IR 05000266/1986001
| ML20214G069 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 11/17/1986 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214G014 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-266-86-01, 50-266-86-1, 50-301-86-01, 50-301-86-1, NUDOCS 8611250542 | |
| Download: ML20214G069 (17) | |
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SALP 5
APPENDIX SALP BOARD REPORT
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE 50-266/86001; 50-301/86001 Inspection Report N Wisconsin Electric Power Company Name of Licensee Point Beach Units 1 and 2 Name of Facility October 1, 1984 through March 31, 1986 Assessment Period
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8611230542 861117
{DR ApoCK 05000266 PDR
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Point Beach Units 1 and 2 Facility Summary of Meeting with Wisconsin Electric Power Company on July 18, 1986 The findings and conclusions of the SALP Board are documented in Reports No. 50-266/86001; No. 50-301/86001 and were discussed with the licensee at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. The licensee's regulatory performance was presented in each functional are Overall performance and performance in each functional area was found to be acceptable. The licensee was found to have a high level of performance in the functional areas of Plant Operations, Maintenance, Surveillance, Security, Outages, and Training and Qualification Effectiveness. All other assessment areas were found to be adequate and represented a licensee management team that was sufficiently staffed and appropriately involved and concerned with nuclear safety. The licensee was informed that a failure to meet a schedular commitment resulted in a decline in its rating in the Licensing Activities area and that a recent degraded vital area barrier event should be reviewed to assure that it was not indicative of a declining trend in the security categor List of Attendees Wisconsing Electric Power Company S. Burstein, Vice Chairman of the Board R. W. Britt, President C. W. Fay, Vice President, Nuclear Power J. J. Zach, Manager, Point Beach Nuclear Plant C. Krauss, Licensing Engineer J. C. Reisenbuechler, Superintendent, EQRS J. E. Knorr, Regulatory Engineer U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission J. G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, Region III W. G. Guldemond, Chief, Reactor Projects, Branch 2, Region III I. N. Jackiw, Chief, Reactor Projects, Section 2B, Region III T. G. Colburn, Project Manager, NRR R. C. Hague, Senior Resident Inspector, Region III R. Leemon, Resident Inspector, Region III Comments Received from Licensee The licensee indicated that there were some editorial and minor technical corrections required and that it believed that a Category 2 rating in
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the functional area of Fire Protection and Housekeeping did not accurately reflect its performance in this are: during the period. The licensee stated that improvements in its performance in the area were not properly weighed against its failure to complete several Appendix R modifications in accordance with the regulatory schedule and that the schedular problems more properly belonged to the Licensing Activities are . Regional Administrator's Conclusions Based on Consideration of Licensee Comments The Regional Administrator believes that Wisconsin Electric Power Company's regulatory performance has been and continues to be one of the best in Region III. The plant management and corporate management usually have been timely in dealing with problems and have done a good job in correcting the root cause of these problems. Although the licensee disagrees with the Category 2 rating in Fire Protection and Housekeeping and formally informed the NRC of its reasons for the disagreement, the Regional Administrator, after reviewing the arguments, does not believe that a Category 1 rating is appropriate. Therefore, the Category 2 rating will remain for that functional area.
