IR 05000266/1988007
| ML20148M666 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 03/29/1988 |
| From: | Foster J, Patterson J, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148M659 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-266-88-07, 50-266-88-7, 50-301-88-07, 50-301-88-7, IEIN-87-058, IEIN-87-58, NUDOCS 8804060064 | |
| Download: ML20148M666 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
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Reports No. 50-266/88007(DRSS); 50-301/88007(DRSS)
Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. DPR-24; DPR-27
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Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53201 Facility Name:
Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Point Beach Site, Two Creeks, Wisconsin Inspection Conducted:
March 7-11, 1988
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J s. Poster am Leader
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W Ja s P. Patterson Date IY (
Approved By: WillTim fleT1, Chief 7/2.//58
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l Emergency Preparedness Date
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Section
Inspection Summary Inspection on March 7-11, 1988 (Reports No. 50-266/88007(DRSS);
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No. 50-301/88007(DRSS))
Areas inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of the following areas of
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the Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant emergency preparedness program: action on i
previous Open Items; activations of the licensee's Emergency Plan; LER Review; operational status of the emergency preparedness program; emergency detection
and classification; protective action decisionmaking; notifications and communications; shift staffing and augmentation; knowledge and performance of duties (training); licensee audits; and handling of Information Notice 87-58.
This inspection involved two NRC inspectors.
Results:
No violations, deficiencies or deviations were identified, i
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j-l 8804060064 880330
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PDR ADOCK 05000266
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- J. Zach, Plant Manager
- R. Bruno, Superintendent Training
- P. Dent, Supervisor, Staff Service J. Knorr, Regulatory Engineer
- D. Stevens, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- R. Chojnacki, Quality Specialist
- C. Krause, Licensing Project Engineer
- D. Schoon, Engineer J. Smith, Training Specialist M. Baumann, Engineer-II, Corporate T. Slack, Nuclear Specialist-III W. Hermann, Superintendent of Maintenance & Construction E. Lange, Health Physics Supervisor T. Garot, Duty Shift Superintendent M. Reiff, Duty Technical Assistant Z. Laplant, Nuclear Engineer
- R.
Leemon, NRC Resident Inspector
- R. Hague, NRC Senior Resident Inspector
- Denotes those attending exit interview.
2.
Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Open Items a.
(0 pen) Open Item (266/87018-01; 301/87018-01):
During the last exercise, there was poor coordination between the Operations Support Ceater (0SC) and the Health Physics Control Point.
This was due to lack of definitive command and control of the OSC organization.
Licensee personnel indicated that the relevant procedures have been reviewed and changes proposed to clearly define command and control for these areas.
This item will remain open pending demonstration in an exercise.
b.
(Closed) Open Item (266/87018-02; 301/87018-02):
Exercise Weakness:
during the last exercise, the Medical Drill portion of the exercise was inadequate.
The licensee has reviewed the rescue team procedures and medical training for personnel.
On the basis of the findings of this review, it was decided to upgrade the onsite medical response capability by additional training and an increased number of medical drills.
Six such medical drills were planned for
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1987, ano five were actually conducted.
Licensee records indicated a large increase in the number of onsite personnel trained in first aid.
In addition, it was determined that those evaluating medical drills would be required to be first aid qualified (via multimedia
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first-aid course).
On March 16, 1988, the licensee held an emergency plan drill to demonstrate onsite first aid and offsite objectives pertaining to medical services.
The scenario called for a contaminated, injured
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man in the auxiliary building requiring offsite medical assistance and subsequent transportation to the local hospital.
The drill was observed by the Senior Resident Inspector.
Immediate first aid was appropriately administered at the scene of the injury.
The on-site medical assistance team arrived at the injured man's location within 10 minutes, providing a stretcher, first aid kit, trauma kit, and oxygen.
Due to the nature of the simulated injuries, the injured
man was not moved until the arrival of off-site assistance. All actions of the medical assistance team were appropriate and timely.
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This item is closed.
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(0 pen) Open Item (266/87018-03; 301/87018-03):
At times, during the last exercise, information flow from the Technical Support Center to the other facilities was inadequate.
No specific licensee actions
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i This item will remain open pending demonstration in an exerciss.
d.
(0 pen) Open Item (266/87018-04; 301/87018-04):
During the previous exercise, various problems were observed in the Emergency Operations
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Facility due to inadequate staffing.
A number of licensee actions have been initiated to address this item (see item below). This
item will remain open pending adequate demonstration in an exercise.
