system acceptability.
This is considered an Unresolved Item (No. 266/89008-06).
It was also noted that the licensee lacked a procedure for counting an air sample taken from the plant which had (scenario) elevated levels of radioactive iodine present.
Licensee corporate office personnel indicated that they were aware of the method which should be utilized in such a case, but no procedure existed at the plant site or corporatt office.
NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," included guidance for inplant iodine monitoring in Item III.D.3.3.
By letter (s)
during 1982, the licensee provided information to the NRC regarding improved in plant iodine instrumentation under accident conditions.
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These submittals essentially dealt with stationary instrumentation.
I By letter dated February 18, 1982, the NRC advised the licensee that the review of their submittals had not indicated any technical deviations
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from the stated positions taken in NUREG-0737, and were, therefore, acceptable.
It was, however, the intent that each licensee have the capability to promptly obtain and analyze a sample with elevated iodine levels.
This is considered an Unresolved Item (No. 266/89008-07).
7.
Exercise Scenario and Control The licensee's scenario was challenging and included:
multiple equipment changes, asseinbly/ accountability, meteorological changes, and evacuation of the Primary Auxiliary building.
This was the first time that the NRC had participated in an exercise with this utility.
The degree of challenge in this exercise adequately tested the licensee's ability to assist offsite support groups in their responsibility to protect public health and safety.
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NRC interface was adequately demonstrated through this scenario.
Exercise control was considered adequate.
No instances of controller
" prompting" were observed.
At one point, an exercise " inject" (additional message) intended for NRC Region III only, was mistaken for a possibly valid bomb threat.
The licensee brief r3 considered halting the exercise in response to tht possibly valid bomb threat, but the circumstances of the message were clarified and the exercise allowed to continue.
This demonstrated excellent exercise control.
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8.
Licensee Critiques The Licensee held two levels of exercise critiques, one at each individual facility immediately following the exercise (mini-critique), and a large critique for controllers / observers.
NRC personnel attended each of the i
critiques, and determined that exercise deficiencies of significance had J
been identified by licensee personnel.
9.
TMI Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) Items On October 31, 1980, the NRC issued NUREG-0737, which incorporated into one document all TM:-related items approved for implementation by the
~ Commission at that time.
On December 17, 1982, the NRC issued Supplement No. I to NUREG-0737 to provide additional clarification regarding Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Revision 2) - Application to Emergency Response Facilities, Emergency Response Facilities, and Meteorological Data, as well as other areas.
The status of the completion of these TMI SIMS items are internally tracked by the NRC.
An October 6, 1988, NRC Inspection Reports (No. 266/88021; 301/88019)
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provided a status listing of the SIMS Items related to emergency preparedness.
The followin f
i SIMS items that were "open"g listing provides an updated' status of those I
in the October 6, 1988 Report.
The listing indicates how the item was tracked on SIMS as of February 23, 1989.
III.A Current Status:
Closed This item will be addressed as part of the routine
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inspection program and is therefore no longer applicable i
and has been administrative 1y closed.
III.A.2.4 Current Status:
Closed
This item will be addressed as part of the routine J
inspection program and is therefore no longer applicable l
and has been administratively closed.
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III.A.2.5 Current Status:
Closed l
This item will be addressed as part of the routine inspection program and is therefore no longer applicable and has been administrative 1y closed.
III.A.2.6 Current Status:
Closed This item will be addressed as part of the routine inspection program and is therefore no longer applicable and has been administratively closed.
III.A.2.8 Current Status:
Closed This item has been determined to be no longer applicable and has been administratively closed.
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MPA-F-63 Current Status:
Open I
This' item involves a review of the TSC during a 'uture
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i MPA-F-65 Current Scatus:
Open j
This item involves a review of the E0F during a future
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inspection.
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10.
Unresolved Items
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l Unresolved' Items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations,,
or deviations.
Two Unresolved Items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in Paragraph 7.
11.
Open Items Open Items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which I
will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both.
Open Items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 5.a. 5.b, 5.c, and 5.f 12.
Exit Interview l
The NRC exercise evaluation team inspectors held an exit interview the
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day after the exercise (March 16,1989), with the representatives denoted
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in Section 1.
The NRC Team Leader discussed the scope and findings of l
the inspection.
The licensee was also asked if any of the information discussed during the exit was proprietary.
The licensee responded that i
none of the information was proprietary.