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Wisconsin Electric Power Company September 19, 1986 ERRATA SHEET Page Line Now Reads Should Read 8 4 & 18 Initiated Implemented Basis: Clarification Page Line Now Reads Should Read 8 6 Professional Radiation Control Operator Basis: Clarification Page Line Now Reads Should Read 9 4 Communicator Annunciator Basis: Editorial Correction Page Line Now Reads Should Read 9 26 Reactor Refueling Basis: Editorial Correction Page Line Now Reads Should Read 16 29 Control Room plant organization who can respond to questions from the NRC duty office Basis: Editorial Correction
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Page Line Now Reads Should Read 19 10 Community College Technical Institute Basis: Editerial Correction i
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Wisconsin Electrical Power Company September 19, 1986 ERRATA SHEET Page Line Now Reads Should Read 20 22 All Appropriate Basis: Editorial Correction Page Line Now Reads Should Read 22 36 Plants Plant Basis: Editorial Correction
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in inordinate technical work and task specific supervision which must be performed by the radiation protection foremen; this detracts from their normal supervisory functions. The licensee initiated actions near the end of this assessment period to improve the radiation protection program staffing, including authorization for two new professional positions and a commitment to create a more professionally oriented technician staff by upgrading the radiation protection technician position and f selection criteria. These changes are expected to encourag'e/
improved radiation protection staff retention. Staffing in the chemistry and radwaste programs has been more stable than/in the radiation protection program. No changes in key superv i, lory personnel and only minor turnover (two of ten) of the chemistr technicians permanently assigned to the chemistry lab 'ratory have occurred during the assessment perio The licensee has been generally responsive t pCconcern Steps to resolve the long standing problem .. ning radiation protection staff stability appear to have nitiated near the end of this assessnient period in res to repeated concerns expressed by NRC, Region III pe nel. Additional areas indicative of licensee responsi1gne s during this assessment period include the count @ om quality assurance program, the QA audit program for wp te activities, the area contamination control program, t adiological incident report system, the criteria for evalua Inomalous transuranic and strontium 89 and 90 values from tractor performed analyses of composite liquid discharg sam 61es, and the increased comparison of gaseous effi rab samples with monitor respons Management involvement hay'been generally adequate during this l
assessmentperiodwithifprovementevidentinmanagement support of the radiati However, strong actions were not taken,pn until protection the latterprogra part of the assessment period to correct pself-identified radiation protection problem concerning repeated incidents of high radiation area i
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' rope barrier vi ations. Although licensee management was responsive t large number of inspector identified concerns in this area improvement is needed in self-identification and correction f program weaknesse The licepsee's approach to resolution of radiological technical issues h'as generally been conservative and sound. One exception was t ' handlinj of a radioactive filter which produced high radi tion areas which were not adequately controlle Investiga-l tio of the filter incident identified several problems, the
! most significant of which concerned worker attitude and l
q lifications. Similar problems (worker morale, experience 1 vel and staff stability) were evident in other areas of the l
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in inordinate technical work and task specific supervision which must be performed by the radiation protection foremen; this detracts from their normal supervisory functions. The licensee implemented actions near the end of this assessment period to improve the radiation protection program staffing, including authorization for two new radiation control operator positions
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and a commitment to create a more professionally oriented technician staff by upgrading the radiation protection technician position and selection criteria. These changes are expected to encourage improved radiation protection staff retentio Staffing in the chemistry and radwaste programs has been more stable than in the radiation protection program. No changes in key supervisory personnel and only minor turnover (two of ten)
of the chemistry technicians permanently assigned to the chemistry laboratory have occurred during the assessment perio ;
The licensee has been generally responsive to NRC concern Steps to resolve the long standing problem concerning radiation protection staff stability appear to have been implemented near the end of this assessment period in response to repeated concerns expressed by NRC, Region III personnel. Additional areas indicative of licensee responsiveness during this assessment period include the counting room quality assurance program, the QA audit program for radwaste activities, the area contamination control program, the radiological incident report system, the criteria for evaluating anomalous transuranic and strontium 89 and 90 values from contractor performed analyses of composite liquid discharge samples, and the increased comparison of gaseous effluent grab samples with monitor respons Management involvement has been generally adequate during this assessment period with improvement evident in management support of the radiation protection program. However, strong actions were not taken until the latter part of the assessment period to correct a self-identified radiation protection i problem concerning repeated incidents of high radiation area
! rope barrier violations. Although licensee management was
! responsive to a large number of inspector identified concerns in this area, improvement is needed in self-identification and
- correction of program weaknesses.
