IR 05000266/1986010
| ML20212L259 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 08/08/1986 |
| From: | Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212L226 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-266-86-10, 50-301-86-09, 50-301-86-9, IEB-86-002, IEB-86-2, NUDOCS 8608250265 | |
| Download: ML20212L259 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report Nos. 50-266/86010(DRP); 50-301/86009(DRP)
Dockets No. 50-266; 50-301 License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27 Licensee:
Wisconsin Electric Company 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53201 Facility Name:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Two Creeks, WI Inspection Conducted:
June 1 through July 31, 1986 Inspectors:
R. L. Hague R. J. Leemo b
FE*fd Approved By:
c ReactorProjectsSection28 Date
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Inspection Summary Inspection on June 1 through July 31, 1986 (Report Nos. 50-266/86010(DRP);
50-301/86009(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of operational safety verification and engineered safety features system walkdown; monthly surveillance observation; monthly maintenance operation; followup on
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regional requests; licensee event report followup; IE Bulletin followup; and licensee plans for coping with strikes.
Results:
Of the seven areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in six areas.
Two violations were identified in the remaining area (inadequate procedure and failure to perform an analysis as required by technical specification - Paragraph 2).
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6250265 86000s o
ADOCK 05000266 PDR
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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- J. J. Zach, Manager, PBNP T. J. Koehler, General superintendent G. J. Maxfield, Superintendent - Operation
- J. C. Reisenbuechler, Superintendent - EQR W. J. Herrman, Superintendent - Maintenance & Construction R. S. Bredysd, Health Physicist R. Krukowski, Security Supervisor
- F. A. Flentje, Staff Services Supervisor
- J. E. - Knorr, Regulatory Engineer The inspector also talked with and interviewed members of the Operation, Maintenance, Health Physics, Chemistry, and Instrument and Control Sections.
- Denotes personnel attending exit interviews.
2.
Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71707 and 71710)
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of June and July.
During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when appropriate.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations, and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
Excavation for the construction of the north service building began on June 27, 1986.
Extra security measures were evaluated and monitored.
On July 18, 1986, a special security investiga-tion was conducted by a Region III inspector.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
During the months of June and July, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Auxiliary Feedwater, Vital Electrical, Diesel Generating, Component Cooling, Safety Injection, and Containment Spray systems to verify operability.
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l These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR and administrative procedures.
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t On June 3, 1986,-at 10:31 a.m., Unit I reactor tripped on "B" steam
generator low level.
Both units' white instrument buses had been lost two minutes earlier when a capacitor charge button was not utilized while
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restoring inverter DYOC.
At 10:32 a.m., Unit 1 safety injection was
- actuated on low reactor coolant system pressure.
There was no injection i.
of boric acid into the vessel because the primary system pressure did not decrease below the safety injection pumps shutoff head.
White instrument bus power was restored at 12:30 p.m.
At 11:27 p.m., Unit 1 reactor went critical.
On June 5,1986, at 4:40 'a.m., power was held at 367 We net
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because two control rods were found more than 7.5 inches cat of alignment.
i Reactor Engineering personnel commenced flux map tests and rod position verification tests and released the reactor for further power increase at~
7:52 a.m.
At 10:33 a.m., Unit 1 achieved full power operation.
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L Also, due to the loss of the white instrument bus inverter mentioned above,
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Unit 2 experienced a.five percent runback.
Further details of the loss of the white instrument bus can be found in Licensee Event Report
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' Nos. 266/86003-00 and-301/86003-00.
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The cause of these transients was starting up the white instrument bus inverter without the use of an adequate procedure.
This is a Severity
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Level IV violation (Supplement I).
(266/86010-01; 301/86009-01)
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On June 17, 1986, at 10:40 a.m., the control operator manually ran the Unit 2 turbine back to approximately 195 We net in response to a low
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l suction pressure alarm for the main feedwater pumps.
This transient was
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caused by a manual isolation valve being shut on the air supply to the-air-operated drain valve on the SB feedwater heater.
The unit was back at full power by.3:00 p.m.
On June 29, 1986, as Unit 1 power was increased following turbine.stop
- valve and governor valve testing, the indicated rod positions for two
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Bank "D" control rods differed from the bank demand by more than 7.5 inches. A technical specification violation occurred when reactor
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i power was increased to greater than 75% without determining the hot
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channel factors and the resulting allowable power levels.
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j Technical Specification 15.3.10.D prohibits the increase of power to a level beyond 75% with a rod cluster control assembly (RCCA) misaligned
j greater than 7.5 inches when the bank demand position is between 30 and 215 steps.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
l (266/86010-02)
I On June 27, 1986, load was reduced to approximately 500 We net as a result of monthly flux mapping results for hot channel factors which required a
i slight power restriction.
Full power operation was re-established
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-approximately five hours later following additional flux mapping and analysis which proved some data were bad from the first flux map.
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On July 29, 1986, pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV) PCV-430 i
on Unit 1 was inadvertently opened by a control operator trainee.