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Attachments 1.
Point Beach 1989 Exercise
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Scope and Objectives l
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Point Beach 1989 Exercise Scenario Outline l
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~ EP EXERCISE 1989-Section 3
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3.0 OBJECTIVES
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l EP EXERCISE 1989 Section 3 i
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3.0 OBJECTIVES
3.1 Control Room 3.2 Technical Support Center
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3.3 Operations Support Center
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3.4 Emergency Operation Facility
3.5 Offsite Health Physics Facility l
3.6 security l
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EP EKERCISE 1989 Section 3 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES 3.0 OBJECTIVES 3.1 Control Room 3.1.1 Demonstrate the ability of control room staff to correctly classify an emergency event using the EPIPs.
3.1.2 Demonstrate the ability to notify on-site personnel of emergency classifications using the plant Gai-tronics system.
3.1.3 Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions based upon specified emergency action levels.
3.1.4 Demonstrate the ability to notify on-site personnel of an evacuation using the plant Gai-tronics and alarm system.
(This objective may be demonstrated, in part, from the TSC.)
3.1.5 Demonstrate the ability to perform:
An evacuation of plant personnel to predesignated on-site a.
assembly areas.
(This objective may be demonstrated from the TSC.)
b.
An evacuation of contractor personnel to the SBCC.
(This objective may be demonstrated from the TSC.)
Personnel accountability within about 30 minutes of c.
sounding a plant evacuation alarm.
(This objective may be demonstrated from the TSC.)
NOTE:
FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY, CONTRACTORS AND PLANT EMPLOYEES NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE EXERCISE WILL RETURN TO THEIR WORK STATIONS AND WILL BE CONSIDERED INVISIBLE TO THE REMAINDER OF THE EXERCISE.
3.1.6 Demonstrate the ability of the control room staff to provide data in a timely fashion to the TSC.
3.1.7 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities.
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EP EXERCISE 1989 Section 3 3.2 Technical Support Center 3.2.1 Demonstrate the ability to adequately staff the TSC to support emergency operations.
3.2.2 Demonstrate the ability of TSC staff to correctly classify an emergency event using the EPIPs.
3.2.3 Demonstrate the ability to notify on-site personnel of emergency classification using the plant Gai-tronics system.
(This objective may be demonstrated from the control room).
3.2.4 Demonstrate the ability to maintain meteorological status boards with current data (e.g., not more than 30 minutes old).
3.2.5 Demonstrate the ability to announce the activation of the TSC and the assumption of TSC responsibilities to appropriate personnel.
3.2.6 Demonstrate the ability to provide regular (e.g., hourly)
status reports to appropriate state and county agencies.
(This objective may be demonstrated from the EOF.)
3.2.7 Demonstrate the ability to develop appropriate offsite protective action recommendations using the EPIPs.
(This objective may be demonstrated from the EOF.)
3.2.8 Demonstrate the ability to conduct a plant evacuation to on-site assembly areas.
(This objective may be demonstrated from the control room.)
3.2.9 Demonstrate the ability to control contamination in the TSC/OSC.
3.2.10 Demonstrate the ability of TSC personnel to maintain an emergency reentry team status board.
3.2.11 Demonstrate the ability of TSC staff to provide accurate and timely information regarding plant and emergency event status to the EOF.
3.2.12 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays and other materials to support emergency operations.
l 3.2.13 Demonstrate the ability of personnel using radios to communicate effectively.
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EP EXERCISE 1989 Section 3 3.2.14 Demonstrate the ability to perform computer calculation of offsite radiological consequences based upon a monitored release path.
3.2.15 Demonstrate the ability of the TSC to provide requested information while staff meetings are in progress.
3.2.16 Demonstrate the ability of TSC personnel to maintain the personnel status board up-to-date.
3.2.17 Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions based upon specified emergency action levels.
3.2.18 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities.
3.2.19 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with appropriate emergency response facilities.
3.3 operations Support Center 3.3.1 Demonstrate the ability to adequately staff the OSC to support emergency operations.
3.3.2 Demonstrate the ability to organize, dispatch, and manage a search, maintenance, operations, health physics, chemistry or damage assessment team in accordance with the EPIPs.
3.3.3 Demonstrate the ability to dispatch and control in-plant reentry teams.
3.3.4 Demonstrate the ability to announce the activation of the OSC and the assumption of the OSC responsibilities to appropriate personnel.