i The licensee's approach to resolution of radiological technical i ssues has generally been conservative and sound. One exception j
was the handling of a radioactive filter which produced high
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radiation areas which were not adequately controlled. Investiga-tion of the filter incident identified several problems, the
most significant of which concerned worker attitude and i qualifications. Similar problems (worker morale, experience level and staff stability) were evident in other areas of the i
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radiation protection program as noted above, and the licen ee has initiated corrective action Management demonstrate a conservative approach in relocating a Radiation Monitorifg System (RMS) communicator and in replacing one generaljilarm with seven individual alarms to improve operator awar ness of RMS statu Support for the ALARA program is adequate and roving. This is demonstrated by management support for th famination control program that was implemented during assessment period to prevent area contamination and t6 uce existing areas controlled for contamination purp demonstrated by ALARA initiatives taken ftisalso i
g a refueling outage and by implementation of a dose tability syste Total worker dose was 740 person rem i 84 and 440 person-rem in 1985; the 1984 doses included the ft steam generator replacement outage, I two months of the were both below the average for U he/ecumulativedoses ssurized water reactors and are consistent with the lice istorical personal dose The licensee routinely has mainy occupational doses below the U.S. pressurized water rea j erages, Noble gas release rates durin b/ hfs assessment period have averaged about 55 curies ann if per unit which is below the average for U.S. pressurized a er reactor Reported liquid radioactive releases were abov average for U.S. pressurized water reactors for this es ment period primarily due to a plannea release from t during Unit 2 refuelin tor Water Storage Tank (RWST)
total (excluding trit ovember 1984. About one curie year 1985 which is ab as released per unit in calendar verage for U.S. pressurized water reactors. The RWST co ents were released because of high silica concentration a parently caused by boron recycle activities. Iodine. d particulate releases in gaseous effluents may also quantified and reported conservatively in that activity o weekly filters /adsorbers is decay corrected to startsample of the of sampi period rather than the constancy mid point p to No unplanned liquid or gaseous releases were reported. *!o problems were identified with the licensee's transportatio of radioactive materia The licens 's ability to accurately measure radioactivity in effluents eclined somewhat during this assessment perio Seven di greements were observed in 36 comparisons made with three 1 censee detectors. Most of the disagreements, which involv d a newly calibrated detector, were attributable to coun ng room QA weaknesses and resulted in a violatio Lic see corrective action following inspector identification of the problem was prompt and satisfactor /
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radiation protection program as noted above, and the licensee has initiated corrective actions. Management demonstrated a conservative approach in relocating a Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) annunciator and in replacing one general alarm with seven individual alarms to improve operator awareness of RMS statu Support for the ALARA program is adequate and improving. This is demonstrated by management support for the contamination control program that was implemented during this assessment period to prevent area contamination and to reduce existing areas controlled for contamination purpose It is also demonstrated by ALARA initiatives taken during a refueling outage and by implementation of a dose accountability syste Total worker dose was 740 person-rem in 1984 and 440 person-rem in 1985; the 1984 doses included the final two months of the steam generator replacement outag These cumulative doses were both below the average for U.S. pressurized water reactors and are consistent with the licensee's historical personal dose The licensee routinely has maintained occupational doses below the U.S. pressurized water reactor average Noble gas release rates during this assessment period have averaged about 55 curies annually per unit which is below the average for U.S. pressurized water reactors. Reported liquid radioactive releases were above average for U.S. pressurized water reactors for this assessment period primarily due to a planned release from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)
during Unit 2 refueling in November 1984. About one curie total (excluding tritium) was released per unit in calendar year 1985 which is about average for U.S. pressurized water reactors. The RWST contents were released because of high silica concentration apparently caused by boron recycle activitie Iodine and particulate releases in gaseous effluents may also be quantified and reported conservatively in that activity on weekly filters / absorbers is decay corrected to start of sample peried rather than the constancy mid point of the sample period. No unplanned liquid or gaseous releases were reported. No problems were identified with the licensee's transportation of radioactive materia The licensee's ability to accurately measure radioactivity in effluents declined somewhat during this assessment perio Seven disagreements were observed in 36 comparisons made with three licensee detectors. Most of the disagreements, which involved a newly calibrated detector, were attributable to counting room QA weaknesses and resulted in a violatio Licensee corrective action following inspector identification of the problem was prompt and satisfactor __
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The emergency preparedness training program in general has be,en good. Procedures are in place to ensure all members of the'
emergency organization have the opportunity to periodical.ly participate in the emergency drills. The main weakness, identified in the training program was in keeping personnel up-to-date on changes in the emergency plan and procedure An example of the adequacy of the program wa demonstrated by an acceptable performance during the 198 annual exercis During the assessment period two instance o apparent incomplete reporting occurred. Althoug violations with 10 CFR 50.72 were identified, the lac omplete information caused concern that the NRC might no y understand the significance of a reported even irst event occurred on July 25, 1985, and was reported he Headquarters duty officer as an unusual event due to t loss of the low voltage station transformer. The init notification of the unusual event was made by a security per the licensee's emergency plan. The security guard co t provide the additional information requested by th , duty officer. The duty officer subsequently called control room and was informed that there had been a loc of the low voltage station transformer for Unit 1 a e unit was being shutdown per Technical Specifications t was not known by headquarters nor the region until afte se . ring from the unusual event that this transformer supp' ed offsite power to the unit. After this event, the lice revised their reporting procedures to requirethattheEN) tification be made by someone in the control roo The second event occurred on December 31, 1985, and was reported to the headquarters' duty officer as an unusual event due to a loss of load to t_he Unit 2 generator. The loss of load was caused by a fail,e'd lightning arrestor in the switchyard. The report was made by the duty and call superintendent who was able to answer'all of the questions asked by the duty office nificance of this event was not initially understood The by the full sig' officer or the region. Loss of load to the generator duty, without an a'uto bus transfer causes a loss of reactor coolant pumps, cir'culating water pumps, steam generator feed pumps, and condensate pumps. An attempt to close the main steam isolation valvesfromthecontrolroomwasunsuccessfulandoneofthe source / range instruments failed. This information was not volunfeered by the licensee. After this event the licensee agairf modified their reporting format to include any equipment mal unctions which would help the NRC to appreciate the actual pl nt conditions whether the equipment was safety-related or n .