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(0 pen) Open Item (266/87018-05; 301/87018-05):
During the previous exercise, it was observed that the Emergency Operations Facility needed redesign and updating.
Licensee personnel have contacted
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other plants and visited two other EOFs to ascertain the current i,
state-of-the-art in EOF equipment and layout.
Proposals for revised
EOF equipment (including telefax and copy machines) and facility j
layouts are under consideration.
Licensee personnel indicated a
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tentative September,1988, completion goal for this ef fort.
This item will remain open.
3.
Activations of the Licensee's Emergency Plan On June 19, 1987, an unplanned discharge of radioactive liquid to Lake-l Michigan took place at 0846 hours0.00979 days <br />0.235 hours <br />0.0014 weeks <br />3.21903e-4 months <br />, as indicated by an "alert" alarm on a l
discharge monitor.
i "high" alarm of the discharge monitor occurred a'.
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0851 hours0.00985 days <br />0.236 hours <br />0.00141 weeks <br />3.238055e-4 months <br />, and an Unusual Event was declared at 0922 hours0.0107 days <br />0.256 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.50821e-4 months <br />.
The basis
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for the classification was a calculation estimating that 235 gallons of i
liquid had been released to the lake, exceeding Technical Specification requirements.
Because the release had been terminated approximately 25 minutes prior to event classification and the discharge monitor was no i
longer alarming, the Unusual Event was declared and terminated at the same time.
On August 16, 1987, an apparent lightning strike to a transmission line near the site (or to the ground near the site) caused a loss of
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electrical load to Point Beach Unit 2.
The loss of load caused a subsequent turbine trip and reactor trip.
The lightning strike occurred
at approximately 1855 hours0.0215 days <br />0.515 hours <br />0.00307 weeks <br />7.058275e-4 months <br />, and an Unusual Event was declared at 1955 hours0.0226 days <br />0.543 hours <br />0.00323 weeks <br />7.438775e-4 months <br />.
The event was terminated at 2005 hours0.0232 days <br />0.557 hours <br />0.00332 weeks <br />7.629025e-4 months <br /> on the sap date.
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On November 5, 1987, between 2204 hours0.0255 days <br />0.612 hours <br />0.00364 weeks <br />8.38622e-4 months <br /> and 2350 hours0.0272 days <br />0.653 hours <br />0.00389 weeks <br />8.94175e-4 months <br />, five helicopters flew over the Point Beach site at low levels.
Efforts to identify the
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aircraft were unsuccessful, and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
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officials initially contacted were unaware of any such planned flights.
At 0035 hours4.050926e-4 days <br />0.00972 hours <br />5.787037e-5 weeks <br />1.33175e-5 months <br /> on November 6, an Unusual Event was declared based on unusual aircraft activity over the site.
The unusual Event was declared
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and terminated at the sama time, as the unusual activity had ceased.
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On Novemt,er 21, 1987, an unplanned actuation of the Safety Injection System (with injection to the reactor vessel) took place at 0312 hours0.00361 days <br />0.0867 hours <br />5.15873e-4 weeks <br />1.18716e-4 months <br />.
The cause of this event was the failure of a pressurizer spray valve
resulting in excessive spray in the pressurizer, and reactvr coolant system depressurization followed by initiation of Safety Injection.
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Safety Injection flow to the vessel began when system pressure reached 1483 PSIG, and continued for approximately 22 minutes.
An Unusual Event
was declared at 0331 hours0.00383 days <br />0.0919 hours <br />5.472884e-4 weeks <br />1.259455e-4 months <br />.
The event was terminated at 0457 hours0.00529 days <br />0.127 hours <br />7.556217e-4 weeks <br />1.738885e-4 months <br /> on t
the same date.
On October 17, 1987, a contractor employee working on the Unit 2 "B" steam generator became dizzy and fainted.
The worker had been working in a contaminated area, utilizing anti-contamination clothing and supplied
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air.
As a result of anti-contamination clothing removal, the individual had slight amounts of radioactive contamination of the face, hair and socks.
He was transported to the Two Rivers Community Hospital and
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decontaminatcd.
This event was not classified as an emergency event, per tb wording of the licensee's Emergency Action Level (EAL) scheme.
The Emergency Plan provides for an Unusual Event classification for offsite
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transportation of a contaminated and seriously injured individual whose hospitalization is expected to exceed 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
This wording is
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considerably more restrictive than the guidance in NUREG-0654, which
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provides for such a classification on "transportation of a contaminated
injured individual from site to offsite hospital".