3.3.5 Demonstrate the ability to control contamination in the TSC/OSC.
3.3.6 Demonstrate the ability to maintain an OSC emergency team status board.
3.3.7 Demonstrate the ability to monitor and control exposure of all persons assigned to the OSC.
3.3.8 Demonstrate the ability of personnel using radios to communicate effectively.
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EP EXERCISE 1989 Section 3, i
i 3.3.9 Demonstrate the4 ability and' resources necessary to properly-I d
outfit reentry teams with protective' clothing based upon_
. anticipated environmental. conditions.
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direct on-site radiological monitoring teams.
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3.3.11 Demons _trate the use of respiratory. protection equipment and associated communications equipment (ear mikes, boom boxes, etc.)
3.3.12 Demonstrate the ability of the OSC to organize a " STANDBY" y
team following dispatch of reentry teams.
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Demonstrate the ability of supervisory staff (e.g., Chemistry l
and Health Physics) to keepsthe OSC. director informed of significant findings, and/or events.
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3.3.14 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment,-displays and other materials to support emergency operations.
3.3.15 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities.
3.3.16 Demonstrate the ability ~to communicate with appropriate emergency response facilities.
3.4 Emergency Operations Facility 3.4.1 Demonstrate the ability to adequately staff the EOF to support emergency operations.
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3.4.2 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays
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and other materials.to support emergency operations.
3.4.3 Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate and approved status reports to state and county offices of emergency.
government, on a regular Isasis (e.g., hourly).
3.4.4 Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate and approved status reports to the NRC, on a regular basis (e.g., hourly).
3.4.5 Demonstrate the ability to perform computer calculation
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of offsite radiological-consequences based upon a monitored
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release path.
3.4.6 Demonstrate the ability to announce.the activation of the EOF and the assumption of EOF responsibilities to appropriate
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personnel.
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EP EXERCISE 1989 Section 3 3.4.7 Demonstrate the ability to estimate total population exposure.
3_4.8 Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate and timely information to the JPIC.
3.4.9 Demonstrate the ability to evaluate radiological survey information and recommend appropriate protective actions based on PAGs and plant conditions.
3.4.10 Demonstrate the ability to maintain facility status boards with recent data (e.g., not more than 30 minutes old).
3.4.11 Demonstrate the ability to develop a coordinated, preliminary action plan for on-site recovery.
3.4.12 Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers.
3.4.13 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities.
3.4.14 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with appropriate emergency response facilities.
3.5 Offsite Health Physics Facility 3.5.1 Demonstrate the ability to adequately staff the OSHPF to support emergency operations.
3.5.2 Demonstrate the ability to maintain meteorological status boards with recent data (e.g., not more than 30 minutes old).
3.5.3 Demonstrate the ability to mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely fashion.
3.5.4 Demonstrate the ability to routinely inform offsite survey teams of changes in plant conditions and/or emergency classifications.
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EP EXERCISE 1989 Section 3 j
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3.5.5 Demonstrate the ability of the offsite Health Physics
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director to direct offsite radiological monitoring teams to:
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Perform radiological surveys in order to characterize the
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plume.
b.
Report survey results to appropriate emerg<ency response facilities.
c.
Collect ambient air samples.
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Transport radiological samples to the appropriate
laboratory facility, in a timely manner.
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3.5.6 Demonstrate the ability to coordinate actions necessary to
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control the release of evacuated plant personnel from the i
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SBCC.
I 3.5.7 Demonstrate the ability of offsite survey. teams to include complete radiological sample information with samples to be analyzed.
l 3.5.8 Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne radioiodine concentrations as low as E-07 pCi/cc in the presence of noble gases.
3.5.9 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays
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and other materials to support emergency operations.
3.5.10
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Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities.
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3.5.11 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with appropriate i
emergency response facilities.
3.6 Security 3.6.1 Demonstrate the ability to accomplish personnel accountability within 30 minuter of a plant or limited plant evacuation.
3.6.2 Demonstrate the ability to control access to the plant site.
3.6.3 Demonstrate the ability to dispatch guards to the site boundary, prior to the arrival of evacuated plant personnel.
I 3.6.4 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control j
emergency activities.
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3.6.5 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with appropriate emergency response facilities.
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EP EXERCISE 1989 Section 3 3.7 Joint Public Information' Center (Communications Dept.)
