IR 05000266/1989026

Insp Repts 50-266/89-26 & 50-301/89-25 on 890828-0901.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Onsite Followup of Events & Licensee Implementation of ATWS Rule 10CFR50.62

ML20247G023
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	09/13/1989
From:	Gardner R, Westberg R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247G013	List: IR 05000266/1989026 ML20247G009
References
50-266-89-26, 50-301-89-25, GL-85-06, GL-85-6, NUDOCS 8909180346
Download: ML20247G023 (9)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s

REGION III

Reports No. 50-266/89026(DRS); 50-301/89025(DRS)

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. DPR-24; DPR-27 Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company 231 West Michigan Avenue Milwaukee, WI 53201 Facility Name: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Two Rivers, Wisconsin Inspection Conducted: August 28 to September 1, 1989

' CA, V l Inspector: Rolf . Westberg Date Approved By: Ronald N. Gardner, Chief c) IB @

Plant Systems Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on August 28 to September 1, 1989 (Reports No. 50-266/89026(DRS);

No. 50-301/89025(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Special announced inspection relative to onsite followup of events at operating reactors (93702) and the licensee's implementation of the ATWS Rule, 10 CFR 50.62, per Temporary Instruction 2500/20 (25020), (SIMS Number MPA-A-20).

Results: No violations or deviations were identified. Two previously reported LERs were closed. Temporary Instruction TI 2500/20 and Generic Letter (GL) 85-06 were closed. Based on the inspection, the inspector reached the foll.owing conclusions:

The Quality Assurance applied to the ATWS mitigating systems modification generally exceeded the guidance given in GL 85-0 Plant I&C personnel, corporate engineering, control operators, and supervisors appeared to be well trained ar:d knowledgeable in ATWS system The quality of the onsite construction of the AMSAC cabinet was excellen The Unit 1 AMSAC modification was implemented ahead of the original schedule commitmen i

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DETAILS Personnel Contacted Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEPCo)

• J. Zach, Manager, Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP)

G. Maxfield, General Superintendent, Operations

-*J. Knorr, Regulatory-Engineer

~*E. Gross, Instrumentation and Control Engineer, Nuclear Systems and Analysis Section-(NSEAS)-

• W. Fromm, Modification Engineer

• P. Dent, Supervisor, Staff Services U. S.-Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U. S. NRC)

• J. Gadzala, Resident Inspector W. Swenson, Project Manager, NRR

• Indicates those attending _the exit meeting on September 1, 1989. Other personnel were contacted as a matter of routine during the inspectio . Review of Events at Operating Reactors (93702) (Closed) LER (266/89006-00): Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Star On May 5, 1989, at 1440 hours0.0167 days <br />0.4 hours <br />0.00238 weeks <br />5.4792e-4 months <br />, a lo-lo water level signal from the

"A" steam generator (SG) in Unit 1 caused the motor-driven auxiliary

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'feedwater pumps (P38A and P388) to start. At the time;of occurrence, Unit 1 was shut down for refueling. Normally, during an outage, startup of the auxiliary feedwater pumps on lo-lo SG water. level is prevented by a circuit on the control switches for the main feedwater pumps (lP28A and 1P28B). If the main feedwater pump control switches are in pullout, the auxiliary feedwater pumps will not start automatically. However, at the time of this occurrence, the main feedwater pump switches had been placed in the AUTO position to er,able testing of the Anticipated Transients Without Scram Mitigating System Actuation Circuit (Al15AC) per ICP 11.422, " Initial Checkout and. Test of AMSAC, M1285-312, Unit 1." The AMSAC test was designed to intentionally start the auxiliary feedwater pump The test procedure contained a precaution that if SG 1evels are expected to go below the low level setpoint, to install temporary analog simulators in the reactor protection racks and simulate

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signals of approximately 50% for two SG levels in each loop. This precaution enables the plant to proceed with draining the SGs for maintenance / repair without affecting the tes _ _ _ _ ________ __ _ _ __