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The emergency preparedness training program in general has been good. Procedures are in place to ensure all members of the emergency organization have the opportunity to periodically participate in the emergency drills. The main weakness identified in the training program was in keeping personnel up-to-date on changes in the emergency plan and procedure An example of the adequacy of the program was demonstrated by an acceptable performance during the 1985 annual exercis During the assessment period two instances of apparent incomplete reporting occurred. Although no violations with 10 CFR 50.72 were identified, the lack of complete information caused concern that the NRC might not fully understand the significance of a reported event. The first event occurred on July 25, 1985, and was reported to the Headquarters duty officer as an unusual event due to the loss of the low voltage station transformer. The initial notification of the unusual event was made by a security guard per the licensee's emergency plan. The security guard could not provide the additional information requested by the NRC duty officer. The duty officer subsequently called the control room and was informed that there had been a lock-out of the low voltage station transformer for Unit 1 and the unit was being shutdown per Technical Specifications. It was not known by headquarters nor the region until after securing from the unusual event that this transformer supplied offsite power to the unit. After this event, the licensee revised their reporting procedures to require that the ENS notification be made by someone in the plant organization who can respond to questions from the NRC duty office The second event occurred on December 31, 1985, and was reported to the headquarters duty officer as an unusual event due to a loss of load to the Unit 2 generator. The loss of load was caused by a failed lightning arrestor in the switchyard. The report was made by the duty and call superintendent who was able to answer all of the questions asked by the duty office The full significance of this event was not initially understood by the duty officer or the regio Loss of load to the generator l without an auto bus transfer causes a loss of reactor coolant i pumps, circulating water pumps, steam generator feed pumps, and l condensate pumps. An attempt to close the main steam isolation l valves from the control room was unsuccessful and one of the i source range instruments failed. This information was not volunteered by the licensee. After this event the licensee again modified their reporting fcrmat to include any equipment malfunctions which would help the NRC to appreciate the actual i plant conditions whether the equipment was safety-related or I not.
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identified as a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> report rather than a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> report, which precipitated an untimely official notification to the NR .
pons The security bilities organization are well is properly defined. Security force resourced members aand r mot))vated, technically competent and well equipped. The smoot functioning l of the security program is testimony to the appropyia e 'taffing l
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of the security organizatio The security force training program represen s f i ovative approach to satisfying security plan commitme tV he licensee has contracted with a local community coll g o evelop and administer a security force training prog e college faculty and staff reviewed all security p c itments and developed a 120 hour0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> course which en res security personnel are properly trained to e tive execute security plan commitment Successful co n of the course awards
security personnel three college tpdurs. The faculty is very professional and techn : y co petent. The contractual arrangement to administer an '
at security training provides a more objective ev u4 ion of individual security officer qualification. The t of the Security Training Program is reflected in th nti ued high performance of the security force. The seguri tr ining program will enhance the overall quality of the cu it progra . Conclusion
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Ca egory 1 in this area based on enforce-
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ment history, tra g nitiatives, and the demonstrated high performance of the e urity force. The inattentiveness to detail demonstrated uring the latter part of the assessment period was indicat e of a declining tren . Board Recommenda ion A minimum ins ction program is recommended.