3.7.1 Demonstrate the ability.to provide accurate and timely information to the public.
3.7.2 Demonstrate the ability to mobilize personnel and activate the JPIC in a timely manner.
3.7.3 Demonstrate the ability to brief the. media in an accur&te, understandable and timely manner.
3.7.4 Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate a utility rumor control program at the JPIC.
3.7.5 Demonstrate the ability to provide advance coordination with offsite agencies of information released to the public.
3.7.6 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with appropriate company locations and offsite organizations.
3.7.7 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays and other materials to support emergency operations.
3.7.8 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities.
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emergency response facilities.
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4.0 EMERGENCY EXERCISE SCOPE i
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EP EXERCISE 1989 Section 4 l
l 4.0 EMERGENCY EXERCISE SCOPE 4.1 Overview J
l 4.1.1 The 1989 Point Beach Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan exercise i
scenario will require activation of the Wisconsin Electric TSC, OSC, EOF, JPIC and various corporate support facilities.
4.1.2 Scenario events will provide opportunities to identify, I
classify and mitigate emergency events.
4.1.3 Scenario events will escalate to the General Emergency level.
4.1.4 Scenario events lead to an environmental release of radioactivity of sufficient magnitude to be tracked by field i
teams.
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l 4.1.5 Protective action recommendations will be required due to plant conditions.
4.2 Sequence of Events 4.2.1 The scenario begins with PBNP Units 1 and 2 at 100% power.
4.2.2 On PBNP Unit 1, reactor coolant pump IP1A breaks apart.
Loose parts result in an instantaneous seizure of the pump rotor.
Control room indications of the event include the
"RCP 1P1A Vibration High" and " Loose' Parts Monitor" alarms.
4.2.3 The reactor trips on low flow.
4.2.4 Loose parts are hypothesized to have migrated to the bottom of the reactor vessel restricting flow through the' core.
Localized overheating occurs.
4.2.5 Some fuel clad failure occurs resulting in a significant
increase in primary coolant activity.
Primary coolant activity ultimate ramps to >600 mR/ hour as indicated on the failed fuel monitor (1RE-109). UNUSUAL EVENT and ALERT classifications are warranted when the activity reaches 120 and 600 mR/hr, respectively.
4.2.6 Coincident with the seizure of the reactor coolant pump, a small leak (2-8 gpm) initiates through the pump casing.
Control room indications of the leak include:
" Sump A" high level alarm, an increase in containment humidity, and containment radiation monitors (RE-102, RE-107, RE-211 and RE-212).
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EP EXERCISE 1989 Section 4 4.2.7 the ALERT' declaration will result in notification of'offsite authorities and activation of-the Technical Support Center.
Although-not required, ' it is likely _ that: a limited plant evacuation _ of' the. primary ' auxiliary building will be _ _
conducted as'a' result of..the high primary. coolant.activityL in the' letdown lines.
4.2.8-Plant operators will begin cooling the plant to'<500*F as a result of the high primary coolant activity.
4. 2 :. 9 Sometime later, the leaking pump casing fails catastrophically resulting in a large break cold-leg loss of coolant accident.
Containment radiation monitors detect an increase in activity to >6000.R/ hour and containment pressure 1 increases to-
>25 psig. A GENERAL EMERGENCY classificationjis warranted based upon Category 3, " Containment high radiation with-the potential for loss of containment' integrity."
4.2.10 As containment pressure increases, a diaphragm valve (1-H V-4) in the. post-accident containment venting and
monitoring system fails, becoming a' release path!from'the containment to the auxiliary building and ultimately to the environment. Effective operations or_ maintenance activities can successfully terminate the environmental release.
Dose / benefit considerations, however, may preclude such-activities.
4.2.11 Improper valve alignment prevents addition ~of NaOH to containment spray. Operations activities can restore NaOH addition to the spray.
4.2.12 As a result of the. GENERAL' EMERGENCY declaration, protective action recommendations are required. The recommendations, at a minimum, should include sheltering'all sectors to'two-miles and downwind sectors from two to five miles.
4.2.13 During the plant evacuation and accountability efforts which follow the GENERAL EMERGENCY' declaration, one individual remains unaccounted for. This will require a search. effort.
4.2.14 Recovery activities will commence following establishment of long-term core cooling.
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4.2.15 The exereise will be terminated at the discretion of the main exercis: controller.