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The personnel performing the test discussed ongoing outage activities with control room personnel and understood that the "B" SG would would be drained to below inlet pipe level for a valve repai However, they did not realize that both the "A" and "B" SGs were being drained and consequently, only the "B" SG 1evel signals were simulated. Subsequently, when the water level in the "A" SG reached lo-lo level, the auxiliary feedwater pumps started and pumped water into the SGs of both Unit 1 and Unit 2 until the pumps were turned off by an operator. By this time, the water flow to Unit 2 had been stopped by automatic isolation valves as per the desig The licensee determined that the system had performed as designe At PBNP, the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps will automatically start if a 10-10 water level is sensed in either steam generato The motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps are part of a shared system between Unit 1 and Unit 2 and, as such, will inject water into both units until valves. automatically close to isolate the unaffected uni The cause of this event was a cognitive personnel error concerning projected plant conditions not directly related to the performance of the AMSAC as a result of miscommunication between persons in the control room and personnel performing the tes The NRC inspector reviewed the AMSAC test procedure and the auxiliary feedwater system description and concurred that the system performed as designed. The inspector also agreed with the root cause determination and corrective actions taken. This LER is considered close b. (Closed) LER (266/89007-00): ATWS Mitigating System Actuation 1 Circuitry Bistable Failure, j On June 25, 1989, during normal 100% power conditions, operators noticed the " Loss of Feedwater Turbine Trip Blocked" status light on control board 1-C03 was illuminated. This instrument channel was recently installed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.62 -

Anticipated Transient Without Scram Mitigating System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC).

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The P-20 bistable alarm module within the AMSAC instrument channel was found to be faulty by instrument technicians. Upon determining that the AMSAC channel was in a disabled mode, a power reduction was initiated in accordance with Condition for Operation (LCO)Th plant Technical P-20 Specification bistable alarm Limiting module was replaced and the AMSAC channel was restored to servic The licensee determined that the instrument channel and components within the channel responded as designed when the P-20 bistable

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alarm module degraded. With increasing power, at the setpoint, the L bistable relay should actuate (contacts makeup) concurrent with a local light emitting diode indication on the module. When troubleshooting the bistable, technicians had proper LED readout at the setpoint; however, the bistable relay contact closure did not occu i

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The P-20 bistable alarm module is an " Action Pak" Series (model)

I AP1004-6016-R, manufactured by Action Instruments, Inc. of San Diego.. California. The module features a 4-20 milliamp input, a norma 11y'de-energized double pole - double throw (DPDT) relay, an adjustable setpoint, and is powered by a 120 VAC power suppl .The bistable was sent to the manufacturer for repairs who-subsequently reported that the cause of failure was-due to the failure of an integrated circuit (component) within the modul The inspector reviewed the manufacturer's. documentation of the failure analysis and found it acceptabl The NRC inspector reviewed the design of the AMSAC. instrument channel'

as part of.the-10 CFR 50.62 implementation inspection described in Section 3 of this report and concurred that the instrument channel

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and the bistable responded as designed. The inspector also reviewed the corrective actions and the related-TS LC0 actions and found them acceptable. This LER is considered close .- Temporary Instruction (TI 2500/20) (SIMS Number MPA-A-20) (Closed)

10 CFR 50.62, "The ATWS Rule," requires that each pressurized water reactor must have equipment from sensor output to final. actuation device, that is diverse from the reactor trip system, to automatically initiate the auxiliary (or emergency) feedwater system and initiate a turbine trip under conditions indicative of an ATWS. This equipment must be designed to perform its function in a reliable manner and be independent (from sensor output to the final actuation device) from the existing reactor trip syste The Westinghouse Owner's Group (WOG) submitted a generic design for ATWS mitigation system actuation circuitry - AMSAC in response to 10 CFR 50.6 This design, Topical Report WCAP-10858, "AMSAC Generic Design Package,"

was approved by the NRC in a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated September 17, 1986; however, this SER required further approval of many plant specific detail The PBNP plant specific design was approved by the NRC.in a SER dated August 4, 1988, and was conditional based on the satisfactory completion of isolation device testin The PBNP design which implemented the logic 3 option from WCAP-10858 (AMSAC actuation on Main Feedwater Trip or Main Feedwater Valve Closure)

was installed and tested ahead of the original implementation schedule in the refueling outage completed during May 1989. The Unit 2 AMSAC installation is scheduled for the November 1989 refueling outage which will meet the implementation commitaen The objective of this inspection was to determine that ATWS mitigating systems comply with the 10 CFR 50.62 rule requirements and that the effectiveness of the QA controls applied to major activities (design, procurement, installation, and testing), for ATWS equipment complies with Generic Letter (GL) 85-06, "QA Guidance For ATWS Equipment That is Not Safety-Related," or to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and to assess the operational adequacy and reliability of ATWS equipmen _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _

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[ 1; l Documents Reviewed-

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(1)' Letters - C. Fay to Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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(a) . Schedule for compliance with 10 CFR 50.62, "ATWS Rule "

dated September 30, 198 '(b) Schedule for Implementation of ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC), dated October 10, 198 (c) 'ATWS Mitigating System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) - Final Design and Implementation Schedule,' dated April' 23, 198 (d) Additional-Information ATWS Mitigating System Actuation Circuits (AMSAC),' dated December 30 198 (e) ATWS Mitigating System Actuation Circuits (AMSAC) - Isolation Device Information, dated March 2, 198 (f) ATWS Rule (10 CFR 50.62) - Answer to Request for Additional Information, dated April 13, 198 c; (g) Modification of Technical Specification Request 128 - Clarification of Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Start Following Installation of AMSAC, dated March 3, 198 (2)' Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs)

(a) SER of Topical Report No. WCAP-10858, "AMSAC Generic Design Package."

(b) SER of Site Specific AMSAC Design including Revision 1 to WCAP-1085 (3) WCAP-1216,'"The Qualification of Struthers-Drum Relays for AMSAC Application," Revision (4) Modification Request No.85-213, " Anticipated Transients Without Scram Mitigating System Actuation Circuit."

(5) Procedure No. ICP 11.421, " Installation Procedure for ATWS Mitigating System Actuation Circuit (AMSAC) Unit 1 MR 85-213."

(6) Procedure No. ICP 11.422 Minor, " Initial Checkout and Test of AMSAC, MR 85-213."

(7) Calculation No. N-89-028, " Load Qualification for the Newly Designed Support Bracket for AMSAC."

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(8)' Drawings (a) No. 499B466, " Elementary Wiring Diagram."

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.k Sheet 370, Auxiliary Feed' Pump 2. ' Sheet 799, Remote Operated Valves

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T 2 Sheet-814. Steam to Turbine Driven Auxiliary-Feed Purp

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(b)' No. PSE-210, "ANSAC.(lN16 and 2N16) Enclosure Parts-Layout."

(c) No. PBE-ole, "AMSAC (lN16) Circuit Diagram."

(d) No. PBE-209, "AMSAC (1N16 and 2N16) Internal Connection-Diagram."

(e) No. 110E 163, "AMSAC Annunicators."

(f) No. . PBE-61, " Schematic Diagram - Turbine Generator Control." .

(g) No. PBE-98, " Connection Diagram Local Devices Control- 1 Valves."

(9) Procurement Packages j (a) Agastat time delay relay '!

(b) Namco limit switch (c) Struthers-Drum. latching relay i (d). Key operated selector switch

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(10) Surveillance Report No. QAM-89-109, " Fabrication of AMSAC Control Panel." ]

(11) Memo Logan to Krieser - Subject: " Application of Quality 'I Assurance to ATWS System."

(12) Annunicator Procedure l (a) ARB 1C03, 1E2 3-7 Minor, " Loss of FW Turbine Trip Channel Alert."

(b)' ARB 1C03, lE2 2-7 Minor, " Loss of FW Turbine Trip in 30'Sec." I (c) ARB 1C03, lE2 4-7 Minor, " Loss of FW Turbine Trip Disabled." ,

I (d) ARB 1C03, lEl 3-2 Minor, " Loss of FW Turbine Trip."

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(13) Lesson Plans (a) No. IM 89-028, " Provide Initial Information on AMSAC to Operators."

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(b) No. Plant Startup 89-4, " Training for Cycle 89-4."