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Documentation related to each event had been collected, reviewed, and
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analyzed to determine if actions met those required by the Emergency j
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A summary of the analysis, including an introduction, actions taken, and recommendations for corrective actions or improvements were
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included in the package.
Action items had been assigned tracking numbers j
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and had been placed on the Emergency Preparedness "punchlist" tracking
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l During the inspection, a review was performed of Licensee Event Reports
(LERs) to determine if events had been properly classified per the EAL Scheme.
The following LERs were reviewed:
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I LER#
Unit Brief Description
Manual Reactor Trip During E0L Physics Testing
Containment Integrated Leak Rate Exceeds Tech. Specs.
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Containment Isolation Valve Leakage Exceeds Tech. Specs.87-004
Loss Of Red Instrument Bus During Battery Cell Change
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87-005 1*
Reactor Trip, Safety Injecticn (Spray Valve Failure)
Single Failure Potential, 4160V Switchgear
Steam Flow Minimum Redundancy Below Tech. Specs.87-002 2*
Loss of laad Reactor Trip Due To Lightning 87-003
Main Steam Isolation Valves Open Without Trip Power r
87-004
Degraded Steum Generator Tubes
Turbine Runback Caused By Dropped Control Rod
Potential Loss of Containment Integrity, Misadjusted Valve
- Denotes Unusual Events All LERs were found to be properly classified as either not falling under
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an Emergency Action Level or as an Unusual Event.
4.
Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program (82701)
a.
Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures (Also 822C4)
The inspector verified that both emergency plan changes and
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emergency plan implementing procedures (EPIPs) were being reviewed and approved at appropriate management levels.
Emergency plans and EPIPs sent to the NRC, whether to Region III or Headquarters, are i
considered uncontrolled copies, since they are inaccessible to audit
and control by the licensee's administrative branch, Staff Services.
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Actual distribution of the NRC copies as well as those sent to the
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State of Wisconsin, Emergency Services, Kewaunee County, Manitowoc County, and the NRC Resident Inspector's office are as uncontrolled copies sent via the corporate office.
There is no way for plant personnel to verify that these plans and procedures were distributed
within 30 days after being issued by the licensee.
The Staff Services
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Branch and the EP Coordinator should be made aware of the timeliness
cf these distributions to the NRC as well as to State and County emergency services.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for i
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improvement:
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The licensee's corporate office should provide a copy of the
distribution dates of uncontrolled copies of changes to the emergency plan and EPIPs to the Supervisor, Staff Services and the EP Coordinator.
This list should include distribution
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dates for NRC copies.
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b.
Readiness of Facilities
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i The TSC and OSC were toured by the inspectors and appeared to be in
an adequate state of operational readiness.
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c.
Organization and Management Control (Also 82204)
The licensee emergency organization and procedures were largely
unchanged from the last inspection.
One individual has been added
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to the emergency organization, and plant personnel advised that they i
will be assuming responsibility for coordination with the federal
Superfund (Superfund Amendment Reauthorization Act) and for Meteorological data review.
The Emergency Preparedness Coordinator maintains a computer based database (EP "Punchlist") of unique and repetitive items.
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Repetitive items include actions involved with program maintenance, such as communication checks, semiannual and quarterly meetings.
Unique items include exercise and drill critique items, NRC Exercise i
Weaknesses, Open Items, Items for Improvement, licensee audit items,
corrective actions from actual plan activations, Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Open items, and Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) findings.
Items were being tracked by source, priority, due date, status, group or individual assigned, d.
Emergency Preparedness Training (Also 82206)
Current training requirements, as listed in the Point Beach Emergency Plan (EP) require EP training annually only for "key"
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plant personnel and personnel assigned specific duties associated
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j with the Emergency Plan.
This program provides annual training only for substantive changes in the EP and EPIPs to these key plant personnel.
All other plant personnel with emergency response assignments only receive EP training every two years (biennially).
e Participation in drills is also required, once every two years.
t Thus, several important emergency support positions require only biennial training, such as the Chemistry Director, Health Physics i
Supervisor, etc..
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The licensee does not consider participation in an annual emergency i
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exercise as a part of training.
Some phase of EP training, whether i
it be classroom, drills, critiques of EP activities, or table-top
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discussions, should be conducted annually to maintain capabilities
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and state-of-the-art for all emergency response personnel.