i H. Outages Analysis Evaluat on of this functional area is based on the results of inspec ions conducted by the resident inspectors. The inspection activ ties included observation of fuel movements; verification that surveillance for refueling activities had been performed; l
tha refueling containment integrity requirements were met; and l
ob ervation of outage controls and activities. One violation was l 1 ntified:
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identified as a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> report rather than a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> report, which precipitated an untimely official notification to the NR The security organization is properly resourced and responsi-bilities are well define Security force members are motivated, technically competent and well equipped. The smooth functioning of the security program is testimony to the appropriate staffing of the security organizatio The security force training program represents an innovative approach to satisfying security plan commitments. The licensee has contracted with a local technical institute to develop and administer a security force training program. The college faculty and staff reviewed all security plan commitments and developed a 120 hour0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> course which ensures that security personnel are properly trained to effectively execute security plan commitment Successful completion of the course awards security personnel three college credit hours. The faculty is very professional and technically competent. The contractual arrangement to administer and evaluate security training provides a more objective evaluation of individual security officer qualification. The quality of the Security Training Program is reflected in the continued high performance of the security force. The security training program will enhance the overall quality of the security progra . Conclusion The licensee is rated Category 1 in this area based on enforce-ment history, training initiatives, and the demonstrated high performance of the security force. The inattentiveness to detail demonstrated during the latter part of the assessment period was indicative of a declining tren . Board Recommendation A minimum inspection program is recommende Outages
! Analysis Evaluation of this functional area is based on the results of inspections conducted by the resident inspectors. The inspection activities included observation of fuel movements; verification that surveillance for refueling activities had been performed; that refueling containment integrity requirements were met; and observation of outage controls and activities. One violation was identified:
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Severity Level IV - Failure to comply with Technical Specification 15.5.4.4 in that three spent fuel assemblies, subcritical less than a year, were stored adjacent to the spent fuel pool east wall. (Inspection Reports No. 50-266/85-015; No. 50-301/85-015(DRP))
The licensee identified this violation during a ua it assurance audit of the spent fuel pool record It appe h the assemblies were inadvertently placed adjacent h wall four months after they were removed from the co i a spent fuel pool shuffle in preparation for an upcomi . The licensee verified that the fuel pool wall did not ny structural damage due to the thermal load induced by e ssemblies. The LER submitted on this event was classifie a personnel erro No other personnel error LERs were ne to this are Licensee management is kept abrea o tage activities through a three times a week major items 1 st meeting. The outage schedule is fed into a compute, gr with target dates for completion of the major outa a s At the meetings the cognizant individuals for th e ent tasks report on the progress toward completion ey sed target dates are established if necessar eW schedule is then printed out by the computer, reproduce d distributed to all plant management. This method of trolling outage activities has proved to be very effe tiv At the completion o tage, as systems are turned back over to the operations p a series of operational readiness l testsareconductl ring these tests, all safety systems j aretestedandvepffidasoperationalpriortoplantstartu During monitoring arr this testing the inspectors have found few if any instances o systems which were not properly returned to service or which id not function as required. This indicates that maintenance performed during the outage was properly accomplished an that valve lineups after maintenance were correct and pr perly verified. This again is indicative of the high level of professionalism exhibited by the maintenance and operations oups.
l During th SALP Period several modifications and inspections l were acc plished during refueling outages. These included:
inspect on and replacement of guide tube split pins, removal of flexur pins and installation of flexureless inserts on the guide ubes, reactor vessel nozzle inspections and inspection of b fle plate joints. The licensee has made plans to do a baf e plate flow modification on both units during the fall l 19 and spring 1987 refueling outages. Prior planning and I
m agement involvement were evident in coordinating these extra tivitie . _ _
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Severity Level IV - Failure to comply with Technical Specification 15.5.4.4 in that three spent fuel assemblies, subcritical less than a year, were stored adjacent to the spent fuel pool east wall. (Inspection Reports No. 50-266/85-015; No. 50-301/85-015(DRP))
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The licensee identified this violation during a quality assurance audit of the spent fuel pool records. It appears that the assemblies were inadvertently placed adjacent to the wall four months after they were removed from the core during a spent fuel pool shuffle in preparation for an upcoming outage. The licensee verified that the fuel pool wall did not incur any structural damage due to the thermal load induced by the assemblies. The LER submitted on this event was classified as a personnel erro No other personnel error LERs were assigned to this are Licensee management is kept abreast of outage activities through a three times a week major items work list meeting. The outage schedule is fed into a computer program with target dates for completion of the major outage tasks. At the meetings the cognizant individuals for the different tasks report on the progress toward completion and revised target dates are established if necessary. The new schedule is then printed out by the computer, reproduced, and distributed to appropriate plant management. This method of controlling outage activities has proved to be very effectiv At the completion of the outage, as systems are turned back over to the operations group, a series of operational readiness tests are conducted. During these tests, all safety systems are tested and verified as operational prior to plant startu During monitoring of this testing the inspectors have found few if any instances of systems which were not properly returned to service or which did not function as required. This indicates that maintenance performed during the outage was properly accomplished and that valve lineups after maintenance were correct and properly verified. This again is indicative of the high level of professionalism exhibited by the maintenance and operations group During this SALP Period several modifications and inspections were accomplished during refueling outages. These included:
inspection and replacement of guide tube split pins, removal of flexure pins and installation of flexureless inserts on the guide tubes, reactor vessel nozzle inspections and inspection of baffle plate joints. The licensee has made plans to do a baffle plate flow modification on both units during the fall 1986 and spring 1987 refueling outages. Prior planning and management involvement were evident in coordinating these extra activities.