The
PORV and its associated block valve were immediately shut, pressurizer j
pressure decreased to 1964 PSIG which is above the technical specification j
minimum pressure for normal operation of 1955 PSIG.
The trainee has been h
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instructed to go to close on the PORV control switch to facilitate testing of a pressurizer pressure channel. Although he was acting under direct supervision of a licensed operator, he turned the switch in the wrong direction.
A nonconformance report is being generated by the licensee and a training evaluation will be performed.
The inspectors will follow these actions.
This is an open item (266/86010-03(DRP)).
Radioactive contamination of an auxiliary operator was discovered on July 20, 1986, when a portal monitor alarmed.
Subsequent radioanalysis (whole body count, urinalysis, fecal analysis) showed an internal deposition, apparently due to ingestion, below regulatory limits.
A regional specialist will perform a followup inspection.
This is an open item (266/86010-04(DRP)).
3.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog Channels and Nuclear Instrumentation and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, the test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector also witnessed or reviewed portions of the following test activities:
TS-5 Rod Exercise (Unit 1)
TS-6 Rod Exercise (Unit 2)
TS-10A Hatch Door Seals (Units 1 and 2)
TS-33 Containment A::cident Fan Cooler Units (Unit 1)
TS-34 Containment Accident Fan Cooler Units (Unit 2)
IT-05 Inservice Testing of Containment Spray Pumps Eductor SupplyCheckValvesandSodiumHydroxideAddItionValves (Unit 1)
IT-06 Inservice Testing of Containment Spray Pumps, Eductor Supply Check Valves and Sodium Hydroxide Addition Valves (Unit 2)
IT-08 Inservice Testing of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump (Unit 1)
IT-60 Inservice Testing of Containment Isolation Valves IT-65 Inservice Testing of Containment Isolation Valves
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IT-72 Inservice Testing of Service Water Valves IT-295A Inservice Testing of Auxiliary Feedwater System Flow Indicators ICP 2.3 Reactor Protection System Logic (Unit 2)
ICP 2.5 Safeguards System Logic (Unit 2)
ICP 8.44 Test Instrument Calibration Procedure ICP 10.2 Routine Maintenance Procedure Removal of a safeguards or Protection Sensor from Service (Unit 2)
Biweekly Heating and Ventilation System Checks W21A and B, W30A and B, MWR No. 53269, TFI 05150200 Periodic and Turnaround Maintenance for the Self-Contained Closed-circuit Breathing Apparatus No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
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The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
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The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
Oil change on Unit 2 steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump
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Repair of 2RE-229 flow switch
Repair of 2FT-411 "A" loop reactor coolant flow transmitter
Repair of Unit 2 yellow delta T module 2TC-404R
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Prefabrication of piping for component cooling heat exchangers
replacement On July 3, 1986, condenser steam dump line snubber (2 REB 2-6) was removed from service for approximately one hour to restore its oil level.
Unit 2 was taken off-line at 1:36 a.m. on July 4.
The purpose of the. shutdown was to repair a leak on the "A" steam generator inboard manway and to replace one of the "A" loop reactor coolant flow transmitters (FT-411).
At 8:17 p.m., on July 4, 1986, Unit 2 was placed back on-line, and full power operation was reached at 9:50 p.m.
On July 12, 1986, Unit I was taken off-line at 3:08 a.m., to investigate and repair the cause of the abnormal noise noted in the Unit 1A moisture separator reheater.
A baffle plate weld was found broken.
It was repaired.
At 8:24 p.m., on July 12, 1986, Unit 1 was placed back on-line, and full power operation was reached at 2:35 p.m. on July 13.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Followup on Regional Requests (92705)
Low level radioactive waste storage facilities:
The licensee has built a structure for the storage of the Unit 1 steam generators.
The building was originally sized to hold both Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam generators; therefore, half of the building is available for storage of low level waste.
The building was constructed using reinforced concrete.
The available storage capacity for low level waste is 26,500 cubic feet which the licensee estimates will provide storage for three and one-half years of waste.
The structure is free standing and will serve as a repository only.
The licensee has not yet performed the required 50.59 evaluation which will include the estimated contribution to off-site dose rate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
301/85002-01-L Failure of Containment Isolation Valve 2-755A No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
IE Bulletin Followup (92701)
For the IE Bulletin listed below the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information present in the bulletin and the licensee's response,
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that licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response.
86-02:
Static-0-Ring Differential Pressure Switches No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Licensee Plans for Coping with Strikes (92709)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's strike contingency plan and determined that the minimum number of qualified and proficient personnel are available to ensure proper plant operation and safety, that plant security will be maintained at a level consistent with proper plant integrity and operation, and that the contents of the plant strike plan are consistent with regulatory requirements.
Contract negotiations are ongoing with the present three-year contract
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expiring on August 15, 1986.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or.both.
The open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraph 2.
10.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection periodtosummarizethesco)eandfindingsoftheinspectionactivities.
The licensee acknowledged t1e inspectors comments.
The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.
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