This is an Open Item (No. 266/88007-01).
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A review of EP training records was conducted for 19 individuals with emergency response positions.
All had met the training
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requirements as specified in the Emergency Plan.
Among the
individuals interviewed regarding their emergency response positions were one Chemistry Director, one Health Physics Supervisor, and one Operational Support Director.
All demonstrated good emergency
j response skills and capabilities to perform their assigned emergency functions.
Also, a walkthrough with a Duty Shift Supervisor and Duty Technical Advisor was conducted.
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In addition, the inspectors monitored two EP training courses, one
for hospital nursing personnel, and one onsite for Oose assessment.
Both were thorough and well presented.
Licensee personnel provided training for nursing personnel
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potentially involved in the handling of radioactively contaminated patients on the evening of March 7, 1988.
One inspector attended and evaluated this training presentation.
The_ training was informative and well presented, and appeared appropriate for the i
personnel in attendance.
Proper emphasis was placed on the basic hazards of radiation, radioactive contamination control, and their l
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relative importance when lifesaving actions are needed.
The inspector confirmed through documentation review that the required drills for Health Physics and Radiological Monitoring including demonstration of post-accident sampling were conducted
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within the required frequency.
Post accident sampling and chemistry
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drills were conducted monthly to accommodate all those required to be trained for this emergency response assignment.
The annual Medical Drill, as performed in the September 1987 exercise, was
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considered unacceptable. A repeat drill has been scheduled for March 16, 1988.
All drills performed in this inspection period have
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been critiqued.
Any recommendations or suggestions to improve the drills have been incorporated into the EP training program with the concurrence of the EP Coordinator, j
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program l
is acceptable.
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f e.
Independent Reviews / Audits (Also 82210)
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i The licensee annually performs two audits of emergency preparedness, one addressing training, and one addressing the overall function of
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the program.
The audit of emergency preparedness training was
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performed during February 3-4, 1988, and the program audit is
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scheduled to be performed in September, 1988.
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Audit No. A-P-88-02, "PBNP Emergency Plan Training Audit, was l
reviewed.
The audit was performed by two engineers from the (corporate) Nuclear Quality Assurance Department. The auditors
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reviewed general overview training, specialized training for
specific functions, and off-site agency training.
The audit concluded that the emergency preparedness training program is well i
developed and sufficiently documented to meet training requirements.
No deficiencies were noted in the audit report, but three comments
for improvement of the program were included.
10 CFR 50.54(t) requires that the portions of the annual independent audit dealing with the adequacy or offsite interfaces be made available to State and local agency personnel.
Documantation was available to substantiate that State and local agency personnel had E
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been advised of the availability of the 1986 and 1987 annual independent audits via letters of January 20, 1987 and April 28, 1987.
Documentation indicated that Appendix "B" (Emergency Action Level
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tables) were provided to the State of Wisconsin for review and comment on January 20, 1987.
Licensee personnel indicated that the next EAL review would follow distribution of a pending revision to the EAL tables.
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Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
5.
EmergencyDetectionandClassification(82201]
One team consisting of a Duty Shift Supervisor (DSS) and a Duty Technical Advisor (DTA) were interviewed regarding general emergency preparedness
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knowledge and requested to classify several hypothetical scenarios
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utilizing the Emergency Action Level scheme.
Both were knowledgeable of i
generic emergency preparedness theory and philosophy, and were readily
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able to accurately classify scenarios presented to them.
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Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
6.
Protective Action (82202)
The DSS and STA interviewed above were knowledgeabla regarding the
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procedures for formulating a protective action recommendation and
notifying appropriate agencies.
They were also aware that the utility
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can only recommend protective actions which, if accepted, are implemented
by the Ste.te.
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Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
7.
Notifications und Communications (82203)
The procedures for notification to the NRC and offsite agencies have been f
separated into two separate procedures.
EPIP 2.1 is for notifying the NRC, while EPIP 2.2 is for notifying the State and local governmental
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agencies.
The licensee has a self-imposed goal of 30 minutes to contact the NRC Duty Officer, instead of the required one hour.
A worksheet from EPIP-14, Communications, is also followed.
After the licensee's communicator makes his initial call to the NRC Duty Officer, the
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communicator asks the NRC Duty Officer to call back the plant on a separate phone number which would be held open for NRC status updates.
This added step should improve communication lines with the NRC.