L b. Inspection Results L

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The inspector verified the following aspects of the PBNP AMSAC:

(1) Design Engineering Review of the AMSAC schematics, the elementary diagrams, and the site specific design submittals confirmed that the AMSAC did

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not compromise the safety features of the existing safety-related protection systems. Walkdown of selected portions of the AMSAC installation on Unit 1.also supported this conclusio Review of the AMSAC modification packages for Unit 1 indicated that the. design endorsed by the NRR SER was properly implemente One item delineated in the SER as requiring resolution by the audit process during this inspection related to the qual.ification of the devices isolating the safety-related interface.between AMSAC and the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)

circuits. The inspector reviewed the documentation which supported the qualification of the Struthers-Dunn output relays and found it acceptable; therefore, this item is considered close (2) Procurement and Installation of the ATWS Mitigating Equipment The inspector selected four of the QA Scope procurement packages at random and verified that the technical requirements of the PBNP site specific design were in compliance with the SER and the ATWS rul Through review of the selected procurement packages the inspector determined that the proper receipt inspection, identification and storage controls were employed for the Unit 1 AMSAC installation. A tour of the storeroom indicated that these controls were still in place for the Unit 2 AMSAC equipment which will be installed during the November 1989 refueling outag Several items for the Unit 2 AMSAC were selected at random and the inspector verified the traceability of the equipment identification designations and quality documentation. The inspector also observed the QA tags on Unit 2 equipment released to the I&C shop for fabrication of the AMSAC control panel during a tour of the sho ___ - - _ _ - - - _ . . _ _ - - . - - . _ i

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The inspector's review of the modification package indicated J that the latest specifications, drawings and procedures were j employed for the Unit 1 AMSAC installatio '

The walkdown of the installed Unit 1-AMSAC verified that the equipment installed met the design requirements for physical, dimensional, and operational characteristics.

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The-inspector's walkdown of the Unit 1 AMSAC provined verification that the control panel and the limit switches were installed in the proper location. This walkdown and review of the support bracket calculation also indicated that this portion of the AMSAC was oriented and supported as specified in the design packag No AMSAC installation was in process during this inspection; however, the inspector observed the Unit 2 AMSAC control panel under construction in the I&C shop. The quality of the fabrication and installation of the AMSAC equipment was excellent. It was evident that the I&C technician took a great 4 deal of personal pride in his work. Discussion with involved personnel indicated that the proper tools, such as a calibrated crimping tool were employe The inspector's review of the Unit 1 installation procedure indicated that housekeeping and fire protection controls were properly implemented during constructio Review of the schematics and elementaries and walkdown of the system verified that the physical separation criteria for maintaining electrical independ?nce between redundant division and between AMSAC and safety-related circuits was maintaine (3) Confirmation of Completed Work The inspector verified that the Unit 1 AMSAC performed as specified in the PBNP site specific design through a review of the modification package and checkout tes The inspector reviewed the AMSAC annunciator procedures and AMSAC training lesson plans. AMSAC training for on-shift personnel was verified and the on-shift supervisor (OSS)

was interviewed relative to AMSAC operation with acceptable result '

PBNP has committed to a complete end-to-end test of the AMSAC during each refuel outage and to test those portions of the AMSAC that can be tested at power on a semiannual basis. At the time of this inspection, neither commitment had been reached. The inspector verified that the AMSAC had been tested i following installation and reviewed the test documentation with !

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.y . -m-l The inspector verified the existence of the permanently

! installed bypass switch in the AMSAC control panel and the

" Loss of FW Turbine Trip Disabled" (key switch to bypass)

annunciator in the control roo The inspector verified that once the mitigative action is initiated, the action goes to completion because the output

, relays are of the latching type. The inspector also verified

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that subsequent return to normal operation can be accomplished with the use of a reset switc The PBNP AMSAC design does not have a manual AMSAC initiation switch. The inspector verified that it was not required during a tour of the control room. This tour and discussions with the control operator (CO) on shift verified that the operator can manually trip the turbine with a switch and start any one of the AFW pumps by using a start switch and a valve operating switch on the control pane (4) Quality Assurance and Qualifications The inspector verified that the major activities such as design control, procurement, installation, and testing were accomplished as QA scope in accordance with the plants established procedure In addition, QA performed documented surveillance of the AMSAC fabrication and installatio During this inspection, the inspector observed that the licensee generally exceeded the supplemental QA controls guidance given in Generic Letter 85-0 Personnel contacted during the inspection such as the I&C engineer, the I&C technicians, the QA superintendent, and the control room operators and supervisors were knowledgeable and capabl . Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 during and at the conclusion of the inspection on September 1, 198 The inspector summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this inspection report. The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in natur _. - ____ ____ - -____ -_ -_- _ _ _ _ _ _ -_ -