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EP EXERCISE 1989 Section 6
6.0 TIME SCHEDULE OF REAL AND SIMULATED SCENARIO EVENTS 06:30 Exercise is initiated in the control room with a shift turnover.
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" Loose Parts" and "High Vibration and Smoke" alarms come in and then clear.
07:47
" Loose Parts" and "High vibration and Smoke" alarms are again received in the control room.
07:48 Reactor coolant pump IP1A breaks apart, the pump seizes and the reactor trips on a " low-flow" signal.
07:48+
Concurrent with the pump failure; a reactor coolant leak initiates through a crack in the RCP casing.
07:48+
Loose parts which have migrated to the bottom of the reactor vessel restrict flow through the core resulting in localized overheating. Some fuel clad failure occurs.
07:53t I
" Radiation Monitoring System" alarms are received as a result of the fuel clad failure and the reactor coolant leak.
08:00 The failed fuel monitor (1RE-109) indicates 600 mR/ hour.
08:10-Containment sump "A" drain alarm. This alarm is a result of the reactor coolant pump casing leak.
(08:15)* Plant Operations manager declares an " alert" based upon Category 3, " Core Fuel Damage." Alert response procedures are initiated.
(08:25)* To aid in leak quantification, operations may drain containment sump "A" drain to the auxiliary building El. -19' sump. This evolution, if initiated, will have a small but noticeable impact on auxiliary building radiological conditions.
(08:30)* Offsite agencies are notified of the " alert" classification.
(08:45)* The technical support center is manned.
08:52 RCS cooldown is initiated per OP-3C, " Hot Shutdown to Cold Shutdown."
(09:00)*
Repositioned WE Headquarters support personnel will be allowed to begin manning the EOF.
- Time is approximate and dependent upon player actions.
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EP EXERCISE 1989 Section 6 p
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(09:15)* Technical support center is operational.
(09:30)*
Repositioned NRC site team will be allowed to begin manning site emergency response facilities.
09:39 Reactor coolant pump (IP1A) casing fails catastrophically.
Control room operators receive alarms and indication of an SI actuation with injection.
09:39+
Containment high range monitors indicate >6000 R/hr. Containment pressure increases, actuating containment spray. A closed manually operated valve (15I-8318) prevents NaOH addition to containment spray discharge.
09:39:30 A valve in the post-accident containment venting and sampling system (1-H V4) ruptures its diaphragm, coincident with peak
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containment pressure. A release from containment to the primary auxiliary building begins.
09:40+
" Radiation Monitoring System" alarms are received from auxiliary building area monitors due to the release from containment.
09:44:30 " Radiation Monitoring System" alarm is received from the auxiliary
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building vent stack monitor (RE-214) indicating that an offsite (/
release is in progress.
(09:54)* Plant Operations manager declares a " General Emergency" based upon Category 3, " Gross Fuel Damage," and loss of three fission i
product barriers.
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Protective actions should include, at a minimum: Sheltering of all sectors 0-2 miles and 4 or 5 downwind sectors from 2-5 miles.
(10:00)* An evacuation of plant personnel to onsite assembly areas is conducted.
PBNP offsite monitoring teams are dispatched.
(10:09)* Offsite agencies are notified of the GENERAL EMERGENCY classification.
(10:10)* Reentry teams will install lead shielding in C59 areas and perform local valve manipulations in preparation for containment sump recirculation.
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EP EXERCISE 1989 Section 6
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(10:20)* Reentry team may be dispatched to determine source of containment leak and evaluate reasons for failure of NaOH addition to containment spray.
j 10:38 Containment sump recirculation is established.
(10:54)* The emergency operations facility is manned by site' personnel.
(11:00)* In plent. ese AL Leam ivuste um mieeing indiciduel.
(11:30)* Chemistry may attempt acquisition of post-accident liquid sample.
l (11:54)* The emergency operations facility and joint public information center are manned by corporate support personnel.
12:42 RHR pump (1P10B) breaker trips as a result of a breaker problem.
Breaker can be replaced and pump will'run. Any attempts to
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restart the pump without breaker replacement are unsuccessful.
(13:00)* Maintenance / repair team is dispatched to evaluate and repair l
cause of RHR breaker trip.
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(14:30)* Emergency support manager considers securing from the emergency j
classification and beginning recovery activities.
(17:00)* The exercise is terminated by the main exercise controller.
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