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i A test of the. Emergency Notification System (ENS) in the Control Room,
.TSC and nearby NRC office at 4:00 p.m. on March 10, 1988,-indicated a
circuit fault, which was reported to the HQ duty officer and promptly
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fixed.
In was discovered that an oversight had been made and the ENS in
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the NRC room adjacent to the TSC had not been included in the testing
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schedule.
This was very promptly rectified by adding the phone to the
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testing list.
The procedure was revised by the morning of the next day.
Documentation indicated that the required communication checks had been performed on the ENS phone in the TSC.
Monthly and annual communications tests were conducted as required, including those agencies within the ingestion pathway (50 miles EPZ).
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All required communications drills, whether monthly or yearly, were conducted satisfactorily as verified by documentation.
In addition,
unannounced notification drills are conducted monthly.
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notification drills included a preplanned message and were intended for-the County agencies and the State agency.
These were conducted on the NAWAS lines and occur on off-hours work shifts.
These drills have proven to be an excellent tool to get the State and county levels of emergency
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response personnel involved in the system.
Reception capabilities and j
any weak points in the communication system can be determined.
This is a
commendable addition to improving communications with off-site agencies.
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Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was I
acceptable, t
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Shift Staffino and Augmentation (82205)
Minimum shift staffing was confirmed by the inspector as being maintained I
as stipulated in Section 5.0, Figures 5-3 through 5-6, of the Emergency
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Plan.
These four figures as represented, specify which emergency
response positions are activated for each emergency classification, j
A shift augmentation drill was conducted on February 9, 1988.
Some
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procedural errors were identified. These occurred when the Duty and Call
Superintendent misunderstood Section 5.1 of EPIP 3.1, Notifications.
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erroneously notified three other positions before he notified the
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i Emergency Support Manager.
The critique following the drill identified
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this error and other areas of concern as voiced by the participants.
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table-top drill was held later to clarify the steps in EPIP 3.1.
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Pager response was determined to be 97%, up from a 64% response in a
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June, 1987 drill.
Documentation on the shift augmentation drill /pager i
j drill was detailed and thorough in its coverage.
l Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was
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acceptable, i
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9.
Licensee Action on Information Notice 87-58
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The licensee's procedures for distribution and review of NRC Information Notices were reviewed and discussed with licensee personnel.
The present
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status of NRC Information Notice IN 87-058 "Continuous Communications a
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Following Emergency Notifications" was also ascertained.
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Section 2.2.3 of Wisconsin Electric Power Company procedure QP 16-3
"Operating Experience Review Program" (Revision 2, dated January 8,1988)
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Notices (IN).
Two copies of each IN are made, with one copy going to
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the corporate office, and one going to the Point Beach plant.
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"scoping" review is immediately done, and documented, to identify
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information notices which could require immediate actions.
By procedure, an IN is routed to the Superintendent, Nuclear Plant Engineering, and the Point Beach Plant-Manager.
A memo is generated, i
indicating the evaluation of the IN, and recommending action if appropriate.
This memo is sent to the Plant Manager, and if the proposed
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resolution is agreed upon, either the IN is closed (if no action required), or the required action is tracked for completion and the IN
closed when action is completed.
If the resolution is not agreed upon,
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further evaluation is done, and the resolution may be revised before l
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resubmittal.
The Superintendent of Training gets copies of all ins and
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related actions.
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L Each IN is tracked via a computerized database which tracks the IN
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number, dates of submittals, system entry, components involved, assigned
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group, assigned engineer, and completion date.
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Discussion indicated that Information Notice IN 87-058 has not yet been j
formally evaluated per procedure QP 16-3, but it has gone through the
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staff "scoping" review, and no immediate need for action was identified.
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4 Licensee procedures do not directly address the issue of how continuous
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communication with the NRC would be maintained during an accident, if the i
NRC requestad that the someone remain on the phone.
Discussion with i
licensee personnel and a review of procedures indicated that
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i communication with the NRC is delegated to the Duty and Call
l Superintendent, then the Duty Technical Assistant, and then tne Duty
Shift Supervisor, if no others are available.
If hourly updates (to the j
NRC) were not satisfactory, one of these personnel would be responsible for continuous communication.
It was indicated that the intent is to
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i call in additional personnel for this function.
It was recommended that i
the relevant Implementing Procedure (EPIP 3.1) be revised to specifically f
address this situation.
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10.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Section 1
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on March 11, 1988.
The inspectors summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of the inspection report.
i The licensee did not indicate that any of the information disclosed
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during the inspection could be considered proprietary in nature.
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