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implementation problems, primarily in the areas of work control, document control, and audits. One cpen issue involving 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations was being addressed by adequa interim measures pending final program revision. Resolution f these items has considerably strengthened the licensee's performance in the QA are One issue from the QA inspection remains open. This i sue involves the failure to train personnel involved in spe o activities in the inspection process and inspector s j 11-ties and the failure to document inspector qualif a While the issue is being addressed, progress has e slo Aspecialregion-basedEQinspectionwascon$tet limited to reviewing the qualification of Limitorqup mot rated valve operator internal wires identified af p nti ly deficient by IE Information Notice N . items of concern were identified: the adequacy 1 ation for two types of insulation used and the ) ek rgency procedures for manually stroking va ves i vent of motor-operator failure during an acciden . neerns are being reviewed by NR The licensee's response to th q tion issue was acceptable with all unqualified wires be ed during the next unit outage. The emergency pro dure has not been resolved nor corrective action initia d During the SALP perio thi nt inspectors attended meetings of the offsite revie and reviewed minutes of the manager's supervis y etings. Meeting agendas are appropriate with gh rities given to safety-related issues. NRC bu etins a information notices as well as INPO significant op rating events are reviewed by the entire staff and routed t appropriate individuals for action. The licensee
developed i s own lessons learned check list after the Davis-Besse event of ne 9, 1985, and assigned various staff members with
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the tas of assuring similar events would not occur at Point Beach. The licensee's quality programs are geared toward the safe peration of the plant T re is evidence of management involvement in the resolution identified concerns; however, resolution of problems is occasionally slow. Corrective actions, when accomplished, are generally appropriat . Conclusion The licensee is rated a Category 2 in this functional are . Board Recommendations Non ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ .
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implementation problems, primarily in the areas of work control, document control, and audits. One open issue involving 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations was being addressed by adequate interim measures pending final program revisio Resolution of these items has considerable strengthen the licensee's performance in the QA are One issue from the QA inspection remains open. This issue involves the failure to train personnel involved in inspection activities in the inspection process and inspector responsibili-ties and the failure to document inspector qualification While the issue is being addressed, progress has been very slo A special region-based EQ inspection was conducted and limited to reviewing the qualification of Limitorque motor-operated valve operator internal wires identified as potentially deficient by IE Information Notice No. 86-03. Two items of concern were identified: the adequacy of qualification for two types of insulation used and the lack of emergency procedures for manually stroking valves in the event of motor-operator failure during an accident. Both concerns are being reviewed by NR The licensee's response to the qualification issue was acceptable with all unqualified wires to be replaced during the next unit outage. The emergency procedure issue has not been resolved nor corrective action initiate During the SALP period the resident inspectors attended meetings of the offsite review committee and reviewed minutes of the manager's supervisory staff meetings. Meeting agendas are appropriate with highest priorities given to safety-related issues. NRC bulletins and information notices as well as INPO significant operating events are reviewed by the entire staff and routed to appropriate individuals for action. The licensee developed its own lessons learned check list after the Davis-Besse event of June 9, 1985, and assigned various staff members with the task of assuring similar events would not occur at Point Beach. The licensee's quality programs are geared toward the safe operation of the plan There is evidence of management involvement in the resolution of identified concerns; however, resolution of problems is occasionally slow. Corrective actions, when accomplished, are generally appropriat . Conclusion The licensee is rated a Category 2 in this functional are . Board Recommendations Non